KIM JONG IL: DAY OF HAVING KOREA REUNIFIED

NORTH KOREAN SCENARIO FOR WAR AND PEACE

Kim Myong Chol
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Shocking prediction that surprised even Clinton. Something will happen in the Korean peninsula in 2003!
A daring forecast of the future that nobody but a military and diplomatic commentator of incisive reasoning guessed on his independent thought and analysis, the forecast which deserves the comment of *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* that he has a wide access to north Korea.
An easy, clear and sensational book by an editorialist of the Nautilus Institute of the United States who has close relations with many Americans and happened to be invited to the National Defence University in Washington and other institutes.

*Kim Jong Il: Day of Having Korea Reunified*, the book dealing with the Korean reunification question, was published in Japanese in October 1998 by Kojinsha, a military affairs publishing house in Japan.
The new Bush administration's hardline policy towards Korea is gravely challenging the effort to build up peace which was welcomed by the world last year. Another war or peace in the Korean peninsula? The world is focusing its attention on this question.
Expecting that the readers will be interested in *Kim Jong Il: Day of Having Korea Reunified* written by Kim Myong Chol, the editorial staff of our publishing house publishes in different languages its pocket edition published in September 1999.
Editor's postscript is carried in the last part of this book.
Kim Jong Il in the days of the Korean War

Kim Jong II, with his father Kim Il Sung, visits the General Exhibition of the Korean People’s Army.

Kim Jong Il in a military training in his days of Kim Il Sung University
Kim Jong Il in his university days

Kim Jong Il visits a front line unit of the KPA with Kim Il Sung.

Kim Il Sung (right) and Kim Jong Il inspect a MiG fighter of the KPA air force.
Night exercise in an air force base

Airborne landing practice
The parade held in Pyongyang on July 27, 1993

Photographs are from *Iron-willed Commander* published in Pyongyang.
Kim Jong Il inspects a tank which was domestically developed for mountain warfare.

Kim Jong Il shows a skilful marksmanship.
Kim Jong Il inspects a firing practice of a rocket-launcher unit.
Kim Jong Il observes the firing practice of an artillery unit.
Kim Jong Il meets the soldiers at a post of the Military Demarcation Line.

Women AA machine gunners of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards
INTRODUCTION

Will the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (north Korea) collapse, as rumour has it? Or is it here to stay? This book gives my answer to the question. My answer is somewhat different from that contained in other books dealing with north Korea, published earlier.

The first conclusion of this book is the prediction that north Korea will not crumble, but that its economy will be completely revitalized by Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea.

There is a prospect that north Korea will overcome its present economic crisis in a year or two, miraculously revitalize its economy in four to five years, and then increase its per capita national income to 10,000 dollars in the ensuing four to five years.

The second conclusion is that Kim Jong Il will normalize DPRK-US relations early in the 21st century, and peacefully reunify the Korean peninsula. The DPRK-US Agreed Framework reached in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 21, 1994, and the year 2003 defined by the agreement provide the basis for this prediction.

The third conclusion is that there is hardly any possibility of DPRK-Japan diplomatic relations being normalized earlier than DPRK-US diplomatic relations. Whether DPRK-Japan relations are normalized or not, north Korea's economy will be splendidly rehabilitated, and Japan's economic aid or
indemnities will no longer be a political instrument to be utilized in negotiations between the DPRK and Japan.

This book views the Korean question as a question of DPRK-US relations, one of removing pent-up "rancour", and develops its logic in line with the three conclusions mentioned above.

When the Korean question is viewed from the point of view of the Korea-US relationship and pent-up "rancour", north Korea and the United States are the sole parties to the Korean question; south Korea is not in a position to take the initiative in the settlement of the Korean question. From this, it follows that Kim Jong Il of north Korea is the right person to settle the Korean question.

This book has been written on the basis of my articles published in the United States, my lectures there, and my talks to US government officials and military authorities concerned.

The first article was titled, Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals. It was published on the Internet by the think-tank, the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California, on September 5, 1995. The gist of the article was that, by the Geneva Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, Kim Jong Il placed Korean reunification within sight, and that diplomatic relations would be established between the DPRK and the United States around 2003. President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Ambassador Gallucci in charge of the Korean question, and all the other related officials of the State Department read the article and expressed interest in it. This served as an occasion for the intelligence analyst of the US State Department and me
to deliver lectures at the Japan Institute of International Affairs in Tokyo, on October 13, 1995.

The article about the strategic missile development plan of north Korea was titled, *Kim Jong Il’s Military Thinking and War Scenario*. This article was also published on the Internet by the Nautilus Institute on April 5, 1996. The article, which became a big topic among the Pentagon officials concerned, was quoted during the hearing about the missile threat at the House of Representatives on May 30 the same year. The full text of the article was carried in *The Asia Times*, a daily published in Bangkok, Thailand, and was reprinted by many influential papers in Southeast Asian countries. The article became a topic also in south Korea, and its section dealing with missile attack was carried in newspapers there.

The article, *DPRK Perspectives on Arms Control* was published in Seoul on May 27, 1997. The latest article was published on January 6, 1998 under the title, *Kim Jong Il's Roadmap to Peace and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Prospects of 4-Party Peace Talks*. It was also published on the Internet by the Nautilus Institute, as was the case with the first article.

Lectures were given on October 1, 1997 at the think-tank, the Atlantic Council in Washington, which is said to be intimate with the US military, and on October 7 the same year at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies affiliated with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command in Honolulu.

Readers may have different opinions about this book. The prospects may largely vary according to their viewpoints. There will be nothing strange, however, if they have different
viewpoints and opinions. The most important thing is to agree to disagree.

Kim Myong Chol
Significantly, the publication of *Kim Jong Il: Day of Having Korea Reunified: North Korean Scenario for War and Peace* by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Pyongyang is a most timely event to come at a time when the Bush Administration, inaugurated last January, is feared in capitals of the world to take a hard line toward Pyongyang. Reading the book will leave the world audience with little doubt that the Bush Administration will end up picking up where the Clinton Administration left off, settling for a negotiated package solution with the Kim Jong Il Administration not later than the year 2003.

What underlies *Kim Jong Il: Day of Having Korea Reunified* is an entirely new nationalist approach to the Korean question. The book will go a long way toward helping satisfy the growing international demand for a balanced, informed picture of the Korean question. This book provides the world audience with better insights into the least known nationalist perspectives of Kim Jong Il on the Korean question.

The north Korean leader dismisses the view of the Korean question as ideological rivalry between socialist north Korea and capitalist south Korea. He writes off such a view as fundamentally unfounded and presents a picture of the Korean question as one of military confrontation between the victims, the Korean people and the foreign aggressors,
the United States and Japan. He defines the Korean struggle as a sacred war to settle the moral scores with the Americans and the Japanese.

The international audience will marvel at the prospect of seeing the north Korean supreme leader leaving the United States holding the bag as he will succeed in neutralization and removal of the American factor from the Korean scene. Given the obvious American responsibility for the division of the Land of Morning Calm, they will agree to share my prediction that Kim Jong Il will preside over the negotiated reunification of the divided country in a bisystem federal framework without having to fight the Americans and the south Koreans in shooting war.

This English translation is from the Japanese original book under the same title, which was published in Tokyo in October 1998. Its publisher is Tokyo-based Kojinsha, one of Japan's most conservative publishing houses, specializing in military books. Public reception of the Japanese original was so favorable that I was invited to appear on Japanese TV, contribute comments to Japanese dailies and magazines and give talks.

A south Korean version was published in Seoul in January 1999. As the first casualty of authoritarianism is truth, within hours of its hitting bookstores in Seoul the book was banned by the south Korean authorities. Currently, unauthorized south Korean translations are available on websites in the United States and south Korea.

Kim Myong Chol
May 2001
Tokyo
PART 1. "SACRED WAR TO GET RID OF RANCOUR" ⋅⋅⋅ 1

1. The Question of Removing "Rancour"; the Question in Relation to the United States ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅ 1
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PART 1
"SACRED WAR TO GET RID OF RANCOUR"

1. THE QUESTION OF REMOVING "RANCOUR";
THE QUESTION IN RELATION TO
THE UNITED STATES

In order to discuss whether or not north Korea will collapse, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the Korean question (mainly the question of Korea's reunification), which is the fundamental question. It is also important to have a clear idea of the views of north Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong Il on the Korean question, the views of the man who is a major party to the question.

According to him, the Korean question is firstly a sacred war to get rid of "rancour".

The Korean question means a sacred war to put an end to the "rancour" of the Korean nation, which has a history of 5,000 years, and win back their national pride, dignity and sovereignty. By "rancour" here I mean Koreans' "rancour" against foreign forces. In their history of 5,000 years, the Koreans have never committed aggression against any country, but they have suffered innumerable
acts of aggression by foreign forces.

Especially during the Japanese military occupation of their country (Note 1), the Koreans were deprived of their culture and even their names, and were forced out of their land. Therefore, the Koreans have deep-rooted "rancour" against Japan.

The territory of Korea, though under Japanese military occupation, was not divided. It was by the United States that Korea was divided for the first time in its history. In the history of Korea there has never been such a long-term presence of foreign military forces in its territory as the occupation of south Korea (Note 2) by the US forces. That is why Koreans also harbour "rancour" against the United States.

Secondly, the Korean question is a political question in relation to the United States. It is a question of normalizing on an equal footing political and diplomatic relations with the United States that partitioned Korea, which had existed as a single nation for more than one thousand years, and flagrantly interfered in its affairs.

If north Korea normalizes its relations with the United States, the latter will have no reason to interfere in the affairs of the former, and there will be no reason for Korea's continued divided existence. In other words, this means eliminating the direct and biggest cause of Korea's division.

Thirdly, the Korean question is a military question in relation to the United States. It is a question of putting an end to the confrontation between north Korea and the United States and laying the foundation of durable peace by turning the Korean peninsula, the powder keg of the world, into a peace zone.
Military tension in Korea means military confrontation between north Korea and the United States. It is the Korean People's Army and the US forces that actually signed the Korean Armistice Agreement (Note 3) and have the responsibility to implement the agreement.

Fourthly, the Korean question means the final settlement of the Second World War in the Far East.

So long as the legal position of the 700,000 Koreans in Japan (Note 4) remains unsettled, the Second World War has not ended for the Koreans in Japan; in this sense, Korea has not won back its sovereignty. This also means that Japan has not yet settled its postwar problems. Korea's division resulted in the division of the community of Koreans in Japan. The Koreans in Japan who have citizenship of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are treated as people without nationality or as refugees under international law.

If north Korea and Japan establish diplomatic relations and settle the problems left over from their past, and if a reunified state is established in Korea, the question of the legal treatment of the Koreans in Japan and discrimination against them on national grounds will be completely resolved.

Thus, the Korean question (the question of Korea's reunification) is a question of removing "rancour", a politico-military question between north Korea and the United States, and a question of Japan's final settlement of its postwar problems. It is not a question of ideological antagonism between north and south Korea. In other words, it does not mean confrontation between the socialism of the north and the capitalism of the south, nor is it an economic competition between the two sides. It is a question of removing intervention in Korean affairs by the United States, a foreign
force, or neutralizing it to create a physical environment for reconciliation between the north and south of Korea and win back Korea for the Koreans. In short, it means Koreanizing the whole country.

In this context, the key to the settlement of the Korean question lies in 1) defending the national dignity and sovereignty at all costs, 2) taking the political and diplomatic initiative in negotiations with the United States, and 3) establishing a system of immediate military counteraction to compel the United States to refrain from military threats and provocations. This signifies bracing the spirit of the Korean nation and taking the initiative in dealing with political and military affairs vis-a-vis the United States.

Diplomatic avoidance of confrontation in the face of the United States' nuclear threat or subservience to it is nothing but humiliating diplomacy. The most important thing is to maintain the pride and dignity of the Koreans, and keep their sovereignty in dealing with the United States and other countries. Comparing the economic or state power of the north and south of Korea, therefore, cannot be the decisive factor in the settlement of the Korean question, although economic prosperity in both the north and the south will be a matter of pleasure for the nation.

But even if the north and south achieve economic prosperity, it will be impossible for them to keep national dignity or get rid of their "rancour" unless they have political and military freedom, equality and sovereignty in their relations with the United States.

Note 1. This was the 40 years from 1905 to 1945. In the early years of their occupation of Korea, the Japanese placed Korea under "military rule". The basic characteristic of their military rule was
that they dominated the Korean people by means of military and police violence in all fields of the economy, ideology and culture.

The "cultural rule" in the 1920s was the second phase of their occupation. In this period, they outwardly strengthened appeasement and ideological and cultural infiltration while resorting to all-out economic plunder. Entering the 1930s, Japan enforced repressive rule on the excuse of putting the Korean peninsula in "war readiness" and on a "war footing" for its security while carrying out aggressive expansion, and intensified repression as the war extended.

Note 2. On August 15, 1945 Korea became free from the yoke of Japan. On September 8 the same year, the United States landed troops at Inchon, saying that it was necessary for US troops to be stationed in south Korea to keep the Soviet Union at bay. They have been stationed there ever since. But now that the Cold-War structure has been demolished, there is no reason for their presence in south Korea.

Note 3. A temporary agreement that defined the necessary measures to prevent the recurrence of hostilities and armed clashes on the Korean peninsula until the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The agreement, which consists of 63 paragraphs, was signed on July 27, 1953. Because of its repeated violations by US forces, two-thirds of the paragraphs of the agreement were abrogated, and it now remains only in name. The Military Armistice Commission, whose mission it is to supervise the implementation of the agreement, remains inactive since a general officer of the south Korean army was appointed Senior Member of the "UNC" side in March 1991.

Note 4. The legal position of the Koreans in Japan cannot be discussed in the framework of the foreign residents in general, because these Koreans have a special historical background in that they are people, or descendants of people, who were forced out of their homeland into Japan due to Japan's military occupation of Korea. In dealing with the question of improving their legal position, therefore, there is no need to refer to international human rights conventions or the human rights regulations stipulated by the Japanese Constitution and other laws. This question is an outstanding postwar problem, the solution to which is Japan's
Dual Structure of the Korean Question

I think that the Korean question has a dual structure. Its outer covering is the hard shell or Korea's relations with the United States, and its core is national reconciliation and unity between the north and south of Korea. Without removing the shell, it will be impossible to reach the core. When it has matured, the core can, of course, break the shell from inside. This is possible only when the relations between north Korea and the United States are normalized, and the north and the south become one. Only then will the "rancour" of the Koreans in Japan, the question of the discrimination against them and their legal problems be resolved. The general view in the past, however, was completely different. It considered the Korean question to be antagonism between the socialism of north Korea and the capitalism of south Korea, and regarded the two parts of Korea as the parties to the question, with the United States as an outsider.

This view is seriously mistaken. The division of Korea was not caused by any antagonism between the north and the south. This view ignores the basic cause of Korea's division, the fact that the US army, which landed in south Korea on September 8, 1945, put south Korea under its military government. It was the United States that drew the demarcation line, the 38th parallel, across the Korean peninsula (Note 1).

Something was wrong with the attitude of the Soviet
Union. Why? There was no need whatsoever for the Soviet Union to admit the US troops into Korea because the US forces had not fought the Japanese in Korea. If it admitted them into Korea because they belonged to the Allied Forces, then the Soviet army could have landed in Japan, put Tokyo under the joint administration of the four Allied Powers as was the case with Berlin, and placed the Kanto area and the northern region under its occupation. It could have occupied Hokkaido at least, and set up a pro-Soviet regime there. The Soviet Union did not distinguish between the offender nation and its victim, between the victor and the defeated nation. Wasn't it natural that not Korea but Japan, the vanquished nation, should have been divided? Korea was neither defeated nor allied with Japan. There was no reason, therefore, for south Korea, half of liberated Korea, to be placed under US military government which was as bad as Japan's military occupation. That was the tragic beginning of the Korean question, the division of Korea.

The US army occupied south Korea without firing a shot. When it won back freedom, Korea was not in a state of division, nor was there any ideological antagonism within the country. In other words, Korea was divided not because of any ideological antagonism or economic competition, but by external factors. The argument for ideological and economic antagonism between the two parts of Korea is nothing but artifice aimed to justify and hide the cause of division, an artifice that turned the essence of the question upside down. As a result, the object of "rancour" was obscured, and north-south antagonism was always brought to the fore. The dignity of the Koreans, who are proud of their
history of 5,000 years, was impaired, and indignation was stirred up in the depth of their hearts.

The essence of the Korean question consists, in the final analysis, in the contradiction between the Korean nation and foreign forces, not between north Korea and south Korea. The key to the settlement of the issue lies in neutralizing the United States' military forces in south Korea. The essential requirement for this purpose is to build up strong independent defence power and demand that the United States agree to a final politico-military settlement.

Note 1. At a meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the US State, Army and Navy Departments on August 10 to 11, 1945, two army colonels were instructed to think out a plan to divide the Korean peninsula within 30 minutes in the next room. One was Charles Bonesteel, who later became Commander of the US Forces in south Korea, and the other was Dean Rusk, who was later appointed US Secretary of State. According to Rusk's Memoirs, the 38th parallel was too far north, so they intended to sound out the Soviet attitude. If the Soviet side objected to the idea, they were going to give up the proposal and draw the demarcation line further south. But they were surprised when the Soviet Union accepted the proposal.

Five Thousand Years of "Rancour"

The Korean nation is proud of its history of 5,000 years, and of its single state that prospered in East Asia for more than 1,000 years.

The country, however, was trampled upon by foreign invaders, who committed repeated acts of aggression. In the course of this, Koreans came to harbour distrust and
"rancour" against their large neighbours, especially against Japan and the United States. Their "rancour" against Japan and the United States still continues.

"Rancour" against Japan

Japan's military occupation of Korea lasted for 40 years in the 20th century. In this period more than 8.4 million able-bodied Koreans were forced into the Japanese army and put to hard labour in the army, construction sites and mines.

Also, nearly 200,000 Korean women were subjected to sex slavery as "comfort girls" for Japanese soldiers. The Koreans were robbed of their country, and were forced to be Japanized, with their names, language and cultures totally denied.

This military occupation is considered to have ended on August 15, 1945. It is a brutal fact, however, that Japan's military occupation became the origin of Korea's division, and that this wrong in the past has not yet been redressed. That is why the Koreans have "rancour" against Japan.

The "rancour" against Japan is deep-seated also in the minds of the Koreans in Japan. In Japan there is a real problem of the legal position of the Koreans there, a problem which is caused by the still deep-rooted national discrimination. For instance, their request for renting a flat is frequently refused. Arai Shokei was a naturalized south Korean. He was a former Member of the House of Representatives. He also served in the Treasury of Japan. When he ran for the Diet, he was denounced because he was a Korean. There are many such people who have succeeded
in business and art in Japan. However, they cannot get rid of "rancour" in the present circumstances, no matter how much they wish to. Such denizenship means no more than escapism. It can be said, in a sense, that the mental state of these people is the same as that of the colonial years. Their "rancour" against Japan can be dispelled only when they can proudly say, "I am a Korean in Japan," or "I am a naturalized Japanese of Korean ancestry", and when the names of the Japanese women who are living in north Korea with their Korean husbands can be made public through the Japanese press media by their relatives during their visits to their home towns. This will become a reality when Japan redresses its past wrong and establishes diplomatic relations with north Korea, and when Korea is reunified.

"Rancour" against the United States

The Korean nation also has "rancour" against the United States, because the United States divided Korea, which had won back its freedom after the Second World War. With 40,000 troops stationed in south Korea, the United States has had a decisive influence on the south Korean politics, economy and culture. It not only divided Korea, but was a belligerent party to the Korean War and a signatory to the Korean Armistice Agreement. It is still in a state of war against north Korea. The real problem is that nearly two million troops are in war readiness on both sides of the demarcation line that runs across the Korean peninsula, the most dangerous zone in the world. If a war breaks out again in Korea, it will be an all-out war between the Korean People's Army and the US forces.
Especially, the south Korean people have a deep-seated "rancour" against the United States, and live in dire distress. That is because south Korea is not an independent sovereign state, although it is such a state in name. An independent sovereign state must have its own regular army for the defence of its territory, territorial sea and air and people as well as its command prerogative. Even if it has its own regular army, the army will be meaningless and the state cannot be a sovereign state unless it has the command prerogative.

In fact, there is an army in south Korea. But in whose hands is the authority of its supreme command? It has been in the hands of the commander of the US forces in south Korea since the Korean War. The command prerogative is supposed to belong to a south Korean only in peacetime since 1987, but it is turned over to the commander of the US forces in south Korea in case of emergency. In other words, south Korea has no sovereignty with regard to military affairs. During the Vietnam War crack units of the south Korean army were sent to Vietnam to protect US troops there, to earn dollars, so to speak. A large number of south Korean soldiers were killed or wounded in Vietnam and fell victims to defoliant sprayed by the US forces.

During the Kwangju incident (Note 1) that lasted from May 18 to 27, 1980, south Korean troops were ordered out to put down the uprising in Kwangju with the approval of General Wickham, commander of the US forces in south Korea, and killed approximately 2,000 students and other citizens. Different figures for the casualties in the Kwangju incident were reported.
Because of the humiliating administrative agreement signed between south Korea and the US forces there, American soldiers commit murder, rape and other crimes of violence with impunity (See Tim Shorrock's article carried in the US magazine the *Journal of Commerce*, dated February 27, 1996). Western European countries like Germany have their own laws on the crimes committed by American soldiers stationed there, but Japan has weaker judicial power, and the situation in south Korea is particularly deplorable in this respect, virtually nothing is done to punish the crimes committed by American soldiers.

In the economic aspect, too, on December 4, 1998 the south Korean economy was put under the management of the International Monetary Fund, with its headquarters in Washington, and, in fact, under the control of the United States. In consequence, south Korea lost even its economic sovereignty. South Korea is void of military and economic sovereignty because it is, in fact, void of political sovereignty. South Korea cannot formulate or implement a policy against the will of the United States; it has to read the face of the United States at all times. But for all this face reading, it is not accorded reasonable treatment by the United States. On his tour of the Far East, for instance, President Clinton stayed two hours on April 16, 1996 on Jeju Island off the southern tip of south Korea, not in Seoul. Originally his itinerary did not contain a stopover in south Korea. He dropped in at the island at Kim Young Sam's earnest request. By contrast, he stayed in Tokyo, Japan, for three days and two nights, and just as long as in Moscow, Russia, which is not a US ally.

Also, during Kim Young Sam's United States visit from
June 21 to 29, 1997, Clinton refused to see him. As Kim Young Sam wailed, saying, "Failure to be received by the President of the United States means a diplomatic rebuff," Clinton was obliged to meet him at the US mission to the United Nations in New York, not in the capital city. The time of interview was reported to have been only 15 minutes. This meant seven or eight minutes for each of them to speak. Since they had a conversation through interpreters in Korean and English, Kim Young Sam must have actually spoken for only three to four minutes. This shows what south Korea, a so-called sovereign state, and ally of the United States, really is. The United States itself does not treat south Korea as an independent state. Richard Halloran, former foreign and military correspondent for *The New York Times* said in an article that the US forces had never treated south Korea on an equal footing (South Korean English newspaper *The Korea Times*, dated January 17, 1997).

Note 1. The incident broke out on May 18, 1980, when Chun Doo Hwan placed south Korea under martial law, arresting Kim Dae Jung. An anti-government demonstration took place in Kwangju, the capital of South Jolla Province. Nearly all the citizens took part in the demonstration. On May 26 airborne troops and tanks of the south Korean army were ordered into the town to massacre the students and other citizens.

**Is There Any Leader in South Korea Who Can Dispel "Rancour"?**

Has there been any leader or hero in south Korea who has tried to free the people from this "rancour" Syngman
Rhee, Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam were the successive rulers. These rulers acted as agents of the United States in relation to the south Korean people, far from standing in the forefront of a sacred struggle to dispel "rancour". Syngman Rhee was the first President trained by the United States. He enacted the notorious National Security Law in imitation of the Japanese Law for the Maintenance of Public Order, and resorted to repressive rule. He was overthrown by the April 19 Students Uprising (Note 1), and died in exile in Hawaii.

His successor Park Chung Hee was shot to death by the chief of the south Korean Central Intelligence Agency at a secret banquet hall. Chun Doo Hwan, who put down the Kwangju Uprising on the orders of Wickham, commander of the US forces in south Korea, was arrested by Roh Tae Woo, who in turn was imprisoned by Kim Young Sam. Chun Doo Hwan was sentenced to death, and Roh Tae Woo was sentenced to life imprisonment. Kim Young Sam was brought to ruin by economic bankruptcy and scandal. His second son, Kim Hyon Chol, was sentenced to three years penal servitude for the crime of receiving bribes.

As you can see, one of these Presidents died in exile, another was killed by his subordinate, others were sentenced to death or life imprisonment, one was involved in a scandal, and the son of one of them was thrown into jail.

They doubled and trebled the pain of "rancour" of the south Korean people, far from dispelling it.

Then, is there any leader in south Korea who can free the
south Korean people from their "rancour"? If so, who is he? What is the qualification required of the leader who has been long awaited by the south Korean people? One of the qualifications is the virtue of giving foremost consideration to the Korean nation. Political acumen and leadership that can ensure equality in relation to the United States and control of the military, political and economic sectors and the people are also essential. Was there any leader in south Korea who had these qualifications? If there wasn't any in the past, is there such a leader at present?

Note 1. In those years the United States brought large amounts of surplus agricultural products and other "aid" goods into south Korea. The marked imbalance between exports and imports, however, resulted in a serious depression of agriculture, and produced the problems of urban unemployment and food shortages in rural communities, which plunged the people into dire poverty. The Syngman Rhee regime took hardline measures against the people's mounting discontent and resistance. In protest at the overt acts of fraudulence in the "Presidential" election in March 1960, an election aimed at giving Syngman Rhee a fourth term of office, the people in Masan rose in revolt, which spread into other southern parts of south Korea. The struggle came to the climax in Seoul, overthrowing the Syngman Rhee regime. Students were the leading force of the uprising.

**Who Is the Leader of the Sacred War to Dispel "Rancour"?**

Kim Jong Il in the north of the demarcation line that divides Korea is the representative proponent of the Korean-nation first principle, the traditional ethos. He has no equal in
his knowledge of Korean philosophy, history and politics, as well as in action and practice. This has been fully proved in the negotiations with the United States, negotiations which started with the issue of nuclear suspicion.

Kim Jong Il leads the seventy million Koreans in the north, south and abroad in the sacred war to dispel their "rancour". He will rid the Korean nation of its 5,000-year-old "rancour".

National leaders and heroes in history can be classified roughly into three categories. The first is the type who defends the national territory; the second is the type who leads overseas aggression; and the third is the type who spearheads the unification of the national territory.

Heroes of the first type can be found frequently both in Korean and foreign history. Korean history is a history of resistance, of repelling repeated aggression. In other words, Korea historically has had to fight all-out defence, which produced many heroes of the first type.

There is no hero of the second type in Korea, although there are many in other countries. Throughout their history the Koreans have never committed aggression to expand their territory.

War in Korea was mostly to defend the country from aggressors, rather than fight among the forces of different regions.

Heroes of the third type can, of course, be found in foreign history, and three of them in Korean history. The first was Wang Kon of Koryo (Note 1).

He founded the kingdom of Koryo in 918, and unified the Korean peninsula in 936 by bringing about the surrender of Later Silla and conquering Later Paekje.
The second person was, of course, President Kim Il Sung. He did not hesitate to fight the United States, the largest political, military and economic power in the world, to reunify the country. He fought for three years against the superpower after the Second World War. The war ended in a tie, but in fact, in his victory. This marked a brilliant page in Korea's history of 5,000 years and meant the first defeat for the United States.

The third person of the third type of hero is Kim Jong Il. In the political, military and diplomatic negotiations with the United States, he has demonstrated the mettle of the Korean nation, taking the initiative firmly. In this sense, he is the hero who has led the Korean nation to the most brilliant era in their history of 5,000 years, and occupies the highest place in the legends of Korean heroes.

The March 1994 issue of *Wolgan Joson*, an influential south Korean conservative magazine, carried an article, titled *Can the Republic of Korea Decide to Fight a War?* by Jo Kap Je, one of the most prominent journalists in south Korea. This article indicates that the learned conservatives in south Korea today regard Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il of north Korea as the saviours of the nation, and as national heroes (Matsui Sigeru's work, *Kim Jong Il's North Korea; Has Nuclear Suspicion Really Been Resolved?—Kim Jong Il's Personality, Policy and Think-tank?!*—PP. 83-95, Kojinsha).

Note 1. Wang Kon was the Commander of the Navy. Towards the end of the 9th century, Silla was divided into Later Silla, Later Paekje and Thaebong. Wang Kon seized power in 918, and founded Koryo. He named the country Koryo to mean that it succeeded the earlier kingdom of Koguryo. The name Korea originated from Koryo.
2. "WOLVES'" ETHOS

North Korea plays the role of the prime mover for the reunification of Korea mainly because Kim Jong Il is the incarnation of the "rancour" that has accumulated for 5,000 years. It is a historical inevitability that he stands at the helm of the sacred war to dispel "rancour". In the background of this there is the traditional ethos of Korea.

My Talk with Ezra Vogel

What kind of ethos is it, then? It is the ethos of "wolves".

A few years ago, I met Ezra Vogel, a professor at Harvard University in the United States. I exchanged opinions with him for a few hours at his home in the campus of the university in Boston.

In October 1997 he invited Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Harvard University to give a lecture. He published *Japan as Number One—Lesson for America*, which became popular in Japan, and his name is widely known in Japan and south Korea.

Vogel, who speaks fluent Japanese, worked in the CIA as an analyst for Asia until the spring of 1996. In our talks he said that he could hardly understand north Korea and asked me to explain it. I gave him a figurative explanation,
for Americans easily understand fables and the relations between the sexes.

I compared the Koreans to "wolves". They have continued to fight the "lion," or the United States, at the risk of their lives. It has been a long-drawn-out fight. Once a pack of these "wolves" found themselves in an unfavourable situation in terms of strength, surrendered and came down from the mountains to become "dogs" of the United States.

