THE TRAGIC DEATH OF CHANG TSO-LIN

A Documentary Survey of a Prelude to the Japanese Invasion of Manchuria

by

T. P. K'UNG

Peiping, 1932
Marshal Chang Tso-lin
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PREFACE

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, head of the Peking Government, was killed by a mine or bomb at daybreak on June 4, 1928, while his special train of the Peking-Mukden line was crossing beneath the South Manchurian Railway bridge near Huangkutun station, just before entering Mukden.

Although the general public already considers this tragic and mysterious event a matter of history, the fact remains that there is a very close relationship between this murder and current events in Manchuria (whose correct name, we cannot too often repeat, is "The Three Eastern Provinces"). The death of Chang Tso-lin was one of the main events which logically led up to the coup of Sept. 18, 1931, when the Japanese entered Mukden. As far as the logical sequence of historical events are concerned, and as far as the reasoning of the Japanese cliques who believe in the Tanaka "positive policy toward China" is concerned, the coup of last September might well have been expected two years earlier. As Japanese documents indicate, the death of Chang Tso-lin seemed to many leaders in Japan to be the sign that the "occupation" of the Three Eastern Provinces was to begin immediately.

Knowing these facts and mental processes, we appreciate the great political significance of the murder of Chang Tso-lin, and appreciate the urgent value of a study of the murder as a basis for an understanding of the events obtaining now in the Three Eastern Provinces.
The purpose of the following pages is to supply this need with documentary, scientifically culled information on the death of Chang Tso-lin. The writer offers a detailed analysis of the tragedy, basing his statements on Japanese official documents and on reliable and impartial reports.

After sketching very briefly the Far-eastern situation leading up to the outrage, we give the facts of the explosion, quoting the impartial investigations of Reuter's News Service; from Reuter's and other studies of the damage done by the explosion, it is obvious that the work was done not by hand bombs but by mines, carefully planted and exploded by a highly technical system of wiring. We then discuss the question of whether the Japanese or the Chinese were responsible for the protection of the railway crossing at which the mines were laid and, after comparing pros and cons, it is found that the Japanese could not possibly have failed to notice such mine-laying. In chapters III to VII we quote from the more authoritative and significant documents which indicate what public opinion thought of the case, and tell of the efforts of Tanaka and his partisans to hush up the whole question. Finally, we quote Japanese sources on the punishment by Japan of some of her officers who were in Mukden at the time of the outrage, and a speech by Major Kawamoto; we estimate that these Japanese documents constitute a de facto Japanese confession of the guilt of military leaders partisan to the Tanaka "positive policy toward China", officers for whose actions the Tanaka Cabinet was ultimately responsible.

T. P. K'ung
Peiping, March 20, 1932.
I. THE POSITIVE POLICY OF THE TANAKA GOV'T.

AND

THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE DEATH OF CHANG TSO-LIN

By June of 1927 the Chinese revolutionary army had occupied the Yangtze Valley and was preparing to continue its march into North China. In the meanwhile, in Japan the Wakatsuki Government had resigned and the famous Tanaka Cabinet had come into full control, able to dominate the political life of the Japanese Empire. The Tanaka Cabinet and its policy was under the leadership of the greatest advocate of a "strong" policy toward China. Tanaka, it must be remembered, had already acted according to his policy, by instrumenting the Twenty-One Demands while he held the post of Vice-Director of the Japanese General Staff. It was he who planned the Japanese military expedition to Siberia in 1918. When he was made Premier, the masses in Japan looked forward to a realization of his ideas in the form of aggressive actions against China, and extraordinary steps were anticipated, especially since he was known to be among the most influential of Japan's military leaders.

True to himself and to the forebodings of the Chinese, he publicly advocated his famous "positive policy toward China" as soon as he entered upon his new duties. He sent an expedition to Shantung to check the advance of the Chinese revolutionary army toward the North. This action on his part forced the Nationalists to give up their march northward, since difficulties with China's neighbor were unthinkable at that time. Thus the Sino-Japanese conflict was for the time being avoided and, having succeeded in their object, the Japanese troops withdrew, in the winter of 1927.
The next year, however, found the Chinese army advancing toward North China. It very soon reached Shantung, having set out hurriedly with the hope of reaching Tsinan, the capital of Shantung, before Japan could send any troops to that province. The Chinese Revolutionary army was successful in reaching Tsinan on April 30, 1928, but Japan was equally quick in its despatch of troops and the Japanese army reached Tsinan simultaneously with the Chinese. On May 3 the Japanese started an offensive and the events occurred which are known throughout the world as "the Tsinan Incident". The actions of the military at Tsinan left over 10,000 Chinese civilians homeless and destroyed millions of dollars worth of Chinese property. Once again, the Nanking revolutionary government desired at all costs to avoid trouble with Japan and withdrew its forces, allowing the Japanese army to occupy Tsinan. The Japanese eventually withdrew from the Shantung capital but the "Tsinan Incident" has never been settled; the question of responsibility of the Japanese for the loss of civilian lives and civilian property and other questions are still awaiting solution.

In the same year the Chinese revolutionary army had succeeded in pushing northward in spite of Japanese opposition. The old Peking government, seeing the critical nature of the national situation, decided to withdraw its army to Shanhaikuan and thence to the Three Eastern Provinces. On May 18, General Tanaka, in the name of the Japanese Foreign Office, called together the diplomatic representatives of all the more powerful Western nations, to tell them that Japan would take all action needed to preserve peace in Manchuria and that no Chinese civil war would be allowed to penetrate Manchuria (the Three Eastern Provinces). This official declaration came as a complete surprise to the Western officials assembled in Tokyo. When the news was reported in the West, the sentiment in Europe and particularly in America was against this "positive" policy of Japan in
what are obviously China’s internal affairs. Japan’s declaration of policy made the Western powers particularly uneasy because by this time the West fully appreciated the world importance of Far-eastern affairs and the danger lurking in any alteration of the status quo of Chinese sovereignty.

Putting Tanaka’s words into action, Japan transferred all the troops she had stationed in Shantung to Manchuria, and concentrated them on Mukden. At the same time, Japan moved her military headquarters from Dairen to Mukden. The situation was so acutely critical that the smallest spark might well have started a conflagration in Manchuria, bringing far-reaching changes in the entire Far-eastern situation. It was at that moment of threatening turmoil, when the peace of the Far East was at the breaking point, that the bomb was laid which killed Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

II. WHAT HAPPENED AT HUANGKUTUN
ACCORDING TO REUTER’S INVESTIGATION

On June 2, 1928, Chang Tso-lin, at that time head of the Peking Government, left Peking for Mukden. On June 4, at 5:30 a.m., when Chang’s special train was crossing underneath the bridge of the South Manchurian Railway, a bomb or mine exploded from above inflicting a death blow on Chang Tso-lin; he died a few hours later. The military governor of Heilungkiang, one of the Three Eastern Provinces, was killed instantly by the explosion.

