SPECIAL REPORT

JAPAN RETHINKING SECURITY POLICY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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For the first time since their devastating defeat in World War II, the Japanese have undertaken a serious and responsible debate on national security. The major aspect of this debate is the degree of defense capability required if Japan is to gain a first-class power status commensurate with its pre-eminence as the fourth industrial power in the free world and the economic leader in the Far East. Government leaders, taking advantage of rising nationalism, are stressing that Japan must make a greater effort to provide for its own defense, while maintaining the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty as an indispensable adjunct of national security. Nevertheless, Japanese defense planners are still handicapped by the postwar legacy of demilitarization and pacifism.

Present Provision for National Security

Both popular attitudes and constitutional proscription have handicapped the development of Japan's defense. Deep-seated antipathy toward the military arising from the experience of military domination and the shock of defeat in World War II has only recently begun to fade. Pacifism was enshrined in Article IX of Japan's postwar constitution, which bars the maintaining of "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential." This restriction was circumvented beginning with the creation of the National Police Reserve under US occupation aegis in 1950 and the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces four years later. A Supreme Court decision subsequently upheld by implication the legality of these forces, but successive conservative governments have shied away from attempting to remove the constitutional disability—especially because the combined opposition has the votes to block amendment.

Today the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) consist of about 220,000 men, principally in the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). By policy, however, they are restricted to a purely defensive role, and in fact are considered to have only a limited capability. Military policy does not envision more than a supplementary role for Japan's armed forces in a major conflict. Planning has been based on the belief that successful defense of Japan depends upon US naval and air forces.

The GSDF is capable of preserving internal order, but is largely equipped with obsolescent
US-supplied weapons and is inadequate to cope with major aggression.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has been formally given the mission of defending coastal waters and sea approaches, but its surface force and air arm, despite their modern equipment, are barely adequate to carry out this task.

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is capable of providing adequate tactical support for both ground and naval forces, but does not have the capability to defend independently against a determined attack by either Communist China or the USSR.

The armed forces' share of the GNP has barely exceeded one percent, a figure far below the norm for countries of comparable industrial strength.

Japan's defense continues to depend, as it has since 1945, on the US. The terms of the relationship, expressed in the Security Treaty signed in 1952 and revised in 1960, provide the US with important bases in the Far East. Beginning in 1970 the treaty can be revised or terminated on one year's notice. The leftist opposition--principally the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)--last year embarked on a campaign to end the US alliance by 1970. Playing on the public's fears that the treaty will drag Japan into a major war over Vietnam, the JSP is trying to set off disturbances like those it used to bring down the Kishi government in 1960.

In the face of continuing Socialist attacks on the treaty and "American imperialism," Prime Minister Sato has been making increasingly forthright statements about the necessity of continuing the alliance after 1970. He has even hinted that the treaty should be revised to provide for a fixed term rather than possible abrogation on a one-year notice. Although Sato's Liberal Democratic Party
is deeply split on this issue, the encouragement of public debate emphasizes Sato's confidence that Japanese attitudes have matured on the problem.

**New Approaches**

The government's willingness to face defense problems reflects the revival of nationalism and the growing realization that Japan is one of the great nations of the world. Japanese policy makers, faced with the hard facts of power, are embarrassed to discover their country regarded internationally as a cipher, dependent upon the US. They want an "independent" posture even though it would probably closely parallel most US policies, to enhance their country's stature in the eyes of its citizens.

However, Sato, although long a nationalist who favored increased defenses, did not consider it politically feasible until late 1965 to support stronger security policies publicly. The way for this new stand was opened by Peking's two nuclear explosions and the crises in Southeast Asia which have obliged the Japanese to think more seriously about security problems. While more heat than light has been generated in the popular debate, at least some Japanese have come to recognize that Japan's voice carries little weight in international councils without military strength to back it up.

Further, the growth of Peking's power and the instability in the Malay archipelago have suggested to a few that Japan must think about defense of its "lifeline" to its markets throughout South and East Asia. About half of Japan's energy resources depend on tankers traversing those waters, and one third of its trade is with the underdeveloped lands there. Naval chief Admiral Tomoharu Nishimura has stressed the need for escorting tankers on Japan's "lifeline" to the Middle East. The reappraisal of Japanese defense policy probably will become more meaningful as Japanese realization of dependence grows.

**New Roles for the SDF**

Officials charged with planning Japan's defense on a long-range basis face several problems. In trying to forecast needs five years or more hence they must take into consideration the possibility that the Security Treaty may be abrogated at any time after 1970. To have a credible defense substitute available by 1971, Japan would have to embark at once on a major rearmament program, possibly including a nuclear capability. In addition to the political hazards inherent in any nuclear weapons program, a defense buildup will seem wasted to the Japanese if the conservatives continue in control and the treaty remains in force.
Japan's leaders may be trying to influence popular opinion in favor of a defense buildup by encouraging discussion of SDF missions going beyond the present conception and capability. In August 1965 the director general of the Defense Agency, Raizo Matsumo, lofted a trial-balloon appeal to nationalism by stating that Japan must achieve an independent defense capability by 1975. He claimed that Japan could not depend on the US in case of emergency and that it was "disgraceful" for an independent country to have foreign military installations on its soil permanently. Since then he has continued to call for an independent defense structure in keeping with Japan's advanced status in other fields and has raised the specter of a Chinese Communist nuclear threat.

The acquisition of a nuclear capability, despite continuing public sensitivities, is being increasingly aired as a logical corollary of an independent defense posture. Former chiefs of the services have begun advocating the use of tactical nuclear weapons for defense only and the development of an antimissile capability. Sometimes they justify nuclear arms as necessary to give Japan a strategic deterrent. Admiral Ichizo Sugie, chairman of the Joint Staff Council, reportedly feels that even with the continuation of the US guarantee, Japan as a great power should acquire nuclear weapons.