As American dogs, they have acquired a few favourable points. They are provided with food, clothing and housing. They eat food containing much American beef, live in "dog" kennels furnished with air-conditioners made by General Electric, and get fine collars and leads of American make. They can also become popular performers.

When they take a walk with their master, the President of the United States, in the morning, cameramen will rush after them to report them in the press media. Quite a sight.

What has become of the pack of "wolves" that continue with their resistance in the mountains? These "wolves," in a fierce fight with the attacking "lion" have to undergo many difficulties and trials. It is hard for them to find prey or food, and frequently have to endure hunger. At times they cannot find shelter from howling snowstorms. Even when they are leaning against each other in the snow to warm themselves, nobody comes to help them.

What, then, is the good of remaining "wolves" and continuing with resistance? That is being free. Though hungry, they can live in freedom. The primeval forest and wilderness of Mt. Paektu is the land where they can run about freely.

Which is better, the "dog" which, though fat, is fastened
with American collar and lead, or the “wolf” which, though hungry, can run about in freedom? The answer depends on the likes and dislikes of the man in question, and the choice cannot be forced upon him. You might say it would be much better to be a lion.

Vogel chuckled at my explanation, saying jokingly: "I understand. The ‘wolf’ would be better off as far as its dignity is concerned, but it would have a hard life. The 'dog' would be much more comfortable, wouldn't it?"

Since the dawn of its history north Korea has been as hardy, stubborn and freedom-loving as a “wolf” is. It can survive any adversity. This is beyond imagining for Americans and Europeans (On April 23, 1998 the IISS in the United Kingdom published its annual report, Strategic Review 97-98, which summed up the international situation in 1997. The report said that it was surprising that north Korea's worsening economy did not lead Kim Jong Il's system to collapse, as had been predicted).

"The World of Ethics and Humanity"

There is another aspect of north Korea, namely, the world of ethics and humanity. In north Korea even the slightest generosity rendered free of charge is highly valued, and the man who is indebted helps his benefactor even when the benefactor has gone bankrupt. This is north Korean ethics and aesthetics. In the capitalist world nobody, in fact, wants anything to do even with the president of a large company, a village head, or a person of high social position as soon as he or she loses his or her
position. Today you may have friends, but tomorrow nobody will care about you if you go bankrupt. An empty purse cuts off the ties of friendship.

Here I would like to take two examples of the aesthetics of north Korea.

The first example concerns King Sihanouk of Cambodia. Cambodia is a small, poor country in Southeast Asia. It became unhappily involved in the war in Vietnam. When this war was being escalated, a military coup took place in Phnom Penh under the manipulation of the United States. Lon Nol seized power, and Prince Sihanouk was exiled abroad. Neither the United States, Western European countries, nor the socialist Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries nor Vietnam helped him. North Korea and China helped him. Short of money, fuel oil, and food, north Korea was not in a position to help others. However, it invited Sihanouk, built a palace for him and provided him with bodyguards and even an airplane for his travel abroad. In those days, the United States and European countries said in chorus: "North Korea is a fool to spend money on a king who has no future." They might have been right. But this is the very ethos of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

What does north Korea owe to Sihanouk? Decades ago Sukarno's Indonesia and Sihanouk's Cambodia recognized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea diplomatically by brushing aside the pressure brought to bear by the United States.

Kim Il Sung did not forget that. Sihanouk was a king, and Cambodia was a semi-feudal country. There was no reason for socialist north Korea to make friends with Cambodia. Guided by communist ideology, it did not need to
help a king who had been ousted from power. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, however, did not consider ideology and interests to be everything.

Another example concerns Erich Honecker, former Chairman of the State Council of East Germany. When the Berlin Wall fell, Germany was reunified, and the Honecker's socialist government perished.

Honecker was virtually placed under confinement in Moscow, and was to be sent to the Federal Republic of Germany. At that time he expressed his desire to receive medical treatment in north Korea. North Korea accepted the request without hesitation, sent a jet plane to Moscow in a hurry and got it to wait there for a month. No other country expressed any intention to receive Honecker. In these circumstances, no benefit but loss would come from helping him. At that time some people in Europe and the United States said, "We like Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il of north Korea." They were Jews. These people did not forget Honecker and other German Communists who helped Jews to hide or escape from persecution by Nazi Germany. Jews have hidden influence in Europe and the United States, so that the governments of many countries cannot ignore them. These Jews launched a silent campaign to save Honecker and brought pressure upon the German government. This enabled Honecker and his wife to go to Chile, where their daughter and son-in-law live.

In those days Honecker's daughter was the wife of the Chilean foreign minister. The story dates back to the years of the Allende government in Chile (September 1970 to September 1973). The Allende government was overthrown by a military coup led by General Pinochet
under the manipulation of the United States. In the coup Allende was murdered. His colleagues fled to East Germany. Honecker's daughter fell in love with a young political exile from Chile and married him. When civilian government was restored in Chile, those who were in exile in East Germany returned to Chile and came to power. Honecker's daughter and son-in-law were among the returnees, and the son-in-law became foreign minister. This was how the Chilean Foreign Ministry welcomed their benefactor Honecker. When Honecker died, his wife hoped to go to north Korea, but the Chilean government which was receiving much economic aid from Germany did not allow her to go to north Korea. For north Korea it would have been a good idea to forget its friendship with East Germany when it takes into account its intention to establish diplomatic relations with reunified Germany and other political interests. North Korea, however, cannot forget it because it has its own ethos.

Kim Jong Il of north Korea places ethics and humanity above everything when he judges it right to do so, no matter what it may cost him. He has the mettle to say, "I'll go my way even if one million enemies get in the way."

**North Korea Flatters Nobody**

The ethos of "wolves" finds expression in the national trait of north Korea which flatters no country, especially a large country. This national trait is rooted in Korea's history of 5,000 years. This ethos has struck root in the bloody struggle against aggression by large countries that surround
Korea. Meanwhile, a tendency to grovel before large countries, in fact, appeared. This tendency is called the worship of big powers.

The worship of big powers has been much in evidence in south Korea.

In East Asia, Japan, south Korea and Taiwan allowed long-term stationing of foreign troops in their territories after the Second World War. In Europe, Britain, Germany, Poland and nearly all countries permitted foreign troops to be stationed on their soil. These are well-to-do economic powers. Most of them accepted the long-term presence of US or Soviet troops in their territories. The only exception was France, which pursued independent diplomacy. Some Nordic countries and Switzerland, which proclaimed permanent neutrality, did not permit foreign troops on their lands. North Korea, which does not flatter any other country, is highly regarded not only in Europe but also in Asia. Especially, being surrounded by large countries, north Korea adheres to and crystalizes this aesthetic standpoint. One needs to know the meaning of the north Korean word Juche (Note 1).

The United States clearly knows that north Korea flattered neither the Soviet Union nor China. In the present circumstances, however, the United States thought that north Korea, too, would eventually become a "dog" and wag its tail before the United States which has great military and economic power, including absolute nuclear supremacy. But north Korea did not grovel before the United States, either. It does not grovel before anyone. It believes that it is fully able to live without flattering. It does not grovel even when the United States brings pressure to bear upon it, or threatens to
provoke war. This is because it values its principles, namely, the freedom and independence of the nation, more than anything else, and because it is fully prepared to return war for war.

Note 1. The Juche idea was authored by Kim Il Sung. It was founded during the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle and systematized in the course of full-scale socialist revolution and construction. The Juche idea is a man-centred outlook on the world. It holds that man is the master of everything and decides everything, whereas Marxism-Leninism regards objective material conditions as paramount. The Socialist Constitution of North Korea (enacted in December 1972) clearly stipulates that the Juche idea is the guiding ideology for state activities. The importance of establishing Juche was emphasized in the building of socialism after the liberation of the country, and the line of independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy and self-reliant national defence was evolved. This idea is now the guiding ideology of the Workers' Party of Korea, and the guideline for the activities of the state.

Forbidden "Nuclear Love"—Bargain with the United States

DPRK-US relations since Clinton became President in 1993 can be called forbidden "nuclear love" or a bargain of love. It might also be termed a dangerous playing with nuclear fire.

Kim Jong Il was fully aware of the psychological state of the United States. He knew that if he was to attract the United States it would be very effective to take a cold attitude and, if necessary, to slap it across the face. He also knew that the United States was not in the habit of accepting the words of others at their face value.
Kim Jong Il came to the conclusion that the best idea would be to stimulate the hunter's animal-like instinct of the United States.

North Korea had proposed negotiations to the United States because the Korean question was essentially a politico-military question in relation to the United States. The United States, however, had turned a deaf ear to the proposal. So north Korea decided to lure the United States by means of a calculated ploy.

This "nuclear ploy" is a method of exciting the adversary's curiosity to the maximum, by revealing a glimpse of the spot about which the United States is most curious, that is, the nuclear facility.

Although it intimates its intention of showing its nuclear facilities, north Korea never actually shows them, guarding the most important of them particularly strictly.

It invites inspection delegations to Pyongyang, but never permits inspection. It denies the possession of nuclear weapons. It declares that it has neither the intention nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons. It never says that it has any nuclear weapons.

If it said it had nuclear weapons, the United States would not believe it. It was enough for north Korea to repeat that it had no nuclear weapons, and that it had neither the intention nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

The more north Korea denies, the more the United States suspects, until the latter concludes that north Korea is already in possession of nuclear weapons. Repeated denial deepens suspicion, and exaggerates the situation. That is, indeed, intelligence warfare and psychological warfare, the tactic of surprise. The north Korean government has never admitted
possession of nuclear weapons, not even a plan for the development of nuclear weapons. When the United States tried to provoke north Korea unwarrantedly, north Korea answered by slapping the United States across the face. Utterly fooled by north Korea's badger game, the United States at last held up its hands in surrender, and officially proposed negotiations to north Korea for "marriage". They promised to have a "wedding ceremony" in 2003. That was the Agreed Framework concerning the nuclear issue signed at Geneva on October 21, 1994 (Note 1). This could be a historic agreement.

Note 1. The governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States held negotiations at Geneva for an all-inclusive settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and reached the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. The agreement is characterized by the replacement of the "temporary freezing" of nuclear weapons development of north Korea with "complete abandonment". The operation of the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor and the related facilities are to be frozen within a month and placed under the observation of the IAEA, but a period of five years is allowed until a special inspection is undertaken. The north Korean graphite-moderated nuclear reactor and related facilities will be dismantled when the construction of LWRs is finished.

North Korea, the Deceiver, Is More Laudable Than the United States, the Deceived

The intelligence agencies and press media of the United States were of the greatest help to Kim Jong Il in his psychological intelligence warfare. They even seemed to be
moving under his direction. They might have been awarded decorations in secret. The USCIA now calls north Korea a canny fox. This means that the CIA, which is specialized in deceiving others, has admitted that it has been deceived; that is praise in a sense. Is the United States bad when it was deceived by trying to deceive north Korea? Is Kim Jong Il laudable, who had no intention to deceive but caught the United States in a trap of suspicion pretending to be deceived and deceived it by psychological warfare in the end?

Schools teach their pupils that deceiving people is bad, and warn them not to be deceived. In capitalist society, however, it is recognized as laudable and wise to turn another's fraudulence to one's own advantage. That is why The New York Times dated October 21, 1994 declared Kim Jong II to be the big winner (A Short Scorecard: Who Won in the Korea Deal?—a long explanatory article about the negotiations between the DPRK and the United States). The United States, which has sophisticated all-purpose computers and a large number of experts, and is well versed in intelligence and psychological warfare, was brought to its knees before Kim Jong Il without being able to mobilize its nuclear weapons and armed forces equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and devices.
PART 2
THE SECOND KOREAN WAR

1. THE MILITARY THOUGHT OF KIM JONG IL

The Military Strength of North Korea

The fascination of north Korea for the United States, a world superpower, is based on cultural and traditional values. It cannot be calculated in terms of money or material goods.

It is expressed by the “wolf” ethos and backed up materially by the military power of north Korea.

One can never correctly understand the military, economic and technical power of north Korea by merely comparing it with that of the United States.

One will misjudge war if one fails to view it from a proper standpoint, although numerical expression is important. A war is nothing but a means to achieve a certain political aim. The political aim of north Korea is overall defence. Namely, the main thing is to protect the territory, territorial waters, territorial air space, the people and the political and social system of the state, and defend the dignity of the state and nation.
North Korea is satisfied if only it can achieve its aim at all costs. North Korea can get along even without casting covetous eyes at big countries and relying on them. It has built strong military power capable of dealing powerful retaliation upon big countries as circumstances require. North Korea regards overall defence as its principle. However, it knows that attack is the best defence when it is judged that the enemy is preparing for a preemptive strike.

A large part of the equipment of the Korean People's Army may be outmoded when viewed in the light of the level of that of Japan, Europe or the United States, and some of it cannot at all be regarded as being based on up-to-date technology. North Korea does not necessarily require large-sized, long-range equipment based on ultramodern technology to attain its military aim. Only when one aims at overseas aggression and domination, is such equipment essential.

However, it is a hard fact that the Korean People's Army has the military capability of striking blows at the US troops stationed in south Korea, the US military bases in foreign lands adjacent to Korea and some cities on the mainland of the United States. During the Korean War, north Korea was not able to strike retaliatory blows at the take-off pads of the US army stationed abroad.

However, the Korean People's Army is now able to deal annihilating blows to the enemy at any place on the globe. It is fully anticipated that this army may deal "surgical operation-type blows" first without remaining an on-looker if its opponent is considered to be preparing for a pre-emptive strike, if, for instance, the US reinforces its armed forces in
the neighbourhood of Korea to the level reached during the Gulf War in 1991.

North Korea, a small country, has been able to gallantly fight the United States, a world superpower, in Northeast Asia where the interests of the great powers are entangled, because it has strong military power.

If necessary, it can deal a hard blow to its opponent at any time.

What is the main factor in the powerful military strength of north Korea? It is the original military thought which determines the tactics, and lies at the bottom of this strength, rather than any physical factor.

President Kim Il Sung created this military thought, and Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, has inherited this thought and develops it still further.

Neither Kim Il Sung nor Kim Jong Il received regular military education at a military academy or in the Soviet Union or China. However, these two leaders not only fought on a par with those generals who had received military education of the highest level in Europe and the United States; rather, they drove these generals to the defensive.

This cannot be understood at all with the common knowledge of Europe and the United States.

Kim Jong Il thinks that north Korea is fully able to cope with the United States in case of military confrontation with the latter, based on his own military thought, which has already been confirmed through actual warfare. He thinks that, from the first, there is no need to compete with the United States in armaments, and that this would be
meaningless. This military thought is backed up by the historical experience of Korea such as the anti-Japanese armed struggle and the Korean War, and Kim Jong Il’s own analysis of the over 140 military clashes that have taken place in the world since World War II as well as of the more than 14,000 wars that have been fought since the dawn of history. (If we calculate the latter figure roughly, the time-ratio between war and peace is 4:1 and the warless period is some 25 years in a century on an average).

On the basis of the above-mentioned experience and analysis, Kim Jong II drew a conclusion which is fundamentally different from traditional European military thought, and has put it into practice in the interests of the Korean nation.

Western Military Thought Disregards the People

According to traditional Western military thought, war assumes an aggressive character, aiming at the expansion of territory. It aims to defend the interests of a small social section, namely, the ruling class, and not those of the people. Whether a war should be fought or not is determined by the will of the ruling class, not by that of the people, and whether the war should be continued or not is also decided by the judgement of the ruling class.

The outcome of a war is decided if the ruling class of one party to it acknowledges defeat.

This is decided utterly regardless of the interests or will of the people, the masses. In fact, the outcome of a war is
decided mostly by the fighting between soldiers on the battlefield.

For instance, the defeats of China and Czarist Russia by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War and that of Japan by the United States in the Pacific War were all decided by the outcome on the battleground. The changes of times and regimes, as well as the expansion and diminution of territories were decided irrespective of the interests of the people. Not only in Japan but also in China there were constant civil wars and internal disturbances. Therefore, the masses, the people, were utterly indifferent to the changes of the ruling class and the government.

The trend of a war is mainly decided firstly by the national power, secondly by the equipment and weapons and thirdly by the military strength and mode of combination of these three factors.

In particular, the quantity and quality of the equipment and weapons and the numerical strength of the army are decided by the national power. The national power means the economic power, population and technical power. In essence, this is a view which regards material objects as most important. Nevertheless, by and large, the party which has a larger territory and stronger economic power gains the upper hand with regard to the quality and quantity of the equipment and weapons and the numerical strength of the army, and wins the war.

In view of such military thought, in Europe and the United States it was regarded as important to eliminate the opponent's physical ability to continue the war. Accordingly, strategic importance was to be attached to the following points:
1) Confusing and destroying the strategic bases in the rear of the enemy, major production facilities and munitions factories, power stations and electrical transmission facilities, means of transportation, supply bases storing such materials as fuel and ammunition, and the communication control system.

2) Annihilating the enemy bases and combat units at the front with weapons of greater efficiency and fire-power than those of the enemy side.

3) Making the enemy side become unwilling to continue the war through such things as a propaganda offensive.

In view of Western military thought, the victory of the United States in World War II was quite natural. The defeat of the Japanese army in the Pacific War was obvious from the start, because the United States was overwhelmingly superior to Japan in all spheres: territory, population, economic power, and so on.

Controversial Point of Western Military Thought

The common military features of the United States and various other countries of the world based on Western military thought are reduction of the number of troops, introduction of the latest equipment and the attaching of greater importance to the navy and air force than to the land forces. In short, they attach the greatest importance to the art of war in which cost performance is good and losses on one's own side are reduced to the minimum, while the efficiency of the fire-power is enhanced.
In the light of this military thought, small countries such as the developing ones will not dare to rival the large countries of Europe or the United States so far as defence expenditures and the efficiency of equipment are concerned. Even if these countries were able to provide such weapons as tanks and missiles at home, they would eventually have to buy these weapons from Europe and the United States because their efficiency depends upon high technology. It is inevitable that those countries which are unable to appropriate the cost needed for this will inevitably lose the war.

However, in the light of this principle one cannot explain why in the Korean War the United States failed to win over north Korea, which was far inferior to Germany or Japan. North Korea had no aircraft carriers, submarines, warships or strategic bombers such as B 29s. The reason for the failure of the United States to win the Vietnam War cannot be explained in conventional terms, either. Nor can the reason for the defeat of France in the Algerian War be explained thus.

In the Korean and Vietnam Wars the United States threw in not only the navy and marine corps but also the crack units of the land forces and strategic air force from the start. The battlefield was not the vast area of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, as was the case during the Pacific War, but was an extremely limited place such as the Korean peninsula and Indo-China.

So far as economic and technical power, equipment and population were concerned, north Korea and Vietnam were like babies compared with the United States. Therefore, there were important blind spots in the military strategy of Europe and the United States.
They failed to consider the fact that for the Korean and Vietnamese peoples both the Korean War and the Vietnam War were wars to defend and liberate their countries and protect their cultures, and that an outstanding leader stood in the van of each war. That is to say, they failed to understand that these wars were not ones between regular armies, like previous wars, and that the side capable of mobilizing all its people would emerge victorious.

The Korean War was not fought between regular armies out of sight of the people. It became an all-people war to defend the country in which all the people of north Korea took part along with the Korean People's Army, because the US troops trampled underfoot the territory of Korea in a form obvious to everyone. In other words, the Korean War became a war between the US army and the Korean nation, between the former and Korean culture.

For north Korean nation and its army, the Korean peninsula, with many steep mountains, was a battlefield with which they were as familiar as with the backyards of their own houses or the hills at the back of their villages. If they kept the US troops there, they could pounce upon the latter almost out of nowhere, and also retreat to mountainous areas at the drop of a hat. That is to say, they could make the most of the geographical advantages.

Not only the regular army but all the Korean people became the enemy of the US army. The US troops could never take even a short rest in peace no matter in what part of the Korean peninsula they found themselves. Therefore, B 29s, which had flown over Japan as they pleased, were shot down one after another in Korea. Many of those planes hardly managed to flee as far as Kitakyushu, Japan, before
crashing into the sea near Itazuke Airfield (the present Fukuoka Airport). Korea was not inferior to the US army, either in air battles, ground battles or sea battles.

Recollecting on those days, Ito Masataka, an editorial writer of *Asahi Shimbun*, said:

"Large formations of US fighters and bombers, which had flown across the Tsushima Strait from Itazuke Airfield, returned damaged. Some of these planes crashed in various parts of Fukuoka City because they were exhausted just before reaching safety. One pilot ended up on the roof of a private house because his parachute had failed to open. There was a rumour that the basement of a certain hospital was full of the corpses of American soldiers and that measures were being taken to prevent them from putrefying. I could not understand why the planes of the US army that had caused overpowering terror and nightmares to the Japanese army, flying over Japan with impunity, and the tall, seemingly invincible US soldiers, who had driven jeeps wherever they had wanted to go, were suffering hardships on the Korean peninsula." (*Asahi Shimbun*, July 23, 1992).

North Korea's torpedo-boats sank the US cruiser *Baltimore*, and severely damaged naval destroyers, and the north Koreans sank many US warships with mines.

The north Korean army did not yield to the US army even a little in artillery attacks, tank battles and hand-to-hand fighting.

The Korean People's Army and people's guerrillas pounced upon US soldiers even though they had incurred heavy casualties and the territory had been reduced to ruins, with not a building remaining intact. The Korean front was a hell for the US army. The United States had the bitter taste of
destructive defeat for the first time, and came to feel acutely that they were fighting a war which could not be won even by dint of operations relying on superior material resources, nuclear threats or hi-tech weapons.

According to an official statement by the US army, the number of US soldiers who died during the three years of the Korean War amounted to 54,246. This is nearly the same amount as that of the US soldiers who died in the ten years of the Vietnam War, which totalled 58,135. This shows well how fierce the Korean War was.

On top of this, the US cruiser *Baltimore* was sunk and the flagship of the Seventh Fleet *Missouri* was heavily damaged. General Omar Bradley confessed: "The Korean War was the wrong war, at the wrong place, and the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy". This lesson was reaffirmed in the Vietnam War.

**Attaching Great Importance to the Unity of the People and Geographical Advantages**

President Kim Il Sung created original military thought, strategy and tactics suited to the Korean situation. This is attributable to Korea's historic experience and to the fact that he personally organized, waged and led the anti-Japanese armed struggle. According to Korea's historical experience, wars were fought against other countries to repulse foreign aggressors and defend the country. Accordingly, there was no other way of driving back a foreign aggressor army but to unite the people and make the best use of Korea's geographical advantages. There were
only a few dynasties in Korea—Kojoson, Koguryo, Palhae, Koryo and the Ri Dynasty, and civil wars and internal disturbances were rare.

Wars meant fights against foreign invaders. In the old days wars were fought mainly against the Tang, Sui and Yuan dynasties of China, as well as against Japanese pirates. In recent times, wars were waged against Western powers and Japan, and lastly a war was fought against the United States. In the course of this, in Korea the historic tradition was created of not only the regular army but also the general public rising up in defence of their country. Furthermore, in many cases the former and the latter fought the war in a body.

Therefore, Korea does not yield even if the regular army may lose the war and the territory is trampled underfoot by the aggressor army. It never gives up the fight, even if numerous innocent people have been massacred, fortresses, batteries and the capital have surrendered, and the outcome of the war has apparently been decided. Even if the given political regime may yield, it does not mean defeat if the people do not accept the surrender. The Korean people do not yield while even one of them remains.

In Korea the battlefield was always its territory and territorial waters, because wars there were ones to defend the country against foreign aggressor armies. In a sense, they were wars to annihilate the enemy forces by drawing them deep into its own territory. Therefore, successive aggressors who had made inroads into Korea met disaster after using up their national power because of repeated military expeditions into Korea.

The Japanese militarists, who took Korea by force, were also defeated there in the long run.
The same can be said about the United States. The US army believed that they would easily win the Korean War. However, hell-like battlefields and ignominious defeat awaited them.

General Douglas MacArthur, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the occupation forces in Japan, had the bitter taste of defeat because of the Korean War and was eventually dismissed.

Since the Korean War, the United States has never won a war. Not to speak of its defeat in Vietnam, it can be said that the United States lost the Gulf War. However, it claimed its victory by manipulating the media. Moreover, it even had to withdraw from Somalia.

There was not even a token provisional government when the 20-year old Kim Il Sung started the anti-Japanese armed struggle in 1932 (Note 1). There was no liberated zone anywhere in Korea, nor was there any foreign support. No rich man offered war funds. Nor, as a matter of fact, did a single American missionary, a Christian, give military training or provide funds in support of Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese armed struggle.

Kim Il Sung believed not in a foreign country, but in the Korean people who were all around him and deprived of their country. He organized the masses and fought the enemy by arming himself and his men with the weapons wrested from the enemy, and making the most of the familiar terrain of Manchuria and Korea.

The Korean War, which was unleashed on June 25, 1950, five years after Korea's liberation and nearly two years following the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was, for north Korea, a period of harsh trial,
affecting the destiny of the country and the nation. In the early stage of the war the Korean People's Army drove the troops of the United States and Syngman Rhee to Pusan Perimeter, but then the supply route was cut off and they ran short of weapons and ammunition. Hence, north Korea requested the Soviet Union to assist it with ammunition and other things urgently, but the latter did not comply promptly. If the Soviet Union had accepted north Korea's request without delay and supported it with weapons and ammunition, the Korean People's Army would have already reunified their country.

It was none other than the Korean people that supported Kim Il Sung when the destiny of the nation was at stake.

An active role in shooting down US planes was played not by Soviet AA guns, but Korean AA guns consisting of a number of outmoded rifles installed on cart wheels and AA snipers awaiting on mountain tops or on trees for enemy planes to dive.

Large US warships were sunk not by naval vessels of the Soviet Union or China but by small torpedo-boats of the Korean People's Army.

Furthermore, the Korean People's Army and the rest of the Korean people were protected from the carpet bombings of US planes and artillery attacks not by hi-tech foreign weapons but by bombproof shelters and tunnels, namely by the Korean earth.

Note 1. The Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army was founded by President Kim Il Sung in Antu, Yanji County, China on April 25, 1932 (It was reorganized into the Korean People's Revolutionary Army in April 1934).
Kim Jong Il's View of War

Kim Jong Il is fundamentally different from the strategists and generals in all ages and countries in that he does not regard armament and other hardware as absolute, although he attaches great importance to them. He regards an army as consisting of living people, not robots. Hence, he attaches the greatest importance to political and ideological education to determine people's actions as well as to the capacity for military command.

The most important special feature of Kim Jong Il's view of war is that war acquires a psychological aspect because it is common for friend and foe that arms and equipment are handled by people.

On the basis of summing up numerous wars and military conflicts that took place in history, and analysing the factors determining the outcome of war, Kim Jong Il drew the following conclusions:

1) In almost all wars the economic power, the size of a country, the degree of soldiers' training and the quality of weapons and equipment decide the outcome. Since a war based on such a view is one between materials, the amount and superiority of materials are essential for victory.

According to this equation, for victory in a war material and technical superiority is a prerequisite, and it is necessary to eliminate one-tenth to one-third of the enemy's battle strength or destroy their supply bases and prevent them from continuing the war.

2) In a war to repulse foreign invaders or in a national
liberation war the existence of an outstanding leader capable of becoming a hero of the country and nation is enough to make up for the shortage of national power, the degree of soldiers' training and hardware.

In other words, since a war is one between materials on the one hand and ideology and spirit on the other, between materials and culture, the precondition for its victory is political and ideological and cultural superiority. That is to say, the criterion of victory is to what extent people are awakened and trained. The leader sets the people the political, ideological and cultural goals to become one body, makes a war become a political, ideological and cultural one, and makes it possible to use the geographical advantages to the full. Then the war will be won.

3) It is impossible to decide the outcome of a war with the strength of the air force and navy alone.

Despite its overwhelmingly superior air force and navy, the US army could win neither the Korean War nor the Vietnam War; it could not overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime in the Gulf War, either. The outcome of a war is decided in ground battles. The air force and navy look splendid on the TV screen, but their battle performance is nowhere near as splendid.

4) Once there is a certain amount of hi-tech weapons, even a small country can defend itself against a large country. This is an important lesson of the Korean War, Vietnam War, Middle East War, Falklands conflict and Gulf War. In the final analysis, the effect of an air battle does not depend on hi-tech apparatus or the number of Mach, but on the quantity of the fighter planes and bombers that can be mobilized, and these planes are piloted by people, not by robots.
Even if a superpower has nuclear aircraft carriers, *Aegis* ships, nuclear submarines and the like, sonars and radars will become impotent in a mixed-up fight. On the contrary, one can attain great results with small submarines or highspeed missile boats using diesel fuel.

5) Nuclear weapons are useless things.

In fact, the United States could have emerged victorious in the Pacific War against Japan even without dropping atomic bombs. Hence, the dropping of atomic bombs upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki was aimed at nothing else but testing them. If it had succeeded in making A-bombs a little earlier during World War II, the United States could have used these bombs on the European front. However, on that front ground battles between the same white people were the main form of battles and there was the danger of causing tremendous losses to the friendly soldiers in case atomic bombs were dropped. In the case of the Pacific War, the opponent of the US was mainly the Japanese, a yellow race. In this war the ground units of the US army did not fight battles against the Japanese army in Japan proper. Battles were mostly fought at sea to wrest control of islands in the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, there was no worry about the forces of the US suffering casualties if atomic bombs were dropped upon the mainland of Japan.

The Hiroshima-type atomic bomb was called the *gun barrel* type. Unlike the Nagasaki type (implosion type) that had already been successfully tested, the dropping of the former upon Hiroshima itself was the first explosion test.

Nevertheless, later on the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel could not make a decision to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Middle
East War, the Falklands conflict or the Gulf War, despite the fact that this could have considerably economized on military expenditure, and that they were put on the defensive. Although it was known to everyone that Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union had large numbers of nuclear weapons, these could not stop wars breaking out.

6) One can win a war without fighting.

If one is fully prepared to cope with a nuclear war and an ordinary war, one can win without fighting, by means of psychological and diplomatic warfare alone.

This is an important lesson which can be drawn from a number of crises that have taken place in Korea since the Korean War.