As Chang’s train was on the Peking-Mukden line, and as the S.M.R. tracks cross above this line at this spot, the explosion wrecked the bridge above, which fell in, and damaged the carriages not directly affected. This indicates what a tremendous quantity of explosive must have been used.
The tragedy caused consternation all over the world. The newspapers of Japan united in their attempt to tell the world that their government and military men had had no part in this crime. One Tokyo paper, however, the Hachi Shimbun, printed some news concerning the incident which laid the Japanese military leaders open to suspicion. This article brought immediate suspension upon the Hachi Shimbun.

*Reuter’s News Service*, which connects up with most of the world’s great newspapers, cabled the following report to Europe and America:

“Mukden, June 7. The spot on which Chang Tso-lin was murdered, has been investigated. The upper part of the train has been destroyed but not the lower part which is untouched. This shows that the explosion must have been caused by one or two mines which might have been put at the bridge where the Peking-Mukden and the South Manchurian railways intersect. According to the estimates of experts, the force of the explosion must have been some 200 pounds which exploded just at the second when Chang Tso-lin’s special train was passing by. It could not have been done by automatic mines; it must have been started by electric wires. However, the work of such kind takes at least six hours. According to the arrangement, the plot must have been carried out by army workers. The eyewitnesses said that the spot where the tragedy occurred was well guarded. No person was allowed to pass by until next morning when the Japanese soldiers began to withdraw from the place. The time from dawn up to the moment when Chang’s train passed by was not sufficient to have worked out the plot. The government agencies have not been able to investigate the incident and everyone is surprised. Hand grenades certainly could not have destroyed the train and the rails to such extent.
We must keep in mind the fact that the Mukden-Mabtian Railway is extensively patrolled by Japanese soldiers. The very site of Chang Te-hi's death, two Chinese were found hanging, though up to now nothing has been discovered. This indicates the Japanese were responsible for the attempt.
Therefore all doubt the truth of such an explanation. Some say that the bombs were hidden beforehand in the train but this seems not true.” (from the Chinese translation)

We must keep in mind the fact that the South Manchurian Railway is exclusively patrolled by Japanese troops. On the very eve of Chang Tso-lin’s death, two Chinese were shot down by the Japanese for having, through ignorance of the arbitrary regulations, trespassed on the crossing where the two lines intersect. This indicates the “supreme efficiency” of the Japanese sentinels and eliminates any suspicion that others but the Japanese were responsible for the outrage.

Almost a month later, after very painstaking work by members of its staff, the following exhaustive investigation of the bombing of Marshal Chang Tso-lin’s train just before its arrival in Mukden was issued by Reuter’s News Service, from its main office in Shanghai:

“‘The bomb outrage at Mukden on June 4 which resulted in the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Wu Chun-sheng, his most trusted lieutenant, who was governor of Heilungkiang and acting governor of Manchuria, seems likely to become one of the crimes of history. Despite the fact that a Sino-Japanese Committee of Enquiry was formed to investigate and to discover the plotters immediately after the outrage, no authentic statement has been issued up to the present, it being understood that the Chinese members of the Joint Committee refused to sign the report drawn up by the Japanese members.

“The author of the following lines has had the opportunity of closely following and studying the circumstances both before and after the accident, and believes himself therefore capable of laying the facts before the public. The facts he be-
lies to be indisputable—he leaves to the public to draw its conclusions.

a. The Make-up of the Train

"Arrangement of special train carrying Marshal Chang and suite.

2 Locomotives.
3 3rd Class cars for body guards.
3 1st Class cars for cabinet ministers, adjutants, Marshal Chang's third son and others.
1 Tsin-Pu Railway 1st class steel car ("Blue Express") for some cabinet ministers.
1 Peking-Mukden railway private car (No. 80) for Marshal Chang.
1 Dining car.
9 cars for suite, guards, baggage, etc.

b. The Place of the Outrage.

"The disaster took place just where the South Manchuria railway between Mukden and Changchun, on a viaduct, crosses the Peking-Mukden railway between Huangkutun and Mukden City station.

"The viaduct consists of three spans, supported by two piers in the middle and buttresses at both ends. Both piers and buttresses are of granite masonry, the former with a core of concrete and measuring about 6 feet across. The steel bridges, each more than 30 feet long, are of heavy construction, the beams being about 5 feet high. Close to the viaduct, at the base of the South Manchuria Railway embankment, there are
three blockhouses built for the Japanese railway guards, two on the east side and one on the west side. They are made of railway sleepers and surrounded by barbed wire entanglements.

c. The Story of the Eyewitnesses

"At about 5:30 on the morning of the 4th of June the train was approaching the fatal crossing, having passed Huangkutun station without stopping and running on the Northern track of the Peking-Mukden railway. At the moment Marshal Chang's car passed the viaduct, a terrific explosion occurred, which was heard all over Mukden. A few seconds after the explosion the passengers in the train heard a thundering crash, evidently caused by the steel spans of the S. M. R. viaduct falling down on the train. After the explosion the train is said to have moved on, but after the crash it stopped.

"The body guards on the train immediately alighted and, finding nobody round, started firing in the air as a demonstration and alarm signal. The firing was only kept up for a few minutes.

"Shortly afterwards Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Wu Chun-sheng, who had been sitting together in the observation room in the center of the former's car, were taken out and attended to. Both were seriously injured; Chang was taken away by a Ford car that had arrived and was driven to his mansion in the city. Wu was put in a carriage and taken into a Japanese hospital where he passed away about an hour later. All the other wounded persons were also taken out of the cars and attended to.

"The disaster claimed only two fatal casualties among men of political importance, viz. Marshal Chang, at whom the plot
was primarily aimed, and Wu; several other prominent people were however more or less seriously injured, the following being a list of them: Mo Teh-hui, ex-civil governor of Fengtien and Minister of Agriculture; Yu Kuo-han, chief of Staff; Chang Ching-hua, Minister of War; Liu Tse, Minister of Education; Wu Chin, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chen Chi-yun, private secretary to Marshal Chang and Major Giga, the Japanese military adviser.

d. Effects of the Explosion

"(A) Both steel bridges of the northern span and the eastern bridge of the central span were blown up at the ends where they were supported by the northern bridge of the central pier; the western bridge of the central span was dislodged.