Conservative Prime Minister Sato has been quite circumspect in reaffirming past renunciation of nuclear arms. He has made it clear, however, that he welcomes the US "nuclear umbrella," although fellow conservatives as well as the leftist opposition have pointed to the inconsistency of renouncing nuclear arms while still depending on them ultimately. He has been careful not to close the door to a future nuclear weapons program.

Two revolutionary proposals for using Japanese forces overseas have received wide attention and some public acceptance inasmuch as they concern subjects close to Japanese hearts—the United Nations and Okinawa. Japanese interest in the UN as the harbinger of world order is strong, and national defense policy calls for support of UN activities. Following Japan's recent election to the Security Council, the raising of the question of cooperation in peacekeeping operations gave the government the opportunity to state that participation in observation-type missions did not contravene the constitution. Considerable leftist opposition, however, persuaded government spokesmen to backtrack somewhat on the question of legal obstacles to participation, and there seems little immediate prospect that such supervisory missions can be authorized without revising present legislation.
A second possibility for sending troops abroad was advanced by Sato's suggestion that Japanese forces might be used in the defense of Okinawa if US bases there were attacked. The Socialists charged Sato with scheming to violate the constitution by dispatching the SDF to American-administered territory. Socialist obstruction in the Diet influenced Sato to explain that he was merely reflecting a "frank, fraternal expression of Japanese national feeling," and that in fact the constitution, the security treaty, and present SDF laws rule out an exercise of the right of self-defense by Japan on Okinawa. The exchanges nevertheless left the public with the impression of a more "forthcoming" and independent policy for national defense.

Popular Attitudes

The Sato government's failure to disclaim the more extreme statements on military matters indicates its estimate that the public is ready to consider defense problems in a more realistic framework. The relatively quiet public acceptance of the visits by US nuclear-powered submarines to Sasebo illustrates the growing popular tolerance even on nuclear matters. The Socialists, however, continue to emphasize nuclear dangers in pushing the "peace" theme on which they have depended so heavily in the past to develop "mass" appeal. They have recently accused the Sato government of "stockpiling" legal precedents through its stepped-up program of visits by nuclear-powered vessels and of planning to add visits by nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Socialists claim that the government is trying to prepare the public for the introduction of nuclear arms.

The government's effort to isolate the Socialists by appealing to the more moderate opinion groups appears to be having some success. There have been recent indications that elements within the opposition parties (particularly the small Democratic Socialist and the Buddhist Komeito) acknowledge the value of the US role in Japan's defense. In fact, despite Komeito's public stand for nonalignment in foreign policy, not only supported the present security system but also felt that Japan should eventually have nuclear arms. Public opinion polls reveal a growing acceptance of the SDF and of Japan's alignment with the free world, although a strong minority still resists both of these.

Even among Japanese who accept the need for defense forces there are many who believe that Japan's rising standard of living, made possible by minimum defense outlays, has enabled the country to avoid Communism, and that this should not be jeopardized by substantial increases in defense spending. Most Japanese, in fact, probably prefer that the US guarantee their security and spare them the expense, risk, and responsibilities involved. They argue that Japan cannot afford the effort to provide...
a nuclear capability of its own and should rely on the US "umbrella." Many, however, would be willing to support a greater Japanese defense effort to bring about the removal of US bases but wish to retain the US guarantee of security.

More nationalistic overtones have appeared among groups who may have taken their cue from Defense Agency chief Matsuno's remarks last summer. They find dependence on the US "humiliating," demand a completely independent defense effort, and are willing to pay the costs. Some of them advocate the development of an independent nuclear capability, although their timing for such a program is unclear at present.

**Increased Defense Effort and The Third Defense Plan**

Official and public discussion of the defense problem suggests general support for the limited buildup envisaged under the prospective five-year Third Defense Plan, the draft of which is being prepared by the Defense Agency for submission to the National Defense Council by June 1966. For the last year of the present Second Defense Plan (1962-1966), the SDF received a sizable budgetary increase--13 percent over the appropriation for fiscal 1965--but rising costs will make it much less in real terms. Nevertheless, the plan will be completed fairly close to its targets.

As now drafted the Third Defense Plan, to be launched in April 1967, calls for a somewhat greater effort in the provision of firepower, mobility, and general modernization, and the improvement of air and antisubmarine defense. A major suggested innovation creates small reserves for the air and maritime defense forces in addition to those for the ground forces. For the latter, the draft retains the same authorization as the Second Defense Plan for 180,000 personnel, but this may well remain academic since the less prestigious ground forces have continuing problems in recruiting and retaining personnel.

Three major goals of the present proposal are (1) correction of deficiencies in the SDF; (2) development of a domestic industrial defense base; and (3) raising budget appropriations progressively to the level of two percent of the GNP. The total cost of the package has been estimated at $7.5 billion, a figure more than double that for the previous plan.

While the anticipated buildup will increase the credibility of Japan's defense efforts, the modest modernization possible under the limitation to two percent of GNP is quite inadequate.
to relieve the US of its responsibilities for Japan's defense. The government continues to count on the Security Treaty for Japan's defense and considers the continuing offer of bases to the US the least it can do in the absence of a constitutional sanction for participating more fully in a truly common defense.

If present trends in public opinion continue to move as rapidly and in the same direction as they have over the past few months, however, it may prove possible to go beyond present limitations before the period of the Third Defense Plan is completed. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEN)