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JAPANESE INfiltrATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

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SUMMARY

The Muslim world comprises more than 320,000,000 adherents who cover a huge area of enormous strategic and industrial importance. The goodwill of these people promises incalculable political advantages. Japan is in an unequaled position to capture that goodwill. Thus far Japan has met with signal success in the pursuance of this program. She has expended on it many years of patient labor and has assigned to it some of her ablest political and military leaders. Her cunning and opportunism, her flexible approach and unscrupulous manipulation of the facts have borne fruit in many lands. To date, there have been no effective countermeasures on our part. Our apathy in this respect has been due to our failure to see the picture as a whole. Much harm has already been done and there is more in store. The matter is urgent. It calls for a comprehensive, over-all policy, backed up by determined action.
SECRET

JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

I. THE PROBLEM

On 12 May 1938, the attention of the Muslim world was fixed on the capital of Japan. The occasion was the dedication of a mosque, the first of its kind to be opened in Tokyo. It was a notable occasion in more ways than one. A skilful build-up had commenced months in advance. Delegates had been invited from the various Islamic countries, with all expenses covered. Representative Japanese were in attendance to extend to the guests the official welcome of the Government. The date was bound to impress itself on the memory of many millions of Muslims all over the world, for it coincided with the birthday of Muhammad. Thus the birth of the Prophet and the dawn of a new era for Islam under Japan had been brought into suggestive association.

Three years earlier another mosque had been opened in Kobe. Japan could also point to two foreign-language Muslim periodicals, one in Arabic and the other in Turkish, not to mention several in Japanese. It boasted an Arabic press which printed and distributed, free of charge, copies of the Koran, the Muslim Holy Writ. There was, besides, in Tokyo the Society for Islamic Culture, one of several similar bodies, which enjoyed Government recognition and pursued cultural activities with noteworthy zeal and vigor.

All this interest in Islam might seem to indicate the presence in Japan of a large and highly influential Muslim community. Yet precisely the opposite is true. One of the chief sponsors of the Tokyo mosque, made public in 1941 these revealing figures: total number of Muslims resident in Japan -- six hundred; number of native Muslims -- three or four. It is plain, then, that Japan's elaborately pro-Islamic activities have little relation to the demand at home, but must be aimed at bigger and more promising targets abroad. A brief review of the theater of operations will show how really big and promising these targets are.
II. THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

In general, Islam stands out by reason of (1) the number of its adherents, (2) its enormous geographic expansion, (3) and the variety of peoples and races which it has united through a sense of spiritual kinship and solidarity. Moreover, (4) many areas which are solidly Muslim have vital strategio significance and no less vital natural deposits. Lastly, (5) Islam is not just a religion. It is also a social and political philosophy sensitive to secular aims and influences.

A. Number of Muslims

On the basis of most recent figures and estimates, the total number of Muslims throughout the world is now well over 320,000,000. In the following table, countries with Muslim majorities are listed in capital letters, while an asterisk after a given figure calls attention to the few instances where there exists the possibility of a greater than usual margin of error.

B. Geographic Expansion

One can travel from the westernmost tip of Africa to the very center of Asia, a distance of some ten thousand miles, without once getting out of compactly Muslim territory. Yet tens of millions of devoted adherents of Islam live outside this contiguous expanse, in crowded Bengal, and the Netherlands East Indies, in the Caucasus and the Balkans. Countries or territories with solid Muslim populations or large Muslim majorities include Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the various political sub-divisions of the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Gambia, Iran, Iraq, the Levant (including Libya, Morocco (French and Spanish), Palestine, Rio de Oro, Somaliland (British, French, and Italian), Transjordan, Tunisia, and Turkey. Besides, we have prominent Muslim minorities in such widely separated regions as Nigeria, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, Soviet Russia, China, and India. It is worth stressing that the Muslim minority in India, although a mere 24 per cent of the country's total, exceeds, nevertheless, the entire population of Japan or the Greater Reich.

C. Unifying Effect of Islam

In this multitude of geographic and political units there lives a corresponding variety of peoples and races: Arabs, Albanians and Serbs, Turks, Iranians, Indians, Chinese, Negroes, Mongols, and Indonesians. But such is the sense of kinship and solidarity inspired by the teachings and practices of Islam that a conflict in Morocco or Palestine will stir up the passions of Muslims in Siberia or the Philippines. The premise that all Muslims are brothers is still a living truth in Islam.

D. "Geopolitical" Importance

The vast community of Islam covers some of the world's most critical crossroads and border areas. Muslims occupy two-thirds of the coast of Africa, from Dakar to (16695)
Suez, and thence south through Aden to a point close to the island of Madagascar. Arabs and Turks line the greater part of the Mediterranean and half of the Aegean and Black Sea shores. The borders of Russia from Turkey to China are in predominantly Muslim territory. The same is true of both the eastern and western frontiers of India. Islamic countries command the most important central water routes: the Mediterranean, at the Straits of Gibraltar (Moroccan coast) and the Suez Canal; the Far Eastern, at the Straits of Malacca (Singapore); and the Black Sea route from Europe to Southern Russia, at the Danube, the Aegean, and the Bosporus. In Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, which lie apart from the Muslim belt proper, Islam dominates also a region of vital material significance. But the Muslim belt, too, is notable for its natural resources. Over 80 per cent of all the oil produced outside the Western Hemisphere comes from solidly Muslim areas.