"(B) The upper portion of the northern pier (granite masonry with core of concrete) was largely destroyed.

"(C) Two cars of the train (the Marshal's car and the dining car) were demolished; one car (a blue steel car) was partly wrecked and one car (behind the dining car) was destroyed by fire.

"These effects will now be described separately in detail.

"(A) The steel bridges: A careful study of the position of the bridges a few hours after the explosion showed that the southern ends of both bridges of the northern span must have been lifted out of their supports, not vertically but obliquely, towards the west, so that these ends instead of landing again where they had rested, were thrown down on the moving train, at the same time breaking loose the northern ends. By the momentum of the moving train the beams were turned further until
Marshal Chang's car in flames as a result of the explosion

Debris of the car
(a)

(b)

Other views of the cars gutted by fire. (From photographs taken some hours after the explosion.)
they became parallel with the cars, at the same time being carried forward some distance. The eastern steel bridge of the central span was thrown in the opposite direction towards the east and turned fully 180 degrees.

"(B) The northern pier was destroyed from the top downwards while the northern buttresses opposite were left completely intact. Both ends of the pier were completely blown away to a depth of several feet while in the middle there was a deep crater.

"(C) The explosion completely wrecked the Marshal's car and the dining car and partly wrecked the blue steel car in front. The significant fact in this connection is that while the roofs and walls of the cars were completely smashed the chassis were left almost intact, as was the track underneath. The bodies of the Marshal's car and the dining car were afterwards completely destroyed by fire, and it has therefore been impossible to ascertain if the damage to these cars was caused by the air-pressure of the explosion, or by the falling steel bridges, or by fire.

e. The Origin of the Bomb

"From the above facts the following conclusions must be drawn.

"1. The explosion was caused by a great quantity of high explosive, placed on the northern pier, underneath and beside the northern and central spans of the bridge.

"2. The ignition of the blasting charges must have been done electrically from a safe distance from the bridge. This necessitated elaborate preparation with electric detonators and connecting wires.
"3. The placing of the explosives and their ignition was done with considerable skill and forethought. The whole arrangement and its complete success unmistakably denotes the hands of trained and capable sappers.

"4. Experts agree that the installation of the blasting charges with detonators and connecting wires must have taken four or five experienced men six hours to complete."

f. The Question of Responsibility

Although our final chapters, "The Fall of Tanaka" and "The Speech of Major Kawamoto", show conclusively from Japanese sources the ultimate admission by Japan of the responsibility of officers under control of the Tanaka Cabinet, we must take under consideration the evidence ascertainable from the location of the train at the time of the explosion and the circumstances of the murder. The present chapter presents the evidence obtained on the spot and shortly after the incident occurred while our final chapter confirms the conclusions we reach here by indicating to what extent the Japanese ultimately admitted their responsibility.

As we have already said, the place where the explosion took place is located within the South Manchurian Railway Zone which is entirely under the control and protection of the Japanese authorities, though that control having no legal status. However, since the Peking-Mukden Railway intersects the former line at the point where the disaster occurred, the spot is simultaneously part of the latter line. Some time prior to the incident here discussed, the two lines reached a modus vivendi by which the Japanese would patrol their property while the Chinese would patrol their line at this spot. This has been repeatedly referred to in Japanese newspapers in the attempt to shift responsibility for the crime to the Chinese authorities. The Chinese,
however, insist that as a matter of fact their guards were never allow-
ed by the Japanese to carry on their patrol work as was their right ac-
cording to the agreement between the two parties. Thus, although
technically they had a right to patrol the zone of intersection, the Chi-
inese guards were prevented by the Japanese from coming within 200
yards of the viaduct. This Chinese claim is indirectly confirmed by
the following statement issued by the War Office in Tokyo on ap-
proximately June 18. This statement, however, gives us the impres-
sion of having been phrased ambiguously with conscious intention:

"At the point of crossing the Chinese guard were under
the command of Lt. Kin, who speaks and understands Japanese
quite well. The guards were stationed there at 8 p.m. on the
3rd June and while Japanese guards were sent on to the S.M.R.
bridge (which crosses the P.M.R. line at this point) they kept
watch to within about 200 metres from where the bombing took
place. During the day time watch was kept by keeping a strict
look out in all directions, but at night time the spot was patroll-
ed."

Since, however, it has already been demonstrated that the explo-
sive charges had been placed on top of the stone pillar under the
S.M.R. bridges and against the beams of the latter, it is on the Ja-
panese authorities that the full responsibility for the outrage falls.

There is nothing they can claim in attenuation. They had ample
forces available for patrolling the spot, and what is more, there is
every evidence that they really did patrol it, both according to various
statements of their own and of independent witnesses. It is known
that two soldier guards march at regular intervals along the railway
track, starting from the Mukden S.M.R. station and continuing to
Wenkuantun, the first station north of Mukden, 5 miles distant. Im-
mediately upon their arrival at the latter station, two other soldiers walk the same way back to Mukden, and so on continually. Moreover, there is, about 150 yards south of the viaduct, a Japanese watch shed erected on top of the railway embankment, where about a dozen Japanese guards are constantly stationed. Here a search-light has been installed, by which the line—including the fatal point of intersection—can be effectively illuminated at night, and which has often been directed at the passing trains of the P.M.R. line. Various witnesses agree that throughout the days immediately preceding the outrage, Japanese guards were posted at the viaduct, either on top of the embankment or at its base on the Huangkutun road. On no less authority than the Japanese official investigation committee we know that the spot was patrolled throughout the night preceding the fatal morning, and that one of their sentries actually witnessed the explosion. Chinese witnesses declare that people coming from Mukden who wanted to pass through the viaduct in the early morning were refused passage by Japanese sentries posted on the road east of the crossing. In short, when and how the plotters could have carried out their elaborate preparations right under the nose of the Japanese guard, remains an insolvable mystery—unless the Japanese authorities themselves were instigators of, or accomplices in, the plot. They alone had at their command all the elements necessary to carry the scheme through successfully: detailed advance information of the disposition and movements of the train, technical expert knowledge, material resources, and—to the exclusion of everybody else—the unhampered opportunity for preparing the coup.

