TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
NOVEMBER 3, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1994
TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

4 F 76/1: K 84/13

TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 3, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

76-603 CC

WASHINGTON : 1994

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-044087-4
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio

(Vacancy)

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BERREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Chief of Staff
ROBERT M. HATHAWAY, Professional Staff Member
MICKEY HARMON, Staff Associate

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York, Chairman

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin

RUSSELL J. WILSON, Staff Director
JAMES MCCORMICK, Republican Professional Staff Member
DAVID S. ADAMS, Professional Staff Member
LISA C. BERKSON, Professional Staff Member

(II)
# CONTENTS

## WITNESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paul D. Wolfowitz, professor of national security strategy, National War College</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clark, Jr., Japan Chair and Senior Advisor on Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selig Harrison, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Taylor, Jr., senior vice president, Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selig S. Harrison</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Taylor, Jr.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(III)
TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1993

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman (chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific) presiding.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific meets today in open session to assess one of the most important foreign policy issues facing the international community today. While events in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti captivate the world's television cameras and headlines, the tensions on the Korean peninsula are no less significant; the potential consequences of lack of progress are no less profound.

Two weeks ago, I had the opportunity to visit both North and South Korea, becoming one of the few Americans since the end of the Korean war to meet with Kim Il-Sung.

I also had the opportunity to meet with President Kim Yong Sun in South Korea, for whom I have the greatest respect and admiration. I firmly believe both men are interested in resolving the nuclear issue.

During my first visit, I emphasized that I had come not to negotiate, but rather to break the ice, to listen, and to make certain that Pyongyang understands the seriousness with which the international community views North Korea's apparent determination to proceed with the development of nuclear weapons.

I stressed that the Congress fully supports the Clinton administration's handling of the issue, and that Americans of all parties and all political persuasions are unanimous in supporting the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to bring the DPRK into the International Inspection regime.

President Kim Il-Sung, in his statement to me, assured me that North Korea has no nuclear weapons, no nuclear capability, no reason or motivation now or in the future to ever develop such weapons, and that in addition to which they did not have the money for such a project. I replied to him, basically using President Reagan's famous dictum, "Trust, but verify."

I also had the opportunity to become the first foreigner to pass from North Korea to South Korea through the infamous DMZ, a very tense, heavily armed "no-man's land," artificially dividing the fine Korean people. I hope that a day will come in the not too dis-
tant future when crossing from North to South or South to North is not a media event.

Let me say that I raised another issue of profound concern to me, the issue of family reunification. The tragedy of divided families, ensnared in a web of geopolitics and cruelly separated through no fault of their own. I am hopeful that the North Korean Government will look into some of these cases as they promised to do during my visit.

Today, we have with us four very distinguished political scientists, all intimately familiar with the issue. We welcome each of you and appreciate your appearing before us, especially on such short notice, and we look forward to your insights on this issue. You may, if you so choose, summarize your formal statements, the entire context of which will be entered into the record.

We have with us today, Professor Paul D. Wolfowitz, Professor of National Security Strategy, National War College; Ambassador William Clark, Jr., Japan Chair and Senior Advisor on Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. William J. Taylor, Jr., Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Selig Harrison, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And I think it was suggested that we begin with Ambassador Wolfowitz.

STATEMENT OF PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, PROFESSOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be invited here to testify, and I should welcome the attention the subcommittee is giving to this critically important issue, which in my view, is quite a bit more important to our long-term national interest than some of the more immediate crises that preoccupy us in the world today. And I think there is going to be an "unsatisfactory" solution to the problem until, I think, we get a better public understanding about the issue.

I begin by noting that I do think there is a widespread consensus now about the seriousness of this problem, and that consensus is extremely valuable. But, I think it might be useful to clarify a bit why I think the North Korean nuclear weapons program would be a bad thing.

It may be unnecessary because at one level, it seems rather obvious. The North Korean Government is the same government and its leader, Kim Il-Sung, is the same leader that started the Korean war 43 years ago. It is the same government and leader that has been responsible for numerous acts of violence over the years since that war, including what must surely count as one of the most egregious acts of state supported terrorism in our time, the bombing in Rangoon in 1983 that killed almost the entire South Korean cabinet.

This is the same government that continues to proclaim the goal of unifying the Korean peninsula, by force, if necessary, and it has built up an enormous army, poised near the Demilitarized Zone and able to invade South Korea with relatively little warning. From this perspective, a simple view would hold that it would be a bad thing for Kim Il-Sung to have nuclear weapons because he might use them.
Let me say that while I am in substantial agreement with what I have called this simple view, there is also a great deal of truth in a more complex view; a view that says the likelihood of North Korea using nuclear weapons is really quite low, given the consequences that it would inevitably expect to face. For all the violence this regime has perpetuated during Kim Il-Sung's long tenure, its behavior in some sense, as one could argue, has been basically rational and surely, they would realize the consequences to them of using nuclear weapons.

In this view, the greatest danger from a North Korean nuclear weapons program is not the use of the weapons, but the effect that it is likely to have or could quite possibly have on Japan and on South Korea; and the possibility, which I think is a serious one, that a North Korean nuclear weapons program could ultimately destabilize what has been an exceptionally important security balance in Northeast Asia, and in particular, push Japan into military programs that Japan has so far strongly resisted going.

I do think it is true that that may be in the long run the biggest problem with the North Korean nuclear program. But, I believe it would be a mistake to assume too readily that North Korea would be totally rational. For one thing, whatever we know about Kim Il-Sung, we know very little about his son and designated heir, Kim Jong Il. And what little we do know about him is not of the sort to reassure one that he will behave with the rationality that one could argue his father, brutal though he is, has shown over the years.

But more important than this issue of the rationality of individual leaders, in my view, the greater danger is that these nuclear weapons would be introduced into the Korean peninsula in a military balance that has already got to be counted as the most dangerous in the world; one where armies of more than half-a-million on each side are poised, with the North Koreans able to start an attack in possibly as little as 24 to 48 hours.

With 36,000 Americans on the peninsula and with the United States committed to the defense of South Korea, deterrence at a conventional level has held remarkably well, at least since the late 1970’s. And I think the key to that has been repeated declarations by American Presidents, including most recently by President Clinton, of our resolve to come to the defense of South Korea. And I will admit that I have a great deal of confidence in the strength of our conventional deterrent in the peninsula.

But, I do not have such confidence in the strength of that deterrent that I am willing to have it bear the additional burden of forestalling a war in which nuclear weapons might well be introduced. And indeed, I think one of the things that one has to fear is that it may indeed be part of the North Korean strategy to hope by posing a nuclear threat to the United States or Japan, to isolate South Korea, which has been one of its longstanding ambitions, and perhaps to feel embolden to take conventional military actions that hitherto it has been deterred from taking. So, I believe that for all three of these reasons, in fact, it is something that we should be seriously concerned about.
Mr. Chairman, let me just state what I think are seven points about how we should proceed here, and I will try to summarize here briefly, and I can give you more for the record.

First point is I think we should remember how much we do not know about the North Korean regime. I have in mind particularly that an anonymous senior official was quoted recently as saying, "We know they don’t have a nuclear weapon." I am not sure that we know that and I would caution people that even in Iraq, which frankly is an open society by comparison to North Korea, we obviously missed three major development programs, and people at the time were declaring we knew what the Iraqis had. I think it is dangerous to assume that we know anything and unfortunately, that is a fact that we are going to have to deal with.

An ideal solution here is one which will allow us the ability to inspect not just designated locations, but anywhere in North Korea to substantially reduce that level of uncertainty. But, we certainly do not know a lot by our independent means.

Secondly, I would take issue with anonymous statements that I see attributed to officials that North Korea does not respond well to pressure. It is not that I disagree with the statement, it is that I disagree with the implication of the statement because I do not think North Korea responds well to the absence of pressure. In fact, I think it responds even less well. And I think the only way to get North Korea to move is for them to see very clearly that going down the road of nuclear weapons is going to take them into a much more costly and dangerous position than if they give them up. And that is not going to be accomplished simply by offering carrots.

Third, let me say, I believe in the “carrot and stick” approach. I believe that because this problem is so serious, there are many things we should be prepared to do, including normalization of relations, including encouraging even of economic assistance if North Korea clearly and unequivocally, and I would emphasize that, clearly and unequivocally abandons its nuclear program.

I do not think we will get there only with carrots, but I would also emphasize that I do not believe those carrots should include the kinds of measures that would make the nuclear problem worse or that would weaken our ability to maintain our necessary military readiness in South Korea.

I have in mind particularly some real skepticism about the notion of assisting a peaceful North Korean nuclear program. I think our goal should be to have no North Korean nuclear program, and I think we have to bear in mind that we had a military problem before nuclear weapons were introduced. It is essential to maintain our military readiness.

Fourth, let me say that I think unless we achieve dramatic progress very quickly, that we should move reasonably soon to impose serious sanctions on North Korea. There are difficulties with sanctions; no sanctions are going to be airtight. China, in particular, I think, is important, if not critical to the effectiveness of sanctions. But two of the most serious possible sanctions do not impinge directly on North Korean-Chinese relations.

I have in mind, first, the possibility of ending the substantial remittances—financial remittances that North Korea now receives
from Korean residents in Japan, remittances which, as far as one can tell, are extracted by a kind of extortion and blackmail. And secondly, measures that could be taken to curtail or end the North Korean trade in missile traffic to Syria, and Iran and other renegade countries of the Middle East. That traffic is not only very dangerous in the Middle East, but it is a major source of foreign exchange for North Korea. And, indeed, North Korea is heavily dependent on foreign exchange to purchase its declining sources of oil.

Fifth, let me say that because China is important to any strategy, and particularly a strategy of sanctions, I think we need to—and because I believe the nuclear issue is one of such importance to the United States, I believe we need to give this issue priority in our relations with the PRC. I welcome the news of the Clinton administration moving forward with China to restore some degree of security relationship and the reported success of Ambassador Freeman’s recent visit to Beijing. Of all of the security problems that we face in common, it seems to me there is none that is quite as urgent or critical as forestalling a war on the Korean peninsula that might possibly go nuclear and I think we should work with the Chinese on doing that.

Fifth, I believe that we should begin immediately to consider steps to increase our military readiness in South Korea, and I emphasize steps that would improve our ability to defend the South. I think this is, in the first place, a prudent defensive measure, given that we may be heading into a more serious period in the peninsula. Second, I happen to believe that it will strengthen our bargaining position with North Korea, just as I believe Secretary Cheney’s announcement in December of 1991 that we were curtailing our withdrawals from South Korea strengthened our bargaining position. And third, I believe that it will help to alert people in other governments to our view of the seriousness of the problem.

I would like to be clear, I am not recommending that we take military action against the North Korea nuclear program at this time. Both the danger and difficulty of such action are enormous and should not be underestimated, and it would certainly be premature. At the same time, I do not believe we should rule out that option, and we need to be ready for the possibility that military action may be forced upon us by the North Koreans.

Sixth, I would say that in my view, time is not necessarily our ally in dealing with this problem. In fact, I think time is starting to work against us. It is a common and usually good rule of diplomacy that a danger—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ambassador Wolfowitz, let me just ask for a clarification on something you said, that you would not have—or you would not encourage military strikes against their nuclear reactor at this time, followed by saying that you would not rule out that possibility either. Does that rule out—you would not rule out that possibility at this time, or you would not rule that out at a future date?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. At a future date.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you.
Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate the chance to clarify that. It is important. Thank you.
It is a common rule of diplomacy, and it is usually a good rule, that a danger postponed is a danger avoided. But in this case, I fear a danger postponed may mean a bigger danger down the road. While we are talking with North Korea, their stockpile of radiated fuel, containing plutonium that can potentially be used in bombs, is growing. And we can be reasonably certain, although I will give myself my own caveat, we do not know for sure, we can be reasonably certain, nevertheless, that the North Koreans are doing everything they can while they talk to move their nuclear program along.

Finally, and I will conclude my last point, I believe this problem will not be solved without vigorous American leadership. And I believe it will be a test of U.S. leadership ability that will have far reaching consequences for vital U.S. interest in Asia and in the world. I think it is important that Cabinet officials, and even the President, himself, begin to speak out clearly about the dangers that we face and outline a serious strategy for dealing with this problem.