E. Dominant Trends in Islam

The fact that Islam has succeeded in expanding over so many areas of vital economic and political importance, inhabited by a multitude of peoples and races, is proof of the dynamic nature of its creed and its philosophy of life. Because Islam is not only a creed but also a social and political body, Muslim solidarity is much stronger than Jewish, Christian, or Buddhist solidarity. This is due to a variety of factors. Islam is essentially a lay religion, free from the restrictive influence of a clerical hierarchy. It is also outspokenly democratic, untroubled by racial and social bias. A Negro from Nigeria, for example, has served as the Chief of the General Staff of Ibn Saud, the most powerful personality of modern Arabia. At the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, which brings together men of all lands and tongues and cultures, rich and poor alike, must wear identical clothing as a symbol of equality. Inspired by this realization of a common heritage, these pilgrims go back to their homes as zealous witnesses of Islamic solidarity, which helps to maintain Islam as a vigorously missionary creed.

But the chief reason for the political orientation of Islam is the tenet that the people of Allah should not be ruled by adherents of other religions; that the umma (the ummah) could not be left in the hands without preventing the community from leading the true Islamic life. This helps to account for the acute nationalism which dominates today many of the Muslim lands, except where the Muslims constitute a minority which nationalism threatens with subjugation. This nationalism is directed necessarily against western imperialists. It has made all westerners suspect if not invariably unpopular. Where religion and nationalism appear to be in conflict, nationalism is likely to prevail. But such conflicts are no more than superficial, because Islam is not just a religion. More often than not, nationalism and pan-Islam have occasion to cooperate in a common cause, as in joint opposition to western imperialism or communist anti-religious agitation. In such instances the far-flung world of Islam can be a most formidable foe. Herein lies the outstanding significance of Islam as a theater for psychological warfare.
III. ISLAM AND JAPANESE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A. Political Value of Pan-Islam

The fundamental tenets of Islam and the fact of Islamic solidarity form the joint basis of the pan-Islamic movement which has been used as a psychological factor in international politics for the past seventy-five years. The principal purposes of this movement have been sway by ulterior rather than spiritual motives. Sultan Abdul Hamid II (in power from 1876 to 1909) made shrewd use of pan-Islam to restore the Caliphate as a means of reviving the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain lent support to Abdul Hamid's pretensions and the hope of thus setting up an Islamic front against Russian expansion. Kaiser Wilhelm II took up the pious cry as his slogan in Germany's pressure eastward, and Mussolini has strutted with much pomp as the self-styled Protector of Islam. It has remained for Japan, however, to make the most concerted and effective use of this playball of international politics.

B. The Value of Pan-Islam to Japan

In courting the Muslims with ever-increasing fervor Japan has been (1) guided by ambitious objectives, in the pursuit of which she has been (2) aided by invaluable psychological advantages; (3) where and when necessary, there have been adjustments of method and shifts in emphasis.

1. Objectives. Russia and China, Japan's nearest neighbors, have aggressive and strategically located Muslim minorities with a history of opposition to the governing elements. The winning over of these minorities would facilitate Japan's expansionist aims. In the Philippines, Malay, and particularly the Netherlands Indies, regions of immense economic importance, vast numbers of Muslims have lived under the rule of Western Powers. Political discontent in these territories could not but further avowed Japanese policy. India's huge Muslim minority would form the largest single group in a united Islamic front. The friendship of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, the four signatories of the so-called Saadabad Pact, holds out the promise of a corresponding decrease in Russian and British influence. The rest of the Near East and the Muslim half of Africa offers tempting trade advantages, apart from the essential opportunity of causing added embarrassment to western imperialism.

2. Advantages. Factually and psychologically Japan is in a favored position to carry appeal to the Muslims; she can enlist the cooperation of the nationalist as well as the religious elements within the Islamic world. The Japanese have been persistent in broadcasting their anti-western policy to the Muslims and in proclaiming their pride as members of the Asiatic or "colored" race at the respective empires depending on the intended audience. It is a fact, also, that Japan's anti-communist policy is gratifying to Muslim religious sensibilities. But the subtlest advantage on which Japan has capitalized (16695)
in her dealings with Islam springs from the character of her own religion. For Shinto, in its aspect as a state creed, is an excellent instrument for the purpose.

Because its authority does not rest on any set of canonical writings, Shintoism is formless and flexible. It is also, not unlike Islam, a political as much as a religious creed. The emphasis rests on devotion to the State, which is symbolized by the Emperor. By being a faithful servant of the State, the Japanese can be a good political Shintoist regardless of his personal religion. Even conversion, whether ostensible or real, to other religions is meritorious from the standpoint of Shinto so long as such a step is in the interest of patriotism. Christianity is powerless to compete against this type of opposition.

Japan has thus the evidence to impress Islam with her record of religious tolerance. She can appeal at the same time to Muslim missionary zeal by hinting the opportunity of large-scale conversions among the Japanese. Instead of posing as the magnanimous protector of Islam, Japan can make a plausible showing as an eager seeker after the truth. Under these circumstances, rumors judiciously planted here and there that the Emperor himself might consider turning Muslim, are bound to take root and spread. Millions of sincere believers have fallen for the promise that Islam is about to become the world’s greatest power with the Mikado as Caliph.