The attitude of their own authorities and press in regard to the incident greatly strengthens these suspicions. The accounts of the disaster circulated by the Japanese news agencies, among them the official Japan Press Bureau, the pronouncements of the Consular au-
torities and lately the finding of the official investigation committee have been throughout characterized by what must be stigmatized as wilful misrepresentation of facts for the purpose of concealing the truth and misleading public opinion. Otherwise intelligent Japanese in responsible positions seem all of a sudden to have lost all their powers of observation, reasoning and judgment, presenting nonsensical and palpably mendacious statements and obviously untenable surmises. Not one of the military experts close at hand at the time of the incident seems to have been summoned to prepare a professional report and pronounce his verdict. The guilt of the Chinese has been considered a foregone conclusion. While carefully avoiding the presentation of evidence in support of their accusations, the Japanese consular authorities have tried to place entire responsibility on the Chinese provincial government. The Japanese have used all their powers of persuasion, during conferences lasting for hours to make the latter subscribe to their mendacious version of the outrage and acknowledge themselves guilty.

In the first communications of the local Japanese press correspondents stationed in Mukden, as well as in the telegraphic despatches circulated by the Japan Press Bureau, it is positively asserted that "a gang of southern plain-dressed agents threw bombs at it (the train)" and that "a bomb was thrown at it by Southerners in plain clothes" (J. P. B.). It is, moreover, stated that "the bodyguards of the train opened fire with machine-guns on the bombers" (Man.), and in another message the same reporter goes so far as to assert that "the engagement lasted for an hour, causing considerable casualties". The official J.P.B. version of this phase of the incident runs: "The Chinese guards on the train immediately opened fire on the perpetrators of the

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1 The Mainichi local correspondent who was on the spot immediately after the disaster.
outrage who were Southerners in plain clothes, but they succeeded in making good their escape.” Another passage in the same message has it that “when the bombing took place some Japanese patrols were also on the scene and witnessed the outrage, but they remained neutral and refrained from firing on the delinquents, when they saw that the Chinese guards on the train were firing.”

Now this bomb-throwing story must be a pure fabrication, in spite of all the persistency with which it has been repeated in Japanese messages. Not one of the several passengers on the train questioned about this point admits having seen any such men. As already stated, according to these passengers the Chinese guards fired in the air. Besides, taking the real facts of the case into consideration, it seems unbelievable that the master-ploters who accomplished the marvellous feat of mining the viaduct with such deadly precision, while themselves invisible to the Japanese guards, should have committed the stupidity of throwing ineffective hand bombs, when all they needed was one man, hiding nearby at a suitable observation point, with the death-dealing switch in his hand. This bombing-story is obviously a preconceived canard which the public unexpectedly found too misshapen to swallow. It has therefore been quietly dropped by the official investigation committee.

An allied episode, fabricated to reinforce the above bombing story by concretely demonstrating the existence of a bombing gang prowling about the scene shortly before the disaster is more difficult to abandon. It is therefore still adhered to by the official investigation committee, although it has no raison d’etre after the burial of the bombing story. Briefly told, it is alleged that about 3 a.m. or about two hours before the disaster, three suspicious looking Chinese climbing over the railway embankment near the viaduct were stopped
Two views of the S.M.R. viaduct beneath which the Peking-Mukden train was passing
(a) from the S.M.R. level. (b) from below.
and searched by the Japanese patrols. As they offered violent resistance, trying to drop bombs behind them, two of them were killed. On their persons were found letters proving them to be Southern agents. After the burial of the miscarried bombing version this story remains hanging in the air, as nobody believes the conspirators, having successfully installed the blasting charges, would be foolish enough to prowl about the place with hand-bombs and letters of identification in their pockets. Who the unfortunate fellows killed by the Japanese guards really were will probably never be found out.

As the bombing story was found already generally discredited on the day following the outrage, more acceptable substitutes had to be resorted to by the Japanese. So the theory of a bomb hidden in one of the cars, came into being. It was first published by the Manchuria Daily News on June 5th and is adhered to by the Japanese Consul-General in his protest filed with the Foreign Intercourse Office at Mukden on June 7th (translation published in Manchuria Daily News of June 9th).

Again, according to the official statement of the Tokyo War Office published about June 18th, based on the findings of the official investigation committee which had allegedly carried out "a close and detailed inspection of the locality where the attack took place" it is declared that "the explosion is supposed to have been caused by an immense quantity of high explosives and that the explosives must have been placed on the rails at the foot of the stone railway bridge supports." This verdict by an official committee, which must necessarily have consulted the opinions of competent and responsible specialists, constitutes cogent evidence against the Japanese authorities, definitely establishing their deliberate insincerity.

We shall only give one more clue, which is unofficial but perhaps instructive. The following evidence of two Chinese who happened
to pass the viaduct on the previous night, shortly before midnight, may be given for what it is worth. For obvious reasons these witnesses do not wish to have their identity disclosed; it should however be pointed out that they were questioned separately in detail, neither knowing that the other was being questioned. Their answers are in complete agreement in every detail.

The two men, coming from Mukden, arrived at the viaduct about 11.30 p.m. Sunday night. They noticed a motor-car standing on the road about 50 yards east of the viaduct with its lights out. Under the viaduct, on the northern track of the Peking-Mukden railway, were standing 5 or 6 Japanese officers and some soldiers. The witnesses state that they were frightened by the threatening appearance of the Japanese, but were not accosted and were allowed to pass unchallenged.

Conclusion

The results of the present investigation may be summarized as follows:

(1) The destruction of the South Manchuria Railway viaduct and of the cars of the passing train on the Peking-Mukden track below, was caused by the simultaneous explosion of various electrically ignited blasting charges of high explosives, installed in a manner revealing it the work of experienced experts. Part of the charge was placed on top of the northern stone pier, under the steel bridges, and part on top of these bridges piled up against the sides of the beams. Hence the explosives had been placed in positions belonging to the South Manchuria Railway Co., for the protection of which this company and the Japanese authorities are alone responsible.

(2) Since the careful preparations necessary: i.e. the correct placing of the blasting charges, their fastening and tamping, the in-
stallation of wire-connections with detonators, etc., require 5 to 6 hours' work by at least 4 or 5 men, such elaborate preparations could only escape detection and remain unchallenged by the Japanese patrolling guards on one of the following two premises: (a) the patrolling of the spot was extraordinarily lax and disorganized, or (b) the Japanese authorities connived at, aided and abetted the conspiracy.

(3) Since, according to statements not only of independent witnesses but of the Japanese authorities themselves, the patrolling of the intersection point was efficiently organized and vigilant, leaving no interval sufficient for the plotters to complete their preparations, circumstances irresistibly support the second of these alternatives (b).

(4) Since the misleading and erroneous versions of the causes of the explosion, circulated not only by the Japanese news agencies, but lately also by the responsible Japanese authorities, cannot be ascribed to any involuntary misunderstanding due to lack of competent expert advice, they unmistakably reveal the deliberate purpose to suppress the disagreeable and shocking truth.