To say that U.S. leadership is the essential ingredient to a successful outcome does not mean that we can achieve one by acting alone. We have made great progress already in forging an international coalition to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and that effort should be continued and strengthened, particularly with our South Korean and Japanese allies. But, American leadership will be essential to generate that coordinated response. Confidence in our leadership will be critical in managing the crises that may still confront us on this issue.

And conversely, a failure of American leadership on a problem of this gravity would have a wide ranging and long-term destabilizing impact throughout East Asia and, indeed, I could say throughout the world. Thank you.

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Ambassador Wolfowitz. Ambassador Clark.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM CLARK, JR., JAPAN CHAIR AND SENIOR ADVISOR ON ASIA, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the opportunity to appear for the first time as a civilian on this side of the table.

Mr. Ackerman. You do not look much different.

Mr. Clark. I could not agree more with your statement that the tensions on the peninsula are a problem that has vexed those of us interested in Asian policy since the end of the Second World War. And your interest was very clearly shown—I happened to be in Seoul at the time—by your visit to Pyongyang and Seoul and coming across on foot of the center line of the DMZ. You got a lot of coverage on that.

Looking at the tensions on the peninsula—

Mr. Ackerman. I wish I got that much attention back home in my district.

Mr. Clark. Ambassador Wolfowitz has talked about the military balances, and I will not do that. But, I think when we look at these problems, and I will try and cut this back a little bit, we need to
look at the governments in both Pyongyang and Seoul. And the government in Pyongyang and what has happened to it in the last few years, I think, is nothing short of cataclysmic.

If you look at the way it had already shut itself off from the world, and, I would argue, in fact, even shut itself off from the Communist bloc as we were wont to call it at one time, is probably the most unpopular ally that most bloc countries have had. But even so, the Soviet Union recognized Seoul, without even a nod at Pyongyang.

Very soon, the Chinese came along and did the same thing. Perhaps the closest leader in the Communist world, Kim Il-Sung—Nicolai Cheivchesky, was overthrown and later murdered, killed by the people. China was urging North Korea to abandon Juche, get on the bandwagon, as it itself drifted further from the Socialist road and toward economic progress. And the Soviet Union, which arguably was the model, certainly in its Stalinist phase, and later on the model for the economic phase of North Korean development, disappeared from the world stage. One can only believe that the two Kims probably understood how Lord Cornwallis felt at York-town when he had the band play "The world turned upside down."

In contrast to all of this, the Republic of Korea caught the world's attention with the 1988 Olympics; continued its progress, which today, is still growing—though it slowed down to about 4.3 percent, still has its per capita GNP six times that of the North. And the North's economy is declining at a rate of about 7.5 to 8 percent for the last 2 years. It also has its first freely elected civilian President, Kim Yong Sam, whose initiatives have earned him a popularity rating that started at 90, but is still above 70 percent. He is the envy of many of his democratic colleagues around the world.

Today, the two most apparent policies in North Korea are their tentative efforts to attract foreign investment and their nuclear program. I would like to start with the economic policy.

Not only is the economy in decline, but the harvest this year, by most accounts, has been drastically reduced, although the North is denying this. Add to this the strains that they place on an already weak economy by an army in excess of 1 million men, and you have to believe that the two Kims are looking for the only hope they have of reversing the trend, and that is the infusion of outside capital into the development of North Korea.

The second problem is the development of a nuclear capability. There has been a lot written about it and there will be a lot more. However, I take a slightly different view from many of those who debate this issue. It seems to me in the last few years, if we look at the countries that have developed nuclear potential, all of them had a lager mentality. They all felt threatened. And you could probably make the argument that if, indeed, Kim II-Sung is building a bomb, that it is in the sense of "Leave me alone. The world has changed, just leave me alone."

Now, what is the danger we face if North Korea has a bomb or the material to build one? There has been a lot of talk about the spread of nuclear technology that is all over the world. You can get technology to build a bomb almost anywhere these days. The question is the material, and I see nothing on material—or fissile mate-
rial in North Korea that suggests that there was more than enough to build one or two bombs. And if that is what you have, I would argue quite strongly that you would probably keep it at home. You would not be selling it to somebody.

If, indeed, there are one or two bombs in North Korea, what do they do with them? Do they force their neighbors to do their bidding? No country has been able to do that because of the possession of nuclear weapons, including the United States. And the common myth, notwithstanding, I do not think Pyongyang is irrational. Stupid, nasty, arrogant, yes; but I do not think it is irrational to the degree that it wants to commit suicide.

This does not mean that the fact or the suspicion that the North has a nuclear device will not have a marked effect on the North-east Asian region. Now, there is a lot of speculation about what will happen and whether others in the neighborhood will go nuclear to protect themselves. Here, and I agree with Ambassador Wolfowitz, U.S. leadership is essential and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, even though it may appear tattered to some, is still the best insurance that we have to prevent this from happening.

So, what do we do? What do the United States, Korea and the other countries, do? First and foremost, it seems to me we need to keep the North Korean nuclear question in perspective. Nuclear capability does not turn North Korea into a world player. It does play to the domestic needs of Kim the elder and Kim the younger to puff up, and to strut and to pretend that they occupy center stage. But, they have an aging military machine, a failing economy and a government system that has demonstrably failed around the world. And probably it is not too much of a stretch of the imagination to think that they need something to try and revive the perceived glories of the past for the North Korean Government.

I spoke earlier of two policies: the economic and the nuclear. It seems to me there is another policy we have to look at, and that is the policy that has been pursued for a number of years now by Kim Il-Sung of gradually handing power over to his son, Kim Jong Il, of achieving a dynastic transfer in Pyongyang. I cannot believe that the elder Kim, who learned in the Korean conflict that a world of hurt can come out of the skies, really wants to under—

Mr. ACKERMAN. A what?

Mr. CLARK. A world of hurt can fall out of the skies. I do not believe he really wants to hand over to the son of the family a country that glows in the dark. I just do not think that is on.

But what do we do? I will not go into a list of specifics. It seems to me that the first and fundamental requirement is something that is probably the most difficult thing for this town to do, and that is to exercise patience. The problem will not be solved right away. I have dealt with North Korea for a long time and nothing with North Korea is solved right away. And on this particular issue, I think they have been milking it for all it is worth. They have taken a weak hand and they have played it rather well.

Today they have canceled the meeting tomorrow at Panmunjom with South Korea, supposedly because of statements made by the Republic of Korea's defense minister in preparation for Secretary Aspin's visit. I have to believe that it may be in part a reluctance to sit down across the table from their South Korean friends, hav-
ing just suffered a crushing defeat in the UNGA, where nobody, nobody voted in favor of the North Korean position, except North Korea.

So, we need to keep a steady pressure on the North, and at the same time, engage in an educational program. And with the educational program, like so many educational programs, we will need to go back at it time and time and time again.

The end game on all sides will be to bring North Korea into a normal relationship with the world, and this cannot be achieved as long as North Korea continues to try and play off one side against the other. It is a policy they have been engaged in since the 1960's and 1970's. It is still apparent in many of the things we do—that they do, and they need to be disabused. If the North continues its intransigence, we may need to go back to the Security Council and take further steps, and this could involve sanctions. There are a range of options from condemnation resolutions to graduated or selective sanctions.

If full sanctions were to be adopted, I would argue that we should not spend a lot of time with our friends pointing fingers at who is not maintaining the sanctions. Sanctions do not work. They have not worked. They do not bring about action, but they do show the determination of the international community.

A more effective sanction will be one that says to the North, that as one of my Korean friends put it, "You cannot catch two rabbits at the same time." If you have a nuclear policy, there will be no international funding for the Tumen Basin project. There will be no international private sector investment in Korea. You will not get out of your economic difficulties if you are following your nuclear desires. And in that respect, and if that happens, I would argue that continuing on the nuclear course would be much more dangerous for the North Korean regime than their having a nuclear device would be for the folks in the neighborhood.

So let me conclude with saying that I am concerned about the nuclear problem, but I am also concerned about another outcome, where the North overestimates the degree to which it can impose upon its long-suffering populace. Even without considering the consequence of 1 million plus men under arms who are at sixes and sevens, or about the possibility of considering that weapons of mass destruction might really fall into irrational hands, the prospect of 20 million hungry North Koreans coming across the 38th Parallel looking for a better life is something we need to pay attention to.

So while we are dwelling on the nuclear question with North Korea, I think we better put our heads together and decide what happens in the next stage of North Korean development, which is liable to be the unraveling of that government. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, very much, Ambassador Clark. Dr. Harrison.

STATEMENT OF SELIG HARRISON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Chairman, thank you, very much, for the opportunity to testify here today.
I believe that the North Korean nuclear problem can be resolved, but only if the United States, Japan and South Korea make major changes in their approach to the problem, based on a realistic assessment of the forces at work inside North Korea. I am going to make a series of specific policy proposals today. All of them rest on the central premise that significant differences exist within the North Korean regime concerning the nuclear issue as part of a broader debate over foreign and defense policies.

In my prepared testimony, I go into this at some length. I am now going to condense this and get as soon as I can to the specific proposals.

The power structure in Pyongyang is, of course, monolithic: Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong Il, and the Workers Party. But an increasingly sharp policy struggle within the ruling party has become apparent over a period of years. My first visit to North Korea was in 1972 and even then, I could detect differences in approach with respect to how to relate to the outside world. In the past 5 years, these internal differences have become clearer and clearer, especially over the issue of whether or not the North should continue to pursue the nuclear option.

On one side in this debate are what we might call the more pragmatic elements and those with a greater experience of the outside world, and on the other, the hawks centered in the military establishment. The pragmatists and the more modern elements have been strengthened greatly by the end of Soviet and Chinese subsidies. That has brought to a head economic problems that they have been warning about for many years.

The basic problem that North Korea faces is that it has to spend five times more of its GNP on defense than the South does, partly because of the population differential, partly because of an over-autarchic economic system. The result is that they are not able to have the light industries, and consumer industries, and the labor for them and the funds for them needed to deliver consumer goods to the people.

Just as in China, this became a force for change, it has become increasingly worrisome to the leadership of North Korea. They fear potentially de-stabilizing political consequences if they cannot have a greater consumer goods program, and more significant improvement in the lives of the people.

And so the reform group has been talking about first, a significant opening of the economy, a controlled, but significant, opening of the economy to outside inputs. Bill Clark mentioned the Tumen River project. There is also—they are also starting special economic zones like those the Chinese have had. And they have got a new joint venture law which has some elements that are—would be more attractive than some that the Chinese have if people believe that they really were going to enforce them and honor them.

Secondly, the reform group wants to reduce defense spending through arms and force reduction agreements with the South. Now, there is—a more powerful group is the old guard, which is the armed forces, the military-industrial complex, the hard-liners in the ruling party. And basically, this group believes that it is not going to be possible to get any help or any significant inputs from the United States, Japan or South Korea because basically, in this
period of change, it is the objective of our hard-liners to see the end of North Korea. This is the perception of the hawks in North Korea, that their beleaguered state—

Mr. ACKERMAN. You mean American hard-liners?

Mr. HARRISON. No, I am saying that the hard-liners in North Korea believe that the hard-liners here, and in Seoul and Tokyo want to bring down the present regime, believe that it is going to fall of its own weight, and that we should do nothing to prop it up or prolong its life. Because, if we put pressure on it and isolate it, it will fall sooner, that that is desirable, and that we want to replicate the German model in Korea. That is the perception of the hard-liners in the North.

The doves in the North are saying we can do business with the outside world. We can get support. We can have a transition of our system, a peaceful transition, and deliver the goods to the people; and the hard-liners are saying impossible, you are being very naive. And, therefore, the hawks have resisted most of the reform moves that have been approved by Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong Il. And this has been a struggle that has been building up over a period of years.

They certainly have been trying to make nuclear weapons. In my presentation, in my formal text, I go over the history of this. It goes back to 1963. It was attractive as a cheaper route to national security than an indefinite conventional arms race with the South. And particularly, when the South began to speed up its growth in the 1970's, it still looked good.

But, it got harder and harder to bring this program off because North Korea has a very autarchic economic program and it does not have the oil money that Iraq has had to import vitally needed equipment for its nuclear program, and it got harder and harder to do.