A wise general avoids unnecessary sacrifice or fighting, and regards it as his duty to win without fighting. A terror-stricken general suffers defeat, but a general who fights any enemy, no matter how formidable, with resourcefulness and confidence is always victorious.

2. NORTH KOREA IS A "HEDGEHOG"
FLYING ACROSS THE AIR

Kim Jong Il defined war as an organized struggle which a certain social community, a social force, wages with arms to meet its fundamental demands. On the basis of this, he thinks that having a powerful army, a special means of violence, is a very effective means for a class or a nation-state to impose a political compromise upon the enemy. If one holds to the
viewpoint of regarding the essence of the Korean problem to be a political and military problem between Korea and the United States, increasing the nation’s defence capacity despite all difficulties is the primary task of the nation and state even if it means imposing considerable sacrifice upon the people.

This is a matter of course because Korea is surrounded by large countries, is a divided country and, in particular, it is in direct military confrontation with the United States, the strongest military superpower ever known in history.

Kim Jong Il holds that however developed the economy is and however prosperous and rich the country becomes like a city-state of the middle ages, it will be no more than a castle in the sand, and will inevitably meet its doom and become meaningless, if it has no strong defence power.

The defence structure built by Kim Jong Il is really like a “hedgehog” flying across the air. North Korea’s impregnable defence power today is based on the decision made by Kim Jong Il and the people after hard thinking. This entails the stamina to implement the “wolf” ethos to the end.

Now I would like to explain how north Korea has come to possess impregnable defence power, looking back on the road it has followed since the Korean War, by dividing it into several stages, and further explain the efficiency of this defence power.

The Period of the Leap of Chollima after the War (1953-1960)

For the first time in history, the United States, which had been able to hold the position of a victor nation in World
War II was defeated in the Korean War. North Korea miraculously reconstructed its economy, calling the spirit of postwar rehabilitation there the "Chollima speed" spirit, comparing it to *Chollima*, a horse which, according to a Korean legend, was said to cover 250 miles a day (Note 1). In all parts of north Korea the sounds of hammers engaged in postwar economic construction echoed.

*Chollima* became known to the whole world as a symbol of Korea. Even under the difficult conditions of postwar rehabilitation, Kim Il Sung sent a huge sum of scholarship funds to the Korean students residing in Japan. In those days, north Korea's economic power far surpassed that of south Korea. Everything was going on smoothly there. Not only the economy and national defence, but also political stability was superior by far. There was nothing to worry about.

In south Korea, Syngman Rhee trampled upon democracy and was seeking a pretext for reinvading north Korea, advocating reunification by marching north. Nevertheless, north Korea did not worry much about this. On the contrary, the leap of *Chollima* continued into the 1960s, too, and the rapid growth of national income was maintained. North Korea believed that it would be able to catch up with advanced nations such as the European countries and the United States before long.

Therefore, north Korea judged that it would be fully able to cope, using its own efforts, even if the US army stayed in south Korea and a military alliance was concluded between the United States and south Korea. Hence, it had the Chinese People's Volunteers withdrawn. North Korea neither requested the stationing of the Soviet army nor did it regard a military
alliance with China or the Soviet Union as necessary. North Korea was bountiful and in high spirits.

Note 1. The Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea convened at the beginning of August, 1953, immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement, set forth the basic line of postwar economic construction on giving priority to the development of heavy industry and simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture. It also adopted the policy of promoting reconstruction in three stages: To make preparations and readjustment for reconstruction during six months to one year in the first stage; carry out the Three-Year Plan (1954-1956) and restore the economy to the prewar (1949) level at the second stage, and carry out the First Five-Year Plan and lay the foundation of socialist industrialization in the third stage.

In the industrial sector, the goal was attained four months ahead of schedule. At the end of 1956, industrial production had grown 2.8 times compared with 1953. The production of the means of production had grown 4 times, and that of consumer goods, 2.1 times. This meant an average 1.8-time increase over the level of the prewar year 1949. During the plan period, the average annual rate of growth in the industrial sector reached 42 per cent.

The Alliance with the Siberian "Bear" and the Chinese "Dragon"

Entering the 1960s, the military and political situation in Korea changed completely. A tense situation was created, in which Chollima had to make a sudden stop. Dark clouds foreshadowing another war gathered, with the result that the Korean "wolf" was compelled to be on the alert and sharpen its vigilance.

As a result of the student movement that started in south
Korea on April 19, 1960, Syngman Rhee was overthrown, and the trend toward reunification mounted. Nevertheless, the student movement was no more than a start, and the dark shadow of the United States was hidden behind the scenes of the collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime.

As the Vietnam War was escalating, Syngman Rhee, who had anti-Japanese feelings, became an obstacle for the United States in forming a new military alliance in the Far East. A "military coup" broke out in Seoul on May 16, 1961, and Park Chung Hee seized power and suppressed the movement for peaceful reunification by force.

The situation reminded the north Korean side of the bygone days when the Treaty of Mutual Defence and Assistance was concluded between the United States and south Korea on January 26, 1950, five months before the outbreak of the Korean War, and the Japan-US Security Treaty was concluded on September 8, 1951. In Japan a revised Japan-US Security Pact was concluded on January 19, 1960, and a virtual tripartite military alliance was formed between the US, Japan and south Korea, with the United States as the axis, in the form of the Japan-US Military Alliance and the US-south Korea Military Alliance.

In January 1961 John F. Kennedy took office as president of the United States, and the "south Korea-Japan talks" (Note 1) were resumed with US backing. The atmosphere was really reminiscent of the eve of the Korean War. North Korea felt great apprehension. With the expansion of the Vietnam War it could not but feel keenly the danger of invasion by the United States, Japan and south Korea. North Korea took into consideration that the "mad dog" that had appeared in south Korea would make
inroads upon its mountains with the backing of the Japanese "monkey" and the American "lion". Therefore, it concluded an alliance with the Siberian "bear" in Moscow on July 6, 1961, and did the same with the Chinese "dragon" in Beijing on July 11. Thus, an alliance was formed between north Korea, the Soviet Union and China in opposition to the US, Japan and south Korea.

North Korea considered that, with a population of 20 million, it would be able to oppose the allied forces of south Korea with a population of 40 million, Japan with a population of 100 million and the United States with a population of 200 million, by forming an alliance with China, which had a population of nearly a billion, and the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 million, and that Chollima would be able to continue to gallop. However, the situation did not develop as expected.

Kim Il Sung keenly felt time and again that large countries were not to be trusted at all, and that he could trust only the Korean people burning with patriotism and the Korean land. He realized that the "wolf" would remain a "wolf" until death, and that it should not trust others. Why did he come to realize this once more?

Note 1. The "south Korea-Japan preliminary talks" started in November 1951. Until the third round of talks was suspended in October 1953, because of the utterance of the Japanese senior delegate, Kubota Kanichiro, to the effect that "Japanese rule over Korea brought the latter benefit," the pressure of the United States to have Japan directly involved in the Korean War was pushed forward. Nevertheless, the anti-Japanese position of the Syngman Rhee regime was stubborn and there were still great differences between the stances of south Korea and Japan. The fourth round of talks was held only in April 1958, after a long lapse. The talks made
rapid progress because the aim of the Park Chung Hee regime, established in May 1961, to strengthen the base of its power by achieving "modernization" through the introduction of Japanese capital, and the demand of the United States, deeply involved in the Vietnam War, to make south Korea play the role of Japan's "proxy" had something in common.

**Others Are Not to Be Trusted**

About one year after north Korea had concluded a Mutual Defence Treaty with China and the Soviet Union, the Cuban crisis (October 22-28, 1962) suddenly sprang up (Note 1). This served as the touchstone for measuring the degree of trust in the alliance with the Soviet Union. In those days Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union had promised to build a nuclear missile base in Cuba and defend that country in the military confrontation with the United States. Nevertheless, as Kennedy expressed a resolute stand that he would blockade the sea off Cuba, even if it led to war, he went back on his pledge before long.

This was an astonishing situation, which showed that Khrushchev's pledge to his allies was not to be trusted. Hence, trust in him failed.

Not to mention the large-scale operations he led before World War II to defend the Soviet Union with arms, Kim Il Sung later helped the Soviet Union in protecting the gains of its revolution when Japan attempted to invade the Soviet Union from the direction of Siberia in response to the German army's attack on the Soviet Union from the west. At that time, Japan had a lot of trouble because of the units of Kim Il Sung's guerrillas who were active in the area of Mt.
Paektu and in the vast Manchurian plain; thus, though there might be other reasons, Japan did not dare to invade the Soviet Union in step with the German army's attack in the west.

Despite this, the Soviet Union accepted the US policy of dividing Korea when World War II came to an end. Not only that; during the Korean War, it delayed its support to north Korea of ammunition and other weapons.

Therefore, Kim Il Sung could fully foresee from the start such an action as the Soviet Union's withdrawal of support from Cuba.

Furthermore, the relations between Korea and China became tense, as the Great Cultural Revolution (Note 2), which started around 1964-65, got into high gear in 1966.

In retrospect, some 250,000 young Korean people directly took part in the battles to liberate Northeast China, and made a great contribution to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of the People's Republic of China when the army of the Chinese Communist Party was in difficulties because of an attack by Chiang Kai-shek's army backed by the United States during the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, which was fought from November 1945 to September 1949.

The participation of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean War was, so to speak, like give-and-take. The adoption of a peculiar line by China in the Great Cultural Revolution was something foreseen in a sense. This was the reality of stern international politics.
Note 1. On October 22, 1962, Kennedy said in a speech on TV that the missile base being built in Cuba gravely threatened the security of the United States, and declared that he would blockade the sea off Cuba, even at the risk of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. In a letter addressed to Kennedy on October 28, Khrushchev promised to withdraw the missiles, and thus the crisis was defused.

Note 2. The Great Cultural Revolution in China was a socio-political movement conducted across the whole country from May 1966 to October 1976. Its content was extremely violent and ultra-leftist. This revolution came to an end with the arrest of the so-called Gang of Four in October 1976.

North Korea's Choice

In those days north Korea had two choices. One was the road of becoming the United States' "dog" in order to maintain the "Chollima speed", and the other was to follow the road of a "wolf", putting a stop to the "Chollima speed".

Becoming a "dog" was easy, and there would have been no need to undergo hardships for this. But the road of becoming a "wolf" was a thorny path and one replete with tribulations. Which road should be chosen? North Korea had to make a prudent choice.

If it were to choose the road of a "dog", there was no need to spend money for military purposes, and the "Chollima speed" could be maintained. The north and the south might have been reunified, earning the praise of the "miracle on the Taedong River" instead of the "miracle on the Han River".

However, Kim Il Sung did not choose that road, but dared to choose the thorny path. North Korea, with its
population of 20 million, chose the road of fighting against the United States with its population of 200 million, Japan populated by 100 million and south Korea with a population of 40 million, without counting on the support of the Soviet Union or China. As a matter of fact, the burden of every one of the north Koreans must have surpassed imagination. However, the people of north Korea supported the path chosen by Kim Il Sung, and were determined to share their fate with him.

Decision Made after Hard Thinking—Simultaneous Building of the Economy and Defence

North Korea had to make an important decision in view of the treachery of Khrushchev, who yielded to the enemy at the time of the Cuban crisis. This was to adopt an out-and-out self-defensive policy.

It would have been a different matter in the case of such neutral nations as Sweden and Switzerland, which have a high level of industrial technology. However, it was extremely difficult for north Korea, a small country with no such high technological level, to implement the line of independent defence without relying on other countries. There was no other way but this, as long as it did not choose the path of becoming a "dog". This decision could be regarded as being reckless in a sense.

Nevertheless, neither Kim Il Sung nor the north Koreans flinched from this path. They firmly believed that this was the road to independence and sovereignty, and a
shortcut to the country's reunification, the cherished desire of the nation. To be concrete, that decision was adopted at the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, held December 10-14, 1962. This was a four-point military policy for simultaneously carrying on economic and defence construction and strengthening the country's defences.

The aim of this policy was to possess the ability to defeat the invading allied forces of the United States and South Korea alone even if there was no support from China and the Soviet Union, in case of the provocation of a nuclear or non-nuclear war by the US army, and achieve the country's reunification. The four points of this defence policy are as follows:

1) The arming of the entire people: To give military training to all people, young and old, men and women, and arm all of them, so that they can encircle and annihilate the invading enemy units.

2) Fortification of the whole country: To build all the air force bases, artillery and missile units, naval bases and munitions factories deep underground, construct a huge network of underground tunnels and withstand the US's nuclear attacks.

3) Turning the entire army into an army of cadres: To give training to every soldier of the regular army to fulfil the duties of a higher rank, so as to make it possible to organize scores and hundreds of divisions with the regular army as the core at any time.

4) Modernization of the whole army: To introduce the latest weapons to the maximum, and produce and store them at home, because a military clash and war anticipated
between the Korean army and the US army would be a modern war. To store up ammunition and oil on a long-term basis, because a modern war is, in a sense, a war of attrition of ammunition and oil.

It was the Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea held from October 5 to 12, 1966, that reaffirmed and promulgated the policy of simultaneously pushing ahead with economic construction and defence build-up. This was made public, based on the actual results and experience gained during the previous four years.

Out of these four points, the arming of the entire people and the turning of the entire army into an army of cadres could be solved by a variety of means. However, the policy of fortifying the whole country and modernizing the whole army needed tremendous investment and labour, as well as a high scientific and technological level. Although north Korea is said to be small, it is wider than south Korea, and between its eastern and western parts, steep mountainous areas stretch into the north and south for a long distance. Furthermore, it has many rivers with swift currents, and the ground is very firm because it consists of granite. It does not have a great number of large-size building machines like the United States.

The successive kings of Egypt built pyramids and the Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang constructed a huge underground palace and the Great Wall. The project for underground fortifications across north Korea involving incomparably larger state funds and labour than those spent on the above-mentioned structures had started and was virtually completed at the beginning of the 1990s.

The underground fortifications of north Korea are
estimated to be the strongest and most complete in the world.

"The Guns of Navarone"-Style Defense

Numerous artillery units and missile bases resembling those in the film The Guns of Navarone (Note 1) have been set up in all parts of north Korea along the coastline. All enemy warships of every size and type, no matter whether they are landing craft or hovercrafts, which invade the territorial waters of north Korea, will become the victims of long-range guns and anti-vessel cruise missiles.

Moreover, submarine bases have been set up under the sea. Even if the US marine corps or special naval units approach the north Korean coasts or attempt landings, or even if the US army carries out a large-scale landing operation like that at Inchon (Note 2), they will only become the victims of mass destruction. The anti-vessel missiles awaiting orders at various underground bases along the coastline have as their targets enemy vessels far from the territorial waters of north Korea. The main targets of these "Guns of Navarone" are the US fleets such as the Seventh Fleet as well as US nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers, Aegis-type cruisers and destroyers belonging to these fleets. The fact that the US army uses these large vessels in war even today is itself a concept dating from the period of World War II, old-fashioned tactics.

It is very convenient for north Korea to have large US vessels as the targets of its anti-vessel cruise missiles. The efficiency of these missiles against large vessels has already been amply proved. On October 25, 1967 an Egyptian
A missile boat sank an Israeli destroyer with one Soviet-made SSN-2-STYX cruise missile. During the Falklands conflict, Argentina sank the British destroyer *Sheffield* with French-made *Exocet* anti-vessel cruise missiles. In 1971 an Indian missile boat sank a Pakistani naval destroyer with a SSN-2-STYX cruise missile, similar to the one used by Egypt.

The days when the United States monopolized missiles have gone. An end has been put to the times when large US warships used to cruise as they pleased. It is clear that, if a second Korean War breaks out, the gruesome scenes of nuclear-propelled carriers and other major warships of the United States being sunk as targets of north Korea’s attack planes, numerous missile boats, cruise missiles fired from the ground and torpedoes fired by small attack submarines, will be broadcast to the United States and the rest of the world on the spot by satellite TV.

Note 1. The *Guns of Navarone* is a film made in the United States in 1961. The story is about how a commando team destroyed a huge coastal artillery position of the German army.

Note 2. This was a landing operation carried out in mid-September 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, by the US army, which had been bottled up in the Pusan perimeter at the hands of the Korean People’s Army, to change the war situation. It was a large-scale landing involving more than 300 warships of seven countries, over 1,000 support military planes and more than 50,000 soldiers.

13,000 Long-range Guns and Rocket-launchers Deployed along the Demarcation Line

Along the north of the demarcation line which connects the east and west of Korea, there are strong
underground structures which can resist indiscriminate bombing by the US air force. American calculations claim that 13,000 long-range guns and rocket-launchers have been deployed there. Their range includes Seoul, 42 kilometres south of there, the densely-populated suburbs of Seoul and strategic bases.

The range of north Korea’s artillery is twice that of the American artillery. Among these guns, the destructive power of a gun, which was developed by north Korea itself for destroying the enemy front line, is so high that one shell can shatter a mountain, I was told.

Seoul and its suburbs have a population of 20 million, 40 percent of the south Korean population. Pyongyang is located 180 kilometres away from the demarcation line, so it is absolutely favorable from a geographical point of view. These artillery and rocket units alone are enough to annihilate the elite units of American troops in south Korea and the south Korean army, and turn south Korea into a sea of fire. It would take less than an hour. A US military expert foresaw that the fire power of these artillery and rocket units might be the most powerful in the history of mankind (Newsweek, June 18, 1994).

Another expert said that if firing started from the north, the allied army of the United States and south Korea would detect the artillery positions of the north at once, and start a counterattack. But this stems from ignorance of military affairs. They could not retaliate against shelling from the north; they would die before starting a counterattack and their combat power would be crippled. Their surroundings would be turned into a sea of fire, they would be struck with horror and those who survived would be completely
disoriented.

**Long-range Ballistic Missiles Which Aim at the Bases of the American Troops in Japan and the Strategic Bases in the US Proper**

The Process of the Development of Missiles

In the 1970s, Kim Jong Il ordered the organization of strategic missile units and set out a plan to launch an artificial satellite using Korean technology. Kim Jong Il made up his mind to develop missiles with Korea's own efforts, stating his reasons as follows:

First, the Korean question is a military question with the United States, which is the most powerful nuclear-armed country in the world, as the antagonist.

Second, the United States has military bases in south Korea, Japan and other areas surrounding the Korean peninsula, and they threaten north Korea continuously.

Third, to counter an American attack, north Korea needs to have a great retaliation power capable of attacking the bases of the US troops in Japan and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the strategic points and densely-populated areas in the US proper.

North Korea succeeded in test-firing missiles in April 1984. In September the next year, a second round of tests was held.

At the beginning of 1987, missile production started along regular lines, and afterwards the plan to develop missiles was carried out smoothly, thereby bringing about the success in the

North Korea gave prior warning to the United States about the test-firing. It fired three missiles: The first, with a range of 500 km, fell into the open sea off Japan's Nodo peninsula; the other two flew over 3,000 km and landed in the high seas between Hawaii and Guam.

The success of this test-firing bolstered north Korea's confidence; it apparently achieved another success by developing an intercontinental ballistic missile in 1996. An article in *Rodong Sinmun*, the WPK's newspaper, dated December 24 the same year and written on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of Kim Jong Il's inauguration as the Supreme Commander of the KPA, pointed out, "Under the leadership of Comrade Kim Jong Il, a miracle has taken place in Korea's military affairs." Another article, dated January 1 the following year, declared, "We can strike a blow at the enemy anywhere on our planet."

Viewed from the characters of north Korea and Kim Jong Il, as well as the nature of a possible second war in Korea, the missile warheads of north Korea might be equivalent to nuclear weapons in destructive power. As its enemy is the United States, the world's leading superpower, a missile which cannot destroy a strategic base at one shot would be useless.

In other words, as a state which is capable of developing long-range strategic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles, north Korea ranks among the six top military powers, along with the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom.

The report of an investigation presented to the US Congress on July 15, 1998, by the Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat, headed by Donald Rumsfeld, former secretary of defence, pointed out that north Korea was preparing an immediate deployment of the Taepho Dong No. 2, a 10,000-km-range missile. This report specified that north Korea had deployed medium-range missiles far earlier than the US administration had thought. This report added a possible deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles by north Korea by 2003. But this is a slow-witted judgment. It is almost a fact that north Korea has already deployed IBMs on all fronts. According to an AP report dated July 29, 1998, the NORAD commander said that day that the development of missiles by north Korea was progressing more rapidly than had been thought.

The Launching of an Artificial Satellite; North Korean Rockets Passed over the Japanese Islands Three Times

After successfully firing a multi-stage rocket in May 1993, north Korea stepped up the development of an artificial satellite by its own efforts. It launched a multi-stage rocket at last on August 31, 1998, and successfully placed a satellite into orbit.

This news gave a great shock not only to Japan and the United States but to the whole world.

The successful launching of an artificial satellite showed once again the high level of rocket technology and electronics of north Korea. It showed that the Americans’ economic sanctions and their embargo on the export of military technology against north Korea were useless.
This means that the United States recognized that the test-firing of a missile in May 1993 was that of a multi-stage missile; it also demonstrated that north Korea is capable of attacking the US proper with IBMs, as a retaliation against an American attack. In other words, this missile was the third which passed over the Japanese Islands.

The Russia space monitoring agency ascertained that launching of north Korea’s artificial satellite, and announced that north Korea was capable of firing an IBM. Japan or the United States was not able to identify this as an artificial satellite, and failed to track it. In fact, on September 4, 1998, the American government admitted that north Korea had launched a satellite. The authorities of the Department of State and the Department of Defence declared that they could not deny the launching of the satellite.

The launching of an artificial satellite gave the greatest shock to the Japanese government and its Self-Defence Forces. The Japanese government denied categorically the launching of the satellite by north Korea. In the view of north Korea, the launching made a great dent in Japan’s sense of superiority, which makes it discriminate against other nations. In this sense, the artificial satellite of north Korea and the rocket which carried it into the orbit were the symbol of the “rancour” of north Korea.

The launching of the satellite showed that all the US military bases in Japan lie within the range of north Korea’s ballistic missiles; it meant that 4 Aegis ships, AWACS and Patriot missiles of Japan are useless. It is said that the second and third stages of the rocket which placed the satellite into the orbit flew over the US air force at Misawa and fell into
the open sea 500km away from the base.

It is said that in case of an emergency in Korea, F-16 fighters from the Misawa base will make the first sortie against north Korea. So, it is natural that north Korea would target the Misawa base with missiles.

The plan for the Theatre Missile Defense system (TMD), too, is realistically meaningless. North Korea never worries about whether Japan has a reconnaissance satellite or not, because that of the United States is watching north Korea day and night.

In other words, the launching of a satellite by north Korea means that it had destroyed the US nuclear umbrella. At the same time, it was a warning to Japan which adopted the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines and passed laws concerning them, so as to take part in any US attack on north Korea in an "emergency in the vicinity of Japan".

The most effective method of approaching north Korea may be reasonable negotiations with north Korea. Japan's reaction to north Korea's launching of a satellite was an extreme one. Historically, Japan has never shown such a reaction against the test-firing of missiles by the United States, the Soviet Union or China. Regardless of such a reaction by Japan, north Korea will deepen its relations with the United States and strengthen the north-south relationship. After all, there is an ample possibility that only Japan would be isolated by such moves.

The Deployment of Ballistic Missiles

North of the Demarcation Line which divides the Korean peninsula into the south and the north, the long-
range artillery and rocket-launcher units of the Korean People's Army are deployed in readiness for war. The elite units of the US army and south Korean army and the densely-populated areas, including Seoul, are within the effective range of these guns and rockets. Behind them, a lot of long- and medium-range missiles and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles are ready for a possible war 24 hours a day, to attack not only the whole area of south Korea but also the whole territory of Japan including Okinawa, as well as Hawaii, Guam and the US proper. There is no way to defend oneself against these missiles, which may shower down on the bases of the US-south Korean allied army, the US bases in Japan and the US proper, and for scores of years it will be impossible to find a means of defense. Americans have tested interceptor missiles several times, but failed every time (Note 1).

If the US-proposed Theatre Missile Defense system is to be developed and deployed, it will need astronomical amounts of money and take more than 10 years. According to a Reuters report dated September 2, 1998, Lester Lyles, head of the US Defense Dept's Ballistic Missile Defence Organization told in a press conference the same day that if the United States is to develop the TMD which can intercept such rockets as north Korea used for launching the artificial satellite, it will have to spend tens of billions of dollars. He continued to say that in the case of theatre high-altitude area defense (THAAD) it had performed missile-interception tests five times, but failed every time.

If we suppose that the rate of success in such an interception system is as high as 90 per cent, then if only 10
per cent of the nuclear missiles hit the targets, the country under such attack would be totally destroyed. Therefore, unless the rate of success is 100 per cent, such a system would be useless. US data show that north Korea has already sold more than 1,000 missiles to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Libya and other countries, hundreds of missiles to each, and their effectiveness has been proved.

Therefore, it would be natural for north Korea itself to have many times more missiles, that is, thousands.

North Korea is capable of launching a mass-destruction attack, if it wants to, on military bases, strategic points and densely populated areas outside south Korea.

During the last Korean War, north Korea was not capable of attacking US military bases overseas, and the battlefields were localized in the Korean peninsula. But, if another Korean War breaks out, north Korea will extend the battlefield to foreign countries where US troops are deployed. North Korea considers that it does not need large ships and long-range bombers, like the United States has, as it has only to develop and deploy strategic missiles which can reach the US proper.

It holds that it need not repeatedly test-fire missiles, as the United States does, as one time success is enough to prove the reliability of missiles (Note 2). In fact, the launching of the artificial satellite mentioned above was successful because it was planned and carried out based on the success of the test-firing of a multi-stage missile in 1993.

In April 1998, Pakistan succeeded in test-firing the new-type 1,500-km-range ballistic missile Gauri, and some people say that it imitated one of the missiles offered by north Korea. This proves how high a level the ballistic
missile technology of north Korea has reached.

In addition, according to an AP report dated July 23, 1998, Iran successfully carried out the test-firing of a medium-range missile, the Shehav 3, on July 22. The US government mentioned that this was also an imitation of a north Korean missile.

If the medium-range missiles of north Korea are exported to the Middle East and the Caribbean area and deployed for possible wars, the US military bases in Europe and the American continent may come within the range of these missiles.

Viewed from the target impact of missiles, north Korea has many excellent mathematicians, its trajectory calculation is at the world's top level and its inertia guide technology is high. This fact was dramatically proved by the launching of an artificial satellite on August 31, 1998.

Note 1. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun of Japan dated March 1, 1997, a Defense Agency official explained that intercepting such a ballistic missile of over Mach 10 as the Rodong No. 1 of north Korea is more difficult than hitting a flying pistol bullet with another pistol bullet. Land-based interceptor missiles for objects at high altitudes did not hit the target even once out of six times during tests, and as for those on the sea, even the future date of the test remains unsettled.

Note 2. The atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima by the United States had not been tested beforehand, but demonstrated its power. The atom bomb dropped on Nagasaki had already been test-fired.

Political Negotiation Chips

North Korea need not use the missiles which have been deployed for a possible war, unless the United States strikes it first; apparently it regards them as political bargaining chips.
By developing long-range ballistic missiles, north Korea became one of the six members of the world missile club. As a result, north Korea has a missile ace in its political "poker hand".

The United States had long refused to engage in negotiations with north Korea, but recent years have seen a series of bilateral talks. When Japan was ranting about taking drastic measures against north Korea following the launching of the artificial satellite, a delegation from the US State Department was having cosy talks with a delegation from the Foreign Ministry of north Korea in New York.

If the United States delays the annual delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy oil, which it promised, or postpones the LWR project, north Korea might openly start the nuclear development, and declare that it has succeeded in developing nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles. This would be a nightmare for the Americans.

But, north Korea is ready to stop not only nuclear development but also the export of missiles and the technology concerned, I was told. The Korean Central News Agency suggested on July 16, 1998, that north Korea exported missiles to foreign countries to earn foreign currency, the fact of which the north Korean government has not yet openly announced, though. According to the calculation of the US government, this foreign currency may reach one billion dollars.

So, indemnifying such a loss of foreign currency and compensating politically is a precondition north Korea demands from the United States for halting nuclear development. But this is less than the money needed to build a nuclear aircraft carrier. For the United States, it would be a good bargain, and even if it takes some time, Americans will

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naturally accept this condition.

When will it be? Apparently by 2003, the DPRK-US problem will be settled by a package deal. Otherwise, the sky over Japan would be the intersecting point of the IBMs of north Korea and the United States. Worse still, those of Russia and China would be fired, starting a third world war.

If the allied army of the United States and south Korea attacks north Korea with fighter bombers, cruise missiles and surface-to-surface missiles, north Korea will intercept them using over 10,000 anti-aircraft missiles of different kinds which have been deployed in underground structures everywhere in the country. Enemy planes or missiles which penetrate the surface-to-air missile network will be shot down by anti-aircraft barrages formed of over 10,000 AA guns. It would be almost impossible to break through the barrages of these surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns (These figures are almost the same in the materials of the Japanese, south Korean and US governments).

No country has such an elaborate interception system as north Korea's anti-aircraft network. Even if such strategic bombers as $B\ 1$ and $B\ 2$ and $F\ 117$ fly into north Korea without being tracked by radar, or even if such fighter-bombers as $F\ 75$ and $F\ 16$ enter, 70 to 80 per cent of them will be shot down. Some of them may return to their bases, but in a damaged state.

**Ideal Composition of the Air Force**

The air force planes of north Korea are superior in number to those of the United States and south Korea, but
most of the planes are outdated, and their quality and efficiency are also low. Some people say that they lag far behind the US aircraft equipped with the high technology. This may be logically right. But the myth of the invincibility of the high technology was destroyed during the Gulf War.