III.

THE REACTION AFTER THE TRAGEDY

The criminals were of course aware of the fact that Chang Tso-lin was the effective leader of Manchuria. In the event of his death the situation in Manchuria would be bound to undergo tremendous changes—civil wars. Thus a chance would be created for outside intervention. Fortunately, the Chinese authorities saw this peril and did their best to keep the situation quiet. On the one hand they tried to keep secret the death of Chang Tso-lin. On the other hand they kept Manchuria in good order. Meanwhile, they tried to pacify the Japanese authorities thus giving Japan no excuse to interfere. This defeated the intrigues of the plotters.

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Then, hoping to create a panic, the Japanese army practised military manoeuvres near the new city district of Mukden (they used to carry on such manoeuvres in the suburban districts where no one could see them). But the Chinese people, understanding this intrigue, paid no attention. Besides, the Japanese residents outside the railway zone began moving from the Chinese city into the railway zone. All these things did not disturb the peace and order in Mukden and the intrigue failed.

This unhappy state of affairs drew the attention of the world to the Manchurian situation and after a certain length of time the public in all nations began to see the bombing incident in its true light, as a Japanese intrigue. Criticism came from all corners of the world. This was particularly effective when it took such forms as the declaration by Secretary of State Kellogg of the United States that Manchuria has always been regarded as an integral part of Chinese territory and that no one would be allowed to annex it. At the same time the British House of Commons raised certain questions concerning the Manchurian situation. The press opinion of Soviet Russia was also very critical of the policy of Japan toward Manchuria. Meanwhile, peace and order were maintained in Manchuria as usual, by the routine Chinese authorities. All these circumstances gave Japan no excuse for any intervention and the whole scheme of throwing Manchuria into a state of chaos failed. The only victims of the whole plot were Chang Tso-lin and Wu Chun-sheng. And, up until September 18, 1931, Manchuria was an integral part of China.

IV.

THE TRAGEDY IN THE JAPANESE LOWER HOUSE

(a) Tanaka's Action before the Opening of the House.

The truth concerning the death of Chang Tso-lin has come to be gradually understood by the world, as regards the intention of the plot.
However, the people in general have gradually lost interest in the affair, while China because of her weak position has refrained from creating difficulties with her neighbor by bringing up the matter. Thus by September 18, 1931, the tragedy was forgotten by almost everyone. It is, however, interesting to know that on December 20, 1928, when Tanaka called the members of the Lower House together in regard to the budget of the Japanese Empire, Mr. Riutaro Nagai, a member of the Minseito party, raised questions concerning the foreign affairs of the Empire, including the tragic death of Chang Tso-lin.

**Question by Mr. Nagai:**

"According to the reports in many Japanese papers, all foreigners consider publicly that the death of Chang Tso-lin was caused by Japanese intrigue. They also believe that Japan plotted this tragedy in order to realize her ambitions in Manchuria. This incident occurred within our railway zone; we have the right to investigate the affair. Why did not our government make an investigation of the tragedy and publish a report in order to maintain our national honor?"

The answer of General Tanaka was:

"We regret deeply that Chang Tso-lin was killed by a bomb. It is certainly a grave incident. Japan, as a close neighbor of China, is indeed in an embarrassing position. Therefore it is necessary to investigate the case. Our government has taken steps toward such an attempt. But it is not an easy job and takes some time."

Mr. Riutaro Nagai replied:

"It has been some time since the death of Chang Tso-lin. Furthermore our Consul-General and the Fengtien Police
head have together made an investigation, a report of which has been drafted. Why did not our government publish the report?"

To this question, Tanaka answered:

"Investigation has to be very carefully made. It is hard to get any concrete evidence. The report cannot be made public unless it is reliable."

After this quiz, the Tanaka cabinet seemed worried about the Mukden murder. Several meetings of the cabinet were called to discuss the matter. On January 21, 1929, the day before the opening of the Japanese House, Tanaka called the members of the House of Peers to his official residence and said the following to them:

"According to the papers a certain grave incident has happened in Manchuria which our government is still investigating. Before the report is published, questioning on this matter in the House would be unfavorable to the welfare of our Empire. I hope that you will inform your respective members not to raise any question in the House concerning this affair. The government called you here in order to make this point clear."

After hearing this, certain members asked:

"What do you gentlemen mean by a certain grave incident?"

Tanaka and Ogawa smiled and refused to answer. Mr. Kuroda then asked, "We are invited here because of this affair?" The answer of Tanaka was "Yes". Kuroda said that this was a matter the Prime minister should report to the House and that the members present could not guarantee that the House would not raise questions. It was from this meeting that the famous quotation in the Japanese papers "A CERTAIN GRAVE INCIDENT" originated.
Soon afterwards, Tanaka again invited the Parliamentary leaders, Yuko Hamaguchi and Takojiro Takonami, to the rest room in the House. He tried to secure their promise not to raise questions concerning the death of Chang Tso-lin for the sake of the Japanese Empire. To this Mr. Takonami said "We might not raise this question but what really is the grave Manchurian incident? It is certainly awkward to raise such a question in the House but the incident has been frequently referred to in the Press although our government is said not to answer such questions. We do not know how the question should be settled." Tanaka replied to Takonami's request for information by saying that for the sake of the welfare of Japan it was best not to explain the incident. Finally Mr. Yuko Hamaguchi said:

"Sir, if you will not explain the incident but instead, in the name of our national interest ask us not to raise the question in the House, I, in the name of our party, reply that we will raise the question in the House to make the case clear to ourselves and so that the general public can understand what the incident really is." This flat refusal greatly disappointed General Tanaka. Thus the government's plan to avoid raising the awkward question in the House was a total failure.

(b) The Beginning of the Questioning in the Japanese House.

The effort of Tanaka to silence the House concerning the "grave Manchurian incident" failed with everyone except the government supporters and the followers of Takonami. On January 22, 1929, Riutaro Nagai raised the question; the government members of the House tried to stop him but failed. According to the record of the House the conversation was as follows:

Nagai said:

"At present, foreigners hold the Japanese responsible for the Manchurian tragedy. We do not see that any steps have
been taken by our government to clear up this misunderstanding. We would like to know why. All foreigners make Japan responsible for the death of Chang Tso-lin. We do not see why our present government does not publish a report in order to clear up such a misunderstanding. The outrage occurred within the railway zone of the South Manchurian Railway line for which our military force and our Kwangtung territory police force are responsible. Our government should order them to investigate the case with every possible means in order to maintain the honor and prestige of our army. A real patriot should take such steps. ........