And then came two things: first, the Soviets and the Chinese effectively abandoned North Korea and began to demand hard cash for the economic and military aid they provide, thus aggravating the economic pinch and making the nuclear program harder to justify. And at the same time, the United States in 1991 announced the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons. The hard-liners lost one of their most potent arguments, and the soft-liners said if we drop this nuclear program, we can get big rewards from the United States, Japan and South Korea.

And I believe that this came to a head in the fall of 1991. And in December, 1991 at the Central Committee, there was a very significant showdown in which the more pragmatic and technocratic elements won what I call a conditional victory because nobody ever agreed to give up the nuclear program. But, the hard-liners agreed to make concessions to the IAEA and to the United States and Japan and to put the program on ice. And that led, of course, to the meeting in 1992 between Undersecretary Kanter and Kim Yong Sun and to the initiation of inspection procedures in June of 1992.

And I think that—and I go into this in some detail in the prepared testimony—we made a great mistake after that breakthrough of early 1992, because instead of continuing the dialogue and beginning to talk about what the incentives for further concessions on their part would be, we put on more pressure. And the re-
result was that we ended up with a reversion on the part of the North Koreans. What started out as a period of—a promising period of change and increasing cooperation on their part, was reversed.

One of the provocative events that occurred on our side was when General Riscassi, in June of 1992, announced that the Team Spirit exercises would be resumed at a time when the Roh Tae Woo government had not been consulted by the United States.

Now the Clinton administration took over this dialogue and confronted the withdrawal from the NPT at a time when the hard-liners had become stronger in the North.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dr. Harrison, if I could ask you to just make it a little bit more concise because we—

Mr. HARRISON. OK.

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Will not have some give and take.

Mr. HARRISON. OK, sure. And the Clinton people took over at a time when the hard-liners had become stronger. And, therefore, even though the posture taken by this administration, I think, has been a flexible one, more flexible than in the past, they are running into more difficulty, and a moving of the goal posts by the North Koreans who are basically trying to bargain.

The broad recommendations that I emphasize in my testimony are first, that you cannot separate the nuclear issue from the broader problem of normalizing relations with the Kim Il-Sung regime. Now, Bill Clark has suggested, I think, in the tenor of his testimony, that he would not—and in an article he just did in the International Herald Tribune—that he would not disagree with that statement. Where I would—what I would emphasize, however, is that we have to spell out quite explicitly what economic and political rewards could be expected and when. We cannot say to them, as we are now saying, comply now with our minimum demands and we will talk about what we are going to do to reward you later.

We have to have, in effect, the approach of a real estate closing. Everything is in the agreement before you buy the house, whether the refrigerator is going to be there or taken out. Everything is transacted at one time. And I do spell out 10 specific items most of which would have to be part of the deal if you are really going to get North Korea to give up its nuclear option as definitively as we want, which I think should include the transfer of such fissile material as they have to international supervision, as well as a regime of full transparency.

The second point that I emphasize is that there is a—

Mr. ACKERMAN. We are not going to do all 10 are we?

Mr. HARRISON. What? No, no. There are only 3, and then the 10 are in the prepared testimony.

Mr. ACKERMAN. OK.

Mr. HARRISON. These are the three basic principles. The second is that there is a perception on the part of the hawks in the North that the basic objective of the dominant elements in Japan, the United States and South Korea is unification by absorption, and I spell out ways in which we can provide reassurance against that.

And finally, the most important point I make is that you have to have equity if you are going to settle the nuclear issue. We cannot say to them, we keep our nuclear option, but you give up yours.
It just is not going to happen. And what we have to do, it seems to me, is reexamine the so-called nuclear umbrella in the South and consider what does it mean. Obviously, whatever we do to give assurance to the North, we are going to have nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean. We are going to have a retaliatory capacity. As President Clinton said in Tokyo, "If you ever try to use your nuclear weapons, we are in a position to deal with you."

But, that does not mean we cannot agree to a multilateral five- or six-power agreement that would make North Korea a nuclear-free zone—no use, no deployment in the Korean peninsula by the United States, Russia, China, North and South Korea, and Japan.

I will conclude now, because I do want to have lots of give and take. And I hope that you will look at the 10 points. They not only include normalization, but also economic incentives which I have described in very, very specific terms. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrison appears in the appendix.]

Mr. Leach. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for just a second. I want to apologize to you and the panel that I have an outside commitment that I have to keep. But, I would like to ask consent to put a statement in the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. James A. Leach

As we all understand, North Korea continues to mount an unprecedented challenge to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. While North Korea has suspended its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), it is clearly not in compliance with its full-scope safeguards obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has not allowed impartial international inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, and shown no serious interest in implementing wider-ranging, and thus reassuring, bilateral inspections under the 1991 North-South Denuclearization Declaration.

These actions, coupled with widely reported appraisals in recent years of nuclear technology development in North Korea, have fueled worldwide suspicions that Pyongyang is bent on establishing a nuclear weapons capacity. Its need for hard currency, and track record of military technology sales to international bad actors, is another potentially ominous portent. Adding to these grave concerns is North Korea's continued development of missile technology capable of striking our allies in Japan as well as South Korea, where over 35,000 U.S. troops are stationed as a deterrent to North Korean aggression. As a result, tensions have increased in Northeast Asia, the vital interests of the United States and its allies are engaged, and prospects for Korean reunification have been set back.

As ever, North Korean motives remain murky. But the United States can only assume that Pyongyang hopes that a nuclear weapons capability will be its "trump card" in any diplomatic or military crisis, and that North Korea will use—as it now appears to be using—violations of its treaty obligations in an attempt to elicit diplomatic recognition and economic assistance from the industrialized world.

Whatever the North's motivation, the response of the United States must be firm and unequivocal. North Korean actions not only contradict Pyongyang's treaty commitments under the NPT but the 1991 North-South Joint Declaration, which obligates the two parties not to possess or develop nuclear weapons. The United States must not conduct separate negotiations with the North, nor permit a wedge to be driven between Washington and Seoul. We must continue to coordinate very closely with South Korea and Japan. Great care must be taken not undermine the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the nonproliferation regime itself by rewarding lawbreakers, or in any way pursuing inappropriate accommodationist approaches that heighten the security anxieties of key regional allies.

No one has a desire to corner Pyongyang or encourage it to contemplate desperate action. The circumstance is fraught with risks. North Korea is dangerously unpredictable, has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use force as well as terrorism, and is currently experiencing severe domestic strains as well as increasing international isolation. Hence the need for our deterrent posture in South Korea to
be unassailable. And while there is a need for firmness, the United States bears no permanent enmity toward North Korea. Given the potential for miscalculation, channels for dialogue with Pyongyang will remain important.

But at this juncture, this Congress and the American people must understand that dialogue alone is unlikely to exorcise the North Korean nuclear threat. If the Iraqi experience proves anything, it is that the world community must be willing to employ sanctions and possibly other measures to convince rogue regimes that there is a price for noncompliance with minimum international norms. North Korea must understand that their failure to comply with nonproliferation norms will inevitably lead down the road toward greater confrontation; the American people must be made to understand why that confrontation may be necessary and what vital U.S. interests are at stake.

Mr. Chairman, the importance of this issue to the United States, our allies, and the world community cannot be underestimated. American leadership is being tested. This Congress and this administration have no choice in these troubling times but to stand firm for our interests, our principles, our allies and our united commitment to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Without objection.

Mr. LEACH. I want to thank all of you for coming today. You have given nicely your time, and particularly to congratulate Dean Wolfowitz on your job.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. He is an alumnus at my new school.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Glad to have you, Jim. Mr. Taylor.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, thanks for having me. It is an important subject, timely, worrisome. I want to say something too, about your staff. They were fun to work with, and I found it good for me over the last 4 or 5 days. It was a pleasure.

I would just like to introduce two new publications and call your attention to them here—the brand new one, Korean Peninsula and Security Cooperation Issues. I would just like for you to have them.

An observation: that is one, I disagree with my good friend, Selig Harrison, that there are fissures, differences among reform group, the old guard and North Korea. I think they sing off of the same sheet of music. I have had hundreds and hundreds of hours with them over 21 days, including Kim Il-Sung for 3 hours. They do not make one bit of difference in what they say; same sheet of music. If the fight is there, I think it is—I do not think it can be substantiated.

Second, I do agree in part with my colleague, Ambassador Bill Clark, that we need to be patient. But, I think we need to be patient in going to the United Nations for economic sanctions and patient in their application. And even Ambassador Clark says in the PC ads in the Herald Tribune today, rather than our objective should be to make sure that no investment from any source gets to the North. That is part of this nations of sanctions that I want to talk about for a second. I agree with that.

But, I do not think we can wait to go to the U.N. for sanctions. We have waited too long. We are running out of time. But once we get the U.N. agreement, and I want to talk about problems with that, where a nations of sanctions have been patient in their very slow, but clear application.

Now, I have changed my mind on sanctions and I have changed my mind in 3 weeks. I mean, when you go to conferences, you talk
to people, you are supposed to learn something. I took a paper to Seoul, and I come out saying that military strikes are insane and I lay out the reasons why. They are in the paper and I do not have to talk about them, but I am happy to.

I lay out in the paper that a second nonoption is economic sanctions. But when I wrote that paper, I was thinking about strangulation sanctions which would—you know, there are a couple or three outcomes from strangulation sanctions. Number one, Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong Il and the Greater Worker Party, the Politburo, they say, "Oh, my God, you have hurt us. You're strangling us. We agree with you. We are going to do whatever you wanted." Nobody believes that for one second.

Number two, they can get to the point where they are strangled and out of sheer desperation attack South. That is a scenario we have to contemplate. I have sat with their generals for hundreds of hours. I am serious when I use the term "hundreds." I have given them unclassified CSIS studies of the Gulf War lessons I learned. I have tried to convince old Kim Jong, Kim Jung Chu that if there were ever a war in the Korean peninsula, they would lose it in less than 60 days. And I think the Joint Staff would support that estimate.

But what I do not talk to them about and what we all have to consider is that in the process, Seoul is going to be destroyed flat out in probably less than a week. Pick your choice of how it is going to happen. Whether it is Scud missiles, South Korea has no air defense that is adequate. They have no missile defense. They are playing around on whether or not to buy ATBM's, Patriot, maybe the SA-10 from the Russians; who knows. But, they do not have any air defense. Seoul gets destroyed. That is what we have to worry about.

But, we have a bigger problem than that. North Korea is challenging at least three of the four highest priority foreign policy objectives on the Clinton administration’s agenda: nuclear proliferation, missile technology proliferation and human rights. Nobody is going to argue with any of that. But the issue, the gut issue right now where we are running out of time is the fact that we do not know whether they have a nuclear weapons program active right now; but there is suspicion. The suspicion is getting—is causing greater and greater frustration. I saw it in Seoul, members of the DLP, the ruling party, the opposition party, senior members of their government. There is frustration right here in this government and a lot of division about how we ought to approach this issue. There is also frustration in Tokyo.

But, we had better get our act together on this thing and we had better get a coherent, coordinated policy with our allies. And I think we have played the carrots and sticks game about as far as we can play it. We have been playing it for over a year: the high-level meeting in New York, the high-level meeting in Geneva, 10 meetings at least in New York at the lower level. On the evening of the 28th, Ambassador Hussein, who I know well, called me and told me about this message being sent to the Deputy Director General of the IAEA. It was rejected. It should have been rejected. All it does—it does not even restore the status quo ante of 3 weeks
ago. It does not take us anywhere. We are running out of time. Carrots and sticks have not gotten us anywhere.

I have already covered the point on military strikes. If you want to talk about it, Mr. Chairman, I am happy. But under the sanctions, which I think we need to go to the U.N. for, I would start with a political sanction, international condemnation by the United Nations of the North Koreans for not living up to their international legal obligations. Now, somebody—some people laugh at that and say, “Come on, Taylor, that does not cause them any problems.”

Well, if you know the North Koreans, if you have studied Juche philosophy, if you have been to the International Friendship exhibition up at Myoyong Mountain, 22 rooms of gifts: from President Muanda, carved ivory tusks; silver trays from the leader of something else; silver trays from the head of the Juche Society of Deli, India; one from the head of the Juche Society of Brooklyn, New York. I am serious. It means a lot to them that they have the respect and admiration of anybody they can get it from.