In addition, for lack of fuel, north Korean pilots cannot get enough training flights, nor do they have top skills. But, in many countries the training of pilots is done mainly by mock flights on the ground. Where a battlefield is as narrow as the Korean peninsula, where the planes can fly in only a few minutes from the frontline of north Korea to the US and south Korean military bases, strategic points and densely-populated areas, Mach 3 speed is not inevitably necessary. In military actions such as air battles or bombing, fighters have to slow down. Furthermore, Korea is a mountainous area, and cloudy and misty on many days. The United States absolutely clings to speed and high efficiency, which would be useless in combat over Korea. A lesson drawn from battles following the Second World War is that it is effective to use old-style fighters and bombers as well as the latest fighters. In this sense, though north Korea lacks oil and is not in a position to import the latest planes, it has an ideally-composed air force. In addition, the planes of the north Korean air force are equipped with air-to-air missiles, and their machine guns, too, are more efficient than those of US fighters.

The B 29 strategic bomber was called a "flying fortress" when it entered the sky over Japan at the end of the Pacific War. But during the Korean War many B 29s were shot down by the north Korean pilots who had only short-course training. North Korean pilots shot down
many American planes in the Vietnam War, too. During the Middle East War, they took part in attacks on ground targets and air battles to destroy and damage many Israeli fighters and bombers made in the USA and France, thereby gaining valuable experience in attacks on the bases and strategic points.

**Domestic Development and Production of Weapons and Other Military Equipment**

Today few countries domestically produce all the military equipment indispensable for modern warfare. Even Sweden and Switzerland have given up the domestic production of tanks and fighter planes.

But, north Korea considers that depending on other countries for equipping its armed forces is dangerous, based on bitter experience in the Korean War. So it has established a system of developing and producing most of the weapons it needs domestically.

North Korea allocated its best scientists and technicians to the munitions industry, and buckled down to the development of new-style combat equipment. Research institutes and production bases have been built underground everywhere in the country. As a result, it is producing at home everything from bullets to radar, aircraft, submarines, tanks, short- and medium-range missiles and long-range ballistic missiles.

One of the characteristics of modern warfare is the successive firing of shells and bullets and a war of attrition.
A colossal amount of ammunition has already been stored in different parts of north Korea. North Koreans say that a shell costs as much as the head of a pig and a bullet costs as much as a chicken. The munitions industry is, indeed, squandering money.

If field guns were pulled by tractors, it would reduce the production cost. But north Korea is producing self-propelled guns with its own efforts. Apart from north Korea, only the United States and Russia have such a system. Japan is producing self-propelled guns by obtaining the patent right, but imports gun barrels from the United States and only produces gun carriages and chassis. (Ebada Gensuke, *The Guns Useful and the Guns Useless*, p. 113.)

Based on experience gained in the Korean War, north Korea is producing and deploying a lot of self-propelled guns which can move north, south, east, west and in mountainous areas freely. Because the tanks produced in the former USSR and USA were produced for battles in plain areas, they would be almost useless in mountainous north Korea. Considering its mountainous terrain, north Korea has produced the tanks for battles in mountains. They can freely ascend and descend slopes with gradients of 60 degrees and suit the Koreans' constitution.

Needless to say, north Korea has produced many howitzers, in line with its mountainous character. It has also stepped up the production of direct-firing guns, so as to deploy them on top of mountains. In addition, it has successfully developed portable surface-to-air missiles to shoot at enemy planes flying at low altitudes in mountain areas and deployed them widely.

The portable surface-to-air missile *Hwasung*,
domestically developed by north Korea, knocked out at one shot a US helicopter which invaded the air space of north Korea in December 1994, demonstrating its power. I was also told that north Korea is producing at home *MiG 21s* and *MiG 29s*, air-to-air missiles and combat helicopters.

3. NORTH KOREA VS THE UNITED STATES

What is the outcome of Kim Jong Il's utmost effort to strengthen the national defence capabilities? There may be many assertions about this. The following, however, are facts that no one can deny.

As many as 30 years have passed since north Korea put forward, in December 1962, a new defence policy aimed at self-defence. During this period of time, acute military confrontations have occurred between north Korea and the United States four times. In each confrontation the United States concentrated in and around Korea mobile forces as strong as those involved in the Gulf War in January 1991, but all in vain.

Hence, Kim Jong Il has placed Korea's independent, peaceful reunification—the long-cherished desire of his nation—within the range of his target, with full confidence in the possibility of ending the national division around 2003. This is eloquent testimony to the correctness of the policy on strengthening the power of national defence.

From his late twenties, Kim Jong Il has commanded the
DPRK-US military confrontations, as intended by President Kim Il Sung. That is to say, for about 30 years he has fought a battle of wits with successive US presidents-cum-commanders-in-chief—Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton—as well as with the Pentagon (the US Defence Department) and the Central Intelligence Agency. In other words, he has fully displayed his ability as a man of intelligence and strategy in this psychological warfare, seizing the United States with terror.

An essential characteristic of his tactics is to win a victory without fighting, namely, a victory gained without shedding blood but by picking brains. In other words, it is to emerge victorious without costing the precious blood of the Korean nation. How he contended with the United States in the duel of wits can be explained by the four rounds of DPRK-US military confrontation that occurred over the past 30 years.

**The First Round—the "Pueblo Incident" of January 23, 1968**

The US Democratic Party brought the Soviet Union to submission by nuclear blackmail during the Cuban crisis. Lyndon Johnson, who succeeded Kennedy as president following the latter's assassination, came to confront north Korea militarily in 1968, when the Vietnam War was at its height.

The US electronic information-gathering ship *Pueblo*, which had violated the territorial waters of north Korea, was apprehended by the north Korean Navy. At that time, one
crewman was shot dead, and four others were injured. The 82 surviving crewmen, including Commdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, were all captured. This incident occurred on January 23, 1968.

The United States had long been gathering information about north Korea by means of its spy satellites and reconnaissance planes, up-to-the-minute radar and other facilities. Therefore, even if it captured a US spy ship, north Korea still could not prevent the United States from gathering information about it. Besides, up to that time no country—including the Soviet Union and China—had ever dared to capture a US spy ship.

Had it not captured the *Pueblo*, north Korea would not have had to stand face to face with the United States. Nevertheless, north Korea was not a country that could overlook a violation of its territorial waters by a spy ship of a hostile country, fearing confrontation.

No sooner had the *Pueblo* been captured than the Johnson administration dispatched to Korea's sea area the main-force task force of the Seventh Fleet headquartered in Yokosuka in Japan. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, leading a destroyer, a nuclear-powered submarine and supply ships, sailed northward through the Straits of Korea.

Many US men-of-war converged on the East Sea of Korea, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, the aircraft carrier *Ranger* and the anti-submarine aircraft carrier *Yorktown*. They were prepared to attack. Several hundred warplanes, including *B 52* strategic bombers that can carry H-bombs and formations of *F 4* fighter bombers, flew from the mainland of the United States to
Osan, Kunsan and other places in south Korea.

North Korea, a small country, versus the United States, which had won in the nuclear confrontation with Khrushchev's Soviet Union, and also had been extending the area of its bombing step by step as far as the northern part of Vietnam—one could easily understand that the odds were against north Korea. A "wise option" for north Korea would have been to become a "dog" wagging his tail at the United States; however, Kim Il Sung decided to demonstrate the mettle of the Korean nation, the mettle of the "wolf".

Agreeing with Kim Jong Il, after full discussion, Kim Il Sung made up his mind to employ a high-grade strategy of winning without a fight, with the full conviction that victory in a war depends not on weapons or up-to-date technology but on the people's idea. The DPRK-US confrontation with regard to the USS *Pueblo* was a clear illustration of the essence of the Mt. Paektu-style art of war, Kim Il Sung-style tactics.

Kim Il Sung ordered the Korean People's Army, all paramilitary organizations and the entire nation to get ready for wartime mobilization, and make full preparations to deliver a frontal attack at the US mobile units of the Seventh Fleet and units of the US air and ground forces concentrated in and around Korea. At the same time, he judged that it was a golden opportunity to drive the US army out of south Korea and reunify the country.

After full preparations, Kim Il Sung announced his historic warning to the United States on February 8, 1968. He said that he would answer "retaliation" with retaliation, and all-out war with all-out war. Victory in warfare depends on
who takes the initiative. North Korea delivered its forestalling attack of threatening words at the United States. The end of this confrontation had already been decided at this point, I can say.

At that time, the operation planners of the US navy predicted that if the US planes violated north Korea's airspace, 70 to 80 out of 100 would be shot down. According to aerial photos of north Korea taken by US spy planes, anti-aircraft guns were installed and, moreover, ready to fire in all places—in schools, factories and even on running trains. The US army officers concerned judged that the anti-aircraft system of north Korea was far stronger than those of Hanoi in the period of the Vietnam War and of Moscow in the Cold-War era.

If it had been a country other than north Korea, the US army would have launched an attack, and fired at least one or two shells. However, it withdrew in silence. Japan's mass media did not dare to explain what this meant, nor were they willing to report it.

At the time of the Cuban crisis, the US army had blocked the seaways with a general mobilization of its Atlantic Fleet, and forced Khrushchev to surrender, the man who had the possession of nuclear weapons with which he could have destroyed the United States in a moment! Khrushchev yielded to the blackmail.

Then, who on earth were the winner and the loser in the "Pueblo Incident"? The loser was the United States. The Pueblo had been captured and its crewmen were in detention in north Korea. Nonetheless, the US Seventh Fleet sailed away from Korean waters back to base silently. The detention of the crewmen continued for 236 days, and it was
not until the US government, on December 23 the same year, had admitted the violation of north Korea's territorial waters and published a written apology for it that they were finally released.

Kim Jong Il's policy at that time was what was called "3A"—acknowledge, apologize and assure. Twenty-eight rounds of talks were held between the KPA and the US army at Panmunjom. The US side could not help but accept this "3A".

As a result, north Korea won a historic victory in the military confrontation with the United States, without showing the slightest vacillation.

Documentary and other films of the Cuban crisis started by Kennedy had been shot and released repeatedly in the United States and worldwide. The DPRK-US military confrontation over the "Pueblo Incident" and the ensuing US submission were of greater historic significance than the Cuban crisis, and quite worthy to be recorded in TV series or films.

The Second Round—the "EC-121 Incident"

of April 15, 1969

This happened when Henry Kissinger was a special adviser to President Nixon, candidate of the Republican Party, who took office in succession to Johnson of the Democratic Party. The US electronic spy plane EC-121 violated the territorial air space of north Korea on April 15, 1969, less than half a year since the settlement of the "Pueblo Incident". A north Korean MiG 21 scrambled and fired an
air-to-air guided missile at the *EC-121*, shooting it down into the sea, and killing all of its crewmen. The day was the birthday of President Kim Il Sung (Note 1); north Korea was in a festive mood.

It was a national holiday, and north Korea might have connived at such a violation by the US air force of its air space. The US plane might have been off its guard. Moreover, judging by common sense, up to that time no country had ever attempted to shoot down a US war plane.

North Korea was an exception, however. No sooner had the violation of north Korean air space by this plane been detected than the anti-aircraft headquarters of north Korea ordered the air force to intercept it. As soon as its radar picked up the enemy plane, the *MiG 21* that had scrambled launched an air-to-air missile, which unerringly hit its target. North Korea never tolerates any intrusion by the US military forces into either its territorial waters or its air space.

Upon the report of this incident, the Nixon administration hastily dispatched an aircraft-carrier task force to Korean waters. The task force included the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, the aircraft carriers *Ticonderoga* and *Ranger*, and the anti-submarine aircraft carrier *Hornet*. The battleship *New Jersey*, too, sailed as escort for the spy planes. Several hundred bombers and fighter-bombers were flown to south Korea and put on alert. The number of aircraft carriers was four, one more than that at the time of the "Pueblo Incident".

Nixon and Kissinger called the National Security Council to examine the plan for "punitive" bombing of north Korea. Both Nixon and Kissinger strongly insisted
on taking hard-line measures, namely, the bombing of north Korea by US war planes. Then, an unexpected event occurred.

Defence Secretary Laird and Secretary of State Rogers expressed strong opposition, saying that most of the US planes sent to attack north Korea would be shot down, and the US military forces would suffer serious damage. In the end, the persons in charge of military and diplomatic affairs "blackmailed" Nixon and Kissinger, saving north Korea the trouble of doing so. Consequently, the United States had no alternative but to give up its idea of reprisal against north Korea (Note 2).

Note 1. In north Korea April 15 is the greatest national holiday. It is now celebrated as the Day of the Sun on a grand scale.

Note 2. The reaction of the Nixon administration to the "EC-121 Incident" is described in detail in Nixon's book, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*.

**The Third Round—the "Panmunjom Incident" of August 18, 1976**

The third round of DPRK-US military confrontation took place seven years later, that is, three years after Gerald Ford took the office. Ford had been vice-president in the Nixon administration, until Nixon resigned due to the "Watergate Scandal". He succeeded Nixon as president. The incident to be narrated below was "unworthy of the United States".

It arose from the attempt of the US side, without any
prior consultation with north Korea, to cut down a poplar tree which stood by a bridge in the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom (Note 1), under the pretext that it was hampering their forward observation.

The US side, which was boasting of its high technology, must have known well the movements of the Korean side by means of information satellites or electronic spy planes; a poplar tree could not possibly be an obstacle. If the north Korean side had claimed that the poplar tree was a hindrance to its surveillance, it would have been rather more convincing, though.

Cutting down the poplar tree was unworthy of the United States; what is more, it would have been natural for it, in possession of the high technology, far more advanced than that of north Korea, to have used at least a chain-saw. For no reason, however, its side used an ax. And it was two US officers—not non-commissioned officers or soldiers—who began to chop the tree.

Is West Point, the famous US military academy, a training centre for lumbermen? Had they lots of time to spare? (The ax is now exhibited in a museum in Korea.) These two officers had gone there in the company of about 30 US soldiers just to cut down a poplar tree. Just to show off their art of felling a tree?

Enraged with their careless act of attempting to chop down the tree in the Joint Security Area without prior agreement, four guards from the north Korean side rushed towards them. At least scores of men should have been needed for the north Korean side, but only four went there. And they should have taken at least automatic rifles with them. But they were empty-handed, possibly, because they
had no time, I think.

Frightened by the four north Korean guards, the US officer with the ax in his hand threw it at one of them. As it was not a catch-balling, the guardsman should have dodged. But he caught the flying ax and tossed it back at the US officer. The ax flew back, killing the two US officers on the spot. The four north Korean guardsmen inflicted heavy or slight wounds upon the US soldiers by hand-chopping and kicking.

It is quite funny that dozens of US soldiers were beaten to a jelly, and two officers dead and many of them injured seriously or slightly, by only four north Korean guardsmen. The US side reported it to the whole world as a "barbarous act of north Korean soldiers". Who provoked this incident, and who was responsible for it? It was none other than the US side. And the US soldiers were armed, whereas the north Koreans were bare-handed.

After this incident, the north Korean side proposed that the Joint Security Area should be divided, so that the soldiers of both sides could be prevented from going into each other's area, saying that free coming and going by the soldiers of both sides in the area could possibly give rise to another incident. Without regard for south Korea's opposition, both north Korea and the United States reached an agreement on the division of the Joint Security Area on September 6, the same year. Since then, the Joint Security Area has existed in name only. (Asahi Shimbun, dated September 7, 1976.)

Note 1. The Joint Security Area in the Demilitarized Zone at Panmunjom is almost square, with four 800-metre-long sides,
divided into two by the Military Demarcation Line. Located on the boundary is a meeting hall of the Military Armistice Commission. The Armistice Agreement stipulates the number of personnel allowed to enter the DMZ and the kinds of weapons allowed to be taken into the zone.

**The Fourth Round—the Nuclear Crisis of 1993-1994**

Following Clinton's victory in the presidential election in the autumn of 1992, the United States bolstered its confrontation attitude towards north Korea. When did the suspicion that north Korea was developing a nuclear capability arise, and what was the attitude of US governments previous to the Clinton administration towards it? Investigation into the matter brings out very contrasting and interesting facts.

The administration of the Democratic Party provokes wars or conflicts overseas, and the Republican Party settles them—this is what they call a jinx of US diplomacy. Does this saying also fit the case of the suspicion that north Korea was developing a nuclear capability?

The matter of north Korea's so-called "suspicious top-secret plan of nuclear weapons development" was raised around 1986. It is said to have been occasioned by photos taken by US and French military spy satellites of the nuclear facilities in the Nyongbyon area.

The then master of the White House was Reagan, who was notorious for his "Star Wars" Programme (Note 1) against the Soviet Union and serving his second term, which expired in 1988. Reagan was succeeded by Bush, also from the Republican Party, who served only one term (from 1989
to 1992) as president.

The Reagan administration that threatened the Soviet Union with the "Star Wars" Programme did not take a hard-line attitude towards the so-called north Korean nuclear programme. Even in the period of the Bush administration there was no change in the attitude towards north Korea, though it had advertised after winning a great victory in the Gulf War by means of its hi-tech weapons that its next target would be north Korea. Why?

Following the emergence of the issue of north Korea's nuclear programme, these two administrations of the Republican Party did not take strong military countermeasures against north Korea; instead, they held at least 33 rounds of DPRK-US talks in Beijing, and pursued a very conciliatory policy towards the latter—an unbelievable phenomenon. Obviously, they did not want to follow in the footsteps of the Johnson, Nixon and Ford administrations, that had suffered defeat in confrontation with north Korea.

Being unwilling to provoke north Korea for no reason, Bush announced discontinuation of the "Team Spirit" military exercise (Note 2) aimed at nuclear attack, an annual event since 1976. On September 27, 1991, he also declared that tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from south Korea.

Besides, his administration expressed its willingness to agree to on-the-spot nuclear inspection by a north Korean inspection team of the US bases in south Korea. Both north and south Korea simultaneously entered the United Nations, opened north-south high-level talks, signed a nonaggression agreement (Note 3) between them on December 13, 1991, and even adopted the Declaration of Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. In January the following year a high-ranking north Korean official visited Washington to hold high-level talks with the US government. Everything went on as Kim Jong Il had anticipated.

With Clinton elected US president and Kim Young Sam south Korean president in autumn 1992, however, the situation changed. Bush had a record of military service and had been well aware of north Korea's political purpose and military power, which is beyond comparison with those of Vietnam, Iraq and the Soviet Union. But Clinton was just a greenhorn; he had dodged the draft in the Vietnam War, and avoided punishment thanks to an amnesty given by the then President Carter and occupied an official post.

Out of his admiration for Kennedy at the time of the Cuban crisis, Clinton entered political circles and climbed to the presidency. He decided to bring north Korea into submission; now that the Eastern European socialist countries collapsed and the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, north Korea should no longer be left to itself, he thought.

First of all, he needed an excuse to justify an attack on north Korea, should the occasion arise. So he instructed the CIA to manipulate IAEA Director-General Blix, a Swede.

Probably because of his respect for Kennedy or with a desire to show himself as a man of strong will just to offset his guilt of draft dodging in the Vietnam War, he thought that his fellow US citizens would surely applaud him if he punished north Korea, small yet the one and only country that had stood up against the United States.

In 1993 the tension caused by haggling about north Korea's nuclear facilities almost reached the brink of war. On February 25, one month after the inauguration of President
Clinton, the IAEA demanded an unprecedented special inspection of a certain military object in north Korea, claiming that it was a nuclear establishment which had been excluded from north Korea's NPT report. Meanwhile, Clinton resumed the dangerous "Team Spirit" military exercise in March the same year.

Clinton, though with a hard-line attitude, did not take such an extreme measure as to dispatch task forces. Both the Pentagon and the CIA had raised objections to dispatch of any mobile unit, insisting that it was very dangerous to provoke north Korea, I was told. Clinton then instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to retry a computer simulation of a Korean war, each trial of which resulted in defeat for the US side. Nevertheless, he considered that he could attain his aim if he continued military threats on the one hand and pressure through the IAEA on the other. He judged optimistically that north Korea could not help but hang out the white flag as the international situation would be unfavourable for her.

He reckoned that as the Soviet Union, north Korea's military ally, had already ceased to exist, Russia would not support north Korea, and China, too, would not side with it. Perhaps his judgement might have been right, but he was wrong in fact. He misunderstood his rival. Especially, he was in the dark about north Korea's leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

He might have taken no account of the fact that north Korea, united rock-firm around these two leaders, has turned its entire land into a fortress so impregnable as to put any fortress ever constructed in history in the shade, and is ready for any kind of war, nuclear or conventional, and fully
capable of attacking the US mainland in retaliation.

With full determination to steal a march on Clinton, Kim Jong Il ordered the KPA to enter into a semi-war state on March 8, 1993, one day before the resumption of the "Team Spirit" military exercise, so that it could make full preparations for attacking the US overseas bases as well as the US army in south Korea at any time.

Upon his order, the north Korean government announced its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12. The withdrawal would come into effect automatically after 90 days of its declaration. Kim Jong Il's strategic objective was to turn the problem between the IAEA and north Korea into the military and political matter to be resolved between north Korea and the United States, so as to open direct negotiations with the United States. In other words, he played a powerful card by which the United States had no alternative but to come to the negotiating table. This card demonstrated north Korea's capability of delivering a large-scale retaliatory attack by staging a military exercise and test-firing missiles, with the US army as the target of attack.

A large-scale military exercise, with the US army as the target of attack, was staged on March 16, 1993, at an appropriate time for filming by a US military spy satellite. On March 20, four days later, the Clinton administration, in confusion, proposed negotiations to the Korean side.

Besides, Kim Jong Il had taken the measure of deliberately informing the United States of the test-firing of missiles (Note 4)—the test-firing of north Korea's new-type surface-to-surface ballistic missiles—beforehand, though it was not necessary to do so since both sides had no diplomatic relations with each other. On May 29, 1993, three
missiles were fired: One of them fell into international waters off the Nodo peninsula in Japan; the other two flew over the Japanese Islands and dropped into the open Pacific not far from Hawaii. The Japanese Self-Defence Forces had been unaware of the test-firing before getting information about it from the US government one month later. It then made a fuss that Korea had test-fired *Rodong No.1* missiles (Note 5).

North Korea's missile test-firing took place successfully as had been informed, with all details being tracked by the US spy satellite and radar. Clinton and US government officials concerned were dumbfounded. Military threats have very little effect on north Korea; on the contrary, the United States came to be the victim of missile blackmail.

From then on, the US government officials concerned began to make a fuss that the range of north Korean missiles was more than one thousand kilometres, that they were at the stage of development, that north Korea would, in the near future, develop and possess ICBMs which could reach the US mainland, at least Alaska.

From June 2, that is, three days after the successful test-firing, through to June 11, 1993, the first round of DPRK-US talks was held in New York, during which the US government could not but assure it would not threaten north Korea with nuclear weapons and that it would respect north Korea's political system and support Korea's peaceful reunification. The Clinton government had no alternative, for north Korea's withdrawal from the NPT would otherwise automatically go into effect on June 12 that year.

The second round of talks opened in Geneva on July 14 the same year, and the third round on July 8 the following year. On October 21, 1994, the DPRK-USA Agreed
Framework was published.

If the United States reneges on its promise to provide north Korea with two LWRs by the target date of 2003, as agreed by the Geneva Agreed Framework, the DPRK-US military confrontation will enter its fifth and last stage. The United States will have to make a tremendous political concession to north Korea. Otherwise, another Korean war will break out, developing into a nuclear war which will turn south Korea and Japan into killing fields. Besides, Hawaii and some parts of the US mainland will be destroyed, with fallout—ashes of death—raining even on the US mainland. The United States has no other option.

Note 1. The Strategic Defence Initiative, much-advertised in the period of the Reagan administration, was the "Star Wars" Programme. It was aimed at establishing a defence system which could destroy enemy's ballistic missiles, and attack or spy satellites, using laser weapons. Soviet President Gorbachev was very much afraid of this system, it was said. But in fact, it was merely a fiction, the same as that of new-type weapons used in the Gulf War.

Note 2. The world's largest joint military exercise, conducted by the United States and south Korea.

The United States attributed the cause of its defeat in the Vietnam War in April 1975, to "limitations on the use of arms, including nuclear weapons". Based on this "lesson", it prepared to make the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, an integral part of its strategy.

Note 3. A nonaggression agreement drawn up as an attachment to the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchanges between the North and the South" signed on December 13, 1991 (effectuated in 1992.).

Note 4. An article carried in the south Korean Dong-A Ilbo on the first page of its weekly magazine News Plus, on January 4 and 11, 1996. Both the US Army Headquarters in south Korea and south
Korea's Ministry of National Defence did not deny this fact.

Note 5. There are some discrepancies in the descriptions of the impact areas of the three north Korean missiles fired on this day. Anyway, details of this event are carried in Kim Won Bong's book, *The Whole Picture of North Korean People's Army—Close-up of the Real Image of the Unknown "Red Military Strength"?* (pp. 129-130.)

4. SCENARIOS OF A SECOND KOREAN WAR

Will a war break out again in Korea? If so, what will be the scenario? Who will be the winner? There may be different answers, depending on different viewpoints. The scenario of the US forces is known to the public, and that of north Korea can be more or less surmised.

In Japan and south Korea there seem to be many experts who predict that if another Korean war breaks out for some reason, the US-south Korea allied forces, with a good command of the hi-tech weapons which the United States tested and used successfully in the Gulf War, will defeat north Korea, occupy Pyongyang and reunify Korea on the initiative of south Korea.

What are the grounds for their analysis? First, they say that the north Korean economy has extremely deteriorated, and that the north Korean army cannot move tanks and aircraft because of fuel shortages and inadequate supplies of spare parts.

Secondly, they comment that north Korea is far behind the United States and south Korea in high technology, that the north Korean air force planes are inferior to the combat
aircraft of the United States and south Korea in quality and efficiency, and that the outmoded equipment of north Korea cannot cope with the hi-tech weapons of the US-south Korea allied forces: They point out that that was proved by the Gulf War, and that the Iraqi troops were helpless before the hi-tech American weapons. They add that, unlike during the last Korean War, no country will give support to north Korea, leaving it in total isolation.

**Did the United States Win the Gulf War by Using the Hi-tech Weapons?**

As the banner headline reports, in the mass media of Japan and other countries, trumpeted this, everyone believes that the United States defeated the Iraqi army overwhelmingly in the Gulf War because it used the hi-tech weapons. The photo of a *Patriot* missile shooting down an Iraqi *Scud* missile was given as proof. Was the report true?

The Gulf War started with the bombing of Iraq on January 17, 1991 by a multinational force with the Americans as the main force. This was followed by land operations on February 24, 1991, and Kuwait was liberated virtually without bloodshed on February 26. A truce was effected on February 28.

The US army might have advanced to Baghdad, toppled the Saddam Hussein government, which had committed aggression against Kuwait, and established a pro-US government after bringing Saddam Hussein and his followers to trial at the international war crimes court.

So why did the hostilities end in a truce? The
developments would be incomprehensible if it were a fact that the US-led multinational forces won the war by overwhelming preponderance of their hi-tech weapons. Their so-called brilliant victory was nothing but manipulation by the mass media. The more brilliant their victory, the more strange is their hasty truce without advancing to Baghdad.

Some experts explain that if the United States had destroyed Iraq, Iran would have remained the strongest country in the Middle East, and that would have run counter to the interests of the United States, and that, therefore, it chose the truce. It sounds illogical. It is also contrary to the true nature of the United States. It is merciless; if it finds its enemy weak, the United States crushes it. Wasn't it possible for the United States to kill Saddam Hussein and his small coterie without causing damage to other Iraqis if it used the precision-guided munition that it boasts of? But these missiles were not precise enough to do so. In other words, the US hi-tech weapons were not much more highly developed than the ones it used in the wars in Vietnam and the Middle East and the ones used during the dispute in the Falklands.

Common sense shows that if the United States won a brilliant victory, there is no reason why it should accept a truce. A truce means a war ending in a draw, and in the case of the Gulf War, it meant the defeat of the US-led multinational forces. Here are the reasons:

The US army could not procure the war expenses by itself. The expenses were defrayed mainly by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Japan.

The US planes equipped with hi-tech technology were not very effective. It was not published officially, but on the
first day of the war, many US planes were shot down by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire, and the navy insisted on developing the "fighter planes which can survive the first day of war".

The 8,000 *Smart* bombs, with a strong penetrating power, which were dropped failed to destroy the underground facilities of Iraq, and Iraq was able to preserve its military power virtually intact.

The success rate of the *Patriot* anti-aircraft missile, the symbol of the victory of the multinational forces, was, in fact, zero. The televised scene of a *Patriot* missile was the scene of its self-destruction, not the shooting down of a *Scud* missile.

The failure of the multinational ground forces to break through the defence line of the Iraqi army delayed their operations a great deal. The US army gave up its advance to Baghdad because it was afraid of heavy casualties in land operations.

The correctness of this judgment was proved in the surprise attack launched by a brigade of the US marine corps against a brigade of the Iraqi Presidential Security Guard two days after the truce. In a surprise attack, the attacking force is supposed to be overwhelmingly superior. Moreover, the US side committed *M-1* tanks of the latest type and depleted-uranium anti-tank bombs to the attack. Nevertheless, the brigade of the US Marine Corps suffered heavy casualties, approximately one thousand troops, including 240 men killed out of 3,000 in all.

This, in fact, shows the defeat of the US side. In general, if one-third of the combatants of a unit loses fighting capacity, the unit is as good as destroyed. Therefore, General Collin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
General Schwarzkoff, in command of the local forces, to say nothing of Bush, were astonished at the results and gave a sigh of relief when the truce was agreed.

Those who knew nothing believed the propaganda that the US army was the winner because it used the hi-tech weapons. They imagined that the next target of attack would be north Korea, which is regarded with nuclear suspicion as a budding power.

By contrast, Bush correctly estimated the military power of north Korea. He knew well why Johnson, Nixon and Ford shrank from military confrontation with north Korea, even though they had deployed task forces, which were as large as those employed in the Gulf War.

That was why Bush avoided provoking north Korea and adopted a policy of compromise which seemed extraordinary. Bush announced the withdrawal of the US tactical nuclear weapons from south Korea on September 27, 1992, seven months after the end of the Gulf War, and expressed his intention to accept nuclear inspection of the US military bases in south Korea by an international team, including representatives of the Korean People's Army (Note 1).