3. Methods. Owing to the expense of the Islamic world as a whole, some part of it is always liable to important changes. Japan’s policy toward Islam has, accordingly, been subject to local readjustments in tune with the changing conditions. Where Taifist Russia, for example, could be undermined by Internal agitation, the argument against Communist Russia required a religious slant. When pan-Islam had lost its charm for modern Turkey, the racial emphasis was brought to the fore. Nationalism could be a useful weapon in Iran or Afghanistan, but it might prove a boomerang in the case of the Indian Muslims; stress on religious equality is therefore the leading motif in this instance. The approach has always been individual rather than stilted and stereotyped.

In the following comprehensive account of Japanese infiltration among the Muslims only a small portion of the available material could be utilized. The aim has been merely to illustrate the success of the general policy on the basis of selected examples. The facts cited have been singled out from the detailed and amply documented regional studies on the subject which will appear in full in the form of special annexes,
IV. BRIEF ACCOUNT OF JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS

A. Prior to 1905

Japan's interest in pan-Islam goes back to the early phases of that movement as manipulated by Sultan Abdal Hamid II (about 1860). Anything that helped to check Russian-expansion also helped Japan. The Ottoman propaganda was addressed to the Turkic and Tatar groups which lined Russia's southern borders and dotted her eastern provinces, the appeal resting on religious solidarity (pan-Islam) and ethnic affinity (pan-Turanism). Russia might be the loser on either count. From her convenient vantage point Japan could hardly look on with indifference.

When Japan emerged from the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 as a major power with major ambitions, she was prompt to grasp the wider implications of a friendly Islamic front. This time it was the Chinese Muslims who were ripe for recruitment as a willing, if unwitting, tool of Toyko's aggression. A comprehensive "Muslim policy" began to take shape. When in 1896 Aruga, a trader much travelled in Muslim lands, embraced the Muslim faith, his conversion was placed in its true perspective by the following telltale remark in a Japanese work: "What is called the Japanese Islam of Mr. Aruga springs from the abiding spirit of patriotism of the Japanese.... It does away with the superficial and petty rules and regulations which are followed blindly by the Turks and Arabs." The tireless investigators sent out by Japan throughout the Islamic world had done their work and had come home with favorable reports. Political Shinto was awake to the limitless potentialities of a harnessed Islam.

B. 1905-1918

The successful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 left Japan with greatly increased prestige, assurance -- and aspirations. Muslim and colored groups have visions of a new champion. All this is reflected in a more confident and purposeful Muslim policy. Looking ahead, Tokyo now courts the Muslims openly, remaining careful, however, to cover up the real political objectives with an abundance of cultural camouflage. Muslim missionary zeal is played upon with consummate skill. One finds Baron Rikki embracing Islam expressively "for the good of this can do Japan." But pictures of such conversions are sent to the leading Tatar newspapers in Russia where they do not fail to have the effect desired. The slightest tinge of fact is permitted to blow up by rumor. Tokyo is said to have witnessed thousands of conversions within the space of a few months. Word is circulated as early as 1906 that the Mikado is preparing to elevate Islam to the status of a state religion; excited anticipation is registered in India, Egypt, and Turkey, while an apprehensive note is echoed in Germany and England. News is also current that Japan is to have Islamic schools, cultural societies, publications, and the like. This calculated blend of ambiguous fact and gross deception is to be re-introduced a generation later, when the original dose

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had been forgotten, as seemingly brand-new proof of Japanese inclination to Islam.

The new Muslim policy was sponsored, if not actually conducted, by leaders working through special societies, such as the fanatically patriotic Black Dragon Society, which was founded in 1901 and centered from its inception around Uchida and Toyama. The latter, now in his nineties, is generally regarded as the most fateful individual influence in the history of modern Japan. On the Muslim side the leading collaborator was Abdurrahid Ibrahim (commonly referred to as Ibrahim), a distinguished pen-Islamic writer and preacher "who had helped the Japanese with his religion during the Russo-Japanese War."

The importance of the policy was solemnized by the Muslim Pact at which an oath was signed to the effect that the participants were to promote faith in Islam and would spare no efforts to accomplish this task. The date of this event, which took place in Tokyo, is not absolutely certain. It is placed by some in 1900, but circumstantial evidence points rather to 1909. This significance may be gauged from the names of the signers, which include Toyama, Uchida, Tomiaki (future Premier, assassinated in 1932), and others. The religious content was supplied by Ibrahim. We thus have here an ominous alliance between fanatical Japanese patriotism and Muslim ethno-religious fanaticism. The bearing of this alliance may be appreciated from such published admissions as that "the Muslims of Central Asia had established cooperation with Japan to free the Central Asiatic peoples from Russian chains," and hints that the policy has been successful in India, Iran, and Central Asia. Japanese interests are now furthered by notables like Aya Is-haqqi and Yusei Akohara, and Japanese agents can adopt the disguise and enjoy the relative immunity of Muslim mullahs.