I would start with that sanction and then I would move into economic sanctions. What are the problems? Everybody knows: China. We do not know what China is going to do. China has, in every case of every U.N. vote on economic sanctions since 1945, abstained. Would they abstain in the case of sanctions—at the issue of sanctions against North Korea? We have got real problems in U.S.-China relations, I think some of them we have caused ourselves quite frankly, but I think the Clinton administration is trying through dialogue right now to get over some of those hurdles. China might abstain.

Dr. Garrett Dong at our center, Director of Asian studies, thinks that even if China abstained—and they probably would not, he thinks it would veto—they would not cooperate, even if the sanction were laid on by the U.N. Security Council. I hate to argue with Dr. Garrett Dong because he is the expert. But, I think—I would still try it. I think China can be made to understand they have a great deal to gain and a lot more to lose if they should veto or not cooperate with the U.N. sanctions. That, I think, could be overcome.

What about Russia? Those people are not thinking about what they might do. I spent time this morning with Serin Euoba here, known him for years, and I said, “What would you do on this kind of vote?” He said, “You Americans think you really brought yourself a friend in Boris Yeltsin. Wait. What you’ve brought is a military pressure on Yeltsin and the military is not going to let Russia go along with a U.N. sanction on North Korea.” I think he is wrong, but he made the point, nevertheless.

So, bottom line is we have an issue. It is a serious issue. It is getting worse all the time. We are running out of time. Will this administration walk up to another crisis. We have got Somalia on our hands. We have got Haiti on our hands. We have got Bosnia on our hands, which can get a lot worse. Are we willing to take on this issue? It is pretty misty. The further you move the sanctions, the greater the chance that North Korea is going to lash out, the scenario we do not want. But the world is sitting around and watching the leadership of this government, this administration.
The second question is: if the administration went after the policy, what is the mood of Congress? Would Congress support the administration going for U.S. sanctions? Big question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let us see if we can find out some answers. Let me ask Ambassador Wolfowitz if he would, because of time constraints—I know you have another engagement or a flight.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, I have a prior commitment that I cannot miss.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Prior commitment. Let me ask you if you would want to respond to anything we have heard so far. I hate to lose you here and I want you to get your licks in.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess only to say that I find Mr. Harrison has argued a very interesting one. But, I really have trouble believing that there are serious splits within the North Korean regime or that even more importantly, that if there are, that we would know how to manipulate them or work them to our advantage.

I think in the end if there are some different perspectives, they are all in the head of Kim Il-Sung. And I do not deny that the North Koreans are, I am sure, trying to figure out how to get the most that they can in all respects out of this. And I think it is really up to us to make the choice as clear as possible in both ways. I would actually agree with him, and I think it is useful to have it clearly understand the gains to be made from adopting a different course of action. But, I think it is even more important to have them understand the cost that they will suffer if they continue on the course they are on. And I do not think we have done a terrific job of that part of it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Taylor, you say you would go to sanctions. You would go to sanctions now?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I would. I would start the process right now, because nothing we have done, nothing we have said—

Mr. ACKERMAN. You would start it despite the fact that you do not know whether or not we can get them through the U.N.?

Mr. TAYLOR. When I say go to sanctions now, I mean start really not just testing the waters, hardball with China, saying we really want to get to the bottom of this, we want to find out how you are going to go on this, what will it cost for us to get you to go along, abstain at least, cooperate. I think we ought to test the Russians. Find out—

Mr. ACKERMAN. How often has China signalled way in advance of whether or not they are going to abstain or not?

Mr. TAYLOR. We still might want to take it to the U.N. Security Council. And if they veto it, we have to find another way to proceed. But, my point is we have run out of options.

Mr. ACKERMAN. You say another way—another way to proceed. If you say test it without knowing, and the Chinese argumentatively veto it, what is the other way? Once you play your trump card—I mean, there are some who are not willing to play that trump card. Let us say you play it, what happens?

Mr. TAYLOR. Try to orchestrate—I mean, it is not going to be easy—try to orchestrate something with the South Koreans, with the Japanese, with the Russians, the other major actors in the re-
gion, and try, for example, to get all of those who are investing in
the joint venture of the—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Koreans are the largest—as I understand it, the
largest minority in an otherwise fairly monolithic Japan.

Mr. TAYLOR. Hosokawa—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you think Hosokawa is—forget about the U.S.
Congress and what its role—do you think the Japanese are going
to risk a major problem with its largest indigenous minority right
now?

Mr. TAYLOR. They have got 700,000 of them, about 40 percent of
them still have ties to the North. They take remittance payments
up there. It would cost some political capital from the Hosokawa
government to do something about stopping that. But, it is about
time we find out what kinds of risk they are willing to take.

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is easy for you and me to spend his capital.
Do you think he is going to do it?

Mr. TAYLOR. I do not know what we have got to offer him. I do
not know what—you know, I do not know what we are going to say
to them.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I hear your frustration, but you are playing
cards that we do not have.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I think the first thing that is re-
quired on this is for the United States to decide that we want sanc-
tions. It is a decision we have not made; in fact, we resist. And
until we start to be serious about it, there is no way to know how
far you can take people. Once you decide that you are serious, then
you have to start persuading the countries that you need coopera-
tion from that you are.

I mean, it is a process of diplomacy to figure out what they will
go along with and at what price. You cannot, for example, expect
to get China to go along with sanctions at the same time we sus-
pend MFN from China over human rights, and sanction them in
ways—other ways. That is why I said I think we need a sense of
priority in how we deal with China on this issue.

I think in the case of Japan, it is germane that back in 1990, I
believe it was—sorry, the years blur—Japan's position was that
they would normalize relations with North Korea if North Korea
simply accepted the nonproliferation regime. And we raised the
issue that that was not enough; that, in fact, North Korea had to
give up plutonium reprocessing. Some people said you should not
even raise that with the Japanese because they will not agree with
us. We went through about 6 or 9 months of back and forth with
the Japanese, and ultimately, by whatever process, they were per-
suaded of our position. I think they were persuaded on the merits.
I think they were also persuaded that since the United States took
this seriously, there would be a lot of harmful consequences across
the board if they disagreed with us.

And that is, I think, the heart of the matter, is we have got to
decide that it is important. And once we decide it is important, I
think we are going to move people a very long way. How far is
something you only find out by trying.

Mr. CLARK. If I can, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me one of the
things that has been unique about the efforts to walk North Korea
back from its nuclear program has been the degree of discussion
that we have been able to bring to the process, and that means with the Japanese, the Chinese, the Russians, U.S. and South Korea. When it started out, the Chinese first did not want anything debated in IAEA. They wanted it to keep running. Then, all right, you can debate it in IAEA, but you cannot take it to the Security Council.

We worked through all of these things. And, in fact, when the IAEA sent it to the Security Council, they did not take a vote. They did it by consensus. And the Chinese, however, even though it was done by consensus, said that if it had been a vote, we would have abstained. Well, since they do not have a veto in the IAEA, that was an interesting signal for Pyongyang.

I think that the framework for discussion on this issue is there. And so, it is not a question of having to throw our cards on the table and say, “Let’s do sanctions or get shot down on the effort.” I think we have a way of working toward it and finding out what the requirements are on the Chinese and, indeed, the Japanese side to move in that direction.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. I think that it is very important to be clear. Bill Taylor talks about having offered the carrots. I think he is completely missing the point. The whole point is that we have not made up our own minds what carrots we are really ready to offer; how far we are ready to go; how much we are willing to spend; how much we are willing to push multinational aid agencies to spend; how much we are willing to push the Japanese to spend. It all has to do with money.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are you saying that we should be pushing the multinational aid agencies to spend?

Mr. HARRISON. What I am saying is—yes. What I am saying is that we have to—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Should we repeal the Trading With the Enemy Act?

Mr. HARRISON. Certainly. And what I am saying is we should do none of these things unilaterally. What we should do is make up our mind what all the carrots are, put them together in a package, and say to the North Koreans, all of these things are going to happen.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But what is it we want them to do?

Mr. HARRISON. We want them to agree to full transparency of their nuclear program and the turning over to international—to the I.A.E.A of any fissile material that they have accumulated, and it may be more than they have admitted they have accumulated, and the nuclear problem has to be fully resolved to our satisfaction. I think that—

Mr. ACKERMAN. All right. Let me ask Ambassador Clark—

Mr. HARRISON [continuing]. And then—

Mr. ACKERMAN [continuing]. Is that our goal?

Mr. HARRISON [continuing]. You start taking the—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Shouldn’t that be our goal?

Mr. CLARK. I do not go as far as Selig, because it seems to me that the North Koreans have sold this horse about three times now. They signed the NPT. They went on for a long time with IAEA negotiating the full-scope Safeguard Agreement; finally
agreed to it. Then backed off of it and said, "Now, what are you going to give me to do what I said I would already do."

I think we do need to have a consolidated policy, and I think the end goal of a consolidated policy has to be bringing North Korea into the world in a normal fashion, which would be normalizing relations with the United States. I would dearly love to get the Korean War and the hangover from the Second World War behind us.

But, I do not think you run up all of this big pile of carrots and say to the North Koreans, "This is what we are going to give you if you do what you were supposed to do already," because they are going to say, "Oh, look at all we've got. If we hang out a little longer, I wonder how many more carrots he's got in his garden."

Mr. HARRISON. That is the point. You get your bottom line position so that you make it clear to them this is it. And you get out of this situation where they keep moving the goal post. That is the problem. We are exposing ourself to letting them move the goal post because we do not make——

Mr. ACKERMAN. You are saying after the carrots?

Mr. HARRISON. I am saying decide what your carrots are, and make them pretty darn big and juicy, and say to them that we are prepared to do these things in this timeframe, if you do this in this timeframe.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And if they do not?

Mr. HARRISON. That is where the question of sanctions and a tougher posture come in. Once you have really reached that point, which we have not reached yet—that is where we differ—then it seems to me you get into the question of how long you can follow policies based on patience and when you shift to a more assertive approach in which you consider sanctions. And you do approach it, as Bill said, not expecting to get a quick fix on it.

But, you do not do that first if you are trying to reach a settlement. First, you make the incentives really clear, which we have not done. The reason is we do not know what we are prepared to do. A lot of people think North Korea may collapse of its own weight, why help them.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ambassador Wolfowitz, should we have less carrots?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess I am somewhat sympathetic to that idea of making the incentives clear, although it bothers me to sort of go into a position putting your bottom line on the table at the outset, I mean, especially with characters like the North Koreans.

But, I think it is clear that some things have changed in a positive way and that we do not have to—North Korea, in the long run, I think, is not something that we have to worry about; certainly, for example, normalizing relations with North Korea is not simply a carrot. It is something, I think, that would serve our interest in the right circumstances. And I think it would help if we spelled out a bit more what we would be prepared to do.

But, I would also emphasize, I think it is very important the North Koreans understand that we are quite serious and that means that the whole world is serious about making them pay a very, very high price if they do not give up the program. I do not think carrots by themselves—number one, I do not think carrots by themselves will accomplish it. And secondly, I think there is a sort
of danger in how you view it more broadly if they come to the great rewards simply by giving up their program without any sense of threat or any sense of danger.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Say that last part again, please.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it is important that we not send the message to other people acquiring nuclear weapons that once you get these things, you can bargain them for great, valuable currency. And, in fact, I think sanctions would be helpful in part on sending a message that what the North Koreans are doing is a serious and dangerous thing. If the outcome is something that is a net plus for everybody, that is fine. But, I think it is important for potential proliferators to see this is a case where we can really, in fact, take tough measures if those are necessary. And I do not think we have shown that yet.

Mr. ACKERMAN. How do you show it?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think by pushing ahead on sanctions. I think we have been dawdling on that for 12 months now almost, and it seems to me it is time, and I do not get the sense that we are acting like it is time.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Ambassador Clark.

Mr. CLARK. I think where I disagree with Selig is I think we do need to make sure that the North Koreans know where our goal posts are. But, we have to—indeed we should be clear—but it does not need to be a basketful of carrots. It just needs to be, here is where we will move.