Note 1. An article of *The New York Times* carried in the south Korean English-language newspaper *Korea Times*, dated November 24, 1991, said that a high-ranking official of the US government who accompanied Defence Secretary Dick Cheney on a trip to south Korea had clarified the fact that the Bush government was actively examining an exceptional measure to accept the idea of international inspection of the US military bases in south Korea in 1992. A delegation of the Korean People's Army was naturally to be included in the international inspection team.
The Question Which Is Not Mentioned in the Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines

The question of re-examining the Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines (Note 1) was raised in April 1996. These new guidelines stipulate Japan's role in case of an emergency situation in Korea as a rear support base for the US army. Here an important question is not mentioned. What is generally pointed out shows that, in fact, the guidelines are gradually revising the Japan-US Security Treaty in its implementation. An overt revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty would arouse needless disputes in Japan, and may stir up fierce opposition in some cases. But the practical revision in its implementation will not cause any opposition campaign. It is a very cunning strategy.

The Japan-US Security Treaty was concluded in 1951, when the Korean War was in full swing. Even before this treaty was concluded, however, Japan had actually been playing an important role as a launching base and a supply base for the US army. The treaty is an unfair one, and Japan has one-sided obligations to assist the US army in its emergency mobilization.

It is said that the US army is stationed in Japan in order to defend it. As long as the US army in Japan or the Self-Defence Forces refrain from invading other countries, there is, in fact, no country to attack Japan unilaterally. There is no country with a reason to do so, nor is there a country capable of transporting troops to land in Japan. The only two times in
history that Japan has been attacked, were in the 13th century by the Mongols and after the Pacific War by the United States.

Therefore, it will be correct to say that the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines aim at strengthening the US control over Japan. But nobody raises this issue.

Apart from the matter of tightening the US control of Japan, the question of the relations with north Korea is prominent. But here is also a point of issue which is never mentioned. That is the possibility that, in case of an emergency in Korea, or if the Armistice Agreement is abrogated and another war breaks out, Japan cannot remain a safe rear base, far away from a battleground, as it did during the Korean War. There is a great possibility that Japan, too, will become the battlefield. As long as the US bases in Japan are used for launching attacks and providing war supplies, Japan, too, will be considered to be a belligerent allied with the United States. Japan will then automatically become a target of retaliation. Unlike in the past, north Korea can deliver "surgical operational strikes" at the US proper and its military bases overseas.

In addition, 12 atomic power stations are operating in south Korea, and major US warships are nuclear-powered. For example, the aircraft carrier Enterprise has eight atomic reactors, and a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier has two atomic reactors. A nuclear-powered submarine is usually equipped with one atomic reactor and a cruiser with two atomic reactors. If only one of these reactors is destroyed, south Korea and Japan will be annihilated by the "death ash" spreading from the reactor. The explosion of a nuclear-powered warship or a
nuclear-powered submarine in the East Sea of Korea will cause atomic tidal waves to hit Japan's coast.

This is not all. Fifty-one nuclear power stations are operating in Japan. They are all light-water reactors and use seawater for their cooling and moderating operations, so that they are located within 100 metres of the coast. If one of the nuclear power stations is directly hit by a missile, bomb or rocket from a small warship, the land of Japan will not escape destruction.

Graphite is used for the moderation of the reactors of north Korea. So the reactors need not be located near the coast. The nuclear facilities in north Korea are located at Nyongbyon in a mountainous area.

The amount of radioactivity released by the explosion of a nuclear power station equals that of 150-180 hydrogen bombs, and one hydrogen bomb is as destructive as 80-100 atomic bombs. So the explosion of one nuclear power station in south Korea or Japan would be as destructive as the explosion of at least 150 hydrogen bombs or 10,000 atomic bombs.

At the same time, strong electro-magnetic waves will arise and seriously obstruct the work of major industrial facilities. Japan and south Korea, both with great density of population, industries, nuclear power stations and petrol, would be enveloped in flames in an instant.

There were no operating atomic reactors in the battlefields and their surroundings during the Korean War, Vietnam War or Gulf War, to say nothing of the Second World War. Operating atomic reactors are the most important strategic targets of top priority. The United States must be knowing this. If the Japan-US Defence Cooperation
Guidelines are meant for an emergency on the Korean peninsula, this is a very dangerous scenario for the destruction of Japan.

Note 1. The Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines were approved at the Japan-US Security Consultative Meeting in November 1978. In these guidelines the two countries promised to work hard to improve cooperation in operation, information and rear support, and to this end, conduct research on the plan of joint operations and joint training. They also specified the policy of cooperation between the US forces and the Japan Self-Defence Forces in case of emergency.

The Japan-US Summit Talks held in April 1996 published a joint declaration on Japan-US security, and made it clear that the two countries would re-examine the Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines for defence cooperation in an emergency. In June the following year, Japan published the results of the intermediary examination of the new Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines, and in September the two countries agreed on these guidelines. Thus Japan submitted the gist of the bill on the Japan-US Defence Cooperation Guidelines to the ruling party.

Is North Korea a Nuclear Power?

Has north Korea nuclear weapons? This question is only a matter for conjecture, and in reality it is difficult to get a correct answer. The United States judges that there is a great possibility that north Korea has at least several nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Until now, north Korea has never admitted that it has nuclear weapons or succeeded in their development. In spite of its persistent denial of the development and possession of nuclear weapons, few people
in Europe and the United States believe this.

Also, north Korea has never officially admitted or denied that it has produced tanks, warships, *MiG 21* or *MiG 29*, missiles, or other kinds of weapons and equipment. (The Korean Central News Agency implicitly admitted north Korea's export of missiles by publishing an article, titled *Nobody Can Make an Issue of Our Country's Missile Policy*, on June 16, 1998.)

It would be a mistake to consider that north Korea is incapable of developing nuclear weapons. But, for north Korea, it is more advantageous that the United States and its allies suspect that it has secretly developed nuclear weapons and possesses several of them in spite of its denial.

European and US experts suspect that north Korea has developed nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

First, because north Korea lags far behind south Korea in economic level owing to its economic stagnation and in military forces, it is totally impossible for it to offset its economic backwardness by means of conventional weapons.

Second, developing nuclear weapons is cheap and produces a great impact.

Third, the development of nuclear weapons is a very effective means of demonstrating the might of a country and boosting its morale.

These arguments sound plausible. They seem reasonable and natural. But what is the reality?

As for the first reason, north Korea regards the US forces, not the south Korean forces as the enemy when strengthening its defence capability. All that it needs to do is to aim at the American nuclear weapons. From the outset it has ignored
the south Korean forces. Besides, it has no intention to engage in an arms race with the United States, and fight this enemy in accordance with European or American military concepts, which give weight to military equipment and quantity of war materials. So the first argument is wide of the mark.

The second argument is also unreasonable in the light of European and American experience. What kept the United States from using nuclear weapons in Korea and Vietnam? Why didn't the United States use nuclear weapons in the Gulf War, when it could not procure war expenses itself? Why didn't France use such weapons in Algeria and Vietnam, Britain in the Falklands dispute, Israel in the Middle East War, South Africa against its neighbours, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan? Why didn't they use these weapons when they could have reduced their expenditure and casualties?

Why did north Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Arab countries, Argentina and Afghanistan venture to fight their enemies when they knew that their enemies had deployed many nuclear weapons in war readiness?

Isn't it reasonable to believe that all sides fought bloody wars because they had the same view that nuclear weapons were not usable and did not suit actual combat conditions?

As for the third argument, there is no instance in which the development of nuclear weapons has demonstrated the might of a country and boosted its morale. Have the nuclear weapons, for example, in the hands of Israel, heightened the morale of its people and demonstrated its might? Judging from this fact, north Korea has no political and military motives for the development of nuclear weapons.
Paradoxically, however, it is true that north Korea has nuclear capability. The reason is that the basic principle of its military thought implies that the enemy's weapon is its own. In other words, it thinks that it can use American nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities and nuclear power stations (nuclear reactors) as substitutes for nuclear weapons.

There is no distinction between the frontline and the rear in a narrow theatre of war like the Korean peninsula, and there are nuclear power stations in south Korea and nuclear weapons stored at the US military bases there. The US bombers and missiles are mainly intended for carrying nuclear weapons and warheads, and American warships are propelled by nuclear power. Therefore, if nuclear weapons are exploded in the seas or sky near south Korea or Japan, that will be enough for north Korea.

Also, if one of the nuclear reactors of a US warship is bombed or attacked by missiles, the result will satisfy north Korea. Or if nuclear weapons stored in the US military bases in Japan or nuclear power stations in the Japanese coastal areas are hit by missiles, they will play the role of nuclear weapons for north Korea (Note 1).

In case of emergency, north Korea may use the nuclear weapons of the United States and nuclear power stations in Japan and south Korea as if they were its own nuclear weapons. Can there be any cheaper "weapon of mass destruction"?

In anticipation of nuclear war, north Korea has carried out the plan for underground fortification, which cost it 30 years of effort and a large amount of money beyond the imagination of Japan and the United States.

Japan is situated just east of the Korean peninsula and
immediately under the jet stream which would be the distributor of "death ash". The maximum speed of the jet stream is 500 kilometres per hour. Hawaii and the continental United States lie almost on the same latitude as Japan, i.e. on a straight line eastward from Japan. Large quantities of "death ash" produced by a nuclear explosion in or around Korea would rain on Hawaii and the continental United States as well as Japan. In south Korea and Japan there are no nuclear-proof shelters, and important facilities and bases are above-ground. The same is the case with the United States.

If the Americans make a nuclear pre-emptive attack against north Korea, the latter will strike nuclear power stations or nuclear facilities situated near densely populated areas of the continental United States. Of course, it is only a possibility that the nuclear weapons and power stations in Japan and the United States may be used by north Korea. I do not say north Korea will certainly strike them in an emergency.

Recently some US and Japanese scientists and experts say that north Korea has many knotty problems hampering its missile development, and its missiles have low accuracy. Their remarks are the product of excessive confidence in their own ability, and contempt for Asia. They should know that missile and nuclear technology is by no means the monopoly of Europe and the United States. As for the manufacturing technique of atomic bombs, an American student, to the world's surprise, drew up a workable blueprint using only declassified data.

On March 31, 1970, *Yodo*, a Japanese Airlines Boeing passenger plane was hijacked in the air by the Red Army
Faction, and landed in Pyongyang. When the plane was released, a Japanese expert said that unless it was operated by Japanese technicians, it could not fly back, because north Korea had no jet engine starter. But an ordinary technician of the Korean People's Army easily started the plane.

The point at issue is the judgement about the need for nuclear weapons for security.

Note 1. According to *The International Herald Tribune* dated February 3, 1994, Paul Leventhal, president of the US Nuclear Control Institute, warned: "North Korean retaliation to bombing could result in vastly more fallout in the south than in the north. ...North Korean retaliatory bombing could bring Chernobyls multiplied."

"Operation Plan 5027-5", the Second Korean War Scenario of the United States

Immediately after the Gulf War, Bush ordered the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to re-examine "Operation Plan 5027", which was a Korean emergency scenario (Note 1). The details of the scenario, which was drawn up in the 1960s, were not published. It has been re-examined and amended every decade.

According to this plan, from the 1960s to the early 1970s, the US-south Korean joint military exercises placed emphasis on the emergency airlifting of reinforcements from the continental United States to the Korean frontline. Typical examples are "Operation Focus Retina" in March 1969 and "Operation Freedom Vault" in March 1971.
"Operation Golden Dragon", conducted from March to May 1973, and "Operation Eagle", conducted from October of the same year to the following spring, were characteristic offensive landing operations. The "Team Spirit" exercise, starting in 1976 was more offensive, and it began to be conducted in real earnest from 1978.

In concrete terms, it was a "9-day War" plan which was mapped out on the basis of lessons drawn from the US defeat in the Vietnam War. It envisaged destroying the manoeuvrability of north Korea in the first five days by mobilizing hundreds of planes, including B 52s, and naval and ground guns, and then annihilating the surviving north Korean forces in a 4-day ground clean-up operation.

The United States' talk of a nuclear attack implies its inability to defeat its enemy with conventional weapons. This is nothing but a very dangerous threat. Though the United States has made nuclear threats on several occasions, it could not actually use nuclear weapons.

In August 1982 the "Air-Land Battle Doctrine" (Note 2) was mapped out, and applied to exercises from the following year. It aimed at accurately striking the strategic bases in the enemy's rear with precision-guided munition, making the whole area of north Korea a battlefield, up to the borders of China and Russia.

This doctrine was evolved on the basis of the lessons of the Vietnam War and the fourth Middle East War. But it appeared that the doctrine was not very effective in the Gulf War, to which it was applied. High technology is an utter illusion.

The doctrine was based on the premise that the United States could not use nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons
were to be used, the doctrine would be useless. Information on the computer war simulation on the basis of "Operation Plan 5027", which had been re-examined after the Gulf War at Bush's order, leaked into the US press. The result was that if a second Korean war broke out, the south Korean army would be destroyed by the north Korean army, and the US forces would win a Pyrrhic victory.

The computer produced the information that a result tragic beyond comparison with that in the Gulf War was awaiting the US forces. Of course, the computer was not of north Korean make, but of US make. This shows why Bush avoided political and military confrontation with north Korea.

President Clinton, however, was different from Bush. As soon as Clinton took office he had "Operation Plan 5027" re-examined, although it had been re-examined two years before and was not scheduled to be examined again until 2001. It was on December 10, 1993 that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff presented Clinton with the results of the re-examination—it was the same as that of two years before, to Clinton's utter surprise. (*Washington Post*, dated December 12, 1993.)

Following is the computer's estimate:

First, a war with north Korea will require at least half of the US forces, and the United States must mobilize 540,000 troops, as many as in the Gulf War, and fight very fierce battles for 120 days. (Some US experts, however, said that this estimate was too simplistic.)

Second, north Korea has 8,400 long-range guns and 2,400 rocket launchers along the military demarcation line, keeping within their firing range Seoul and its surrounding
area with 20 million people or 45.8 per cent of the south Korean population. Therefore, millions of civilians would be killed by a north Korean bombardment.

Third, the death toll of US soldiers in such a war would be as heavy as that in the 3-year-long Korean War and 10-year-long Vietnam War. This would be intolerable for the United States.

And fourth, nuclear reactors in operation will be bombed, and radioactive fallout would spread in all directions, causing serious damage in Japan and other countries.

This estimate was made by the world's first-class super-fidelity computer, precluding cooperation by Chinese volunteers and Russian support for north Korea.

Moreover, the computer belonged to the Defence Department, not to the State Department.

In the United States, the State Department, as a hawk, always asserts a hard line, while the Defence Department unwillingly follows suit in framing foreign policies. Civilian officials of the State Department establish policies and decide whether to send troops overseas, whereas the officers of the Defence Department carry the policies out. The officers are held up as heroes if their men return home in triumph, but they are blamed if their men are defeated and killed. Indeed the officers' job is a thankless one.

Surprised at the computer's prediction, Clinton realized that a military attack against north Korea would be foolish and meaningless, and agreed to try direct dialogue with north Korea. In other words, he had to follow Bush in his policy towards north Korea. This is the real state of affairs. *Los Angeles Times*, dated February 22, 1994.) The result of the computer war simulation on the basis of
"Operation Plan 5027" was none other than a declaration of US defeat. As the third round of the DPRK-US talks in Geneva was stalled early in 1994, the US government examined its closet plan on a scenario of dispatching 10,000 additional troops to the original 540,000 troops. They were afraid that they would be unable to avoid a war even in that case. The situation differed greatly from that at the time of the *Pueblo* incident.

It can be said that north Korea led by Kim Jong Il had the ability to drag the US government to the negotiation table. In the negotiations, the US side only made general statements, without any detail. In other words they were not ready for the negotiations. So it was natural that the negotiations proceeded as north Korea had intended (Note 3).

In this context, Clinton extended his condolences to the supreme leader Kim Jong Il, on President Kim Il Sung's sudden death of a heart attack. And when the Agreed Framework was reached in Geneva on October 21, 1994, he sent Kim Jong Il a personal letter assuring unconditional implementation of the agreement in the name of the US president. Indeed, this was as good as a situation in which diplomatic relations were established.

Meanwhile, there was an appendix, i.e., "5-Stage Operation Plan", to "Operation Plan 5027" which was presented to Clinton on December 10, 1993. The "5-Stage Operation Plan" was bold in that the US forces were to launch a counterattack in the last stage to conquer the area north of Pyongyang, defeat north Korea and reunify the Korean peninsula on the initiative of south Korea. This was a mere imitation of the counterattack in the early period of the
Korean War, the counterattack which started with General Douglas MacArthur's landing operation at Inchon in September 1950, in addition to an application of the "Airland Battle Doctrine". (The New York Times, dated February 6, 1994, and Dong-A Ilbo, dated March 25 of the same year.) The appendix was needed for face-saving reasons on the part of the US forces.

In Japan and south Korea only the appendix was emphasized, and published as "Operation Plan 5027-5".

The appendix was made public by Ri Byong Thae, south Korean minister of national defence, on March 23, 1994, at a meeting of the Defence Committee of the National Assembly in response to north Korea's statement that "Seoul would be turned into a sea of fire." The south Korean side called the operation plan "US-Korea Combined Forces Command Operation Plan (CFC OP PLAN 5027)" and emphasized the 5th stage.

Following is the content of the 5-stage operation which south Korea expects the United States to carry out:

First stage—Immediately before the war
Disposition of the US rapid-deployment force and the dispatch of reinforcements. If there are symptoms of a war developing, rapid-deployment forces for deterrence are deployed in south Korea from the continental United States.

Second stage—Checking southward advance
Stopping the north Korean army invading along the military demarcation line, and destroying the strategic bases in the enemy's rear. A superior air force launches a powerful missile attack on the heart of north Korea to counter the bombardment of the enemy's front-line artillery units and the enemy's special force actions in the rear at the outbreak of
the war, and frustrates the north Korean army's invasion before the enemy crosses the demarcation line.

Third stage—Destruction

Destroying the main force of the north Korean army, advancing northward, and conducting landing operations. Break through the demarcation line and advance northward to destroy the main force of north Korea, while conducting landing operations on the coasts of north Korea.

Fourth stage—Isolation

Advance to the area along the Chongchon River, isolate Pyongyang and enforce military government. Advance to the area along the Chongchon River which flows into the Korean West Sea, far north of the Taedong River flowing through Pyongyang, isolate Pyongyang and enforce military government.

Fifth stage—After the end of the war

Reunify the Korean peninsula on the initiative of south Korea.

As mentioned above, Clinton was so surprised at the results of the computer simulation of the "Operation Plan 5027" that he adopted the policy of dialogue with north Korea. Meanwhile, Kim Young Sam, the former president of south Korea, who had seen the same computer simulation, was so enraptured by the appendix to the operation plan that he thought, "Large numbers of American soldiers and south Korean civilians would be killed, but I would survive. The US troops will advance into north Korea, overthrow the Pyongyang regime and reunify the Korean peninsula. How fortunate I would be!"

Kim Young Sam regarded the death of President Kim Il Sung as a fine opportunity. He put the army on alert
and increased military tension, awaiting the collapse of north Korea.

President Kim Il Sung had agreed to meet Kim Young Sam in his lifetime for the sake of the reunification of Korea, and as the show of etiquette and respect for former US President Jimmy Carter.

The "Operation Plan 5027-5" was actually a cause of friction between the United States and south Korea, and complicated the relations between Clinton and Kim Young Sam. Therefore, the US government expressed its dissatisfaction to the journalists of *The New York Times* and *Washington Post*, saying, "Kim Young Sam is a spoilt brat. South Korea is more of a problem than north Korea."

The US government thought that it would be unable to justify the American military presence in south Korea, and sell its surplus and obsolete munitions, for example *Patriot* missiles, to south Korea and Japan, unless it somewhat exaggerated the military threat of north Korea. South Korea and Japan bought AWACS from the United States because they had been fooled by arms merchants on the payroll of the US government.

The United States will be unable to meet the expenditure for the procurement of munitions for its armed forces if it does not sell weapons to foreign countries. Besides, as the cost of domestic production of the hi-tech weapons is very high, it is difficult to maintain its munitions industry with defence orders from the government alone. In particular, American munitions companies try to apply inessential high technology to weapons, and so their costs are sky-high, beyond comparison with those at the time of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Consequently, their procurement is limited.
Recently the US government has put forward the concepts of "Bottom-up Review" and "Win-Win War Strategy", and propagandizes them as strategies to win in possible simultaneous wars in Korea and the Middle East. This is nothing more than bombastic propaganda conducted by the US government in order to hide its strained financial situation, which compels it to reform its defence programme that had been considered inviolable.

Anyway, putting "Operation Plan 5027" into practice would be an act of suicide for the US government. Whichever party comes to power next, Democrats or Republicans, they may want enough tension to be able to sell weapons to foreign countries. But they will surely try to avoid direct confrontation with north Korea. Otherwise, south Korea and Japan would be annihilated and the United States would suffer astronomical losses. It is possible that a "nuclear winter" would turn the Earth into a planet of death.

Note 1. A computer simulation developed by a research team including researchers of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a think-tank directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and teachers and researchers of National Defence University, as well as the commander of the US forces in south Korea. Its English name is "US Forces Korea Op Plan 5027". It is also called Operation Plan 5027 of the US forces in south Korea. "50" means the US Pacific Command which is in charge of the plan; "2" is the Korean peninsula, the theatre of the operations; and "7" is the serial number of its computer simulation.

Note 2. "It has been developed from the Forward Defence Strategy to defend Seoul relying on defences constructed near the Demarcation Line north of the capital. It envisages dealing powerful air strikes at the heart and main targets of the enemy in the early stage of a war". (Testimony given on November 10,
1983 by Kim Sang Thae, the then chief of the general staff of the south Korean air force.)

Note 3. The statement of Robert Gallucci, the former ambassador in charge of the Korean question, at a lecture on the north Korean issue which was held under the auspices of the New York University's Center for War, Peace and the News Media, in Washington on September 30, 1997.

Kim Jong Il's Scenario for a Second Korean War

Kim Jong Il thinks that it would not be strange if the ceasefire is switched to a state of war any moment, so long as US soldiers armed with nuclear weapons stay in south Korea, violating the armistice agreement and refusing the conclusion of a peace treaty. He views coolly the stark reality in which about 2 million heavily-armed soldiers, including US troops equipped with nuclear weapons, stand face to face. It is unprecedented in history that a ceasefire agreement has been in effect for so long.

He is attentive to the fact that the United States proposed to hold quadripartite talks (Note 1) while it concluded the US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines, a virtual revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty, and turned Japan into an advanced base and supply base for its aggression against Korea.

In order to disguise the fact that the stationing of its troops in south Korea and its failure to conclude a peace treaty with north Korea are violations of the armistice agreement, the United States is stressing only the technical items related to the ceasefire in the armistice agreement by
means of various remarks and documents. The fact that the United States is not willing to conclude a peace treaty is itself an expression that it does not want to put an end to the war, i.e., it still thinks of attacking north Korea again.

Kim Jong Il thinks that although he does not want to fight again with the United States, he would be forced to do so depending on the situation, and the fight would develop into an all-out nuclear war, the theatres of which would be not only Korea but also the neighbouring countries, including Japan. According to him, the background to a second Korean war, in case it breaks out, will be as follows:

a) The south Korean government commits a rash act of invading the north on its own in order to divert the people's dissatisfaction when a political crisis is created in south Korea, compelling the US forces to be involved, too. In fact, the US troops in south Korea and Japan experienced such a danger in the latter days (1997) of the Kim Young Sam regime (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, February 18, 1997).

When a north Korean small submarine was stranded in the south Korean waters on September 18, 1996 (Note 2), and Kim Young Sam was driven into a tight corner because of a large-scale bribery scandal, he mobilized huge armed forces to chase the crewmen who went ashore. This stirred north Korea up to an extent more than necessary. For fear of a possible military retaliation by north Korea and eruption of a new war, the United States saw to it that the submarine incident was resolved with north Korea in a political way.

b) The United States and south Korea invade the north to overthrow the Pyongyang government on the basis of their underestimation of its military, political and economic strength. The US and south Korean allied forces invade
north Korea when they judge that it is on the verge of collapse.

Immediately after the death of President Kim Il Sung, Kim Young Sam put the south Korean army on full alert, watching for a chance to attack the north. The south Korean army committed intrusions and bombardments one after another against north Korea on the frontline. But north Korea restrained itself.

c) The allied forces of the United States and south Korea carry out a pre-emptive strike against north Korea on the basis of a misjudgment that, faced with implosion, it might commit a military adventure against south Korea.

d) In case the United States fails to keep its promise to hand over two light-water reactors to north Korea by the year 2003 and does not make satisfactory political and economic compensation for the failure, north Korea resumes its nuclear development programme, which has been frozen, and the allied forces of the United States and south Korea make punitive bombing raids on the nuclear facilities and other targets in north Korea.

e) The US and south Korean armed forces undertake limited military actions against north Korea as a reaction against a sharp reduction of their defence budgets in order to justify their maintenance.

f) The United States or south Korea goes too far in making a reaction by launching a retaliatory attack on north Korea when it sinks or captures a US or south Korean warship which has invaded its territorial waters, or shoots down a US or south Korean aircraft which has violated its territorial airspace. Good examples for this are the Pueblo incident, the EC-121 incident and the Panmunjom incident.
The Korean People's Army will not make a surprise attack on the south Korean army or the US troops in south Korea unilaterally, even if the political situation in south Korea is unstable. It is north Korea's stand that the political situation of south Korea is, to all intents and purposes, a thing to be straightened out by the south Korean people themselves, not by north Korean involvement. As it has been firm in this stand, it has not committed any armed intervention even though it has seen its chance several times. For example, the Korean People's Army did not intervene in the uprising on April 19, 1960, and the Kwangju Popular Uprising on May 18, 1980.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that Kim Jong Il has no scenario of a surprise attack on the allied forces of the United States and south Korea. The scenario will be as follows:

a) If the United States beefs up its forces as it did during the Gulf War and it is judged that a surprise attack is imminent, north Korea would regard it as a declaration of war and make a pre-emptive strike, without simply watching the developments.

b) If an unidentifiable object believed to be a missile comes flying into north Korea, it will be judged to be a US missile, and north Korea will fire missiles at the US military bases in south Korea and abroad, and make a retaliatory attack on the allied forces of the United States and south Korea at the front using the long-range guns in that area.

c) If a democratic government is established in south Korea, and a civil war breaks out following an armed conflict between the forces that support the new government with arms and the US and south Korean allied forces, and the new
government asks north Korea for assistance, north Korea will dispatch volunteers.

But these events have not taken place up to now.

If a second Korean war breaks out, what kind of military action might north Korea take irrespective of its reasons? It will be beyond what everyone expects. The Korean People's Army will not fight as it did in the last Korean War. It will not do such foolish things as conducting a three-pronged attack with tanks in the van or attacking US warships with torpedo boats.

North Korea does not conceive of the fighting lasting for even several years or several months. Its first concern is not the southward advance of its armored units. It aims to destroy south Korea within two or three days through a concentrated fire of long-range guns, rockets and ballistic missiles, followed by air bombing. Then, its special forces and armored troops will push ahead, its ground forces occupying south Korea within a week and realizing north-south reunification.

(1). The Presumed Scenario in Case of North Korea's Pre-emptive Strike: Limited to Conventional Weapons

Since the whole of north Korea has been turned into an underground fortress, and the main offensive forces are deployed in the forefront, the US forces will not receive any warning when north Korea makes a decision to make a preemptive attack. The Korean People's Army will attack the allied forces of the United States and south Korea unawares. Its manoeuvrings on ordinary days are for demonstration,
showing itself to the spy satellites and spy planes of the US forces.

Stage 1: On the Day of the Outbreak of the War and the Next Day

a) About 13,000 long-range guns and rocket launchers deployed along the front line start firing all at once. As a result, all the military, industrial, communications and transport strongholds located within 60 kms of the demarcation line, including Seoul and Inchon, are turned in an hour into a sea of fire, a hell on earth.

b) Almost all the areas of south Korea are destroyed on the first day of the attack by hundreds, nay, thousands of ballistic missiles raining down. The elite troops of the south Korean army are routed and most of the 40,000 GIs in south Korea are annihilated.

c) Following the missile attack, the air force units are committed to conduct air raids on the military bases and strategic positions, which were not completely destroyed by the missile strikes, to destroy them completely. At the same time, it wins control of the air.

d) In this stage, the GIs in south Korea are virtually wiped out, and the air raids by the US planes that make sorties from foreign bases prove ineffective, most of them being shot down. The landing operations of the marine corps dispatched from the foreign bases lead them to nothing but death.

Stage 2: Two to Three Days after the Outbreak of the War

a) The large warships like aircraft carriers and Aegis-class ships attached to the aircraft-carrier task force of the US Seventh Fleet that move out to the sea of Korea are
sunk by the concentrated fire of anti-warship cruise missiles launched from the planes and high-speed missile boats of the Korean People's Army. Baby hunter-killers take by surprise the US warships, including nuclear-powered submarines.

b) The Korean People's Army lays a large number of mines of various types to seal off the East Sea of Korea, and the US warships are baffled. The Navy of the Korean People's Army holds the virtual command of sea.

c) A special force believed to be 100,000 strong is airlifted to south Korea, and other north Korean forces make a thrust across the demarcation line and land on south Korean shores. They make the surviving US and south Korean military bases ineffective and deprive the survivors of the US and south Korean forces of power to resist.

Stage 3: Four to Seven Days after the Outbreak of the War

Huge ground forces, supported by mechanized units, advance into south Korea without bloodshed; meanwhile the underground revolutionary organizations set up people's committees and announce their seizure of power. The military alliance between the United States and south Korea is annulled.

Stage 4: Eighth Day of the Outbreak of the War

The establishment of a unified government is proclaimed, and Kim Jong Il is inaugurated as the supreme leader of the government of unified Korea. China, Russia and other countries make declarations of their recognition of the new government. Kim Jong Il demands that the United States conclude a peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations with Korea.
Stage 5: Ninth Day of the Outbreak of the War

a) The United States has to decide whether to recognize Kim Jong Il's government of unified Korea or to continue fighting, claiming aggression by north Korea.

b) In case it takes the choice of war, it means its decision for an all-out nuclear war. And it also means a nuclear holocaust for Japan and other neighbouring countries, and that the US proper will become a target of nuclear attack.

c) If it maintains the normal state of thinking, the United States gives up continuing the war. In the country there may be some who strongly insist on jingoism, but the tendency toward peace holds sway. The United States will get nothing from the war and it has no justification for continuing it. This is because it is an internal problem of Korea, and there is no risk of the US mainland suffering a direct nuclear attack as it was at the time of the Cuban crisis.