Suitable "cultural" backing springs up in Japan in the form of publications. In 1908 Tokyo can boast a Chinese Muslim periodical which bears a name meaning "Muslims Awake" and is gotten out by a handful of Chinese Muslim students, fully five years before the millions of Muslims in China itself are moved to establish a publication of their own. In 1910 the Islamic Fraternity begins publication in Tokyo, with the avowed purpose of uniting Muslim countries with a Japan converted to Islam. The publisher is Muhammad Barakatullah, an Indian destined to prove useful to Japan in the years to come. His collaboration testifies to the ever-broadening scope of Tokyo's Muslim policy.

C. Since 1918

The war of 1914-18 had three major consequences for the Islamic world: (1) Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which marked a serious setback to the political prestige of Islam. (2) Radical upturn in nationalism and anti-Western feeling among the Muslims. (3) Opposition to communism arising from Soviet Russia's anti-religious policy. Each of these three developments played straight into Japan's hands. She was prepared and eager to move into the breach left by the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. The anti-Western ferment in
Muslim lands was inevitably to the advantage of the one expansionist oriental power. Lastly, Japan's well advertised friendship for Islam could now pay dividends in the form of Muslim support against irreligious Russia.

The energy and resourcefulness with which Japan has handled the latest phase of her Islamic policy show plainly the value which she attaches to the prize at stake. An enlarged and modernised arsenal of psychological weapons is now in judicious use. Social, racial, political, and economic pressures are applied alongside the cultural and religious, the precise mode of attack varying with the sensibilities of the given individual sector. Since the full repertoire is never on display in any single region, the underlying objectives are not immediately apparent. Politically restless and disunited, the Islamic countries are ill-equipped to withstand Japanese infiltration.

1. Cultural and religious pressures. Because the history and traditions of Islam form the bond that holds the Muslim world together, Japan continues to base her appeal to the Muslims on religious and cultural grounds. Pan-Islam, with the dazzling promise of "Japan-Islam" ever held in readiness, remains the one common denominator. This psychological argument is now all the more insidious because of its newly acquired flexibility. It can be accommodated, with but a slight shift of emphasis, to specific regional trends, such as pan-Arab or pan-Turkic sentiment. A hidden twist may even help to identify Islam with the cause of universal religious unity; attempts to this effect have been witnessed in India. Clever manipulation is apt to yield plausible results.

The efforts to capitalise on the missionary enthusiasm of Japan are stepped up greatly. Once again word spreads abroad that thousands of Japanese have gone over to Islam, that Japan as a whole is ripe for conversion, and that the Mikado himself is on the verge of embracing the vigorous faith of Muhammad. No one seems to realize that all this is a tale retold, having first been heard at the beginning of the century. A few voices caution against the more manifest exaggerations. But millions of eager Muslims the world over, from learned theologian to the humblist deckhand and mule driver, believe these stories because they wish them to be true.

One reason for the extraordinary success of these fantastic reports is that they are now set against the background of tangible Japanese enterprise in the form of inspired societies and publications. Thus about the year 1925 there is established in Shanghai a Muslim evangelical center known as the Society of Light. Its founder, Sekuma had studied Islam in China, Sinkiang, India, and the Near East. Most illuminating is this connection. The fact that these studies, which began shortly after the Muslim Fast, had been instigated by the Black Dragon Society, clear proof that Sekuma's activities were guided by political motives. For this reason one item in Sekuma's program is particularly significant, namely, that China should bring Islam to Japan. There was obviously nothing accidental in Islam's discovery of Japan as fertile ground for missionary endeavor. Islam was meant to make just this discovery.

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Two periodicals make their appearance in conjunction with the Society of Light: first the English-Chinese Asiatic Weekly in 1923, and subsequently, in 1925, the Light of Islam, which presented articles in English, Chinese, and Japanese. In 1927, Peking comes up with a monthly in Japanese called Islam, published by a Society for the Investigation of Islam. These periodicals and their sponsoring societies are forerunners of more outspoken organs of Japanese propaganda for Muslims which are to be planted in the occupied territories of China after 1937.

The launching by Japan of her Islamic cultural program in China is a signal for the home front to follow suit. In 1925 Tokyo witnesses the foundation of the Institute for Islamic Culture. Its president is Muhammad Abd al-Hay, commonly known as Qurban Ali. A gifted scholar and theologian of Tatar stock, he came to Japan in 1920 with a record of subversive activity against Soviet Russia. The Society is promptly accorded official recognition. In 1927 it establishes an Islamic press, having imported the necessary type from Turkey. Three years later it begins the publication of a review in Turkish under the name of Yapon Mukhbir, "The Japanese Informant." In 1934 the Institute for Studies in the Sphere of Islam inaugurates the free distribution of copies of the Koran, the occasion being marked by a festive gathering of political and literary luminaries and a lecture by the same Ibrahim who played such an important role in the Muslim fact. The following year Japan dedicates her first mosque, the one at Kobe. In 1938 there appears in Tokyo a review in Arabic called Nippon. Significantly enough, it carries no name of director or editor, but is levishly gotten up, evidently at government expense. This round of feverish doings reached a fitting crescendo on the opening day of a mosque on 12 May of the same year. The enormous strides which Japan's Muslim policy had made are reflected in the large and distinguished delegation from the Near East, including Prince Husain of Yemen, whose broadcast to the Arab world from Tokyo, under official auspices, inaugurated Japan's radio propaganda to the Arabs. Toyama himself out the tape at the entrance to the mosque, while Ibrahim led the prayer. No need to ask any longer whether their solemn past of a generation ago had led to worthwhile results.