But first and foremost, you have to get off the nuclear track. If you do not, here is what we will not do. I mean, there has got to be the other side of it as well and the other side are sanctions. And we are moving in that direction, so you had better hurry.

I do not think without pressure you can expect the North Koreans to do more than ask for something else. They have got the deepest pockets in the world. They take it, they put it in the pocket and say, "Thank you. Now, what is next."

Mr. ACKERMAN. All of the talk about Japan and the possibility of them revisiting their nuclear policy, how much pressure in your mind does that place upon the North Koreans?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I do not think it puts pressure on the North Koreans. I think it does get the attention of the Chinese. And I would sort of go back to our earlier discussion, I would not paint the Chinese as people who are exactly in the North Korean's corner on this. They are likely to head for least common denominator policies. They are likely to look for ways that allow them to avoid confrontation, with us as well as with the North Koreans. And I think they will not do much at all unless they are pushed. But, I think it gets the attention of the Chinese. I do not think the North Koreans care at all what the effect is on Japan.

But let me emphasize, too, I do not think we should be alarmists about Japan or encourage a notion that if we cannot—

Mr. ACKERMAN. You do not think this gives strength to the hardliners in Japan?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Oh, yes, it does; absolutely. The North Korean program has an effect on Japan. I thought you were saying the other way around, what—
Mr. Ackerman. Yes, and that—let me do it in two steps—after that happens, and you have pressure on Japan, and what I say if Japan starts musing out loud, or more so out loud, about developing a nuclear program. What effect does that, in turn, then have upon North Korea?

Mr. Wolfowitz. I would defer to others, but I think the North Koreans are thinking much more short term and much closer to home.

Mr. Clark. I see where you are going on it, Mr. Chairman, the North Koreans are probably the loudest in their voiced concerns today about Japanese remilitarization, if you will. But, I agree with Ambassador Wolfowitz. I do not think they are thinking about Japan. I would emphasize that while North Korea having a nuclear weapon does not make it a major factor, even in the region, a fundamental change in the region would occur if the Japanese were moving in that direction.

But that, again—and here I will go back to my argument—that is where the United States has a significant role to play. One of the advantages of the nuclear umbrella is not necessarily just protecting Japan from attack, it is also protecting Japan from those in the country who would like to move in a nuclear direction, just as it does in the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Ackerman. Knowing Korea as well as each of you do, if we would begin down the road toward the imposition of sanctions or indeed impose sanctions, does not that paint them into a corner? And what do they do once in that corner? Do they then negotiate? Do they lose face and come around? Do they throw in the towel? Do they branch out?

Mr. Clark. I think this is where we disagree. It seems to me that the North had said, on several occasions, and they have said now, if sanctions were passed, they would consider it an act of war. But if one goes back and looks at the history, they said if anyone suggested that the two Koreas are going to the United Nations, they would consider it as an act of war. And when it came right down to it, they went into the United Nations.

I cannot construct, in my own mind, a scenario whereby the North would hope to gain anything except destruction—

Mr. Ackerman. Are we—

Mr. Clark [continuing]. So the thing is that the sanctions will increase pressure, but I do not think they will do it to the degree that the North will feel it has to throw the dice and see what happens. That is not a scenario that I credit.

Mr. Ackerman. Your assertion of their claim that the imposition of sanctions would be viewed as an act of war.

Mr. Clark. That is not my assertion; that is their statement.

Mr. Ackerman. Your assertion of their statement.

Mr. Clark. OK, fine. [Laughter.]

Mr. Ackerman. I did not want to say that they said that. I am saying—

Mr. Clark. OK. I understand what you are saying.

Mr. Ackerman. That does not pose significant risk in your mind?

Mr. Clark. It poses a risk, but it is not a unique statement for the North to say that. They are also—they also have a program for unification in 1995, and I do not credit that much either.
Mr. Harrison. The point is that sanctions will not get you the solution of the nuclear problem. That is the one thing that I am confident of. I am not sure what they will do, but I am sure that it will not get them to knuckle under.

Mr. Ackerman. Ambassador Wolfowitz, I know you wanted to leave at 3:30.

Mr. Wolfowitz. Sorry, I have to; yes.

Mr. Ackerman. Do you want to add anything before you go, because we want to keep going.

Mr. Wolfowitz. I guess I would just say this: I do not—I think we need to do everything we can to get a solution to this problem. We also may have to sort of put a heavy tourniquet on it if that is the right analogy, not Band-Aids, but something more substantial. I think we may have to live with something quite difficult over an extended period of time, and I think sanctions need to be viewed in that context also. If North Korea heads in this direction, we had better be singing clearly to everybody that they have paid a big price for doing so.

And I think most important of all, and I agree strongly with what Ambassador Clark said in this regard, it is important to maintain the confidence, especially the South Koreans and the Japanese, that the United States is in there; that we know what we are doing; that they are still much better putting their security in our hands, than going off in some crazy nuclear direction of their own. And that is why I think any impression on their part that we are going to find a way to live with what is, I think, essentially an unacceptable situation, or live comfortably with it, I think would be a real mistake. Thank you, very much, for the chance to——

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you.

Mr. Wolfowitz. I am sorry to have to leave so soon.

Mr. Ackerman. Appreciate that. Let me just observe that quite often if there is no additional known treatment, very often that which we tourniquet, usually winds up having to be severed and lost.

Mr. Wolfowitz. I had better rethink my analogy.

Mr. Ackerman. Let me—I thank you, first of all, Ambassador Wolfowitz, for being with us and we want to congratulate you on your taking over as Dean of SAIS.

Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, very much.

Mr. Ackerman. I wish you well in that endeavor. I hope to see you here before us soon.

Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you.

Mr. Ackerman. Mention was made before about—by Dr. Harrison, I believe, about the hard-liners versus the pragmatists within Korea, and that seemed to be a bit controversial on the panel. Let me ask this: where do you see, each of you, the army, the Korean military, in this equation? Where do you see differences, if any, between the government and the party? And where do you see in general the people of North Korea in this process? We will start with Ambassador Clark and we will just work our way across.

Mr. Clark. I am basically, Mr. Chairman, going to defer to my two friends here who both have consulted more with the North than I have. The fact of the matter is that I am looking at what was available to me. It is very hard to tell whether or not there
are factions within the government. Clearly, my South Korean friends tell me that the one area where there is a disagreement is on the economic side. And, indeed, there has been some indication that some of the officials from the North who came South to look at the economic progress where shunted off to one side when they went back, obviously to diminish their impact; although, they seem to be moving back in.

But, I really cannot answer that question, Mr. Chairman. I do not think we know enough about North Korea to make a judgment before a subcommittee.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. I was very pained by my friend, Bill’s statement that he did not share my view on this after all of the time he spent in North Korea, but I—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Bill Clark or Bill Taylor?

Mr. HARRISON. I am sorry, Bill to my left. He was the anti—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Bill to your right, you mean.

Mr. HARRISON [continuing]. Position and—my right.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Everybody’s right.

Mr. HARRISON. I can match his hours, and I can take them back over a longer period of years, and I have not heard the same thing. I think that there is no question that the North Koreans all spout the same line. And any situation where you are meeting North Koreans in a group of people—again, it is the tightest ship in the world today, I think, in terms of the rigid totalitarianism.

But the longer you get involved with any society, and you build-up acquaintances over a period of years, and you begin to drink with people and eat with people, getting situations where you get them alone, which can happen in the case of North Korea, the more you learn. You are traveling in North Korea, and you and your translator are together for 5 hours on a train, there is nobody else there, it is amazing at some of the things that emerge. Well, when you do this from 1972 to 1993, and you begin to pick up some relationships over a period of years, you begin to get all kinds of nuances. Nobody says the party line is all nonsense. No, but you do get very significant indications, which cumulatively add up to quite a lot that lead to the conclusions that I have presented.

Now the army has its own economic base just as it does in Indonesia, as it does in China now and, therefore, they have a big stake in certain things, including the nuclear program. And they are certainly on the side of—they are certainly the center of hawkishness in North Korea as I see it. And, of course, I do not see a government party split as such. I see within the party, there are some people who have traveled more than others. Some people who have to deal with economic problems more directly than others. And you read Kulloja, the theoretical journal, and you find some very frank differences of opinion.

It was very hard to find out what was going on in the Soviet Union between hawks and doves, but we found out later on that all kinds of things had been going on, going back to Khrushchev. And it picked up with Andropov and it picked up more with Gorbachev. And right now some of the party minutes and Politburo minutes from the early Gorbachev period, from the whole Afghan war period, have been released in Moscow, and you find very explicit
evidence of differences that none of us would have ever believed were going on in the Soviet system. In China, too, we have seen it.

So, I think it is very clear that these differences—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Assuming that there are differences, what are the differences?

Mr. HARRISON. The differences are over how soft a line to have toward the United States, Japan and South Korea; whether they really can do business with us; or whether we are dedicated to making them unravel as soon as possible and having a German solution in Korea. And that is what it is all about.

Now, Kim Dal Hyon and Kim Yong Sun are examples of people who are pretty clearly committed to the foreign economic—getting foreign economic inputs. Kim Jong Il and his group control the conglomerate that handles all of the mineral industries in North Korea, and it has most of their gold bullion exports. And they are the ones who are pushing for various foreign economic involvements, and they have opened up a bank in Taipei recently. Well, you know, it could go on.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you think the Kim Jong Il is for international involvement?

Mr. HARRISON. Kim Jong Il is playing it both ways. He started out being in favor of the foreign economic openings, but he is consortiing with the armed forces for political succession reasons on the question of exactly how to handle the IAEA. But, I think, it is very difficult to speak with certainty, of course, about what is going on inside North Korea, and one should be modest to a certain extent in trying to say we know what is going on.

All you can say is you see differences on the degree of concessions they should make in order to get—to bargain with us. But, you end up with the feeling that the dominant line is now, OK, you soft-liners, go ahead and bargain and we will see what you can get. But in the meanwhile, we are not going to give away our national sovereignty. We are going to keep some of this plutonium until you get your money on the table.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. I will match you hour for hour, gallon of—juice and just conclude that I am not going to be in the business of making policy recommendations based on nuances. If I cannot find some concrete evidence to support something, I just do not want to say it. And I do not want to make a case that there is this fissure and there could be.

Mr. HARRISON. They could not do that in China in the early 1970's, but we started to make concessions to China that made a big difference.

Mr. TAYLOR. Second, I think the role of the military is extremely significant. Kim Il-Sung has never had any trouble with the military. Kim Il-Sung has been the daddy of the military; is revered by the military. He is their myth; myth in the best sense for them.

Kim Jong Il has been struggling with the succession thing. He has been pandering, maybe that is the wrong word, but he is paying all kinds of attention to the military and taking his new position as—what is it, Generalissimo or Supreme Commander of the military.
I think he is worried about the military, quite frankly. He has come up with a——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that Generalissimo dearest?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, right. Dear Generalissimo, right. So, he is worried about the military. If the old man dies, and we better hope he does not anytime soon, all hell is going to break loose. Because, I do not think the military is going to——this is not my nuance, I am guessing—I do not think the military is going to be able to—he could hold the military together. He is trying to give them what they——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Kim Jong Il cannot hold the military together?

Mr. TAYLOR. I do not think he is going to be able to. The military is in deep trouble. There are more than nuances here. They do not have the same—they do not have the number of training hours they used to have——Bob Riscassi has made that point lots of times; do not have the flight hours for training they used to have. Military units fight the way they train. They do not train in large units, they have trouble fighting as large units.

I have seen some of their equipment broken down. I have seen things that blow your mind. A T-55 tank with a thrown track in the middle of a rice paddy, saw it on my way to Wonsan to the east coast. I came back 3 days later and the crew is sitting around the tank and the track is still thrown. We would relieve a tank commander for doing something like that. And, yet, it happened. There are other horror stories Bob Scallopina has of what flying in their helicopters is like. But, they are not in good shape. And Kim Il Sung has got to understand that. It is a fragile relationship. The military is important, that is my only point.

Mr. CLARK. Chairman, if I could take us back one point?

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, Ambassador Clark.

Mr. CLARK. The point is just this: while the military may be hawks, we usually find that men in uniform are not anxious to go to war.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think that is very true.