(2) The Presumed Scenarios in Case of a Pre-emptive Strike by the Allied Forces of the United States and South Korea

Kim Jong Il imagines two circumstances if the allied forces of the United States and south Korea make a preemptive attack on north Korea.

The pre-emptive strike is limited to an attack by the air force and navy, as north Korea will never overlook the reinforcement of the US armed forces to the scale of their strength in the Gulf War. Surprise attacks by ground forces are unrealistic, as they would be detected beforehand.

Scenario 1 envisages a US attack by means of
conventional weapons, and scenario 2, a nuclear attack, a worst case scenario.

Scenario 1: Limited to Conventional Weapons
Stage 1: The Day of the Outbreak of the War and Two Days After

a) The surprise attack by the US and south Korean allied forces begins with a barrage of 200 or 300 cruise missiles from the air and sea. The targets are strategic points like missile launcher bases, AA gun batteries, AA missile launch pads and other AA installations and air force bases in Pyongyang and various other parts of the country, and the positions of artillery and rocket launchers in the frontline areas of north Korea.

b) Several hundred US and south Korean bombers and fighter-bombers led by the latest Stealth bombers like F117s, B1s and B2s, attempt to intrude into the territorial airspace of north Korea in waves.

c) North Korea, which has been turned into a fortress with underground facilities, remains almost undamaged from the missile attacks and bombardment of the US and south Korean allied forces, and north Korea fires surface-to-surface missiles at the military bases of the allied forces. At the same time, the long-range guns and rockets at the front destroy all the areas of south Korea through a barrage.

d) Meanwhile, more than half of the bombers and fighter-bombers of the United States and south Korea that try intruding into the territorial air space of north Korea are shot down soon after the intrusion, by the AA missiles and guns, and most of those that survive are shot down in the sky of north Korea. Less than 10 or 20 percent of them
return to their bases undamaged.

e) Almost all of the Aegis-class ships, warships and aircraft carriers of the US navy, which fired cruise missiles, are sunk or heavily damaged by anti-warship cruise missiles launched from ground pads, aircrafts and missile boats. Those that escape being sunk are disabled for navigation or combat.

f) When it is judged that the US cruise missiles are launched from US bases outside south Korea, north Korea makes a missile strike against these bases. And the countries where these bases are situated are recognized as being directly involved in the US aggressive war, and become targets of its retaliatory attacks; they are engulfed by the flames of war as theatres of the war.

Stage 2: Four Days after the Outbreak of the War

South Korea is overpowered within a week after the outbreak of the war. Details are omitted.

Scenario 2: The Use of Nuclear Weapons—A Scenario that Destroys the Earth

Even if the United States makes a nuclear attack, north Korea can withstand it, as it has built fortresses underground. Even if the ground is levelled, the underground fortresses will remain undamaged. In this case, north Korea will have a good excuse to justify its missile attack on the nuclear power stations in south Korea and the neighboring countries, and justify nuclear retaliation on the United States. A pre-emptive nuclear attack on north Korea will immediately mean a third world war, involving China and Russia—In other words Armageddon. This is because there is no regime for deterring the use of nuclear weapons.
The cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles fired at north Korea are not displayed on the anti-aircraft radar of China and Russia as being aimed at only north Korea. Therefore, these countries regard it as a warning, and fire nuclear missiles at the US proper. In fact, some of the US nuclear missiles are aimed at China and Russia. So one cannot say for sure that the missiles fired are aimed at only north Korea. In this situation the US proper is turned into a nuclear war zone. Unless the US administration goes crazy, this worst case scenario will not be put into practice, and it will remain a mere sheet of paper.

Note 1. This is a proposal for talks involving north Korea, the United States, south Korea and China. It was made on April 16, 1996, during a summit between Clinton and Kim Young Sam to "begin the process of realizing a lasting peace treaty" on the Korean peninsula. The proposal took the form of joint sponsorship of the United States and south Korea, but what had been noted concerning this issue from the beginning was that the United States had been persuaded by south Korea to agree to it. The first full-dress talks were held on December 9-10, 1997, and the second full-dress talks in March 1999, both times in Geneva.

Note 2. It happened on September 18, 1996. A small submarine of the Korean People's Army was stranded in the sea off Kangrung in south Korea, owing to a mechanical failure in the course of regular exercises. Although it was ascertained that it was an accident, south Korea announced that it was an "armed spy ship", and killed 20 unarmed crewmen. On September 22, a few days after the accident, north Korea, through a statement of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, admitted that the ship had been stranded owing to a mechanical failure and demanded that the corpses of the crewmen and the submarine be returned. On the 27th, it announced, through a statement of the Korean Central News Agency, that it had the right "to retaliate as the victim". On November 18, the news
agency published another statement, demanding an apology for the murder of the crewmen and repatriation of their corpses and the submarine without any conditions attached. A spokesman for north Korea pointed out in his statement on December 31: "The sending back of the corpses of the crewmen means that the south Korean authorities admitted, though belatedly, their inhumane deed and apologized for it."
PART 3
THE DAY OF REUNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA

1. THE FUTURE OF NORTH KOREA’S ECONOMY

Money Changes Hands

It is often said that money changes hands. This means that a poor man can become rich tomorrow, and a rich man can become poor tomorrow. It is not rare that a poor man becomes a millionaire in a few years. It is also not rare that a millionaire goes bankrupt and becomes penniless within a few years.

Typical examples are the bankruptcy of Japan’s bubble economy and the disappearance of south Korea’s “miracle on the Han River.” Saudi Arabia, which grew rich through oil exports, has now become a debtor country.

One sometimes has money, and sometimes not. This is quite conventional.

I predicted the plight of south Korea’s economy today in the spring of 1997. During a lecture held in Osaka, Japan, I said,” It will not be strange if south Korea’s economy collapse at any time.”
After the lecture, a Korean businessman, who had kept relations with south Korea, asked me in private: "I have invested quite a large sum in south Korea. What should I do?"

"If you want to withdraw the invested capital, do it as quickly as possible. If you can, do it in a few months' time. Or else, you will regret it."

Afterwards, I heard nothing from him. Had he done as I advised him, he would have sent me thanks. Apparently, he suffered a lot for disregarding my advice.

Until 1997, the international airport in Beijing, China, was crowded with businessmen and tourists from south Korea. But now they are seldom seen there.

And a few years ago almost no one would have predicted today's boom of the US economy. Likewise, no one can swear that north Korea's economy will not be rehabilitated.

The Causes of Economic Crisis

It is said that production in north Korea began to decrease entering the 1990s. It is, in a sense, a miracle that its economy has held out up to now. According to the New York Times, dated February 24, 1992, the average annual per capita income of the country was 2,460 dollars as of 1991.

After 1995 north Korea made an "Arduous March" (Note 1) for three years. This vividly shows the difficult conditions of those days.

In the past north Korea had carried out five-year and seven-year economic plans, sometimes extending them. And
its economy grew. Problems cropped up in the days of executing the Third Seven-Year Plan (1987-1993).

North Korea has pursued a "policy of building an independent national economy" (Note 2), but it is true that it depended on China, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for oil, coking coal and other essential fuels and raw materials. In the days of the Third Seven-Year Plan barter-trade market disappeared owing to the imploding of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the United States kicked up a racket about suspicion of nuclear ambition against the country. It was indeed a double punch.

The greatest problem entailed in this was the oil import of 1993, which decreased by one half of the amount of previous years. It now became difficult to import oil through barter trade. This greatly affected north Korea's economy. Without oil, a modern economy, civilization, cannot operate.

As a result, north Korea's economy was plunged into a sort of crisis. The annual per capita income of the country fell below 1,000 dollars as of 1993 (Note 3). This meant that the gross domestic product fell by half compared to 1991. This led the Workers' Party of Korea to adopt at the 21st Plenary Meeting of its Sixth Central Committee a decision on virtually suspending the Third Seven-Year Plan.

Large-scale construction projects were suspended, and boosting agriculture, light industry and thermal and hydroelectric power stations became a task of the day for rehabilitating the country's economy. But the country suffered damage from cold weather in 1994, from floods in 1995 and 1996, and from tidal waves and drought in 1997. Severe disasters befell the country for several years in succession. The annual per capita income was reduced to
below 500 dollars in 1996. This could not be helped, as factories and farms stopped operating.

As the country had been engaged in barter trade, it had not been so interested in earning foreign currency.

Kim Jong Il stressed on several occasions the need to improve and develop the country's foreign trade to meet the changed situation, but apparently the instructions were not put into practice.

The market surrounding north Korea is in fact a capitalist market, dominated by the dollar. Of course, the euro has come into being, and the German mark, French franc, pound sterling and Japanese yen are also in circulation, but powerful currencies of the capitalist countries, centred on the US dollar, are still manipulating the world economy. It has become difficult to earn foreign currency unless one conducts trade with the United States and other capitalist countries.

Japan could grow economically and south Korea could achieve prosperity, short-lived though it was, because they could make inroads into the large, unlimited market called the United States, at the expense of placing themselves under its political, military and cultural domination.

Following are the factors that compelled north Korea to experience economic difficulties.

[Factor 1] Defence Buildup:
Opposed to putting an end to the state of war with north Korea, the United States has reinforced armaments in south Korea and the surrounding areas, and conducted under various names large-scale military exercises envisaging a
nuclear attack against north Korea. To counter this, north Korea has had to increase its defence expenditure. It has built many underground fortresses and, by developing the defence industry, produced as many weapons and equipment of offence and defence as it could.

From the economic point of view, nothing is more unproductive than national defence. It is difficult to calculate accurately the money, natural resources and labour north Korea spent on national defence in the 37 years from 1962; if we suppose that it has spent 5 billion dollars (Note 4) every year, the total reaches 185 billion dollars, as a simple arithmetic calculation. This is an estimation of the money value, and in actual fact it could be several times greater than that.

All in all, north Korea's defence construction was as gigantic an undertaking as building several Egyptian pyramids underground, and this considerably affected the country's economy. But thanks to its persevering efforts for strengthening its defence capabilities, it has become a flying "hedgehog", so powerful that not even the most powerful country in the world—US lion—dare not provoke it.

[Factor 2] Collapse of Socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe:

In the past, north Korea maintained its existence without foreign currency as it could import what it could not produce at home through barter trade with the socialist economic sphere, including the Soviet Union. But the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe following the implosion of East Germany on November 9, 1989, seriously affected north Korea's economy.
That north Korea could not conduct barter trade was like Japan, south Korea or Taiwan losing their large markets like the United States and Western Europe, in which case they would experience economic panic, confusion and tension. But north Korea held out against the worst conditions.

For lack of foreign currency, north Korea could not import oil, chemical fertilizer and coking coal. Without oil, vehicles, especially trucks, cannot run; coal cannot be transported and factories stop running. Hydroelectricity is not reliable, so it had to depend on thermal power. Not only electricity but diesel fuel is also needed for mining coal, which means oil is also needed. For operating metallurgical works, there have to be coking coal and heavy oil, which also have to be imported.

The goods north Korea exports to earn foreign currency are ferrous and nonferrous metal products, but their prices fell on the international market at that time. It could have caught abundant fish in its offshore waters, but fishing vessels cannot go out to sea without oil. It is a vicious circle, indeed.

[Factor 3] Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States:

From 1953, when the Korean War ended in an armistice agreement, or, to be more exact, from 1945, when Korea became liberated, to this day, north Korea has been under US economic sanctions. This has hindered it from conducting trade with capitalist countries. Freeing itself from the US economic sanctions is an important task for it to eliminate this hindrance and conduct trade smoothly on a worldwide scale.
Financing by international financial organizations will enable it to trade with the capitalist market. Then it will be able to solve, to a great extent, the problem of energy and upgrading production equipment. For obtaining loans smoothly from international financial organizations, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States must be lifted.

It is the US economic sanctions that hinder the European countries from investing in north Korea. They are nervous lest they run up against the US policy of sanctions.

For example, the United States attempts to punish by invoking its national laws companies of Canada and European countries that trade with, or invest in, Iran and Cuba.

North Korea has set up the Rason triangular zone (Note 5) bordering China and Russia, as a special trade and economic zone, but the US economic sanctions are dampening other countries' enthusiasm for investment.

Note 1. This was a 100-day-long march the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by Kim Il Sung made from December 1938 to March 1939. In the dead of winter, they marched towards their homeland at the risk of their lives, breaking through the encirclement of the Japanese army. After the march, they made a thrust into their homeland, instilling hope into the hearts of their fellow people who were groaning under the Japanese military rule.

Note 2. This policy is aimed at building a comprehensive economic system that develops in an all-round way, is equipped with modern technology and managed by relying on its own raw materials, energy resources and technological forces, so as to satisfy in the main its national demands for the means of production and consumer goods on its own. North Korea's basic strategy in economic construction is to build this independent economy by holding fast to the principle of self-reliance.
Note 3. According to the *Asahi Shimbun*, dated April 10, 1998, the statistical data north Korea submitted to the UN showed that the annual per capita income in the country was less than 1,000 dollars in 1993 and less than 500 dollars in 1996.

Note 4. Five billion dollars is equivalent to the money needed in building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier or two B2 Stealth bombers.

Note 5. This is an international development project on the estuary of the Tuman River, which flows through the area bordering north Korea, China and Russia. It consists of a large triangle that links Yanji in Jilin Province, China, Chongjin in north Korea and Vladivostok in the maritime region of Russia, and a small triangle that links Hunchun in China, Rason in north Korea and Posyet and Zarubino in Russia.

When setting up the Rason zone as an economic and trade zone in December 1991, north Korea allowed 100-percent introduction of foreign capital. Rason plans to become a complex economic and trade zone specializing in three functions—transport of goods in transit, processing for export and tourism and financial services.

**Factor of Economic Rehabilitation:**

**Flap Your Wings Again, Chollima**

Can north Korea's economy be rehabilitated? The answer is, "Sure" and "Without doubt." Then, what is the scenario? It is, "Flap your wings again, Chollima."

According to this scenario, Chollima (a legendary winged horse of Korea that is able to gallop 400 km in a day) is now in the stage of recuperating its health. It will start galloping again in one or two years, increase its flight distance after some years, and in ten years fly freely into the sky.

Then, will Chollima be able to fly into the sky again?
This depends on whether the factors causing economic difficulties are eliminated or not. When the above-mentioned factors one and three that arrest its economic development are eliminated, north Korea’s economy will be revitalized, and Chollima will fly at an unprecedentedly high speed.

These factors cannot be eliminated all at once. But it is possible to do this in three stages. The second factor cannot be removed easily, as resurrection of the socialist economic sphere is too unfeasible in the present circumstances. The failure to do so can be made up by the elimination of the remaining two factors. In other words, removing the first and third factors is enough for revitalizing north Korea’s economy. In the third stage, north Korea will challenge the capitalist market economy.

[Stage 1] Chollima Recuperation of Its Health and Preparation for Galloping:

The first stage will appear in one or two years’ time. The basic task in this stage will be to put an end to the present economic crisis.

Kim Jong Il plans to lay a basis for putting the production facilities across the country on a steady footing and stabilizing the people’s living at this stage by obtaining electricity immediately through the large-scale generation of hydroelectricity and the thermoelectricity, as well as through the medium-and small-scale generation of hydroelectricity.

When the rate of operation factories increases and their production is put on a normal basis in north Korea, its per capita income will reach the level of 1991.

Between 1997 and 1998, north Korea changed the expression “Arduous March” into “Forced March”, denoting
its new situation. “Arduous March”, which means a passive posture, is a stage of making preparations while maintaining the status quo at any cost. “Forced March”, however, meaning a qualitative change, indicates a very active and thrusting posture. Its destination is clear.

After the death of President Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il held fast to the political philosophy of “The people are my God” (Note 1) and surmounted the worst crisis in the history of the DPRK. Specifically, he did not rely on foreign assistance but unified the minds of the nation by means of the feeling of reverence for President Kim Il Sung, the father of the Republic, and overcame the difficulties by relying on the people. In detail:

a) The people’s reverence for President Kim Il Sung was the basis for maintaining the continuation of the ideals of the founding of the Republic and its policies. It also reaffirmed the orthodoxy of the statehood of north Korea.

b) During the three-year “Arduous March”, Kim Jong Il gave on-the-spot guidance to many units across the country, studying their current situation and giving commendations to those who had rendered service, no matter how small, to the society and collective. As one can see when one reads Rodong Sinmun carefully, such people are highly commended by the mass media. This method for maintaining oneness in mind of the people cannot be found in other countries.

c) Kim Jong Il led northern Jagang Province, the most backward and mountainous part of the country, with an annual precipitation of less than 600 mm, so as to create there a brilliant model of self-reliance that could be spread across the country.
The content of the guidance was revitalizing the province's economy and improving the people's standard of living by drawing on the strength and wisdom and resources of the province, true to the behest of President Kim Il Sung. The first problem that was solved in this effort was that of electricity. Small hydroelectric power stations of various types, numbering 150, were built on small and swift rivers for the generation of electricity needed by the factories and local people for their living.

This is a quite realistic way to settle the problem by relying on the efforts of the province alone, as its scale is not so large and it requires less manpower. As fewer transmission lines are laid, the line loss of electricity can be largely prevented. The building of power stations and dams with earth, stones and timber available in the province makes it possible to dispense with the use of large quantities of cement.

By means of the electricity generated in this way, local factories were able to operate, and the people could endure the biting-cold winter of the northern part of the country without feeling cold. Thanks to the heating of rooms and cooking of food by means of electricity, the people need no longer collect firewood. In addition, several problems were solved for the machinery and light industries.

When the method of Jagang Province is promoted across north Korea, the country's economy will be rehabilitated and the people's standard of living will be greatly improved without recourse to help from other countries. And the vicious circle of the economy will be overcome.

d) Kim Jong Il also took some measures to put the production of electricity and minerals on a steady footing for the normal operation of the iron and steel works and
smelteries across the country. Increased production of iron and steel materials and nonferrous metal goods, precious export goods for earning foreign currency, is essential for rehabilitating industry.

e) Regular supply of electricity, coal and raw materials will increase the operation rate of cement factories, and promote construction projects now under way in different parts of the country. Moreover, the production of export goods in light-industry factories will be increased, which means more foreign currency earned. This will prove effective for putting production on a steady footing in industry as a whole.

f) A large-scale land rezoning is being conducted by stages every year, so as to avert the impact of adverse weather and increase the rate of mechanization of farm work. It will lay a basis for gathering steady bumper harvest. At the same time, potato farming is being encouraged. The country will solve the problem of food by its own efforts in a few years.

Thanks to these measures, Chollima will finish recuperating its health and start to gallop. In other words, the "Forced March" will come to a successful conclusion.

[Stage 2] Chollima Takes Wing:

In this stage the first and third factors begin to be removed in part, and formal application of the market mechanism begins to be introduced on an experimental basis. This stage starts in two or three years' time at the latest and ends before or after 2003 at the earliest. In case it is extended, it ends in 2003 plus three to five years. The rate of annual economic growth gradually increases from 4-5 per
cent, reaching 15 per cent. The per capita income increases to 4,000 dollars from 2,000 dollars, and even to 5,000 or 7,000 dollars.

In this period, the problem of energy, the problem of electricity in particular, is solved in the main. Within two or three years north Korea steadily runs its industry by its own efforts and operates factories on a normal basis.

In addition, the problem of food is solved. The north Korean government expresses gratitude to the agencies of the United Nations, non-governmental humanitarian organizations of other countries and governments of various countries, including the United States. Subject to the circumstances of the time, Kim Jong Il invites the personages related to the assistance to Pyongyang, and expresses heartfelt thanks to them in person. Highly possible is that this could take place in 2002, when agricultural production is put on a completely stable and modern footing, i.e., on the 90th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung.

The concrete contents of the second stage are as follows:

a) As the whole country has become an impregnable fortress, there will be no need for it to spend so much money on national defence as it has done before. Needless to say, it will have to perfect the fortress and maintain it; it will also have to develop weapons of new types. But part of the defence expenditure will be diverted to economic construction, which means increased investment for the economy.

b) Production will be put on a steady footing, the rate of operation of factories will be rehabilitated to the level of 80 to 90 per cent and the national economy will regain its normal level. Shops will be filled with domestic products.
c) The foreign currency earned by the factories that produce export goods will be invested for the import of hi-tech equipment. The introduction will not be done on a large-scale, as before; it will be conducted in a way best suited to the situation of Korea, on the basis of detailed study of the replenishment and stock of spare parts, and unhindered supply of raw materials.

d) With the laying of the basis for full-scale export industry, preparations will be made for building factories to produce competitive electrical goods for home use and light-industrial goods. In addition, Nampho, Wonsan and other places will be turned into bonded zones.

e) State funds will be appropriated along with foreign investment for building infrastructure in the Rason triangular zone. In anticipation of the improvement of the relations between north Korea and the United States, European businesses will take part in it, and negotiations will be held with the World Bank for raising a big loan. The amount invested thus will reach 3 to 6 billion dollars.

f) The regular flights between Pyongyang and Beijing will increase from two to four or seven a week. This will be done to accommodate the rapidly increasing passengers and materials.

g) Nearly 10 billion dollars of foreign funds will be invested in north Korea, and full-scale construction and investment in the Rason area will be spurred by the LWR project.

What we need to recollect here is the fact that Japan's economy was rehabilitated thanks to the US demand for war supplies during the Korean War. The foreign capital invested directly in Japan amounted to 3.6 billion dollars at
that time; this amounted to 1 trillion yen at the exchange rate of those days. Thanks to this money, Japan's economy recovered miraculously, and a thriving business unprecedented in the history of Japan, a business of meeting the demand for war supplies, began. So electric refrigerators, electric washing machines and electric cookers were distributed to every household across the country. In those days Japan's economy reached 60 per cent of its pre-WWII rates. North Korea's territory is one third of that of Japan, and its population is one sixth of that of Japan. If a colossal amount of money is invested in north Korea, as was done in Japan, it is certain that an economic boom beyond our imagination will start.

When special economic zones were instituted in China, they were literally wild areas without any infrastructure. But after China's establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, a huge amount of money flowed into China from abroad, and she began to become prosperous.

[Stage 3] Chollima's Galloping and Long-Distance Flight:

In the third stage, the first and third factors are eliminated; north Korea learns the tricks of the market economy, and puts them to effective use. Thus its economy enters a period of full-scale growth, a period of prosperity. North Korea holds a large amount of foreign currency in reserve. This period starts around the year 2003, at the earliest. The per capita income reaches 10,000 dollars, up from 4,000 to 5,000 dollars. Chollima flies all over the world, showing itself proudly. The rate of economic growth is kept at 15 per cent.
When it was faced with the Great Depression, the United States introduced the New Deal, which contained socialist methods, saving capitalism and laying the basis for today's prosperity. Britain, where Karl Marx studied capitalism and imperialism, introduced the welfare state, a socialist policy, and turned itself into a model "from-cradle-to-grave" state.

In this stage, north Korea will develop its unique socialist economy by skilfully assimilating the capitalist economy into the socialist economy following the footsteps of the United States and Britain. Through exchanges with capitalist countries, it will become more intellectual and obtain their experiences and high technology. This will demonstrate a great vitality in its economic exchanges with other countries.

North Korea's economy, having put the methods of the free market to optimum use, will maintain and realize the ideals of socialism, playing the role of a new engine in the economic development of northeast Asia. North Korea is fundamentally different from south Korea and Japan in that it need not import raw materials even though it becomes an industrial nation possessing high technology like the latter countries. This is because it is abundant in strategically important minerals and other underground resources.

The detailed moves in the third stage are as follows:

a) Around the year 2003 the relations between north Korea and the United States will be normalized in the main, a peace treaty concluded between them and the nonaggression agreement between the north and south of Korea implemented on a full scale. The Demilitarized Zone will be demilitarized in the true sense of the word, and the Korean
peninsula will enter the stage of arms reduction. The US troops in south Korea will assume the nature of a peacekeeping force, unhareful and neutral, and they will withdraw by stages.

As a result, north Korea will no longer appropriate limitless amounts of money for national defence. Defence expenditure will be reduced by stages, and the troops will be reduced finally to a half or a quarter of the present level. The money saved will be diverted to economic activities. This will enable Chollima to gallop. Thus, the first factor will be eliminated.

b) The third factor, i.e., the US economic sanctions, will be removed and north Korea will be struck from the list of "sponsors of terrorism". European countries will invest in the Rason zone in real earnest, and the large Japanese companies will invest there one after another, so as not to lag behind. Foreign investment will reach 100 billion dollars, up from the targeted 20 billion to 30 billion dollars.

c) North Korea will have its own electronics industry, the most developed in northeast Asia. North Korean specialists possessing knowledge of computer hardware and software will advance to the United States and Japan. US and Japanese businesses will ask north Korean specialists, enterprises and institutes for the development of new programmes.

d) North Korea will have cleared up its foreign debts and held 50 billion dollars in reserve.

e) With the removal of the first and third factors, a spiraling effect which no one has even imagined will be brought about in north Korea, and an unprecedented boom will prevail. With the sustained development of its economy
the per capita income will exceed 10,000 dollars.

f) The international airport in Pyongyang will be expanded into a modern hub airport like Changi Airport in Singapore, and European and US airlines will start direct flights to Pyongyang. The airport in the Rason triangular zone will also be expanded.

To meet the increasing demand, Air Koryo will buy several Boeing super-jumbo jets. Direct flights from Pyongyang to Washington, New York and Honolulu will be operated every day.

g) North Korean people will be able to take tours abroad. The tourists will visit not only China, Russia and Japan, but also Europe and the United States. This will be the abundant life north Korean people will enjoy in the Kim Jong Il era.

It will be a prosperity based soundly on north Korea's domestic resources, a prosperity different from the one Japan achieved by issuing deficit bonds and from the phantom one south Korea attained by borrowing an astronomical amount of money from other countries only to see accumulating foreign debts in spite of its increasing exports. In case it borrows money, north Korea will not accept short-term loans.

Taiwan can be likened to north Korea. South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia had to place themselves in the hands of the IMF, as they had been fooled by foreign speculators. But it was different with Taiwan, because it holds a large sum of money in reserve, leaving no room for foreign financial speculators to meddle.

Note 1. This means that the people are regarded as God. It was a
lifelong maxim of President Kim Il Sung. He made it his faith to go among the people and learn from them.

**The Reasons Why the United States Holds Talks with North Korea**

I would like the people who have read this book this far to think again about this: Why does the United States hold talks with north Korea? Isn't it for political and military reasons? This answer can pass, but it does not deserve a perfect score.

The United States is an imperialist country, the most powerful one in history, and a highly-developed capitalist country. Securing economic interests is the basis of its political and military acts. Why does it pay attention to the Asia-Pacific? It is because of its economic interests.

It is logical to think that the United States holds talks with north Korea for the same reason. Its sense of smell where money can be made is quite amazing; in fact, no one can match it in this regard. It is moving in anticipation of normalizing relations with north Korea.

Let us refer to an interesting example. In the latter days of the shogunate of Japan in the 19th century, Britain, a country of Anglo-Saxons like the United States, thought that Satsuma and Choshu (localities in old Japan—Tr.) would rule Japan, while maintaining relations with the Edo shogunate. The first British minister, Rutherfold Alcok, and his successor Sir Harry Parkes reached this conclusion on the basis of their analysis of the political situation of Japan. So Britain invested money in Satsuma and Choshu. France, however,
invested in the Tokugawa shogunate estimating that it would emerge victorious. It wanted to win concessions in Hokkaido. The French minister was Leon Roches. After all, the British guessed right. This shows the far-seeing wisdom of the Anglo-Saxons.

The Rockefeller Foundation has its eyes on north Korea. This means that north Korea is a promising and secure place for investment. No country in Asia is as abundant in natural resources, particularly strategically important resources, as north Korea is.

Let's take a look at some concrete examples.

In September 1996, the Stanton Group which has close relations with the Rockefeller Foundation, signed a contract with the Sungri Oil-Processing Factory in Rason.

In August 1997, the US National Minerals Association, with the active support of the Rockefeller Foundation, signed a contract with north Korea worth 500 million dollars. The contract concerned the right to mine magnesite and other strategic mineral resources in the Tanchon area in northeastern Korea.

On November 5, 1997, DHL Worldwide Express, a large air transport company, opened an office in a star-rated hotel in central Pyongyang.

Here let me explain in short the differences between US banks and Japanese banks.

If a new company asks it for a loan, a US bank will first study its chairman and technical personnel, and then its products. If it is decided that the company is promising, the bank finances it, and recovers the money only after the company has made profits.

A Japanese bank, on the other hand, will start loaning
money only after it has been confirmed that the company is solvent. Japanese banks do not pay attention to a company's personnel or products.

This is why venture enterprises do not prosper in Japan, while such businesses thrive in the United States.

The US attitude is that it will be all right if a huge amount of money is earned after ten years in spite of losses in the early years.

The period when Kim Jong Il reunifies Korea will fortunately coincide with the period when north Korea achieves economic prosperity.

Then the developments will be very interesting.

2. SECRET OF THE YEAR 2003

The Korean nation was liberated from the long Japanese military rule on August 15, 1945, but it was divided into north and south by the US military occupation of the south.

The 55-year-long tragic division has caused indescribable sufferings to the 70 million Korean people.

For the Korean people, who are proud of their 5,000-year-long history as a homogeneous nation, nothing is more excruciating and humiliating than the national division.

It is quite absurd that an unprecedented violation of international law—the division of Korea, a victim of the Second World War, not of Japan, an assailant—has been neglected until today, the 21st century.
Reunifying the country is the common aspiration of the Korean people, whether they live in the north or south of the country, in Japan, the United States or in other foreign lands.

There have been several chances for them to realize reunification. But these chances have been missed, and many people have come to think that reunification is still far off, an impossible thing at the moment. But if one follows the trend of history carefully, one can see that it is near at hand.