The answer of Tanaka was:

"... As for the grave Manchurian incident, it has been taken under serious consideration and the investigation is still going on. I decline to answer questions about it right now."

Mr. Nagai was not satisfied with Tanaka's reply and asked the Japanese war minister, Shirakawa, to answer. The war minister rose several times to reply but General Tanaka stopped him by a glance from his seat. Hence General Shirakawa was silent. Mr. Nagai was not satisfied with such manoeuvres and reserved his right to raise the question at some other time. The next day when the House met again, a member of the Minseito party, Mr. Katsuta Yokoyama, again asked the war minister, Shirakawa, to answer the same question but without any satisfactory result. Hence the grave Manchurian incident was allowed to stand unexplained and the Japanese government ordered the Press not to publish any news whatsoever concerning it.

(c) Mr. Seigo Nakano raised the question again.

For several days after the incident was questioned by Yokoyama and Nagai, no troubles occurred in the House. But on Jan. 25 of that
year, a member of the Minseito party, Mr. Seigo Nakano, raised the question again, when the House was considering the budget of the Japanese Empire. Based on the report of the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun and the Osaka Asahi Shimbun, the conversation between the Premier and Mr. Seigo Nakano is as follows:

Q. Mr. Seigo:

"... On May 18 of last year, our government made an astonishing declaration concerning the peace and order in Manchuria. What understanding has our government secured from China and what are the impressions of the Powers in regard to this declaration?"

A. Prime Minister Tanaka:

"Because of this declaration, military clashes near Peking and Tientsin were avoided and peace and order in Manchuria were secured. The Powers did not raise any protest in regard to this declaration."

Q. Mr. Seigo:

"But on the next day, Secretary Kellogg of the United States issued a press communiqué and declared that he did not have any previous knowledge of the declaration and that the Powers were deeply impressed by our declaration."

A. Tanaka:

"The American note was misreported by the Press."

Q. Mr. Seigo:

"The press communiqué of Kellogg was not denied by the State department of the United States. Moreover it stated that the United States always regards Manchuria as an integral part of China. Our government is taking a positive policy only to-
ward China but takes no definite attitude toward the United States. Great Britain seems to have made strong comments on our policy toward Manchuria. The said declaration has not only been misunderstood but has been a matter of great concern to our Japanese people. Our government takes the responsibility of issuing such a declaration, hence our military departments have shown some anxiety, as if war were threatening. But though affected by the American communique, our military circles are divided among themselves. This makes the presence of our Army in Manchuria awkward."

A. Tanaka:

"Our government has issued such a declaration; it is natural that the military departments should be cautious. Otherwise our declaration will have no effect."

Q. Seigo:

"Sir, is it because you are interested in a military game that you issue this declaration? Under the condemnation of the world, you seem to have given up the plan. It is the starting point of the so-called 'CERTAIN GRAVE INCIDENT IN MANCHURIA'. The government tried to cheat the world by all possible means in regard to this incident. It, however, concerns the honor and fame of the Japanese people. It is necessary to clear up the facts. We are not as a party particularly interested in the facts of this incident but the general public is doubtful, so why did not you, Sir, make the situation clear?"

A. Tanaka:

"The matter is still under investigation. For the sake of the welfare of our Empire, questions about it cannot be answered right now."
This is the brief summary of the conversation between the House member and the Premier. Tanaka refused to reply on other points concerning the incident, and the questioning came to nothing.

(d) The House Asks the Japanese Government to Explain the Tragedy

On January 31, the Japanese House sat in session. Several members of the Minseito party moved that the House ask the government to publish the report concerning the incident. This, however, was not done because of the opposition of the government supporters. Yet the question of Mr. Toyokichi Tabuchi and the speech of Mr. Shoichi Sando were of particular interest. Mr. Sando visited the site soon after the tragic death of Chang Tso-lin near Mukden. His personal observations and the facts mentioned in his speech are valuable in throwing light on the truth of the outrage. Moreover, Mr. Toyokichi Tabuchi publicly declared that “It was Tanaka who murdered Chang Tso-lin.” The conversation between the members of the House and the Premier was as follows:

Q. Mr. Shoichi Sando:

“......The first question I want to raise and to which I want a satisfactory reply from the Premier, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War concerns the so-called 'Certain Grave Incident in Manchuria'......On January 22, the government requested the members at the House of Peers and some representatives from the Lower House to hold a meeting and asked them not to question the 'certain grave incident'......

..........................When the House opened its present session, the question was again raised by some members of the House. The government maintained the attitude that the so-called 'certain grave incident' has some relationship with the problem of
Manchuria. This shows that the death of Chang Tso-lin on June 4, 1928 has close relationship with the Manchurian question."

"The second question I want to raise is the fact that our government maintains the attitude that the whole incident is still under investigation, and that it cannot therefore be answered at present. I question very much the truth of this statement. ...... When the incident happened, I was .........at Mukden. I personally investigated the case right after the outrage. The case is very simple, and it occurred within our jurisdiction. ............Gentlemen, the incident was within the Japanese jurisdiction......It is certainly a grave international problem. It also affects our position in Manchuria. Since the incident, more than eight months have passed........yet the case is still said to be under investigation. On the one hand we may say that our government is absolutely inefficient while on the other our military force has lost its prestige in Manchuria. I request the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War to answer these questions."

A. To these questions, Tanaka answered in the following words:

"Yours is certainly a sincere and patriotic question. I hear it with great sympathy. I have tried carefully to investigate the problem in order to clear up all misunderstandings all over the world. If there is anything that has affected the honor of our Empire I will try to clear it up. But this cannot be hastily done. Gentlemen, according to your observation, the matter is simple but a careful study of the case will reveal the fact that it is very complex. I hope you appreciate this fact by now."

Q. At this moment, Mr. Genji Matsuda, a member of the Minseito party moved:
General Wu Chun-sheng,
Governor of Heilungkiang, who was sitting with
Marshal Chang in the latter’s private car and
was also killed by the explosion
"That the government should publish the report concerning the so-called 'Certain Grave Incident in Manchuria' as far as it has been studied to date, in order to clear up the world's doubts."

The motion was, of course, lost by 198 to 222 votes. But during the debate, Mr. Toyokichi Tabuchi made a strong speech which is highly instructive and worthy of being quoted:

"I am not quite clear as to the case in question. It seems to be the question about which Mr. Tanaka requested the parties to keep a certain secrecy. It is feared that a little carelessness may overthrow the cabinet. China, the United States and some other nations might use the incident to overthrow the Tanaka government and Japan would thus lose prestige abroad. If foreign nations say that it is the Japanese who murdered Chang Tso-lin, they are sinning against justice and humanity. .............