Mr. TAYLOR. But most military professionals in the world will obey orders.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Does Kim Jong Il survive his ascension to the great leadership from the dear leadership?

Mr. HARRISON. Not indefinitely, but that does not mean that he is——that North Korea is going to fall into——I do not think he will last very long. But, I do not think that means North Korea is going to fall apart either.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, this has been most edifying. Do you think we should have more carrots and less sticks?

Mr. HARRISON. I think we should make no unilateral concessions. But, I think we should make our carrots——make clear what we are prepared to do, and we should have a very expansive approach to that. Recognizing that we are asking a country to give up its sovereign nuclear option while we keep our own, we are making an extraordinary request of it. We are going to have to pay through the nose to get them to comply. And we should make our carrots clear.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Do you think we should have longer sticks? Forget about the carrots?
Mr. Taylor. I think we need longer sticks, graduated economic sanctions after that first international condemnation, which I think will have more impact than most people think. I think we have already had on the table, in those 10 meetings up in New York, Team Spirit, and we ought to have it on the table. We ought to get rid of it. It is useful—it is useless. We do not need it.

Mr. Ackerman. Do we announce that ahead of time? I think that they know it. Do we announce it?

Mr. Taylor. Well, let me put it this way—

Mr. Ackerman. It seems to me, we have let the South Koreans have the benefit of making that decision.

Mr. Taylor. I do not know from our side what has been on the table. But, I am told by North Koreans who have been at the table over these meetings, a Team Spirit has been very much discussed; and heed of that, did not lay out as an option. So has recognition. I have no trouble with recognition. It is not a matter of international legal niceties, as some people say it is. Our policy on recognition is what we say it is. If we want to give them de facto—we have already given them de facto recognition. Go ahead.

But knowing they can get that, with some hints that they can get economic support from moving from graphite base to light water reactors, they know all of those things are on the table. And, yet, they come up with this formula that says, come back and replace your film and your batteries, and that is all you get. And the IAEA says, “the hell with you.”

Mr. Ackerman. Let me thank this panel for their participation today. It has been entertaining besides informative. There are quite a few divergent views as to how we proceed with our policy. I am sorry we did not get to explore what your perceptions were of whether or not the Congress follow suit if the administration takes the kind of leadership on this position that has been suggested specifically by Mr. Taylor. That would be interesting as well.

We do have to adjourn this hearing right now to see over in the Foreign Affairs Committee if Congress follows the leadership of the administration on our policy toward Somalia. So with that, let me thank you for your participation. I look forward to continued discussions here. Before we adjourn, I just want to note that sitting, observing the hearing is Ken Quinones of our State Department, North Korea desk officer, who has been absolutely superb in his cooperation in sharing in his wealth of knowledge and information, and assisting me in my trip to North Korea as well.

I thank the panel for being here and I look forward to continued dialogue with you. The meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

BREAKING THE NUCLEAR IMPasse:
The United States and North Korea

Selig S. Harrison
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace


(29)
The policy proposals presented here all rest on the central premise that significant differences exist within the North Korean regime concerning the nuclear issue as part of a broader debate over foreign and defense policies. While the power structure in Pyongyang is monolithic, an increasingly sharp policy struggle within the ruling Workers Party has become apparent during the past five years, especially over the issue of whether or not the North should continue to pursue the nuclear option. Seoul, Washington and Tokyo can most effectively pursue their objectives by seeking to influence this struggle in a favorable direction.

I

On one side in the Pyongyang debate are reform-minded leaders with some experience of the outside world who have long argued that a changing international environment requires major changes in North Korean policy. These leaders have recognized that the end of Soviet and Chinese subsidies would bring economic hardship with potentially destabilizing political consequences. To preserve the regime, they have advocated a twofold reform program: first, a significant opening of the economy to increase export earnings and to attract large-scale inputs of capital and technology from the South, the United States and Japan, especially through export-oriented special zones similar to those in China; and second, efforts to reduce defense spending through arms and force reduction agreements with the South. Above all, they have called for suspension or termination of the nuclear weapons program as a prerequisite for getting external economic help.
Arrayed against the more pragmatic and cosmopolitan elements in the North has been a powerful old guard centered in the armed forces and a military-industrial complex that includes the nuclear establishment. The hard-liners believe that Seoul, Washington and Tokyo will seek to exploit the vulnerability of the North resulting from changing Soviet and Chinese policies by pursuing a German-style unification-by-absorption. Far from agreeing to negotiate arms and force reductions, in this view, the South will continue to step up defense spending, leaving the North no alternative to the continuation of its own high defense budgets. Pointing to the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the South, the hard-liners have emphasized the need for a nuclear capability as the "last card" necessary to assure the North's survival.

The United States has explicitly acknowledged the nuclear component of its strategy in Korea ever since Admiral Radford made his statement in January, 1955, that the U.S. "would be ready to use atomic weapons if needed" to stop renewed conventional aggression by the North. Soviet officials with direct personal knowledge state that Pyongyang responded to the American challenge by repeatedly asking for help in making nuclear weapons as early as 1963. Rebuffed by the Soviet Union, the North embarked on its own program soon thereafter. In economic terms, the nuclear option was initially attractive as a cheaper route to national security than an indefinite conventional arms race with the South and high defense spending levels that diverted needed resources and labor from consumer goods industries. The economic rationale appeared
particularly persuasive as the South's growth rates and margin of economic superiority soared during the 1970's. However, this rationale lost its force as the costs of a juche nuclear program mounted and as multiplying technical problems made it increasingly unclear when, and if, the program would ever be successfully completed in the absence of the foreign exchange needed to import vital equipment.

The most inflammatory aspect of the American posture in North Korean eyes was the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Korea and the fact that the possible use of these weapons figures in the periodic "Team Spirit" exercises staged by U.S. and South Korean forces. Thus, when President Bush announced the worldwide withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on September 27, 1991, the hard-liners lost one of their most potent arguments. In the months thereafter, evidence of confusion in Pyongyang's pronouncements on the nuclear issue indicated that a major internal controversy was in progress. The debate came to a head during a meeting of the Workers Party Central Committee in late December, 1991, when reform leaders won a conditional victory. North Korean officials and diplomats have guardedly revealed what happened at this meeting in conversations with me and with other foreign observers.

If Pyongyang agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, the reformers argued, this would lead to economic largesse and the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan. The hard-liners agreed to suspend, but
not to terminate, the pursuit of the weapons option, confident that American and Japanese economic and political help would not be forthcoming. Soon after the December meeting, Pyongyang signalled its readiness for a nuclear compromise. This opened the way for the meeting in January, 1992, between Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter and Kim Yong Sun, International Affairs Secretary of the Workers Party, followed by the U.S. decision to suspend the Team Spirit exercises and the North’s decision to sign and ratify the I.A.E.A. safeguards agreement and to permit the formal initiation of inspection procedures in June, 1992.

II

The test of a policy lies in its results. Judged by this standard, South Korea, the United States and Japan pursued a successful policy toward the North during the three years leading up to the 1992 I.A.E.A. breakthrough. By the same token, the policy pursued during 1992 and early 1993 proved to be self-defeating and counterproductive.

When accumulated intelligence findings made clear in 1988 that the North was pursuing the nuclear weapons option, Seoul, Washington and Tokyo adopted a carrot and stick policy, combining pressure on the North with an upgrading of political dialogue and strong signals of a readiness to provide economic largesse in return for abandonment of the nuclear weapons effort. Following the Kanter-Kim Yong Sun meeting, however, they abandoned this policy, refusing to engage in further high-level dialogue or to discuss at any level what the size and content of the carrot would
be. At the very time when the reform elements in the North needed more ammunition to consolidate their victory over the hard-liners, Washington, Seoul and Tokyo continued to apply more pressure. In June, 1992, just as the first I.A.E.A. inspections were taking place, General Robert W. Riscassi, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, announced that the Team Spirit exercises would be resumed. According to Lim Dong Won, who coordinated policy toward the North during the Roh Tae Woo period, General Riscassi did this without consulting the Roh government. The Riscassi statement had an immediate and discernible impact on the North’s posture, Lim said recently, vindicating the argument of the hard-liners that a soft line would not yield results.²

In the months thereafter, the close working relationship between the I.A.E.A. and the United States further reinforced the hard-line position. The image of the I.A.E.A. as a front for the C.I.A. was magnified in North Korean eyes when I.A.E.A. Director Hans Blix testified before a U.S. Congressional committee on July 22, 1992.³ This was the first time that the director of the I.A.E.A., an international agency, had appeared before the legislative body of a member state. The tenor of his testimony, including an urgent appeal for U.S. financial support for his agency, enabled the nuclear lobby in Pyongyang to depict him as a pliant stooge carrying out a U.S. strategy designed to isolate and undermine the Kim II Sung regime.

The atmosphere of nationalist paranoia surrounding North Korean relations with the I.A.E.A. was intensified by the fact that
demands for special inspection have never before been made in any other country. In resisting these demands, Pyongyang argued that the I.A.E.A.'s case for special inspections was based on the use of computer codes and operational assumptions different from its own and asked for negotiations to resolve the issue or for arbitration under Article 22 of the safeguards agreement. Before negotiations could take place, however, Blix, asserting that his case was airtight, reported to the I.A.E.A. Board of Governors that the North was in violation of the safeguards agreement. This led the hard-liners to say that the North had been indicted without a fair trial and to adopt a posture of injured innocence that may well mask what has indeed been cheating.

It is not within the scope of this paper to examine the specifics of the inspection controversy that has developed between the I.A.E.A and the North during 1993. Based on my conversations with North Korean and U.S. officials, my working hypothesis is that the North had accumulated more plutonium than it initially admitted but is nonetheless prepared to turn over its fissile material to the I.A.E.A. — if a face-saving formula can be devised and, above all, if Seoul, Washington and Tokyo are ready for a comprehensive rapprochement that would entail substantial economic benefits and would reverse what is perceived as a concerted effort to replicate the German absorption model of unification in Korea.

The resumption of dialogue with Pyongyang by the Clinton Administration came at a time when the nuclear issue has become intertwined with succession politics in the North and when the
power of the hard-liners has accordingly become stronger than it was at the time of the Kanter-Kim Yong Sun dialogue. Thus, even though the U.S. posture has been much more flexible than in the past, the first two rounds of talks between Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Robert Galluci and his North Korean counterparts have not yet yielded results. In the June round, the U.S. agreed to three principles that could be embodied in subsequent specific agreements if the inspection issue were first resolved: "assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial application of full-scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; and support for the peaceful reunification of Korea." This facilitated the North's decision "unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary" its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty.5

This U.S. posture showed unprecedented sensitivity to North Korean concerns but did not touch on the critical issue of political and economic normalization. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the July round cautiously tip-toed in this direction. A joint statement said that "as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issues, the U.S. is prepared to support the introduction of light water reactors...and to explore with the D.P.R.K. ways in which L.W.R.'s could be obtained." The two sides would meet again in two months, the statement added, "to lay the basis for improving overall relations between the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.A."6
Three basic policy changes would now be necessary to resolve the nuclear issue with Pyongyang as part of a broader movement to a cooperative security arrangement in the Korean peninsula:

First, the United States and Japan should recognize that the nuclear issue is inseparable from the broader problem of normalizing their relations with the Kim Il Sung regime. The time has come for a high-level dialogue between Secretary of State Warren Christopher and North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam in which the nuclear issue is discussed side by side with economic and political normalization and conventional arms control.

In order to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program once and for all, the United States would have to spell out explicitly what economic and political rewards could be expected, and when. Pyongyang would in all likelihood insist that the United States commit itself to a timetable for implementing many of the steps spelled out on pages 19 and 20, concurrent with the North's agreement to a fully transparent inspection regime and any other steps that might be necessary to demonstrate its bona fides. A high-level dialogue would also provide an opportunity to reinforce the North-South dialogue on nuclear inspections with a bilateral exchange on this issue. In the absence of such a high-level exchange with the United States to find a formula for the inspection of U.S. bases in the South, it is unlikely that a North-South inspection agreement will be consummated.
Second, the South should recognize that the nuclear issue is not likely to be definitively settled in the absence of meaningful and continuing steps to reassure Pyongyang that it is not seeking a German-style unification-by-absorption.