One other aspect of cultural pressure calls for special mention. For years Tokyo has been successful in attracting to Japan Muslim students from such areas as East Asia, India, and Afghanistan. Within the past decade the program has been accelerated and expanded to take in the Near East. In 1934 a group of Japanese professors tour the Arab countries for the stated purpose of distributing to worthy students 1500 scholarships for study in Japan. At the same time contact is maintained with the leading Muslim universities, the al-Ashar of Cairo, through a steady trickle of students from Japan. No surprise is shown, therefore, when Tokyo asks al-Ashar, in 1939, to send an Islamic specialist to Japan. A few months later, the same institution is requested to furnish an imam, or religious leader, for the Tokyo mosque; the Arab press registers pleased recognition.

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At about the same time the Iraq Government is invited to nominate a professor of Arabic to a Tokyo chair. By such subtle methods, and with the aid of well-publicized Japanese pilgrimages to Mecca, the Near East is kept oriented toward Tokyo and away both from the imperialist West and atheistic Russia. Culture and religion begin to shade off perceptibly toward politics, but the Muslims are on the whole neither prepared nor willing to question Japan's good faith.

2. Political pressures. This phase of Japanese activity among the Muslims has a close connection with the underlying cultural-religious campaign. Indeed, it is easy enough to see through the pomp and circumstance surrounding the dedication of the Tokyo mosque and some away with the conviction that in her dealings with Islam Japan has begun with politics to mark advantage; it should be remembered that Islam is inherently as well as a religious system. When a member of a Japanese mission to Afghanistan contrives to turn Muslim with much ostentation, he is merely following a politically-religious directive that had come into effect.

The accent is chiefly on politics, however; when Japan bolsters her embassy in Ankara with legations in Kabul, Tehran, and Cairo, complemented by consular offices in Beirut and Jerusalem. That all this is not a question of ordinary diplomacy alone may be judged from Tokyo's haste to establish a legation in Baghdad shortly after the outbreak of war in 1939. It is but another of a series of moves to strengthen Japan's political fences in the critical Near Eastern area.

Side by side with these open moves there is evidence of persistent undercover activity on the part of Tokyo. As a result, the Muslim territories of Russia and China have felt the impact of subversive operations enjoying the blessing of Japan. The inflammatory mixture employed in some of these instances was strengthened by the addition of the racial ingredient. Since the Turco-Tatar and Mongol elements in Central Asia were conscious of their kinship with independent Turkey, and since the Turkey of Mustapha Kemal emphasized nationalism at the expense of religion, the racial angle promised increased returns. Accordingly, it is this approach that is employed by Baron Ungern von Sternberg in the establishment of his Central Asiatic Mongol State, an ephemeral creation (1920-21), for all the help in money and munition that it got from Japan. At the same time Japan was aiding Qurban Ali in his attempts to organize an independent Bashkiria and Kirgizia. When those efforts miscarried, Qurban Ali went to Tokyo where he became an influential leader in the "cultural" campaign. But the subversive work among Russia's Muslims went on just the same. If the pan-Asiatic label proved inadequate, there was the pan-Islamic label. Just as ready to hand, strong enough to catch the group centering around Enver Pasha. Luckly of political success does not seem to dishearten the ultimate instigators. A Japanese Society which calls itself "Turk" publishes in 1929 an ethnographic map which groups together the Ugro-Pins, Turks, and Japanese as members of the Turanian race. All this causes the Russians enough trouble to force upon them three Muslim trials (1929, (16695)
1935, 1939), which at length contribute evidence of Japanese complicity.

In Chinese territory special interest attaches to the strategically located province of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) with its overwhelmingly Muslim population, chiefly of Turkic stock. Japanese officers are stationed there on one pretext or another, as early as 1919. In due time the country is thrown into political turmoil culminating, by 1931, in an open Muslim revolt against the central government. Apparently in anticipation of an eventual Muslim victory, Japan gets hold of a young and native Turkish prince, by the name of Abdul Kerim, and grooms him for the titular rule over a greater Turco-Tatar empire. The prospective subjects could not fail to be awed by the prince's antecedents; for it was his grandfather, the not-to-be-forgotten Abdul Hamid II, who had revived the Ottoman Caliphate and launched pan-Islam on its fateful course. But Soviet Russia upset all these dreams by contributing materially to the downfall of the insurgents. Discouraged and disillusioned, Abdul Kerim leaves Japan in 1934 for the United States, where he is found a year later in the room of a New York hotel, dead by his own hand, with a nearly empty and strictly contra-Islamic bottle of gin at his side. Tokyo, however, is in a position to produce, if need be, another Muslim prince of imperial blood. The man now in tow is His Highness Pu-kuang, a younger son-in-law of the "Emperor" of Manchukuo, who in 1935 had providentially embraced the faith of Islam.