"If the Minseito party has the courage to defend the honor of Japan and the principles of humanity, they should openly declare that it is Tanaka who murdered Chang Tso-lin. This would be an honorable course to take. But they want only to overthrow the cabinet, which is not an honorable course."

...........................................

V.
THE TRAGEDY AS SEEN IN THE JAPANESE HOUSE OF PEERS.

(a) The First Questioning.

After the questions raised in the House of Representatives, the Japanese House of Peers was also anxious to raise the same questions.
Consequently its member, Mr. Eizo Ishitsuka, raised questions concerning the affair on January 29, when the Upper House was in session. The conversation between the member and Tanaka or Shirakawa is very impressive in that the cabinet's replies quite contradict those made in the House of Representatives. This made the situation very awkward for the Japanese government, for it always pays more attention to the Upper than to the Lower House. This is because the Lower House has governmental supporters who always support the government whereas there are no party lines among the members of the Upper House. Therefore the government's attitude toward the Upper House has to be different from that toward the Lower one. However, the Japanese government could not frankly explain the case so it was in a very awkward position when the Upper House raised the same question. The conversation in the Upper House was as follows:

Q. Mr. Eizo Ishitsuka:

"...Recently, according to the account given by certain pamphlets and the Japanese newspapers, the case was said to have been plotted by the Russians. But the author of these papers seems to be someone quite familiar with the condition of our government. The rumor they circulate certainly has some propaganda function. If the murder was committed by the Russians, why did they choose the place where the Peking-Mukden and the South Manchuria railway lines intersect? Moreover, the Russians certainly would not have committed this crime."

A. Tanaka replied:

"I paid no attention to these pamphlets or the papers. Therefore I do not know what to answer."
Q. Mr. Eizo Ishitsuka again:

".......After the outrage, certain English people started to investigate the case and published their findings. At the same time, the American consul and two vice-consuls have investigated the case. The Chinese of course have studied the situation thoroughly. Even the Japanese believe that Japan has to bear the responsibility. These are all facts. The case has already become an international riddle. I am not particularly interested that it should be made clear in every respect, but an explanation of her position is certainly the honorable course for Japan to take, so as to clear up this international riddle. ....................."

A. Tanaka’s reply:

"As for Mr. Ishitsuka’s question, I hold the same view and will make it clear on a future occasion. It is still under careful investigation."

Q. Again Mr. Ishitsuka asked:

"..............On May 18, our government declared that Japan will bear the responsibility of keeping peace and order in Manchuria..............Moreover, on May 22, our government moved the military headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden..............The military and police forces were concentrated at Mukden with the object of protecting the peace and order in Manchuria. But Chang Tso-lin was killed. This grave outrage could not be prevented. On this point I am very dubious..............Furthermore, the place of the crime was at the intersecting point between the two railway lines. The Peking-Mukden line is 524 miles long. The outrage happened within 20 feet of...............? It is certainly a doubtful case.
And above all the place where it happened is within the jurisdiction of Japan according to the treaty provisions. It was under the patrol of our railroad guards and Chinese protection at that particular spot, yet under such protection the outrage occurred without any previous warning. Why?"

(b) The Second Questioning.

Since the above questioning in the Upper and the Lower Houses, there were other occasions on which the same question was raised. For instance, on February 29 another member of the Upper House, Mr. Hidejiro Nagada raised the same question, but from another angle. Mr. Hidejiro Nagada said:

"........As to the so-called 'certain grave incident in Manchuria' I have no intention of asking any details concerning the case. But I would like to ask the attitude of our government toward the case. Chang Tso-lin has been dead since June of last year. After almost eight months, it is still considered an important case in the minds of the Japanese people.................

Mr. Tanaka and Chang Tso-lin were good friends and it is certainly true that Tanaka did not intend to kill Chang Tso-lin. Such an accident is after all only a trifling thing from the point of view of world affairs. Yet it has created a lot of trouble. It is because our Tanaka government did not take a frank attitude toward the case from the very beginning.............In the first place, the government did not speak frankly of the murder of Chang Tso-lin but called it 'a certain grave incident in Manchuria'. We do not see why they have to use such a mystifying expression.................This caused a lot of doubt to arise in the mind of the general public.............Moreover, when the
Premier called the members of the House of Peers to a conference asking them not to raise the question in the House. Tanaka and the war minister smiled without answering when a member asked what they meant by the words, ‘certain grave incident’ .

Tanaka answered such questions with the remark that the government was prepared to investigate the case in order to make it clear. Since then no more questions have been raised in either of the two Houses.

VI.

THE TRAGEDY AND THE JAPANESE PRESS

(a) The Government Censorship

When the outrage occurred, on June 4, 1928, newspapers throughout the world published the news concerning the case. But the Japanese papers were ordered by the Japanese government not to publish any information in regard to the Mukden murder. The publication of the Tokyo Hochi Shimbun was suspended because it violated the order. When the Japanese Parliament started to raise questions concerning the case, the Tokyo Police Department issued the following order on January 25, 1929. It was sent to all Tokyo news agencies and papers.

"Under the headline of 'Certain Manchurian Incident', concerning the death of Chang Tso-lin, and its relation with the Japanese people, it is forbidden to publish anything, as ordered before. Any false news relating to the case may have serious effects on the Empire's foreign relations. The interests of the Empire will be seriously affected. Therefore all debates in the private meetings of the Parliament which might lead to doubts are hereby forbidden publication."

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(b) The Fantastic "Advertisements" in the Japanese Press.

When the Houses raised questions concerning the Mukden murder case, the government was in an awkward situation. The cabinet was afraid of being overthrown. On February 4, all Tokyo papers published a fantastic advertisement concerning the so-called "CERTAIN GRAVE INCIDENT". The exact wording of the warning is as follows:

"A WARNING TO THOSE WHO HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS CONCERNING A 'CERTAIN GRAVE INCIDENT'.

"Gentlemen, are you sincerely discussing our national affairs? The certain grave incident in Manchuria is an affair which is not favorable to the interest of our nation. Therefore the government, unless it has sufficient evidence, and unless our international relations will not be affected by the incident, has to answer 'it is now under investigation'. We trust your common sense will see the delicacy of this answer.