The most convincing form of reassurance would be provided by responding positively to the North's overtures for the mutual reduction of conventional forces. Why is this so? Because the North spends five times more of its G.N.P. on defense than the South does and is thus unable to develop its consumer industries. In Pyongyang's perspective, Seoul hopes to de-stabilize the Communist system by sustaining high levels of defense spending that the North can only continue to match at the cost of further undermining its economy.

In its unification posture, the south could also do much to allay the North's anxieties by seeking a loose confederation based explicitly on the indefinite co-existence of two separate systems on equal terms. President Roh's scenario for a "Korean Commonwealth" envisaged such a confederation in the opening stages but called for eventual elections in which the South would dominate by virtue of its larger population. By contrast, Kim Dae Jang has proposed a confederal structure in which the two sides would have equal representation indefinitely. President Kim Young Sam's unification plan follows the Roh model, envisaging in the final stage "a single, democratic republic according to the Constitution of Unified Korea and general elections".8 Taken together with the Clinton Administration's emphasis on converting authoritarian
states to market democracies, the Kim Young Sam plan has reinforced suspicions in the North that the South’s long-term objective is to replicate the German model.

Third, both Washington and Seoul should recognize that equity is the key to settling the nuclear issue. If they expect the North to surrender its nuclear option, they must be prepared to give up the concept of nuclear deterrence as the basis for the South’s defense. In this concept, the U.S. threatens the first use of nuclear weapons if the North attacks the South with its conventional forces.

At present, while removing its nuclear weapons from the South, the U.S. continues to deploy nuclear missiles in its Pacific submarine fleet and has not ruled out their use in any new Korean conflict. Nor has the re-introduction of nuclear weapons in the South been ruled out. For this reason, Pyongyang has repeatedly called not only for the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the peninsula but also for lifting the U.S. nuclear umbrella as part of a multilateral agreement on a nuclear-free zone.

The U.S. is saying to the North, in effect, "you give up your nuclear option, but we will keep ours in order to make our security commitment to the South credible." In my view, it will be difficult to obtain airtight and durable inspection access to the North unless the U.S. gives up its nuclear first use strategy in Korea. This would still leave the U.S. with a nuclear second-strike capability that could be used against the North if it develops nuclear weapons secretly and seeks to use them.
It was significant that in its June 11 joint statement with the North, the U.S. accepted the "principle" of "assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons." This could be translated into either a unilateral U.S. no first use pledge; a unilateral no-use pledge, or U.S. sponsorship of a multilateral agreement not to use or deploy nuclear weapons in Korea.

Rejecting the North's demand for a non-use pledge, Washington has hitherto refused to go beyond a 1978 declaration that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state party to the N.P.T., "except in the case of an attack on the U.S. or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapons state." Since the U.S. is allied to the South and Pyongang is allied to two nuclear weapons states, the American stand has meant, in effect, that the U.S. is reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in Korea.

While the Russian security commitment to Pyongang has become ambiguous, the 1961 "Mutual Aid, Cooperation and Friendship Treaty" between Beijing and Pyongang remains in effect, with Article Two stipulating that "the two signatory nations guarantee to adopt all necessary measures to oppose any country that might attack either nation." Thus, a unilateral U.S. no-use pledge would leave South Korea dangerously exposed. By the same token, a multilateral nuclear-free zone agreement would be desirable for the U.S. and South Korea if it could be used to draw Pyongang into meaningful safeguards structure. In such an agreement, the United States, Russia, China, the North and the South would pledge not to use or
to deploy nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula.

In an interesting recent Japanese variant of this proposal, Hajime Izumi has proposed a "Northeast Asia Nuclear Non-Proliferation Zone" in which the North, the South and Japan would "forever institutionalize their non-nuclear status while the United States, China and Russia would completely renounce a first strike against these three, besides limiting their deployment of nuclear forces wherever possible."^9

North Korea is likely to condition any resolution of the inspection impasse on some form of unilateral or multilateral U.S. non-use, non-deployment commitment. The North points out that even if the U.S. has removed all of its nuclear weapons from the South, as the South says, these weapons could be redeployed there at any time. Moreover, there is a lingering suspicion in Pyongyang that the U.S. has not in fact removed all of its air-launched nuclear weapons from the South. Explaining President Bush's decision to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons on a worldwide basis, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said on October 1, 1991, that "the President's initiative applies to ground-launched and ship-launched tactical nuclear weapons. It does not apply to the gravity bombs that the Air Force uses." The United States, with its "neither confirm nor deny" policy relating to nuclear weapons, has neither stated explicitly in public nor told the North privately that all nuclear weapons have been removed from the South, though Bush, on his 1992 visit to Seoul, did not challenge President Roh's statement that they have been removed.
In the final analysis, conventional and nuclear arms control in Korea are inseparable. It is the South's fear of a surprise attack by the North's forward-deployed conventional forces that underlies its desire for American nuclear protection. Conversely, it is the nuclear dimension of American-South Korean strategy that has prompted the North to deploy its forces so far forward and to seek its own nuclear weapons capability. The removal of the nuclear umbrella from the South would make it urgently important to pursue conventional arms control measures that should include the re-deployment of the North's forward deployed forces as part of mutual pullback and re-deployment arrangements.

Pyongyang has made progressively more explicit arms control proposals in 1987, 1988 and 1990, centering on force reductions in three stages over a three- or four-year period, accompanied by a phased withdrawal of American conventional and nuclear forces. By the end of the first stage the armed forces of North and South would each be cut to 30,000. The United States would pull back its ground forces and its nuclear weapons during the first stage to a line running between Pusan and Chinhae (35 degrees, 30 minutes north latitude). By the end of the second stage, North-South force reductions would reach a level of 200,000 and American ground forces and nuclear weapons would be completely out of Korean territory. By the end of the final stage, with force levels down to 100,000, American air and naval forces would also be gone. These proposals envisage a verification role for the Neutral
Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland).  

Until the Prime Ministers of North and South began their series of meetings in Seoul in September, 1990, the South had never directly acknowledged the existence of the North's offers. Thus, it was a breakthrough when Premier Kang Young-Hoon addressed these proposals in a five-point arms control formula:

1. "The withdrawal of forward-deployed offensive arms and troops to the rear area and the reduction of offensive arms and troops to prevent surprise attack and a recurrence of war."

2. Arms and force reductions based on the principles of parity, with "the superior side reducing its arms and troops to the level of the inferior side."

3. Reductions in para-military and reserve forces as well as regular forces.

4. On-the-spot verification and monitoring of arms and force reductions by joint verification and monitoring teams.

5. Mutual consultations to determine the "final military strength level appropriate to the unified nation."

By accepting the principle of reductions, Kang opened the way for a meaningful arms control dialogue. However, he refused to put reductions on the negotiating agenda, declaring that this issue should "be pursued only after political and military confidence-building and a declaration of non-aggression have been realized."

Kang's insistence on the principle of parity contrasted with the North's concept of equal reductions, reflecting the South's belief that the North is the "superior side," with more than a million men under arms, as against its own figure of 650,000. The North, for its part, claims that its armed forces number 450,000.
Thus, the first step in any force reduction process should be an attempt to agree on the facts concerning the military balance. As arms control experience in Europe has shown, such an effort might never be fully successful and should, therefore, be accompanied by the mutual pullbacks and reductions in offensive equipment and troop re-deployments envisaged in Point One.

The concepts of "defensive sufficiency" and "non-provocative defense" that have evolved in European arms control negotiations should be applied in Korea. For example, together with exploratory discussions on force reductions, negotiations could be initiated on the proposal for a 62-mile "offensive weapon free zone" proposed by Lim Dong Won. Tanks, mechanized infantry, armored troop carriers and self-propelled artillery would be barred completely from this zone, and the number of infantry divisions would be subject to agreed limits. Lim emphasizes that equipment is easier to quantify -- and verify -- than personnel.¹²

Comparing the arms control approaches of the North and South, James Goodby, who played a key role in East-West negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe, concluded that "the similarities in positions are greater than one might expect" at this stage of the North-South dialogue. For example, while the North has not formally proposed mutual re-deployments, its spokesmen have agreed that pullbacks would be a legitimate arms control agenda item when pressed on the issue at Washington seminars in May, 1989, and June, 1991.¹³ Similarly, in his 1990 meetings with Kang, North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Mok referred
specifically to "mutual spot inspections" in addition to verification by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. But Yon emphasized that discussions on force reductions should take place "together with" discussions on a non-aggression pact and confidence-building measures. Indeed, he argued, the South's effort to put off talks on reductions is "confidence-destroying," since it suggests that Seoul is merely seeking to make the status quo safer rather than to end the military confrontation.

Both North and South have spelled out detailed military confidence-building proposals that are remarkably similar. Both favor the withdrawal of military personnel and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone and the creation of a "Peace Zone" there. Kim Il Sung has been pushing this idea since he first proposed it in my 1972 interview with him. But the North emphasizes one C.B.M. that the South flatly rejects: a ban on all joint exercises with foreign troops such as the annual American-South Korean "Team Spirit" exercises. The North views "Team Spirit" not only as an affront to Korean sovereignty but also as nuclear saber-rattling, since the exercises are based on the "Air-Land" strategy with its explicit nuclear component. The United States, as the prime mover behind these exercises, could remove this important irritant by suspending them indefinitely.

Is Seoul ready for serious movement toward force reductions? Entrenched vested interests in the South, centered in the armed forces and a politically powerful military-industrial complex, have so far resisted a positive response to the North's force reduction
proposals. To be sure, there is also a military-industrial complex in the North, allied with hard-liners in the ruling Workers Party. Force reductions are not popular with this hard-line faction in Pyongyang. In the case of the North, however, economic factors have made such reductions imperative and have tipped the scales in the intra-party debate. By contrast, since the South spends so much less of its GNP on defense, the pressures for reductions are not as great as in the North. The South’s rapid economic growth has enabled successive regimes to avoid increasing the proportion of GNP allocated to defense while, at the same time, steadily raising the actual level of defense expenditures. Another factor making force reductions less urgent than in the North is the economic subsidy provided by the American military presence. It should be emphasized, however, that the middle and low-income majority of the populace in the South would benefit greatly from the diversion of resources now going into military spending to civilian welfare needs.

Professor Lee Chang of Seoul National University has pointed to the urgent need for increased expenditures on health, welfare and social security, comparing what South Korea spends on these programs (2.6 percent of GNP) with comparable outlays in Sweden (33.3 percent), the United States (13.8 percent), and Japan (12 percent). Less than 2 percent of the elderly receive any form of social security. According to Lee, the government spends only $390 million per year on all forms of welfare and would have to spend $1.3 billion "for every citizen to have a minimally adequate
income" (defined as $32 per month). He estimates that there are 4.3 million "poor and near poor" people earning less than $64 per month. 15

Pressures for reduced defense spending have come in recent years from a variety of sources ranging from the Federation of Korean Industries on the right to the Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice on the left. Significantly, the resistance to force reductions does not come primarily from government technocrats concerned about its economic impact. Rather, it comes from defense contractors whose profits would be reduced; from a military elite fearful of losing jobs and perquisites, and from hawkish strategists who believe that both North and South should keep their military forces at high levels so that a unified Korea can confront Japan and China from a position of strength.

Whatever temporary compromise might be reached to resolve the NPT issue and existing IAEA inspection disputes with Pyongyang, the Kim Il Sung regime is not likely to give up its nuclear option completely unless it is convinced that Washington, Tokyo and Seoul are ready for normalization and are not seeking to promote its collapse. In my view, the price for a meaningful nuclear inspection regime in the North would include some or all of the following elements:

1. The exchange of liaison offices with Pyongyang by the United States, preliminary to the establishment of diplomatic relations

2. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Pyongyang ending the Korean War
3. American efforts to promote force reductions by North and South Korea that would enable Pyongyang to reduce its defense spending.

4. The removal of trade and investment restrictions on the North from the Trading with the Enemy Act.

5. American support for Japanese economic aid to the North and for the expansion of South Korean trade and investment.

6. Establishment of a consortium involving the United States, South Korea, Japan and multilateral aid agencies to supply light water reactors on concessional terms, provided that the North phases out its existing reactors and reprocessing plant and agrees to full-scope safeguards.