Japan's expansion since her entry into the war has placed under her rule tens of millions of Muslims in the Netherlands Indies, Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. Tokyo's Muslim policy, which for years had been striving toward this very end, is now fully abreast of the actual accomplishment. No efforts are spared to keep the Islamic faith impressed and implanted in the Turkish journal friendly to the Axis informs its readers in its issue of 17 February 1943, that "Japan would not lay down arms until all Muslim countries in Asia west of the Indies have been liberated." A few days later, Japan's Foreign Minister Tanaki solemnly pledges in the Diet that "Japan is ready to consecrate all efforts in order to free these victims of Anglo-American tyranny and to support with energy the Muslims' political and cultural aspirations." The everlasting Ibrahim urges all Muslims to unite and dwell on Islam's debt to Japan. The recent birthday anniversary of Muhammad on 19 March is made the occasion for an intensified exposition of Japanese-Muslim friendship. The Muslims, it is stated, are now happy to invoke God's aid for a Japanese victory. Had they not welcomed the conquerors of Java as the liberating hosts of Allah? The countless benefits resulting from the recent conquests are called to the attention of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League. Beyond westward, these voices penetrate beyond the borders of India. Their reverberations cannot be shut out automatically from the rest of the Muslim world.

3. Economic pressures. The most tangible and aboveboard form of Japanese penetration can be observed, of course, in the economic field. Here the figures speak

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for themselves. To take an instance in the Far East, Japanese trade with the Netherlands Indies, which had amounted to not more than 1 per cent of the total in 1913, shot up in 1933 to 32 per cent. Startling gains are registered likewise in Muslim countries farther away from Japan, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and the Sudan. In Egypt, for example, the figure for textile goods was nil in 1921 but 58 per cent in 1934. Taking full advantage of the collapse of world markets in 1927, Japan succeeded in overcoming Dutch, British, and Indian competition, thanks largely to her enterprise, ingenuity, and relatively low cost of labor. Furthermore, a special effort was made to determine and meet the particular preferences of each individual country.

Contacts with Japanese merchants and use of Japanese goods serve to reinforce the consumers' awareness of Tokyo's spiritual and political claims. "It is from Japan" -- declares the Saudi Minister of Finance in 1936 -- "that we shall gain both economic and spiritual help." Among the unreflecting masses there was an automatic association between the source of the readily obtainable material goods and the spiritual cure-alls which radiated from the same quarter. For every village and hamlet that could afford a yard of tawdry cloth or a cheap set of pottery tea-cups was thereby made mindful of the great eastern power whose Emperor was about to lead all Muslims for the greater glory of Allah.
V. DEGREE OF SUCCESS ATTAINED

The response of the Islamic world to Japan's Muslim policy has depended in large part on the region involved, the particular ethnic and social group affected, and the flexibility of Tokyo's pressure in adjusting itself to the changeable local stresses. To be sure, the full effect of the policy cannot be assessed completely so long as that policy is still very much in operation. But there is abundant evidence that the progress to date has been eminently satisfactory to the sponsors, so much so that the basic plan has had to be expanded and may even have furnished its pattern for similar ventures with other religious groups.

The caliber of the principal backers and executors of the Muslim policy is a measure of the importance which Tokyo attaches to the plan. It helps also to explain much of its success. Included among the leading figures are men who have shaped and directed the very mainstays of Japanese political and military activities: Toyama, the inspiration behind the powerful secret-societies; Uchida, President of the Black Dragon Society; Inukai, an associate of these two who rose to be Prime Minister. The fact that all three signed the Muslim Pact in the early years of the century merely serves to strengthen the conviction that that pact was one of the keystones of the projected structure of Greater Asia. It now becomes clear why the spiritual problems of Islam should be of such moment to Japan's military hierarchy: General Araki, former War Minister and now a power behind Premier Tojo; General Hayashi, also War Minister and President of the Japanese Muslim Association; General Matsui, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army; General Isogai, head of the Second Department of the General Staff of the like. Small wonder, therefore, that with this kind of backing at the top Japan could count for the execution of this policy on a faithful and self-denying band of lieutenants, happy to devote their lives to the cause with the ecstatic abandon of a Darwīsh.

The career of Ipppei Tanaka is a case in point. During the Russo-Japanese War he served as a spy in North China and Manchuria. While in China he became a specialist in Confucianism and a student of Buddhism. But then the Muslim policy had moved into the foreground, Tanaka was ready, at the age of forty, to start again from scratch. He entered a mosque in 1925, was formally admitted to Islam one year later, his zeal taking him on a pilgrimage to Mecca shortly thereafter. For ten years he traveled, toiled, lectured, and wrote in the interest of Islam and Greater Asia, his consuming ideal in life. Worn out by his labors and suffering from cancer, he determined to go to Mecca once again. On the occasion of his second pilgrimage, in 1934, he was honored by a personal interview with King Ibn Saud himself. Death came to him shortly after his return to Japan. No less a celebrity than the patriarchal Ibrāhīm officiated at his funeral. Because he was a patriot above all else, and his country was interested in Islam, Tanaka had doubtless come to be also a good Muslim. Men of this type are apt to get results.

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The set-up ranges thus from the super-patriot Toyausa and his followers, whose inspiration guides societies like the Black Dragon, through topmost military leaders of the caliber of an Araki, down to expendable cronies like Tanaka. In short, it is backed by the most dynamic elements in Japan, on the ascendant since the turn of the century. This conclusion is not based on guesswork. Ample documentary support exists in the Black Dragon Society's Tō Senkaku Shishi Kiden (Biographies of Pioneer Patriots in East Asia), and especially in Nakabe Wakabayashi's work in Japanese on The Muslim World and Japan (First edition, 1937). It contains much frank statements as that "Islam is the very soul of Asiatic government," being of "extreme importance...in the government of Asia and, politically and economically, in the enlargement of Japan" and "in the management of Asia." The part played by Toyausa and Uchida in the formulation of this policy is brought out specifically.