"If you see it, and yet continue to raise such question, you are traitors. If you really do not see it, you are fools, and not qualified to sit in the Imperial Parliament, or to discuss national affairs. We dare appeal to you, as traitors or fools, that your blind struggle for political power has made you mad. If you have no sense of judgment, please send this statement to your father and mother, or your wife, or your relatives so that they can judge it for you.

"Above all, certain of your group seem to have secured certain material concerning the case. If your material is beneficial to the welfare of the nation, why should you report it in the
House instead of sending it to or for the reference of the government? On the other hand, if your material is not beneficial to our state, your discussion in the House is certainly not right,... or is it that you are fools?

"We, the undersigned, sincerely believe that we are honest and patriotic. If you try to press the government to answer, then you are hypocrites and traitors. Alas! Why do we have so many such men in our Imperial Parliament? Is it because our God has abandoned our nation? Under such circumstances, it is of course natural that our problems with China cannot be settled.

"Ever since ancient times soldiers quarrelling within a city wall have been defeated by an outside force. You, gentlemen, have really disturbed our front line and have supplied ammunition to our enemies. If the sun and the moon continue giving light as usual, gentlemen, you will receive heavy punishment unless you reform."

"Signed,

The Reporters Association for the Preservation of the State"

This fantastic warning created a sensation in Japan. The advertisement title and the signature were printed in big letters. The main message was printed in second and third size characters. It was placed at the front page of the paper covering almost one sixth of the whole page. The cost of such an advertisement is at least 2,000 per day. The total expense of the warning in the thirteen Tokyo papers must have been 30,000 per day. The news reporters are supposed to be poorly paid and without much property. Could their association afford 30,000 for the advertisement? The circumstances in which
this advertisement or warning was issued force us to conclude that the Japanese government or some faction in it was afraid of any disclosure of secrets concerning the murder of Chang Tso-lin.

VII.

THE FALL OF THE TANAKA GOVERNMENT

As seen above, the Tanaka government was questioned several times in both Houses of the Japanese Parliament concerning the "grave incident" in Manchuria. The answer of the government was always: "still under investigation"; after these "investigations", the government would publish the report of its findings. Yet, as late as the end of June, almost five months since the question was first raised in Parliament, the report concerning the Manchurian case remained unpublished. Then the Japanese Parliament sent delegates to ask the government for an explanation of this silence. The Elder Statesmen were of the same opinion as Parliament. Forced by this pressure, the Tanaka government consented to publish the story of the murder case. The report did not, however, touch upon the question of responsibility. According to the opinion of General Tanaka, the question would be settled if several of the military officials serving in Manchuria were punished. But the Minister of War, Yoshinori Shirakawa, held the opinion that the whole Cabinet should be responsible and the Japanese military officials should not be held responsible. Therefore, there was a direct conflict of opinion between the Japanese militarists and the Japanese cabinet. Then Tanaka, in his position as Prime Minister, submitted the case to the Japanese Emperor saying that only the military authorities in Manchuria should be held responsible. However, the Japanese Minister of War had the same right to appeal the case directly to the Emperor. The report of the war minister was entirely different from the opinion of Tanaka. Hence the Japanese
Emperor could not decide what to do, but referred the whole case to
the judgment of the Minister of Interior, who held the opinion
that the whole cabinet should be responsible. At the same time,
another official presented the whole truth to the Emperor and ac-
cused Tanaka of cheating the highest Japanese authority, the Mikado.
The Japanese Emperor was not satisfied with Tanaka and several
times refused to see him. Consequently Tanaka decided, on July 1,
that the whole cabinet should resign. But the details of the so-called
"Certain Grave Manchurian Case" have never been published. At
the same time the Japanese government issued the following orders in
which several military officials in Manchuria were punished.

1. General Chotaro Muraoka, the Commander of the Kwan-
tung army, was transferred from active service to reserves.

2. Major Kawamoto, of the Ninth Division, was dismissed.

3. The former commander of the Kwantung army, General
Tsune Saito, was warned as to his negligence of duty.

4. General Takezo Mochi, the Commander of the Railway
guards, for neglect of duty and causing property loss to the
South Manchurian Railway, was warned for allowing an ac-
cident to occur within the railway zone.

VIII.

THE SPEECH OF MAJOR KAWAMOTO.

When Major Kawamoto was dismissed, he expressed his dissatis-
faction with the policy of the government. On July 8, he made
an hour and a half speech at Karazawa, Japan, in which he blamed
Chang Tso-lin as the man who checked Japanese interests and expan-
sion in Manchuria and in which he criticized Japanese policy in Man-
churia as being too weak. He also maintained the view that Japan
should overthrow the Chinese military power in Manchuria. The speech was commented on in an editorial in the Japan Chronicle of Kobe under the title "Who Has Killed Chang Tso-lin?"

"At the beginning of his speech Major Kawamoto realized that at present he is not in a position to speak without being noticed by the public. However, the Major continued that the truth concerning the Manchurian problem, as he saw it, had to be disclosed. The Major maintained Japan has sacrificed much in order to secure her inalienable rights in Manchuria. Therefore he made the statement 'The best means to protect the Japanese interests in Manchuria and in Mongolia and to extend Japanese influence is to destroy Chinese military rule in Manchuria.'

'Major Kawamoto went on to state that it was the late Chang Tso-lin who was the great obstacle to Japanese interests in Manchuria and Mongolia as secured in the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 (the Twenty-one Demands). Next, the Major tried to relate the facts as to how Chang Tso-lin blocked the interests of the Japanese and he attacked Chang with mean language. He also cynically criticised the policy of the Japanese government at that time toward China and pointed out the fundamental mistakes of the Japanese policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia.'

"After a long speech which lasted almost an hour and half, the Major concluded his talk with the following significant sentence, 'For us Japanese, to wipe out Chinese militarism in Manchuria is merely an easy child's game'."

To this the Chronicle commented:
"With mean language, the Japanese Major, Kawamoto, has attacked the late Chang Tso-lin as the obstacle to the extension of Japanese influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. Chang Tso-lin, of course, used all peaceful means to check Japanese extension of influence beyond the provisions of the treaties. But to what extent the exercise of the treaty rights has been checked or who really is responsible for such actions is, however, not the business of or within the power of a military Major........."

Based upon the above quotations, it is very clear that the recent coup d’etat in Manchuria is far from being an accident but might have happened in 1928. From this study of Japanese and non-partisan documents it would appear that the death of Chang Tso-lin was an item in a long-premeditated program for acquiring control of Manchuria. According to this program, the Mukden coup and its developments ought logically to have occurred two years before they actually did take place. Circumstances postponed but in no way altered Japan’s program.