7. American support for North Korean access to the Asian Development Bank and other multilateral agencies.

8. Admission of North Korea to the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (A.P.E.C.) grouping, as suggested by the Japan Forum for International Affairs.  

9. U.S. government encouragement of American private sector economic collaboration with the North, especially in the development of mineral resources.

10. American readiness to discuss eventual American ground force withdrawals from the South, contingent upon the reduction of the North Korean threat to the South through the re-deployment of forward-deployed offensive forces.

In American eyes, this would be an exorbitant price, but in the North Korean perspective the United States should be prepared to pay a high price indeed if it wants others to give up their sovereign nuclear option while retaining its own.
NOTES

1. On a Moscow visit in 1991, John W. Lewis of Stanford University interviewed Vladimir Nikipelov, head of the department that sold Pyongyang its first research reactor; Nikolai Ermakov, the nuclear specialist who headed the Soviet advisory mission to the North Korean atomic energy agency for ten years, and Igor Kachenko, a leading North Korean specialist on the Communist Party Central Committee.


10. For the texts of the first two of these proposals, made in 1987 and 1988, see Selig S. Harrison, Dialogue with North Korea, Report of a Seminar on Tension Reduction in Korea, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1989), Appendix B, pp. 47-50. See also "On Easing the Tension


PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR.
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
NOVEMBER 3, 1993

(51)
Recently the United States and IAEA have expressed to North Korea that time is running out on their non-compliance with IAEA safeguard inspections. Reportedly, North Korea has been warned that, without their compliance, the issue will be taken to the U.N. Security Council. In 10 or more recent low-level, U.S.-DPRK meetings in New York, U.S. and North Korean officials reportedly have been doing a diplomatic dance to gauge each others positions, with the Americans offering various inducements such as suspension of the annual U.S.-South Korea "Team Spirit" combined military exercise and diplomatic recognition. If such offers in fact induce the North to comply with IAEA demands, so much the better.

Team Spirit is unnecessary in this day of computer simulated, command post exercises (CPX's) and is too expensive at these times of defence budget austerity in both the United States and in South Korea. And diplomatic recognition—so important to North Korea and already bestowed de facto in high level meetings—costs the United States and our allies nothing of consequence. How far the United States wants to go in recognition is not a matter of international legal detail, rather it is a matter of international politics. In the end, U.S. policy on recognition is what our government says it is.

But, I doubt seriously that these U.S. carrots will induce the North to abandon its minimalist position and to cooperate fully with the IAEA or to take any serious steps in the renewed N-S Korea talks at Panmunjom. So, we have to think concurrently in terms of "sticks," or a "compel it strategy," to get the DPRK to stop stonewalling the IAEA and to terminate their nuclear weapons program if we discover that they have one.

Compellent strategy is different from deterrent strategy and is far more difficult to implement. Deterrence is about preventing an adversary from taking an action.
Compellence centers on forcing an adversary to stop an action already begun. It is relatively easy to deter Pyongyang's leadership from attacking South; they cannot want to commit suicide. It is much more difficult to compel the North to stop a nuclear weapons program which the international community (without definitive evidence) strongly believes to exist. Any approach involving compellence must be thought out carefully and implemented with precision.

I have just returned from 9 days in Seoul where I met with ROK government officials, members of the ROK government party (DLP) and the opposition party (DP) as well as with scholars and officials at a CSIS conference with the ROK Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. I sensed a very high level of frustration in Seoul which matches the level of frustration in Washington, Tokyo, and in the IAEA about North Korea's nuclear program. This frustration stems from the fact that the specific "carrots" and "sticks" offered to the North have produced almost no positive results for many months. Washington's allies in Seoul and Tokyo are searching rapidly for some solution to this crucial problem. It is this building sense of frustration, potentially leading to poorly thought out policies, that often results in disaster.

It is a fact that no one outside Pyongyang knows conclusively whether North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program. However, North Korea's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA is now leading many to assume that North Korea is stalling, with the intention of buying time to build a small arsenal of nuclear weapons.

On November 1, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reported to the U.N. General Assembly that North Korea's non-compliance with international nuclear safeguards has been growing. He went on to say that an October 28 telex from Pyongyang stating that the DPRK would permit IAEA inspectors to revisit two sites the agency inspected in
August 1992 for routine maintenance was unacceptable.

The same day, 140 members of the General Assembly passed a resolution praising the IAEA for its impartial efforts and pressing Pyongyang to cooperate immediately with the agency. Only 9 members, including China, abstained.

The present level of frustration, combined with Pyongyang's half-measures in response to current diplomatic efforts, make it almost certain that either the United States or the IAEA (perhaps both) will take this issue to the U.N. Security Council. The first and most obvious issue is what China will do in any Security Council vote on sanctions against North Korea. Would China abstain from a sanctions vote (as they have on every other U.N. Security Council vote in regard to economic sanctions against any country), or would they veto a sanctions resolution against the North? Even if it were to abstain, would China cooperate with U.N. Security Council sanctions?

Judgments, even in our own government, differ over China's reaction. At the moment, some think that China might veto U.N. sanctions against North Korea simply because U.S.-China relations are at a very low ebb, given the recent U.S. sanctions against China for violating the MTCR (in regard to Pakistan) and the Yin He incident (the alleged PRC attempt to ship chemical weapons precursors to Iran) - not to mention the fact that Beijing has blamed the United States for lobbying the International Olympic Committee to vote against China for the Olympics 2000. Dr. Gerrit Gong, CSIS Director of Asian Studies, thinks that China will not cooperate with U.N. economic sanctions against North Korea. It is a very rare occasion when I argue with Dr. Gong about China's policies; he is an expert. In fact, the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Xu Dunxin, recently stated "We can't agree to sanctions." The question is, what did he mean by sanctions? All sanctions? Partial? Economic? Political?
Despite the present low ebb in U.S.-China relations, it appears that the Clinton Administration is making a concerted effort to turn the relationship around through increased dialogue. Perhaps Beijing can be induced to understand that there are potential benefits in continuing its tradition of abstaining on all U.N. Security Council votes on economic sanctions.

Despite the uncertainties, I think that the North Korean nuclear issue should and will be taken to the United Nations, given the current impasse.

There are three types of sanctions: military, political, and economic. Initially, let's deal with the notion of military strikes against Yongbyon. First, at least China would veto any such proposed U.N. sanction, so forget it. Second, a unilateral or combined U.S.-ROK military strike such as Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor makes no sense because:

1. Accurate intelligence on the location of DPRK nuclear production facilities does not exist (this is one of the reasons why the IAEA needs the inspections at Yongbyon and special inspections elsewhere). Thus, one would not know which targets to hit.

2. The well-known DPRK capability and propensity to "dig in" important military facilities under many meters of rock leads to the conclusion that one could not penetrate relevant targets with existing conventional weapons.

3. Nuclear strikes at selected targets could wreak radiation havoc—depending on the weather—on South Korea, Japan, China and elsewhere.

4. The leadership in Pyongyang is not comparable to Iraq's Sadam Hussein in 1981. There is a very high probability that the DPRK would attack south
immediately; many of their leaders have told me so, and I believe them. Seoul would be destroyed at a minimum.

5. If the worst of the pessimists are correct in stating that the DPRK may already have a nuclear weapon, some of South Korea— and perhaps Japan— could be turned into an ember glowing in the dark. Of course, as President Bill Clinton said in a July 9, 1993 NBC-T.V. interview: "We would overwhelmingly retaliate if [the North Koreans] were to ever use, to develop and use nuclear weapons. It would mean the end of their country as they know it."

Net political-military assessment of UN-sanctioned or U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command military strikes against the North? It is a non-option.

That leaves non-military sanctions. Rather than immediately attempting to strangle North Korea, I recommend that the U.S. support Security Council action beginning with a political sanction condemning North Korea for failing to live up to its international obligations under the NPT. Graduated sanctions are more likely to get China to go along and at least abstain in the Security Council. Some might think that this step would mean little. However, given my reading of Juche (the North Korean philosophy of "self-reliance" and my hundreds of hours speaking with the most senior North Korean officials, including Kim Il Sung, I think that the North's leadership places more importance on positive international recognition of their system than some other people do. My view on this might be supported by anyone visiting Mount Myoyong and the DPRK "international friendship exhibition" which contains gifts and expressions of respect from foreign government officials or anyone else from around the world who bestows gifts on the Great Leader or Dear Leader.
If this initial sanction does not produce North Korean compliance with the IAEA and serious DPRK dialogue with the South producing tangible results, then the U.N. should proceed to economic sanctions which would be clearly articulated in advance. Economic sanctions have rarely, if ever, proven effective. However, this does not mean that, as a part of a compellent strategy, they could not demonstrate to Pyongyang that the costs of stiffing the international community increasingly outweigh conceivable benefits. Economic sanctions could be applied at a dozen or more levels. The first level would be designed to persuade the North that they cannot continue to "play a nuclear card" and expect that anything good will come their way to help them out of their increasingly dismal economic situation. For example, the United States, South Korea and Japan might be persuaded to use leverage to induce all parties to the Tumen River Project and other joint ventures to slow or stop any progress in cooperation with North Korea. If these initial sanctions did not work, the U.N. and others could then go to fuller graduations of economic sanctions -- perhaps all the way to a full maritime blockade.

Throughout all this, the goal is to change the North in its approach to the NPT, IAEA and the South. The objective should be North Korean compliance without forcing North Korea to lash out militarily with such measures as SCUD missile attacks against Seoul or, much worse, a full invasion of the South. As I have stated, often and recently, North Korea would lose in less than 60 days any war that they initiate, or that the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command might initiate, in reply to any kind of DPRK attacks against Seoul. However, all of us must think hard about every scenario and what would happen to Seoul in any North-South war. A full scale war would lead to the utter destruction of Seoul in a matter of days, even though the North would lose the war.
No one wants the North Korean regime to collapse totally, especially Seoul, because various South Korean studies show that the price tag for handling refugees and reconstructing the North would range anywhere between 200 billion dollars and one trillion dollars.

The goal must be to get Pyongyang to accept not just regular inspections, but also special inspections. In exchange, carrots can include U.S. diplomatic recognition, South Korean request for suspension and subsequent cancellation of Team Spirit or continuing dialogue from the South and future economic assistance from Seoul. For the stick, in my opinion, gradual U.N. Security Council sanctions, beginning with political condemnation and subsequent graduated economic sanctions—tightening the screw, constructively rather than bludgeoning Pyongyang destructively.

Again, it is not at all clear that the very high level of frustration in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington will lead to a properly orchestrated approach. Seoul clearly prefers a continued policy of engagement with the North. In fact, South Korean Minister of Unification Han, Won Sang said just that in an October 19 speech in Seoul. And with 70,000 Koreans living in Japan, about 40 percent of whom have chosen to retain formal ties to North Korea, the new government of Prime Minister Hosokawa might find it very difficult to support economic sanctions, especially if sanctions included cessation of remittances to North Koreans from Koreans living in Japan.

Beijing also clearly favors engagement. On the other hand, North Korea's paranoia about any interference or pressure from outside powers may mean that even the most rational, carefully orchestrated diplomatic approach will fail and result in a second Korean war. What is critical is to minimize that risk and maximize effectiveness by carefully planning and implementing U.S. policy in conjunction with our relevant
allies, regional actors, and international organizations.

The increasing tensions are worrisome because it is at times such as this that wars can start by accident or miscalculation. On the other hand, all major powers in Northeast Asia have an interest in preventing North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and we cannot afford to sit back and just wait. A key issue is how U.S. policy is coordinated with South Korea, China and Japan. We must provide a firm, yet non-threatening, unified front.

The final issue is whether our government is now prepared to become involved in yet another full-blown U.N. crisis beyond Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Implementation of U.N. sanctions against North Korea is not a matter to be taken lightly. There are real risks involved. However, the North Korean crisis is clearly not the issue to ignore, hoping it goes away. North Korea challenges almost all the highest foreign policy priorities of the Clinton Administration—nuclear nonproliferation, missile technology control and human rights. Meanwhile, the rest of the world is watching very closely these days to see the way the world's sole superpower leads—or fails to lead—in international relations. U.S. leadership is essential and a carefully orchestrated approach is critical to that leadership.