Nor can one dismiss the pro-Japanese leaders on the Muslim side with the all too facile accusation of personal opportunism or mercenary interest. Ibrahim, Is-hadi, Akhura, and Qurban Ali had gained their prominence as Muslim scholars, publicists, and leaders before they were sought out by Tokyo. The followers won over by the manifest sincerity of these men have inevitably become sponsors of Japan's expansionist program. Thay in addition to all the other incidental advantages which have fallen to Japan in her dealings with Islam, she has also had the inestimable benefit of voluntary and idealistic leadership from the Muslim side.

A. China

Turning now to the actual impact of the Muslim policy upon the areas concerned, a distinction has to be made between Japan's occupied territory in East Asia and the Islamic lands to the west. The occupied areas cannot be judged objectively, but the increase in their recorded pro-Muslim orientation should be noted nevertheless. There is thus in Manchoukuo a Muslim People's League which has, among its other activities, been financing the study of selected young Muslims in Turkey, obviously with an eye to the future. The North China Muslim League has been especially active through its five actually functioning divisions which operate a total of 394 branches. There is also a Chinese Muslim Youth Corps, a Northwest and a Canton Muslim League, and other similar undertakings. It would be foolhardy to discount in advance the effect of so much ambitious enterprise. The Chinese Government is well aware of this and its various countermeasures are an admission that damage has been done and that it must not be allowed to spread.

B. Indonesia

In the Netherlands Indies the first anniversary of the Japanese conquest was made the occasion for celebrating "the liberation for the Muslims from three hundred years of Dutch tyranny." The second largest Muslim group in the world -- more than sixty million of them -- are now said to call in their prayers upon Allah to bless
the imperial Japanese army and the imperial palace. A congress of Malay and Netherlands Indies Muslims, which was recently held in Singapore, was obviously not welcome to the Japanese, since they furnished special ships for the delegates and sent high dignitaries to address the sessions.

C. USSR

There is significant and varied evidence from areas not reached by Japanese occupation. Japan's Muslim policy in the Soviet Union bore fruit in the several separatist governments which sprang up in the Muslim regions of Asiatic Russia, with moral and material support from Tokyo. Although these movements were eventually put down by Moscow, the ferment generated by them continued to make itself felt, as may be judged from the three Muslim trials which took place in 1936, 1937, and 1939 respectively. The last of these involved the leaders of the All-Union Muslim League as well as a host of minor functionaries. All were charged with subversive activities, and Japan's complicity in these machinations was officially established.

D. The Middle East

The minority complex and the pronounced missionary zeal of the Indian Muslims have long made that group particularly susceptible to Japan's infiltrating tactics. As far back as 1906 we hear of fifty-three sons of rich Indian Muslims being sent to Japanese trade and technical schools. Nor have Tokyo's increased efforts of recent years gone without effect among British India. Thus Fruz ad-Din, a Calcutta philanthropist, contributed more than half of the total amount required for the building of the Koba mosque. A prominent speaker at the opening of the same mosque was Haji Abd al-Aziz, Minister of Education for Bihar and Orissa and a member of the Council of the All-India Muslim League. His book entitled The Crescent in the Land of the Rising Sun, published in 1941, expresses the hope that the Muslim Crescent and the Rising Sun of Japan may join in shedding light over the whole world. That Japan's propaganda has been accepted for good coin by broad circles of Indian Muslims may be gathered from an editorial in The Light of Lahore, dated 8 June 1938: "If anything is obvious...it is this: that change of religion is not a thing viewed with abhorrence in Japan; that it has for some time past been considered a change for Islay... If Japan adopts Islam as a national religion it becomes at once the greatest power in the world,... the dread of the west... It seems that an alliance between Japan and the Muslim countries along these lines is already taking shape and if one of these days Japan declares the adoption of Islam as a national religion it will rank as the greatest event of history." This from a presumably enlightened writer. Similar sentiments are voiced by Senh. Sheikh M. H. Kidwai, of Gads. What, then, could one expect from the uncritical rank and file?

In Afghanistan Japan has been able to capitalize on four fears: of Russia, Communism, England, and the Hindu Congress party. They are fanned and kept alive by...
the Japanese Legation at Kabul and by returning Afghan businessmen and students who had been entertained and indoctrinated in Japan. When a special Afghan mission arrived in Japan in March 1941, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi stated that "this is but part of the program of the Afghan ruler to free his country from Occidental dominance under the guidance of Japan as the leader of all Asiatic nations." One of the returned students, recently received by the King, has been spreading the doctrine that Japan alone can free Islam from western imperialist control and the contamination of Communist Russia. Similar views have been propounded by Habibullah Tarzi, Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office and former Minister to Tokyo. They find ready followers among the fiercely nationalist and religious Afghans.