Then who will lead the Korean nation to reunification, their greatest aspiration? And how and when? The physical and objective conditions for giving concrete answers to these questions have begun to mature.

Following are the answers: The year 2003, the date of the implementation of the Agreed Framework signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994, will become the decisive occasion for reunification.

The socialist governments in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries collapsed in less than one year after the ideals of socialism and communism had been negated. This happened almost in the twinkling of an eye. No one foresaw it and no one could check the developments. Such a collapse is inevitable in south Korea.

Around 2003, at the earliest, south Korea will lose its raison d'etre, sliding downhill; and at the latest, in a few years after that, the north and south of Korea will achieve peaceful reunification through federation.

The central figure here is Kim Jong Il. At the request of the entire nation, he will be acclaimed the supreme leader of reunified Korea.
Lost Chances for Reunification

I mentioned before that chances for reunification have cropped up on several occasions for the Korean nation.

The first chance was when the country was liberated on August 15, 1945.

But far from gaining independence as a single country, it was divided into north and south. If Stalin had not agreed to the US proposal for dividing the country along the 38th parallel of latitude and if the US troops had not occupied the southern part of the country, Korea would not have been divided.

The second chance was the time when the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union (Note 1) adopted a resolution on December 27, 1945. The resolution dealt with the establishment of a provisional government in Korea and five-year trusteeship. But the United States did not abide by the resolution. If it had complied with the resolution, a provisional government would have been established, and five years later, that is, in 1950, Korea would have re-entered the international community as a single state.

The third chance was when the Joint Conference of Representatives of Political Parties and Public Organizations in the North and South of Korea was held in April 1948. The participants in the meeting included Kim Ku, a Rightist nationalist, Kim Kyu Sik and many other patriotic figures from the south; they reached a historic agreement on the establishment of a unified government. But, manipulated by
the United States, Syngman Rhee established a separatist government in Seoul.

The fourth chance was during the Korean War, which erupted on June 25, 1950. North Korea soon launched a counterattack, and drove the allied forces of the United States and south Korea to the Pusan Perimeter. But it failed to drive them completely out of Korea as its supply route became over-extended. At that time, reunification was near at hand.

The fifth chance was when the Syngman Rhee dictatorship was overthrown in south Korea by the uprising on April 19, 1960. The spirit of reunification ran high across the country, and it was believed that reunification, led by students, was approaching. But on May 16 the following year Park Chung Hee, manipulated by the United States, staged a coup d'etat and mercilessly suppressed the reunification movement.

The sixth chance was when the South-North Joint Statement (Note 2) was issued on July 4, 1972. The authorities of the north and south agreed to reunify the country independently and peacefully, based on the spirit of great national unity. But Park Chung Hee reneged on the agreement. Had the principle of the statement been put into practice, the independent reunification of the north and the south would have been realized.

The seventh chance was when the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South was adopted on December 13, 1991. This agreement also was sabotaged, this time by the Roh Tae Woo regime. The United States at first pretended to welcome the agreement. But changing its attitude, it instructed the
south Korean government to scupper it.

As seen above, there have been seven chances for reunification, and it was the United States that put a spoke in the wheel every time. No matter how many rounds of talks the north and south Korean governments hold, the south Korean government cannot go against the opinion of the US government. No matter who its leader is, south Korea is a protectorate of the United States, unable to follow independent policies.

What is the lesson that we can draw from these seven lost chances? It is a stark fact that reunification of Korea cannot be realized unless north Korea settles accounts with the United States, without which inter-Korean talks will produce nothing, and the essential nature of the problem will remain obscure.

Note 1. Occupying south Korea, the United States realized that the political climate there was unfavourable for it. So it did not allow any moves by the Korean people to establish an independent state, including the activities of the Preparatory Committee for Nation-Building. It also exercised direct military rule, and suppressed the Leftist forces. Moreover, it wrecked the US-Soviet Joint Committee, an organ established at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union in December 1945 to help the independence process of reunified Korea. In 1948 the United States got a separate election held in south Korea, and inaugurated the Republic of Korea with Syngman Rhee, its vassal, as president.

Note 2. This was a statement issued on July 4, 1972 simultaneously in Pyongyang and Seoul, after it was agreed at the two rounds of north-south high-level talks held in May and June that year. In addition to clarifying the three principles of national reunification—independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity—the statement dealt with the issues of
relaxing tension and conducting multifarious exchanges between the north and the south, cooperating for the early holding of talks between the Red Cross Societies of the north and south, opening a hotline between Pyongyang and Seoul, and instituting and running a north-south coordination commission.

The Seoul Government Lacks National Orthodoxy and Legitimacy

When north Korea mentions the orthodoxy of its government, it has in mind that it was established as a product of the glorious anti-Japanese armed struggle, that it was developed by the anti-Japanese and anti-US veterans, and that it set as its basic policy the regaining of the complete independence and sovereignty of the country through anti-Japanese and anti-US struggle, and building a powerful country on the reunified land. When it speaks about its legitimacy, it has in mind that it accords with the August 1945 international agreement on Korea and was founded in accordance with the unanimous will of the Korean people both in the north and south of Korea. Establishment of government by relying on military suppression does not deserve discussion.

According to these standards, one can see clearly that the successive governments of south Korea have lacked orthodoxy and legitimacy. The south Korean government has no "justification". South Korea's economic prosperity means the "dog" has grown fat, but it has not become a "wolf". In any case, south Korea is only a mistress and plaything of the United States.
This is proved graphically by the aforementioned policy formulation by the present south Korean government. In concrete terms, it cannot exercise prerogative of command over its own armed forces in a time of emergency. It has no power to deal, on its own initiative, with a violation of its territorial air space or territorial waters. It has never enjoyed due, corresponding treatment from the US government.

Let me explain this in detail through a few examples of developments that took place during the establishment of the south Korean government.

Example 1
The resolution of the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union issued on December 27, 1945 deals with the setting up of a provisional government in Korea and a five-year trusteeship. In violation of the resolution, the United States resorted to bloody suppression and installed the Syngman Rhee-led government.

The United States claimed that this government was recognized by the United Nations. However, bringing this matter to the United Nations was itself a serious violation of the resolution of the Moscow conference and the agreement of the US-Soviet Joint Committee. In other words, the Syngman Rhee regime’s flaunting of UN credentials bespeaks that it lacked national orthodoxy and legitimacy.

Example 2
The Syngman Rhee government was set up against the unanimous will of the south Korean people. Syngman Rhee was flown to Seoul on October 16, 1945, on General MacArthur’s plane. He had no experience of anti-Japanese activities to speak of. His only merit was the fact that he was
proficient in English; his Korean is said to have been fully “Englishized”. Supported by the United States, he took over the ruling mode of the Japanese imperialist occupation rule and pro-Japanese elements as they had been.

Syngman Rhee cherished neither national reconstruction plan nor patriotism. He proclaimed the so-called Syngman Rhee Line (Note 1) and seized Japanese fishing boats. If he had to do such a thing at all, he ought to have excluded from his government former officers, noncommissioned officers and privates of the Japanese army and special secret-service policemen, and court-martialed them. He also instituted the notorious “National Security Law”, based on the “Maintenance of the Public Order Law” Japan had exercised until the end of the Second World War.

Example 3

The Syngman Rhee regime consisted of former officers of the Japanese army and pro-Japanese elements. The most important posts were occupied by those who had served in the Japanese Government-General in Korea and collaborators of its rule in Korea. Most of the noncommissioned officers of the south Korean army were former soldiers of the Japanese army (Korean War, edited by the History of Ground Warfare Study and Dissemination Society and published by Hara Shobo, p. 11).

Especially, the south Korean army was organized by recruiting people who had graduated from the Japanese military academy, former Japanese army volunteers, draftee schoolchildren and former soldiers of the puppet Manchukuo army. Those who had graduated from the Japanese military academy included Park Chung Hee (57th class), Jong Il Gwon (55th class) and Ri Jong Chan (49th
class), Jang To Yong and others had been draftee schoolchildren of the Japanese army (Note 2).

Figuratively speaking, it was nothing other than a new army of "dogs" which the "lion" organized under his army's command by gathering the survivors of the "monkey" army. This was the Korean Augmentation Troops to the United States Army (KATUSA).

The Syngman Rhee government was set up on August 15, 1948, and on August 26 that year the United States concluded the Tentative Military Agreement with south Korea, seizing the right of command of south Korea's coast guard and ground forces. Through the "Taejon agreement" (Note 3) concluded on July 15, 1950, the US army usurped the prerogative of command over the south Korean armed forces.

As these three examples show, the south Korean government, from the process of its establishment, is only a "bastard" of the Japanese Government-General and a "government" in American clothes. It only set up the signboard of the Republic of Korea under the aegis of the United States. This history restricts the south Korean government's formulation of policies, and it is quite natural that it lacks national orthodoxy and legitimacy. Unless it cuts its ties with this history, its nature can never be changed no matter what new governments appear through general elections or whatever.

Note 1. This was the sea area around the Korean peninsula fixed according to the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Seas Syngman Rhee proclaimed on January 18, 1952. It stipulated that the south Korean government had the right to protect, defend and use all natural resources like minerals and sea products on the surface of
the seas, in the seas and on the sea beds 200 miles (including Tok Island) from the south Korean coast. It would exercise the right to harvest maritime products in this area, but it would not interfere in the freedom of navigation there. This line was abandoned after a fishing agreement was concluded in 1965 as part of the "Japan-South Korea Treaty". Now south Korea's economic waters stretch 12 miles from the coast.

Note 2. Jong Il Gwon was army chief of staff, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prime minister, foreign minister and speaker of the National Assembly of south Korea. Ri Jong Chan, a former major in the Japanese army, was martial law commander during the Korean War and defence minister. Jang To Yong, a graduate of Toyo University in Japan, was chief of the army intelligence agency, lieutenant general of the army and figurehead of the 1961 military coup.

Note 3. During the Korean War, the UN forces (the US forces in substance) seized the right of command of the south Korean armed forces in accordance with the "Taejon agreement" concluded on July 15, 1950. The official title of the "agreement" is the "letter on the transfer of command of the ground, naval and air forces of the ROK" from Syngman Rhee to General MacArthur. In accordance with the Joint Statement of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and the UN Forces Commander issued on May 26, 1961, ten days after the Park Chung Hee-led military coup, the 30th and 33rd divisions and five companies of the ground forces were freed from the command of the US forces, but the US forces still exercise command over the whole of the armed forces of Korea.

National Orthodoxy and Legitimacy of the Pyongyang Government

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was founded on September 9, 1948. Its founder is Kim Il Sung, the legendary hero of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and a great son of the Korean nation. Former officials and
collaborators of the Japanese colonial rule had no role in the building of this government.

As a state founded by Kim Il Sung, it could enjoy justification among the Korean nation.

It was founded also in conformity with the agreement reached at the Joint Conference of Political Parties and Public Organizations of the South and North of Korea held in April the same year. The general elections were also held in south Korea in secret, with a turn-out of more than 70 per cent. During the days of the general elections, a rumour had it that the day was the "Republic of Korea" and the night the "People's Republic". The present Pyongyang government was established by elections conducted in this way in the north and south of Korea.

The Provisional People's Committee of North Korea (provisional government), the predecessor of the Pyongyang government, expressed its approval of the establishment of a unified provisional government and a five-year trusteeship, an issue decided at the Moscow Three Foreign Ministers Conference held on December 27, 1945. In this way, the Pyongyang government made consistent efforts from the days of the provisional government to set up a unified government in opposition to the separate elections organized by Syngman Rhee.

The fact that Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have justification, which the south has not, is a threat to south Korea's raison d'etre. In order to sling mud at Kim Il Sung's justification at all costs, the United States and south Korea have fabricated lies of every possible kind and propagated them through scholars and mass media organs on their pay-roll.

But this only heightened the fame of Kim Il Sung and
Kim Jong Il as legendary heroes and highlighted the unreasonableness of the stationing of the US troops in south Korea, as well as the pro-American, pro-Japanese and unpopular character of the south Korean government.

Kim Jong Il is perfect in his possession of all qualifications befitting the supreme leader of the nation. He was born in the flames of the anti-Japanese armed struggle, experienced the fierce anti-US Korean War and has emerged victorious in the battles of wits in the political and military realms with successive US presidents from Lyndon Johnson onward.

Kim Jong Il is the very person who can wreak the "rancour" of the Korean nation on Japan and the United States. It is inevitable that Kim Jong Il's government that has justification will emerge victorious in the sacred war to dispel this "rancour" and that the Seoul government, which does not have any "justification", will become extinct.

North Korea, by winning a great victory in the Korean War and emerging the winner in political and military confrontations with the United States in subsequent years, victories that even the Soviet Union failed to win, further consolidated the national orthodoxy as a decisive one at the threshold of the 21st century.

Reunification Strategy Modelled after Koryo Medicine

When meeting Mrs. Pak Yong Gil, wife of the famous south Korean minister of religion Mun Ik Hwan, Kim Jong Il said, "I exist for national reunification. If I
Kim Jong Il drew up a scenario for making the US troops in south Korea harmless and imploding south Korea simultaneously, and achieving the peaceful reunification of the country immediately. He is putting the scenario into practice steadily. This strategy is modelled after Koryo medicine.

It is the United States that divided Korea into north and south, concocted the Syngman Rhee regime by holding separate elections in violation of the resolution of the Moscow Three Foreign Ministers Conference, fought with north Korea during the Korean War, and signed the armistice agreement. It is also the United States that installed and propped up the successive governments in south Korea, and provoked military confrontations, including the Pueblo incident and 1993-1994 nuclear crisis. The United States was a party to the north Korean submarine incident of September 18, 1996. Moreover, it enjoys the prerogative of command over the south Korean armed forces in case of emergency.

By its very nature, Korea's reunification is an internal problem of the nation, which brooks no foreign interference. But a close look will reveal that the Korean issue, the problem of its reunification, cannot be settled without political and military negotiations with the United States.

There are two methods for solving the problem, both of which require the driving out of the US troops.

One is reunification with recourse to arms, and the other is peaceful reunification through negotiations. Kim Jong Il calls the former "reunification method modelled after Western medicine" and the latter "reunification method
modelled after Koryo medicine".

Reunification with recourse to arms means viewing the US troops in south Korea as the greatest obstacle in the way of territorial reunification and driving them out of south Korea by force of arms. To use a medical metaphor, the US troops stationed in south Korea are a malignant tumour. In Western medicine, a tumour is removed by enucleation. For this surgical operation, the patient must be put under general anesthesia. But there have been quite a few cases of patients being put in a dangerous situation because of imperfect anesthesia, and some patients have found themselves not cured even after a successful operation.

Moreover, the use of a scalpel on the body might cause various sequelae. Nevertheless, a surgical operation is undoubtedly an easy method. However, an all-out war between the Korean People's Army and the combined forces of the United States and south Korea would claim heavy casualties on the part of the Korean people.

Reunification by means of force of arms is not a desirable method for the Korean nation.

If the method of Koryo medicine is applied, the tumour can be removed by administering insam (ginseng) and mushroom extract. This method dispenses with the need for a surgical operation. In other words, it enhances the ability of natural healing, changing the malignant tumour into a benign one. A benign tumour is not harmful.

Kim Jong Il is planning to solve the Korean problem by applying this traditional method. This method, which has proved effective in practice, will render the US troops in south Korea powerless and neutral, and open a way for their phased withdrawal through north Korea-US negotiations. It
will create a situation in which the US troops are not a stumbling block for north Korea and the Korean nation even if they remain in south Korea. In other words, it changes the malignant tumour called US troops in south Korea into a benign tumour.

Stationing US troops in south Korea is a most grave violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953. The fundamental difference between this agreement and other truce agreements is that it not only stipulated the technical issues for observing the armistice, but also clarified the issue of withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the concluding of a peace treaty for a peaceful solution to the question of Korea's reunification. The foreign troops that still remain in Korea are in fact US troops, numbering 40,000.

The US failure to conclude a peace treaty to put an official end to the Korean War is a serious violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. All these things considered, it is the United States and its troops that violate the agreement.

The United States claims that its stationing of troops in south Korea fully accords with the US-south Korea Mutual Defence Treaty. But the treaty itself is a violation of the armistice agreement.

In addition, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed and went into effect on July 27, 1953, and the US-south Korea Mutual Defence Treaty was initialed on August 8, 1953, signed officially on January 1, 1954, and went into effect on January 13, 1954.

Therefore, so long as the stationing of US troops in south Korea is a violation of the armistice agreement, the armistice
agreement is in effect and north Korea observes the agreement, the north Korean government will continue to insist on the withdrawal of the US troops.

Nevertheless, Kim Jong Il is trying to change the nature of the US forces from a malign to a benign factor. In this way, the conditions for realizing Kim Jong Il’s "strategy modelled after Koryo medicine" have been created.

Implicit Meaning of the Year "2003" Assigned in the Geneva Agreement

Kim Jong Il enticed the United States into creating conditions for it to pursue his Koryo-medicine strategy, precisely with the lure of the DPRK-US Agreed Framework reached in Geneva on October 21, 1994.

The US government and south Korea, as well as many experts, opined that the agreement was merely a promise: the United States made arrangements for the provision to north Korea of two LWRs by 2003, and of 500,000 tons of heavy oil every year in the meantime. When the LWR project was completed, north Korea would allow ad hoc inspection.

It would be safe to assert, however, that such an opinion and analysis resulted from misunderstanding of the real meaning implicit in this agreement.

The figure "2003" assigned in the agreement has important implications. The agreement contains a provision for the United States to undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of LWRs by the target date of 2003 and another provision that the DPRK and the US would
upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level. Inconceivable, and on top of it, a deliberate scenario has been concealed in this numerical figure.

This is Kim Jong Il's stratagem to translate into reality his "Koryo-medicine strategy", the stratagem that the United States, on the assumption that it keeps its promise, would establish full-scale diplomatic relations with north Korea. This contains two meanings: On the one hand, the main obstacle to the Korean question, i.e., the United States, would be removed; on the other, south Korea would crumble away of its own accord.

No evidence is available to indicate that the United States signed the Geneva Agreed Framework with full knowledge of all these implications. It might have known them, but probably not. Of course, there is some evidence—though circumstantial—suggesting that it might have got an inkling of these implications. For instance, when the agreement was reached, Clinton took the trouble to send a letter of assurance to Kim Jong Il, giving a promise of its implementation; when Kim Il Sung passed away, Clinton sent his condolences to Kim Jong Il—an extraordinary event in the United States; when Kim Jong Il was acclaimed General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, the State Department issued a statement of congratulations, expressing hope for the development of bilateral relations between the two countries.

The United States specified the target year of 2003 for the following two reasons:

First, a LWR project usually takes ten years for completion. This is a calculation made by the United States. Counting from 1994, the target year becomes 2003.
Therefore, this figure is quite reasonable. The United States will judge that the project cannot be delayed, as it is to be undertaken by south Korea under US supervision.

This judgment is merely superficial.

It is common sense that any project can be delay-prone from the outset. Worse still, the United States intended to slow down the project as much as possible.

Second, it expected the Pyongyang government to fall apart within a decade.

According to the judgment of the United States, a reasonable period of time for this project should be fixed to appease troublesome north Korea, and, if it was fixed at ten years, there would be a great possibility of the north Korean government crumbling away before the period expired. As the negotiations were under way in Geneva, the US government was rife with a rumour about north Korea's breakdown. For this reason, delaying the project as long as possible was more favourable.

Judging by common sense, the calculation made by the United States was not erroneous. However, the knowledge common to the Americans hardly makes sense to north Korea. On the contrary, this figure was an awful miscalculation, or even a fatal misjudgment as far as the United States was concerned. Some of its high-ranking officials might have got an idea about the implications, and attempted to abandon south Korea.

Kim Jong Il sets great strategic importance on the target year 2003, for this figure is the factor that makes the provisions of the agreement binding.

If the target period of the LWR project was not specified, the Geneva agreement would become very equivocal, and
have no binding force. Then, it was quite obvious that the United States would procrastinate about the implementation of the agreement. And then the agreement with the United States would become meaningless. Kim Jong Il seemed to have understood that, as the United States is a "society ruled by contracts", a contract with no date of implementation specified would be useless.

According to Kim Jong Il's opinion, for the United States to implement the LWR project to the letter, is as significant as killing three birds, instead of just two, with one stone. For then it would enter into diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level and sign a peace agreement, or, if the occasion arises, a friendship treaty with north Korea.

It is as clear as day, however, that the United States can hardly complete the project and transfer the LWRs to north Korea within the target date of 2003. Six years have already passed, and only three years remain, during which time it is next to impossible to complete the project. This is precisely what the United States calculated, and what Kim Jong Il envisaged. Now that the project has become impossible, the United States has two options.


As it is now unable to observe the target date of 2003, the United States requests north Korea that both sides renegotiate the Geneva Agreed Framework. The United States explains that it has encountered physical barriers to fulfilling its promise about the target year 2003, and proposes that the term of the project be extended for five or ten years, or that the LWR project be replaced by a coal-burning thermal
power stations project.

North Korea rejects the proposal, and demands the resumption of the nuclear development project. The United States denounces this as a breach of the Agreed Framework, implying economic sanctions and military actions against north Korea. Then, north Korea warns that it will regard the US measure as a declaration of war against it.

It is the United States and no other that has broken its promise of the target year 2003. Therefore, on the basis of international conventions, it will have nothing to justify its sanctions or military actions. In the long run, it comes to notify north Korea that it is willing to pay due compensation, compensation that costs it the least, i.e., entering into diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level ahead of schedule and signing a peace treaty.

North Korea shows a tentative refusal of the US concessions, before accepting them as an expression of the tender's sincerity. Then, north Korea and the United States establish bilateral diplomatic relations and set up embassies in each other's capital city. The DPRK-USA peace treaty follows, putting an end to the Korean War.


The United States unilaterally declares its renunciation of the Geneva Agreed Framework. At the same time, it reinforces its troops in south Korea. The north Korean side strongly denounces the US actions, calling them a flagrant violation of international conventions, and declares a state of war. Then, it resumes its nuclear development project full steam ahead and declares its withdrawal from the NPT,
putting an end to its special position of having suspended its withdrawal from the treaty.

It is clear to all that it is the United States and not north Korea that has committed a violation of international conventions, and thus is to blame for this situation. For this reason, north Korea can justify all its actions.

The situation on and around the Korean peninsula becomes touch-and-go. US military aircraft and warships that attempt to violate north Korean air space or territorial waters might be either shot down or sunk. Or the US army in south Korea may possibly be increased to 100,000. Then, war breaks out.

This is a worst case scenario. However, so long as the ruling circles of the United States do not take leave of their senses, this will remain in the drawer.

Consequently, the United States has no alternative but to take Option 1. It has no loophole available. Probably its government had known this all along but kept silent, for it anticipated the opposition to be offered by some hardliners and pro-south Korean forces within itself.

What, then, is the strategic objective Kim Jong Il pursues with regard to the target date of 2003? It is as follows:

[Strategic Objective 1] Removal of the Main Obstacle to the Solution of the Korean Question

This means an end to US interference in the Korean question, namely, the disappearance of the US entity as the main obstacle to the solution of the Korean question. And it also means that north Korea is no longer a "hostile state" or "threat" to the United States, and is not a "sponsor of terrorism—an end is put to the state of war between the two
countries.

The Korean question rids itself of obstacles in the way of peaceful contact between the people of the north and the south.

As a result, an atmosphere will be created for the Korean nation to settle the question of its reunification in an independent and peaceful way on the basis of national unity, and the fundamentals of the Korean question will be resolved.

Then, north Korea will not demand a forcible withdrawal of the US troops from south Korea. With the end of the armistice agreement, the US troops' presence in south Korea no longer flies in the face of international conventions, and becomes an issue to be resolved between the United States and south Korea. According to the DPRK-USA peace treaty or friendship treaty, the US troops in south Korea will change their character into that of either a provisional neutral force or a peacekeeping force; it will go through a phased withdrawal according to a five- to ten-year plan.

In case north Korea and the United States enter into a bilateral friendship treaty, both might also actually establish relations of allied nations.

[Strategic Objective 2] Final Establishment by North Korea of National Orthodoxy

The removal of the external barrier to the Korean question by the US approval of the establishment of diplomatic relations with north Korea will mark a historic event indicative of the final establishment of north Korea's national orthodoxy. Kim Jong Il will have the initiative in
the DPRK-USA talks, and establish diplomatic relations with the United States on an equal footing—which is inconceivable in the case of south Korea.

Since its establishment on August 15, 1948, south Korea has been a US protectorate and second-class ally, because of which its people and elite have always felt humiliation and an inferiority complex in their attitude towards the United States. This is their fate—their helpless "rancour". However, Kim Jong Il will come to ease them of their "rancour" and restore to them their sense of pride and dignity as the Korean nation.

Whereas south Korea is still in the position of being a US protectorate, north Korea enters into equal relations with the United States and, without reference to south Korea, discusses the matter of US troops in south Korea and the future security on the Korean peninsula.

The south Koreans will then identify national orthodoxy with north Korea, and see their national hero, their national leader, in the image of Kim Jong Il.

[Strategic Objective 3] Reunification by Federation
Doubtless, Kim Jong Il will achieve the reunification of north and south of Korea; yet, he will never attempt a type of unification that would force south Korea to adopt the north Korean politico-economic system. Kim Jong Il's idea is a federation consisting of a single state with the governments of the north and the south making up its local governments, leaving the socialist system in the north and capitalism in the south intact.

Whether to effect unification of the systems some time later after the realization of reunification by federation or to
proceed with the two systems in coexistence is a matter to be decided by the people in both north and south. Reunification by federation is not aimed at setting up a socialist government in the south nor reunification through absorption of the south by the north.

The ensuing situation following reunification by federation will be as follows:

1. There appears a federation with a single central government under which two systems and two regional governments coexist.

2. South Korea proceeds with the implementation of its obligations under external treaties.

3. The US troops in south Korea remain for a certain period of time.

4. There are no "boat people" fleeing from the south.

5. No retaliatory action occurs in south Korea.

6. The south Korean capitalists enjoy protection.

7. South Korean capital abroad is under protection.

With the DPRK-USA relations put on a normal basis, Kim Jong Il will find an answer to the Korean reunification question, and bring about peace on the Korean peninsula—an outcome everyone has thought extremely difficult to bring about.

Before and after this event, Kim Jong Il will also get state relations with Japan normalized. With Japan squarely redressing its past, the bilateral relations between north Korea and Japan will turn into peaceful, neighbourly relations.

As a result of normalized DPRK-US and DPRK-Japan relations and of Korea's reunification by federation, the Korean nation will put an end to its history of "rancour".
Reunified Korea will greet the heyday of its 5,000-year-long history, in terms of politics, the economy, culture, sports, etc.

**Kim Jong Il’s "Stone-Scissors-Paper Law"

Kim Jong Il's "stone-scissors-paper law" clearly indicates that he will have the initiative in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The conclusion drawn from this law is that north Korea is sure to emerge victorious.

According to Kim Jong Il's opinion, the Korean question is a matter of putting an end to the Korean nation's history of "rancour", the main objects of the "rancour" being the United States and Japan. The Korean nation will be relieved of its "rancour". The United States and Japan are by far superior to Korea in terms of territory, population and economic power. On the surface, it seems very difficult, or even physically impossible for the Koreans to get rid of their "rancour". But Kim Jong Il has a different opinion. He is very optimistic about the future and has worked out a picture of a bright future.

In 1997 I gave lectures to US government officials concerned at the Atlantic Council in Washington. When I explained the "stone-scissors-paper law", the audience said it was "interesting". Let me explain the way this law works:

"Stone" indicates north Korea, "scissors" means the United States, and "paper" is symbolic of Japan. It is common sense that stone outmatches scissors; scissors defeat paper; and paper holds down stone.

The United States, the scissors, overpowered Japan in
the 19th century by dint of ironclad ships, and during the Pacific War, by making use of a colossal amount of war supplies and atomic bombs. As a result, the former assumed a superiority complex towards the latter, whereas the latter's mind became ingrained with an inferiority complex towards the former.

For instance, in its negotiations with the United States, Japan takes an attitude of resistance at the outset, but accepts the terms insisted on by the United States in the long run.

Japan, the paper, colonized Korea from the early to the mid-20th century. Contemporary Japanese and Koreans vividly remember this fact. In consequence, Japan feels a superiority complex towards Korea.

North Korea, the stone, emerged victorious in a series of military confrontations with the United States, including the Korean War. For this reason, it entertains a superiority complex towards the latter, whereas the United States, the scissors, harbours a sort of inferiority complex in its attitude towards the former. Japan finds it hard to understand why the United States is in awe of the stone, and is feeling all the more overpowered by the stone with each passing day. In this sense, the north Koreans can be said to have already put an end to their history of "rancour" long ago.

This "stone-scissors-paper law" clearly indicates that north Korea, the stone, naturally outmatches the United States, the scissors. The "stone" cannot defeat the "paper". However, the former has a way to adapt to emerge victorious in confrontation with the latter: North Korea puts pressure upon Japan through the United States.

As far as north Korea is concerned, both the United States and Japan are its "sworn enemies" against whom it has
"rancour". It is wise to pit its "sworn enemies" against each other. Fortunately, a key party concerned in the Korean question is the United States. Therefore, it is self-evident that north Korea, which is symbolized by the stone that outmatches the "scissors" representing the United States, will win the victory in the long run.

The Japanese, European & US Mass Media

The testimony given by the defectors in relation to the "Ri Un Hye case" and other cases advertised by south Korea is an expression of the last-ditch effort made by south Korea, alarmed at the prospect of being abandoned by the United States.

The evidence given of north Korea's involvement in the "Ri Un Hye case" and the crash of a south Korean plane—the so-called "KAL incident"—is the existence of "Kim Jong Il Political and Military University". Here there is a point that needs careful study. In north Korea there are many public buildings named after Kim Il Sung at present, but none named after Kim Jong Il. Not only that, there is no such thing in north Korea as a "political and military university". But it seems that the scriptwriters, art and administrative directors, actors and actresses involved in the fabrication of this case were unaware of this fact. They should have studied north Korea more accurately.