E. The Near East

Perhaps most gratifying of all, from Tokyo's point of view, have been the results registered in the Near East. Here the impact of Japan has been too recent for any crystallized opposition. The Japanese islands appear too remote to give rise to forebodings. The more cynical nationalists, who fear and resent the Western powers nearby, welcome far-off Japan as an ally even though they may have seen through her propaganda. In line with this is the hope expressed by the Damascus paper Alif-Ba, back in 1934, "that Japan's political development and the progress of events there may hasten the formation of a solid union of Oriental peoples against the ambitions of the Occident." Memories of the political and religious glories of the Caliphate, so long a Near Eastern institution, dull the judgment of other leaders. Thus August al-Ashab University of Cairo continues impressed with the prospects of converting Japan to Islam. In 1937 King Faruk provided a thousand pounds a year to help Japanese and Chinese Muslims studying in Egypt. The divines of Mecca, Iraq, are increasingly sympathetic to Japan. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt are officially represented at the opening of the Tokyo mosque.

Far more pervasive, however, has been the effect of Japan's Muslim policy upon the unreflecting masses of the Near East. Encouraged by their religious and political leaders, and with the ubiquitous products of Japanese industry always before them, these masses have come to look to Japan for the fulfillment of their fondest hopes. The dream of the mission pan-Islamic is still in tens of millions of hearts. The vision of a liberator from the East cannot but deepen the sullen antagonism toward the West. That vision will not be dissipated by half-way measures. It will take at least as much effort to show it up for the mirage that it is as it has taken patience and foresight and scheming to evoke.

The goodwill and cooperation of the Islamic world are not without consequence to a speedier solution of the present conflict. They will certainly have a bearing on events in India, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, and especially the Netherlands Indies. Nor can we be so short-sighted as to ignore the importance of the Islamic masses in the post-war world. It has aptly
been stated that a defeated Japan will intensify her Muslim program after the war, when she will be forced to pursue her expansionist policy through subtler media. We have seen with how much patience and cunning she has been pursuing this program since the beginning of the century. She is not likely to be diverted from her chosen course by a clause in the peace treaty.

There can be no doubt that Japan, at any rate, regards her Muslim policy as a huge success. That is why she now bids fair to use the same model, though with a different label, for Latin American consumption. In a broadcast on 31 March 1943, Tokyo announced to the Western Hemisphere that "the Bible has now become the Book of the Japanese" and that a new translation of the Old Testament by Japanese scholars is well under way. Is the Islamic venture to branch off into a Catholic policy?
VI. SUGGESTED COUNTERACTIVITY

A. General

Underlying all our efforts at countering Tokyo's Muslim policy must be the realization that the stakes are large; that the cards are stacked heavily in favor of Japan; that Japan has given this policy her fullest backing; that the cumulative results attained over a period of scores of years add up to an increasingly menacing total; and, finally, that our countermeasures must be prompt, comprehensive, determined, and unceasing.

B. Theme

The point to be pressed home throughout the Islamic world is the twofaced duplicity of the Japanese. It can and must be demonstrated by an abundance of illustrations. Ample use should be made of the glaring lies and contradictions in Tokyo's propaganda, which can be made plain even to the least sophisticated, if pointed out and repeated often enough. For secondary themes we may dwell on such positive factors as the demonstrable respect of the British and Americans for other religions and the common ideals of democracy and Islam.

C. Demonstration

1. The promised conversion of Japan to Islam is an old fabrication. Tokyo experimented with it as early as 1905, for use in the Russo-Japanese war. Even pro-Japanese Muslim leaders have branded this claim as extravagant.

2. Worship of the Emperor is difficult to reconcile with the worship of Allah. Yet the Japanese have been forcing Emperor-worship on the Muslims of the occupied areas.

3. The Japanese have been holding out the same bait of conversion to the Buddhists, Catholics, Russian Orthodox.

4. The Japanese have betrayed their ignorance of things Islamic by being guilty of many errors in the copies of the Koran which they have printed and distributed for propaganda purposes.

5. The Japanese claims to racial and religious tolerance are lies poorly disguised. Only a religious Shintoist with indisputable Japanese ancestry can enjoy full prestige.

6. The Japanese have been making different promises to different groups. But some of these promises are mutually exclusive. In their broadcasts to the Muslims of India Japan has been stressing the theme of brotherhood with the Hindus in order to appease the Hindu nationalists. But to the Afghans across the border they are emphasizing the pan-Islamic doctrine, offering at the same time to divide India with them. A third story is told the Mongol Hazaras of Afghanistan whom they seek to win over on racial grounds. Listeners who have been exposed to all three arguments know them to be so many sets of clumsy lies.

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7. Contrast all the grandiose claims with the actual experiences of the Muslims in the "liberated" areas of China, Malaya, or the Netherlands Indies.

8. Cite the recent pronouncement by Prince Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq, that Islam is a democratic religion and that the Islamic world can have nothing in common with the totalitarian powers.

9. Publicize the recent visit to the Middle and Near East of Osman K. Wu, the personal emissary of the celebrated Chinese General (Omar) Pai Chung-hsi. His first-hand account of Japanese oppression left a deep impression on his numerous audiences. Excerpts from the vernacular newspapers reporting Wu's trip should be quoted widely and similar visits by prominent Muslims from various Japanese occupied territories should be arranged at frequent intervals.

10. In the Near East and the Balkans much can be made of Japanese hostility toward whites and non-Asiatics. Such a policy affects adversely the Arabs, who are white, and the numerous Muslims in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, who are both white and European.