The European and US mass media have never so much as interviewed the defectors; even the US government dismisses statements of the defectors as unreliable; a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has aired
the same view. For all that, Japan's mass media have given prominence to this vilification invented by south Korea.

The level of Japan's mass media is quite low.

The level of mass media is decided by the role they play in bringing about political upheaval. For instance, the US mass media, since the days of the War of Independence up to now, have exerted a great influence on the US politics. During the Vietnam War, at the time of Nixon's "Watergate Scandal" and of Clinton's sex scandal, and on various occasions of political importance, including the presidential elections, they played a key role. It is the same case with the European mass media.

However, in the case of Japan's mass media, it is different. It cannot be said that it has played a decisive role in all periods, ranging from the Edo period to the period of the Meiji Restoration, during various aggressive wars and the Second World War. A distinguished American journalist well versed in Asian affairs once said, "We obtain information individually, but the Japanese work in groups and merely relay what their government announces." The officials concerned with the first-rank mass media in the United States, such as The New York Times and Washington Post, and in the European countries all assert that "What the defectors to south Korea have said is not believable." According to them, the defectors make statements just to justify themselves and make themselves known, while their custodian modifies their statements to its own advantage.

Rarely do the European and US mass media quote the editorials or news coverage of Japan's mass media; on the contrary, the latter quote their counterparts in Europe and American continent, particularly in the United States, very often.
Be that as it may, the so-called "bashing on north Korea" by Japan's mass media will soon die down, and when the situation develops in favour of north Korea, they will preen themselves as if they anticipated "Kim Jong Il’s victory".

**Placing Hopes on Japan**

As seen above, the parties directly concerned in the Korean question are north Korea and the United States, and DPRK-USA relations are forecast to be normalized around 2003 at the latest. The normalization of DPRK-USA relations will be followed by that of DPRK-Japan relations. For the latter to be earlier than the former is next to impossible, as the United States would not tolerate it.

The Canadian government has long had friendly relations with Cuba, in disregard of the US sanctions and opposition.

Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien visited the Cuban capital city of Havana on April 27, 1998, and held talks with Chairman Fidel Castro. Canada has never joined in the longest, the most unfair and brutal blockade the United States has imposed on Cuba for 36 years. (*The New York Times*, April 27, 1998.) As regards the Korean question, Japan should naturally play the same role as Canada has done, but it is impossible for it to do so.

It is quite natural for Japan to normalize its diplomatic relations with north Korea earlier than the United States. From time immemorial, Korea and Japan have had a close relationship. Their bilateral relations were very friendly, except for a certain period of time. It is the plain truth that Korean culture exerted a great influence on Japan.
No country is as close to Japan as Korea. Therefore, if things should go well, Japan will have to play the role of intermediary in improving DPRK-USA relations. True, Japan was the first country in Asia to introduce modern Western culture and succeed in effecting industrialization, thus obtaining economic power equal to those of both the European countries and the United States. In view of this fact, it was able to become a model for the rest of Asia and was so powerful in terms of the economy as to become a leading power on the Asian continent.

It is natural to suppose, therefore, that Japan could also have played the role of intermediary in improving DPRK-USA relations. To our regret, however, it has no political power and philosophy with which to do such a job. Looking back upon its history, rarely has it acted of its own free will. It has always undergone a process of change, largely owing to external pressure.

Japan's Historical Relationship with Korea

Rice-farming, Buddhism, writing, steel-making, ceramics, pharmaceuticals and paper manufacturing technology, architecture and other skills that Japan imported from Korea a long time ago were all their hi-tech culture in those days. It is no exaggeration to say that almost all the historic remains and relics handed down from ancient times and unearthed in several regions of Japan bear Korean characteristics. Japan, however, makes every conceivable effort to deny that it was influenced by Korea.

The name of Mt. Fuji, the symbol of Japan, is also said to have originated in the Korean language. In ancient times, the Koreans who had gone over to Japan found this mountain,
which is an active volcano, and called it "Purisan"—fire mountain. Later a slight phonetic modification changed its name to the present "Mt. Fuji".

There is a rumour that the collection of Japanese verse known as the Manyo-shu, compiled around the 7th century AD in Japan, was originally written in Korean. Many regional names in Japan are of Korean origin including the name of the city of Nara, which in Korean means "state". As far as the name of a Japanese aristocrat in the Nara period called Fujiwarano Kamatari is concerned, the Chinese character “足”, meaning "leg", is pronounced as "tari", which is precisely the Korean way of pronunciation.

According to a report released by Jiji Press on May 30, 1998, and later by NHK Radio, the mural painting of a constellation found on the ceiling of the Kitora tomb (late 7th century-8th century AD) in Nara prefecture was confirmed to have been drawn on the basis of data obtained in the vicinity of Pyongyang, north Korea. The data are said to have been based on the results of astronomical observations recorded in Koguryo, the state that dominated the northern part of the Korean peninsula until the late 7th century AD. This was analysed and confirmed by a computer-processed photo by the technical information centre of Tokai University. Many traces of Korean culture imported to Japan can be found in various parts of Japan.

As seen above, the relationship between Korea and Japan in the Edo period (prior to 1870) was very friendly, and Korean culture exerted a great influence on Japanese cultural development. It is said that large-scale Korean delegations visited Japan and even Edo—present-day Tokyo—on several occasions. It is said that the Hakusan Shrine deifies Mt.
Paektu, the sacred mountain of Korea.

Tragic Episodes

History records several periods of temporary conflict in the Korea-Japan relationship: from 13th century to 16th century, during which time the Japanese pirates, called "Waegu" in Korean, attacked the coastal regions of Korea; the period 1592 to 1598, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi's samurai army invaded Korea committing all sorts of slaughter and plunder; and the period from 1905, when Japan occupied and put Korea under military colonial rule till its defeat in 1945.

What should be noted here is the fact that when it invaded Korea in modern times, Japan first colluded with Britain or the United States and got their approval and assistance. Above all, in accordance with the "Anglo-Japanese Alliance", concluded in 1902, Japan recognized Britain's special rights and privileges with regard to China, while Britain recognized Japan's special rights and privileges with regard to Korea. In 1905, Japan concluded the "Katsura-Taft Agreement" with the United States, whereby the latter gave approval to Japan's military colonization of Korea and the former expressed its recognition of the US domination over the Philippines.

They say the Korea-Japan relationship is similar to that between Ireland and Britain. For this reason, many Irish residents in the United States sympathize with the Korean nation.

The leading figures in the Meiji regime, in the late 19th century, were supporters of Toyotomi; they were all advocates of the "theory of the conquest of Korea". Their policy can be said to be what the present Japanese
government still pursues. For this reason, the Japanese government is not apologizing to the Korean nation for its past aggression against the latter.

Be that as it may, both Korea and Japan are very close to each other in terms of geography, history, culture, language and race. And the largest proportion of foreign residents in Japan consists of Koreans.

Why Is Japan's Past Not Raised as an International Issue?

Unlike Germany, Japan's war crimes and persecutions against other countries and nations were not dealt with as seriously as they should have been at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East held in Tokyo. For, in the case of Nazi Germany, the object of its persecution was the Jews, whereas in the case of Japan, its victims were Asians most of whom, on top of that, were the Koreans.

The Jews were exerting a great influence in many spheres in the European countries and the United States—political, economic, academic, mass media, etc. But the Koreans, the Chinese and the other Asians, from the racial point of view, were subjected to discrimination as second-class races in the European countries and the United States. Therefore, they were not in a position to exercise any political or economic influence. Consequently, the European countries and the United States could not ignore the holocaust of the Jews, and Germany had no alternative but to apologize and pay indemnities for its crimes. However, Japan's holocaust in Asia did not attract international concern, and the Japanese government was not subjected to severe criticism from the European countries or the United States.
As Japan's economy boomed on the occasion of the Korean War, starting in 1950, the Asian countries pinned their hope to Japan's economic aid and hesitated to deal with Japan's past wholeheartedly. The same is true of both China and south Korea. Japan was able to evade international criticism, because not a single country in Asia was willing to disclose and take issue with its war crimes.

Then, there appeared a country that directly confronted Japan: north Korea. Kim Jong Il's north Korea scathingly accused Japan of its past crimes, while still harbouring "rancour" against it. As it started negotiations with Japan, raising the latter's past crimes as an international issue, Japan's war crimes committed in Asia at long last aroused international concern. A specific example of the above is the fact that north Korea brought the matter of "comfort girls" to the attention of the international community.

It is only north Korea and none other that directly calls Japan to account for its past in the international arena, be it in New York or Geneva, or be it a meeting of the Non-aligned Movement—which is unbearable to Japan. The Japanese government also feels an exasperating ignominy about the ongoing diplomatic negotiations north Korea has been holding in a dignified manner with the US government. Japan entertains a feeling of frustration towards the United States.

Japan's Reflection on Its Past Forced on It by External Pressure

It is my opinion that Japan will only apologize and pay indemnities to the Korean people after north Korea has put its relations with the United States on a normal footing. Only
normalization of DPRK-USA relations will bring Japan to its senses; the Japanese government at that time will have no excuse for postponing the redress of its past, no loophole at all. In the present circumstances there is no hope that Japan will ever sincerely reflect on its past and pay indemnities to its Asian victims of its own accord. This may be the case with the Japanese government, but the Japanese people are willing to upgrade friendship and exchanges with north Korea and other Asian countries at least at non-governmental levels, and are exercising their influence in various spheres so that their government can redress its past. For they themselves are, in some sense, also the victims, like their fellow Asians.

The annual indemnity paid by the Japanese government to its own people in compensation for their sufferings during the Second World War amounts to about 1,500 billion yen (pensions only for ex-soldiers) about 40,000 billion yen in total. (Kyodo News Agency on March 27, 1998.)

Given this situation, the Japanese people are apprehensive of the possibility that the other Asian countries might come to identify them with their ill-intentioned government, and thereby be recognized as the injurer, not as the injured, unless they take concrete actions. Now is the last chance for the Japanese. It will be too late if Japan moves only after the United States has already signed a peace treaty and set up diplomatic relations with north Korea. It will have to act before the United States.
POSTFACE

I conceived the plan of this book several years ago, in fact in 1995, when I published my treatise, *Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals*, in the United States.

No sooner had I read the full text of the Geneva Agreed Framework reached on October 21, 1994, which I had obtained from Kyodo News Agency, than I thought, "Kim Jong Il, north Korea, is almost a winner. Kim Jong Il has turned the tables on the United States. He has the upper hand." The Agreed Framework clearly stipulates that the target date of the delivery of LWRs is 2003, and that diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level will be established between the DPRK and the United States. So, I also thought, "This forebodes spontaneous destruction of south Korea."

In December 1993, five years ago, I wrote an essay, titled *On the Situation of the Korean Peninsula*, in which I pointed out that the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the USA would be resolved in the way Kim Jong Il intended, and the situation would not grow more tense than at that time, and that even if the United States aggravated the tension, the situation would not be brought to the brink of war, for war would mean military and political defeat for the United States and the total destruction of both south Korea and Japan.

Afterwards, the situation developed just as I had anticipated, beyond the estimate of a number of people. The contents of the Geneva Agreed Framework, however, were actually beyond my imagination. For I had never imagined that the DPRK-US
agreement, even if reached, could fix even the target date.

I thought many observers had been making the same analysis as mine, though I found no treatise or analysis presented in that way anywhere else.

So I thought, "Probably I am the only one," before writing my treatise, *Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals*, on my own initiative and also on the recommendation of a US journalist, and sending it to the Nautilus Institute.

In the treatise, I wrote that the situation would develop as intended by Kim Jong Il, even though he might be sitting idle, and he would not need to take the trouble to hurry it along.

But most of the other observers did not understand the situation as I did, because they were thinking that President Kim Il Sung's death in 1994 would soon be followed by north Korea facing the same fate as that of the Eastern European countries. The ensuing situation, however, developed and will develop in the future, too, contrary to their forecasts.

As far as I am concerned, unlike "books on north Korea" that are piled up on the shelves in bookstores in all parts of Japan, my book presents a scenario that has broken the conventional frame of elaboration. Due to space considerations, some aspects of my book have not been given satisfactory treatment, which I intend to supplement to complete my presentation as time permits in the future.

At a glance, the scenario this book presents might seem like an ethereal fantasy. But the situation on and around the Korean peninsula will probably develop in such a way that the scenario will prove to be far from a fantasy.

September 4, 1998
Kim Myong Chol
NOTES TO THE POCKET EDITION

Nearly one year has passed since this book was published. In the meantime, a few facts referred to in the book have been newly verified, and the situation on and around the Korean peninsula has developed as anticipated.

The book narrated that north Korean rockets had flown through the air space of Japan for the first time five years previous to August 31, 1998. The book made public for the first time a fact that two north Korean multistage rockets had flown through Japan's air space on May 29, 1993, one falling into the sea off Hawaii, the other into the sea off Guam.

On October 23, 1998, that is, one week after the publication of this book, the Asahi Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun and several other Japanese daily newspapers reported that the US government had informed the Japanese government of the fact that north Korean missiles had flown through Japan's air space in May 1993. It was also reported that the US ambassador to Japan had notified the Japanese government of this fact.

There is nobody, however, who is willing to call the US government to account for concealing this fact for five years. And nobody dares to take issue with the test-firing that took place in 1993.

This book also anticipated that only Japan would take issue with north Korea's launching of its artificial satellite, which occurred on August 31, 1998. This prediction proved correct.
The US government expressed its dissatisfaction at the freezing by the Japanese government of the funds for KEDO in relation to North Korea's launching of its artificial satellite. After all, Japan had accepted the US demand that it offer the funds for KEDO.

Meanwhile, the United States pursued its multilateral negotiations with North Korea, and provided the latter with food aid. South Korea also kept step with the United States. Given this situation, only Japan was left out and isolated, with the result that the gap between Japan, the United States and South Korea was brought to light. Even today, as far as bilateral relations with North Korea are concerned, Japan lags behind all other countries.

This book made it clear that North Korea had succeeded in ICBM development, and had already deployed ICBMs in the field, with the US mainland as their target. This fact was later confirmed by the CIA in April 1999. (For detailed information, see *The Destruction of South Korea, Kim Jong Il's Military Strategy*, Kojinsha.)

A second Korean war, therefore, will open with the DPRK and the United States launching ICBMs at each other, which precisely means a nuclear war—a scenario of the US mainland devastated.

This book also referred to the significance of Kim Jong Il's "stone-scissors-paper law" in understanding the US moves on and around the Korean peninsula. Judging by this law, one can understand that it is reckless—inconceivable in fact—for the United States to take military actions against North Korea.

What confirm the effect of this "stone-scissors-paper law" once again are the DPRK-USA negotiations on the so-called
"suspicion of underground nuclear facilities in Kumchang-ri" and their result.

In October 1998, the US Congress assigned the target date of March 1, and then of June 1, 1999, with regard to the "suspicion of underground nuclear facilities in Kumchang-ri", giving rise to rumours of a "March Crisis" and a "June Crisis", and setting in circulation talk about the possibility that the United States could carry out preemptive strike against north Korea. (For detailed information, see The Destruction of South Korea, Kim Jong Il 's Military Strategy.)

Contrary to many experts' forecasts, however, the US government agreed to pay the visitor's fee to the tune of 300 million dollars, far from launching military actions. A group of experts from the US government paid a visit to the empty underground facilities in Kumchang-ri—a visit in the form of access, not of "inspection" or "investigation" as demanded by the United States.

As predicted in this book, the United States has not yet started the KEDO project for setting up two light-water-reactor power plants on a full scale. The target date of 2003 is drawing near, and the United States is running out of time.

It is the United States, not north Korea, that is being driven into a tight corner in the long run. Its options are limited; it stands at the crossroads—war or peace. The decision is up to the United States.

This book clearly forecasts that the United States will choose peace for the following reasons: It is not ready for nuclear war with north Korea. And it will lose nothing even if it recognizes north Korea diplomatically, signs a peace
treaty with the latter, and lifts economic sanctions against the latter.

War between the United States and north Korea would make havoc of south Korea, and also result in both Japan and the US mainland getting consumed in a nuclear holocaust. The United States is not ready to venture into this kind of war. Then, the situation will develop as forecast in this book: The DPRK and the United States enter into diplomatic relations and sign a peace treaty in a few years' time. As a result, south Korea loses the ground for its existence as a dependency of the United States, and Korea achieves peaceful reunification.

Taking its cue from the United States, Japan, too, will accept all the demands of north Korea; diplomatic relations will be established between Tokyo and Pyongyang; Japan will take steps to pay a series of compensations for its past, including indemnity for its misdeeds towards north Korea since the end of the Pacific War.

In this sense, this book will serve as a signpost to the solution to the Korean question.

July 1999
Kim Myong Chol
EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT

As the author said in his notes to the pocket edition of July 1999, this book predicts the way to the settlement of the Korean question.

We do not want to take the trouble of giving explanations to the prediction made by Kim Myong Chol. Nor do we need to comment on the validity of his view, because the readers can make their own judgement in the light of the dramatic events that took place in Korea during the year 2000.

Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defence Commission who seldom made himself known to the world since the death of President Kim Il Sung, started his external activity in 2000, attracting the world's attention.

Chairman Kim Jong Il met Chinese President Jiang Zemin in May 2000 and Russian President Vladimir Putin in July the same year, consolidated and developed the traditional friendship with these countries, and built up new state relations with them as required for the 21st century.

The distrust and antagonism that had lasted more than half a century made the prospect of Korea's reunification unpredictable.

In June last year Chairman Kim Jong Il met south Korean President Kim Dae Jung who was on a visit to Pyongyang, and got the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration adopted and published to mark the milestone for
reunification in the 21st century. Since then, moves for reconciliation and unity and multilateral exchange and cooperation between the north and south of Korea have been put in gear. The Korean peninsula will no longer be a zone of dispute between the two sides of the same nation.

A radical change took place in the DPRK-US relations last year.

In October 2000, Chairman Kim Jong Il's special envoy visited the United States, and US Secretary of State visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the DPRK-US Joint Communiqué assuring the end of hostile relations between the two sides was published.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States were in a relationship of sharp confrontation in the past. Today on the threshold of the 21st century, the United States is most responsible for the tragedy of Korea, the last country remaining divided now. The United States is still stationing 40,000 of its troops in south Korea. In this context, the publication of the DPRK-US Joint Communique was of really great significance in levelling up their relations to the standard to meet the requirement of the new century.

However, the DPRK-US relationship which was created amid a gentle smile in 2000 is now facing the destiny of utter destruction. Whether the situation on the Korean peninsula will develop as the daring forecast of the writer stimulates great apprehension among the readers.

Then, on what viewpoint does Mr. Kim Myong Chol approach the present situation on the Korean peninsula?
After reading the following part of the article, the readers may understand that he has not lost his confidence that the situation of the Korean peninsula would develop as he forecasted in this book.

* * * *

The Korean peninsula at the easternmost edge of the Asian Continent, previously aka "Land of Morning Calm", remains one of the world's most volatile flashpoints, bristling with heavily-armed two million troops including 40,000 American soldiers deployed on its southern half. The divided Far Eastern country was the battleground for the fiercely-fought three-year Korean War and has repeatedly teetered on the bank of catastrophic war due to the absence of a peace treaty to terminate the state of war.

All these things, however, will be things of the past soon, probably in the time frame of next three to five years. At last, the long-elusive peace will come to stay on the Asian country as the Korean Gordian knot will be cut in a negotiated way, allowing the world's oldest nation to emerge a reunified state under a federal umbrella....

A widely held misunderstanding is that the Americans will be able to get away without implementing the nuclear agreement as is the case with the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.

The truce accord provides for withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea but does not set any time frame for it. The Chinese Volunteers left north Korea, but the American troops have been kept in south Korea in indisputable contravention of the truce accord. As a matter
of fact, the armistice agreement does not give the north Koreans any substantial leverage to deal with an American violation.

This is not the case with the agreed framework, however. The nuclear agreement obliges the United States to build two light-water reactors on a turnkey basis and deliver them to the DPRK by the year 2003, while supplying North Korea with annually 500,000 tons of heavy oil pending their completion, and to upgrade the bilateral relations between the two former enemies to full ambassadorial relations. There is no question that American failure to meet the deadline of 2003 will prompt Kim Jong Il to jettison the nuclear accord and resume the frozen nuclear program in a bid to gain access to full-fledged nuclear status.

Once this happens, there will be no turning back the clock. The Americans will have slightly more than two years to weigh the following three options against each other before the year 2003 strikes:

(1) To ignore the north Koreans and let them have their own way, namely, resume their nuclear activities, and acquire A-H warheads.

(2) To launch preemptive strikes against north Korea to knock its nuclear facilities out of operation.

(3) To offer to apologize for the failure to complete the construction of the promised nuclear reactors by the year 2003 and accept all the north Korean demands.

The first option would end up with the Americans dethroned from their most-coveted superpower spot, reduced to second-class power status. It would demonstrate the bankruptcy of the American policy of nuclear nonproliferation and rise of a third nuclear power with ICBM
capability after Russia and China in the Far East, sparking the nuclear arms race in Asia. The Japanese would decide to go nuclear, finding the American nuclear umbrella irrelevant and demanding the withdrawal of the American troops from their island nation.

Unsettled by the Japanese acquisition of nuclear capability, the Russians and the Chinese would scramble to strengthen their nuclear forces and grow more defiant of the Americans, who would be driven out of Japan. South Korea would also decide to undertake their own nuclear weapons program. The rising anti-American feelings would force the American troops to leave south Korea.

The second option would develop into a nuclear shootout which would spell the most unwanted disastrous consequences for the Americans as the so-called Perry report notes. Two things will distinguish new war in Korea from the 1950-53 Korean War. Firstly, in the Korean War in 1950-53, the north Koreans had no means to strike American bases in Japan or Guam or Hawaii or the metropolitan areas on the US mainland. Secondly, there was no operating nuclear power plant in south Korea and Japan.

Today, the DPRK has means to launch massive reprisal attacks on Japan or the US mainland. As early as the mid-1980s, north Korea successfully developed technological capability of producing A-H warheads at short notice and is now possessed of intercontinental means to deliver thermonuclear warheads to any remotest target. South Korea has 12 operating nuclear power stations, Japan has 51 and the United States 102, all within 100 meters from the sea. These operating nuclear power stations will be singled out as prime targets.
A nuclear exchange between a small ICBM power and the superpower would leave the major population centers of the US mainland consumed in towering infernos as depicted in "The Day After" scenario. Both Japan and south Korea would be reduced to smoking ashes in less than ten minutes. Nuclear exchange over Korea would instantly spill into neighboring China and Russia, promptly escalating into a third world war.

In short, Japan, south Korea and the United States are most ill-prepared for nuclear exchange as their economies are too developed to have their territory reduced to a theater for full-scale war, conventional or nuclear. An effective NMD will remain a light year away, while a primitive one will be ineffective against north Korean missiles.

Apparently, either of these two scenarios would prove all too unpalatable, nightmarish for the American policy planners. In the first place, nothing would be more humiliating than to be badly mauled at the hands of a small country like north Korea. The Americans will have no good reason to risk catastrophic nuclear war, when there is no moral, political justification to fight it, and in particular when the worst can be averted by a political compromise. The Americans would again find the north Koreans "the wrong enemy at the wrong place at the wrong time".

With all the pros and cons weighed, the third option would be deemed a most acceptable solution for which the Americans would have to settle for. What the Americans will have to do is to agree to a political and economic package solution, expressing a sincere apology for failing to fulfill their part of the obligations under the Geneva agreement and offering substantial political and economic compensation for
it and the north Korean consent to reschedule the promised light-water reactor construction project and keep the nuclear agreement in place.

The political compensations should include signing a peace treaty with the DPRK to terminate the state of war between the two enemies, the DPRK and the United States, establishing full ambassadorial relations between the two, removing north Korea from their list of countries that allegedly sponsor terrorism, and lifting all the embargoes against Pyongyang. The economic part is to compensate the north Koreans for loss of electricity caused by the delayed work on the construction of light-water reactors and for the subsequent economic damages they have suffered.

These political and economic compensations would be a fraction of the astronomical political and economic costs of ignoring north Korea's nuclear program or going to war against it. North Korean acceptance of the package settlement would avert nuclear winter, prevent north Korea from becoming a declared nuclear power, keep the American forces deployed in Japan and let them retain their superpower status. The north Koreans have little interest in seeing the Americans toppled from their superpower seat or the American troops withdrawn from Japan.

Kim Jong Il sees all indications that the Americans will opt for the third option by the year 2003 rings in. He has every reason to believe that the present Bush Administration knows better than to pick any other alternatives than the package solution. In the next two years the world TV audience will view a live broadcast of Air Force One touching down at Pyongyang and President Bush and
Secretary Powell, both beaming with a broad smile, meeting with Kim Jong Il and signing a package settlement.

Like father, like son. The son also rises. Kim Jong Il will be credited with ending the American intervention without having to fight, while Kim Il Sung became a legendary national hero by fighting the Japanese imperialists. Bush will get credit for terminating the Cold War on the Korean peninsula as his father presided over the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Korean people, north and south, the American people, and the whole world will acclaim the two statesmen great builders of lasting peace.
APPENDIX

NORTH-SOUTH JOINT DECLARATION

True to the noble will of all the fellow countrymen for the peaceful reunification of the country, Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea had a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000.

The heads of the north and the south, considering that the current meeting and summit talks, the first of its kind since the division of the country, are events of great importance in promoting mutual understanding, developing inter-Korean relations and achieving peaceful reunification, declare as follows:

1. The north and the south agreed to solve the question of the country's reunification independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.

2. The north and the south, recognizing that the low-level federation proposed by the north and the commonwealth system proposed by the south for the reunification of the country have similarity, agreed to work together for the reunification in this direction in the future.

3. The north and the south agreed to settle humanitarian issues as early as possible, including the exchange of visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term prisoners, to mark August 15 this year.

4. The north and the south agreed to promote the
balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating cooperation and exchange in all fields, social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and so on.

5. The north and the south agreed to hold an authority-to-authority negotiation as soon as possible to put the above-mentioned agreed points into speedy operation.

President Kim Dae Jung invited Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defence Commission to visit Seoul and Chairman Kim Jong II agreed to do so at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

Kim Jong II
Chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission

Kim Dae Jung
President of the Republic of Korea

DPRK-US JOINT COMMUNIQUE

As the special envoy of Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defence Commission, the First Vice-Chairman, Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, visited the United States of America from October 9-12, 2000.

During his visit, Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok delivered a letter from National Defence Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il, as well as his views on DPRK-US relations, directly to US President William Clinton. Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok and his party also met with senior officials of the US Administration, including his host Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and Secretary of Defence William Cohen, for an extensive exchange of views on issues of common concern. They reviewed in depth the new opportunities that have opened up for improving the full range of relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. The meetings proceeded in a serious, constructive, and businesslike atmosphere, allowing each side to gain a better understanding of the other's concerns.

Recognizing the changed circumstances on the Korean peninsula created by the historic inter-Korean summit, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States have decided to take steps to fundamentally improve their bilateral relations in the interests of enhancing peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two sides agreed there are a variety of available means, including Four Party talks, to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and formally end the Korean War by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with permanent peace arrangements.

Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and that better relations would benefit both nations in the 21st century while helping ensure peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, the DPRK and the US sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.

Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 DPRK-US Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21,
1994 Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work to remove mistrust, build mutual confidence, and maintain an atmosphere in which they can deal constructively with issues of central concern. In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and noted the value of regular diplomatic contacts, bilaterally and in broader form.

The two sides agreed to work together to develop mutually beneficial economic cooperation and exchanges. To explore the possibilities for trade and commerce that will benefit the peoples of both countries and contribute to an environment conducive to greater economic cooperation throughout Northeast Asia, the two sides discussed an exchange of visits by economic and trade experts at an early date.

The two sides agreed that resolution of the missile issue would make an essential contribution to a fundamentally improved relationship between them and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. To further the efforts to build new relations, the DPRK informed the US that it will not launch long-range missiles of any kind while talks on the missile issue continue.

Pledging to redouble their commitment and their efforts to fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under the Agreed Framework, the DPRK and the US strongly affirmed its importance to achieving peace and security on a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula. To this end, the two sides agreed on the desirability of greater transparency in carrying out their respective obligations under the Agreed Framework. In this regard they noted the value of the access which removed US concerns about the underground site at Kumchang-ri.
The two sides noted that in recent years they have begun to work cooperatively in areas of common humanitarian concern. The DPRK side expressed appreciation for significant US contributions to its humanitarian needs in areas of food and medical assistance. The US side expressed appreciation for DPRK cooperation in recovering the remains of US servicemen still missing from the Korean War, and both sides agreed to work for rapid progress for the fullest possible accounting. The two sides will continue to meet to discuss these and other humanitarian issues.

As set forth in their Joint Statement of October 6, 2000, the two sides agreed to support and encourage international efforts against terrorism.

Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok explained to the US side developments in the inter-Korean dialogue in recent months, including the results of the historic North-South summit. The US side expressed its firm commitment to assist in all appropriate ways the continued progress and success of ongoing North-South dialogue and initiatives for reconciliation and greater cooperation, including increased security dialogue.

Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok expressed his appreciation to President Clinton and the American people for their warm hospitality during the visit.

It was agreed that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will visit the DPRK in the near future to convey the views of US President William Clinton directly to Chairman Kim Jong Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission and to prepare for a possible visit by the President of the United States.

Washington, D.C.
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KIM JONG IL: DAY OF HAVING KOREA REUNIFIED

North Korean Scenario for War and Peace

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No. 183117
The author with John Randara, the captain of Aegis-class ship *Paul Hamilton* in the Pearl Harbour

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Kim Myong Chol was born in 1944. As a military and diplomatic commentator living in Japan, he specializes in political and military questions concerning the Korean peninsula. Once he was a journalist of the weekly *The People’s Korea*. He has a wide range of personal ties in the United States and has been invited to lecture at the National Defense University in Washington. He has inspected many military installations. According to *The New York Times* and *Washington Post*, he has wide access to north Korea. His article *Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals*, published in 1995, is said to have been read by US President William Clinton and the then Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The author boldly predicts that the year 2003 will mark a turning point in the reunification of Korea.