In January 1961 the Chinese Communist Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a report reviewing Chinese Communist foreign policy for 1960 and outlining Chinese programs and prospects for 1961. The report was distributed to Chinese Communist embassies and legations. A translation of the report is given below.

A Review of the Year 1960 and the Outlook for the Year 1961

1. In general, the development of the international situation in 1960 was intricate and complicated. The result of the struggle, however, was better than we had originally expected. During the year, unity in the international Communist movement was achieved through struggles within the socialist camp. A new high tide was reached in the struggle against imperialism and for world peace and in the revolutionary struggle of the people. The political and economic crisis of imperialism was further deepened. The American imperialist two-faced policy met another failure. A comparison of international forces is further in favor of us and in disfavor of imperialism. The violation of the Soviet territory by the USA-dispatched U-2 plane, the sabotage of the summit conference and the break up of the disarmament conference caused tension in the international situation. The struggle between the socialist countries and imperialist countries exposed the two-faced tricks of American imperialism.

2. Unity in the socialist camp was further strengthened, and its international influence was on the increase. The Moscow conference of brotherly parties achieved a unanimous view on many important international problems, strengthened the international Communist movement and the socialist camp and unified the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and China and the Soviet Union, dealt a blow to the imperialist conspiracy to split us and pushed forward the democratic
8. The struggles of the people in South Korea, Turkey, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos and other countries in Asia against imperialism and its running dogs have shaken the aggressive military policy of American imperialism in these areas. The people's struggle in South Korea caused the United States to understand that even her most reliable puppet regime could not be depended upon. The Japanese people have rallied a tremendous force behind them. An almost all-front struggle of the masses caused Eisenhower to cancel his visit to Japan. All these indicate that the national democratic movement has reached a new height.

9. The smooth development of the Cuban revolution prompted and pushed on the struggles of the people of other Latin American countries. Movements against American imperialism and its running dogs, in different forms and scales, are spreading over Latin America. The national patriotic forces of many countries during their struggles have formed, through a gradual process, an extensive new national democratic united front, thus menacing the rear of the American aggressive force.

10. Within the capitalist countries, the struggle of the working class and labor masses for the improvement of their livelihood and democratic rights and against monopoly also saw a fresh development. During 1960, large-scale economic as well as political strikes broke out in the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium as well as in a few countries in Latin America. The scope of the struggle for peace is being enlarged. In many capitalist countries, more and more middle-class people have joined the struggle for safeguarding world peace and opposing nuclear warfare.

11. The economic difficulties of imperialism are deepened and its internal contradictions sharpened. A number of economic crises occurred in the United States. The present crisis broke out at a time when the United States had not fully recovered from its previous 1957-1958 crisis. The present crisis was caused by surplus production in agriculture and industry. The present crisis is still deepening.

12. At the same time, the economic conditions in Western Europe are not exactly very good. In many countries, the industrial growth rate is either slowed down or at a standstill. Conditions for an economic crisis are present. There has been a crisis concerning the supply of raw material from colonies or from semi-colonies off and on, since 1957.

13. This new economic crisis of the United States, the biggest imperialist country, brought severe consequences to the whole capitalist world. Within recent years, the contradictions between the United States and other imperialist countries, as well as the contradiction among imperialist countries, increased. The deterioration of the United States in economic, political, and military fields becomes more apparent. In order to avert an economic crisis and to save herself from backsliding, the United States has tightened her controls over her allies. While Britain, West Germany, and France attempt to resist American pressure, they are taking the opportunity to reassert their own economic and political positions. This struggle between the controller and the controlled complicates and intensifies the internal contradiction within the imperialist camp. The contradiction between the United States and Britain has seen a new development. France is giving the United States more trouble. The attempt of West Germany to challenge openly the United States is coming to a head. In Europe, the struggle among the United States, Britain, France and West Germany for Western European hegemony becomes all the more intense. In this struggle, the rise of West German power is an important factor. The
contradiction between Britain and West Germany is turning gradually into the chief contradiction in Western Europe. In Northern and Central Europe, the expansion of American bases causes panic.

14. In the East, the economy of Japan and her push to the south brings her into conflict with the interests of the United States and Britain. All these things signify that the process of disintegration of the imperialist camp is being quickened.

The Outlook for 1961

15. Judged from every angle of the situation, the development of the international situation during 1961 will continue to be intricate and complicated. For us, however, it augurs well.

16. During this year, the American economic crisis will continue to develop. It will possibly become the most severe crisis since the war. It is also possible that when the crisis has developed to a certain extent, it will then ease off. In any event, the various contradictions which are peculiar to imperialism will only become more sharply focused. The Kennedy administration was born during these internal and external difficulties. He will follow a two-faced policy, only more obviously. On the one hand, he will push for military expansion in preparation for war, and on the other hand, he will carry out all sorts of deceptive conspiracies in order to gain time for war.

17. The Soviet Union is also anxious to improve her relations with the United States. Therefore, it is possible that there might be a summit conference and that a certain agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests and other related problems might be reached. Another possibility, however, can also be sensed. If the summit conference does not materialize and if no agreement can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, then the socialist countries will sign a separate peace treaty with the Democratic Republic of Germany.

18. The creation of "two Chinas" will be on the increase. Taiwan will be the pivot for much trickery. They will use the United Nations to hook us and participation in a disarmament conference to tempt us. We must be prepared for that. The imperialist camp headed by the United States will continue to try to split and soften Eastern Europe. However, they will not give in on anything. The American imperialist two-faced policy has its limit. The two-faced policy of Kennedy has its limit. This limit is determined by the very nature of imperialism. As far as war is concerned, the Kennedy administration does not dare to risk war as long as the United States is still backward and unprepared militarily, scientifically and technologically; as long as the rearmament of Japan and West Germany is still incomplete and as long as Britain and France are afraid of a major war. Therefore, the waging of a major war is not possible. Because of the United States' need to suppress national independence movements and to solve their own economic crises, however, the possibility of local wars does not only exist but is even increasing. Therefore, we must make sufficient effort and preparation in case the American imperialists start local wars in Cuba, Laos and other areas.

19. As far as peace is concerned, the Kennedy administration has to gain time to prepare for war and with this end in view, it is possible that they will play tricks to split the socialist camp. In any event, they will not abandon the true stand of the United States, nor will they change their basic policy and give in substantially to socialist countries. Generally speaking the two camps are still poised, and the relationship between the two camps will still remain as before. At
times, the situation will become tense, but not so tense that an all-out war will start. At times, the situation will be relaxed, but not so relaxed that a real easing of the situation will develop.

20. The national democratic movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly in Africa, will be pushing forward more extensively and deeply. The wave of independence of the African people, after having hit French North Africa, West Africa and the Belgian Congo, is turning to British and Portuguese East Africa and South Africa. On the one hand, American imperialism will step up its invasion in Africa to expel the old-brand colonial force of Britain and France. A struggle for the redistribution of markets and spheres of influence will intensify. On the other hand, the old-style colonial countries, particularly the old British rogue, will play all sorts of tricks. Therefore, the struggle of the African people against new colonialism will become more violent. For those countries which have already gained independence, the struggle will be more deep and complicated. For those countries which are fighting for independence, the struggle will be more sharp and intricate. Developments in the Congo and Algeria are particularly worthy of attention. It is possible that the struggle in Asia and Latin America against American imperialism and its running dogs will become more stormy. In these areas, a sudden outbreak of incidents is completely possible. At present, the Laotian situation is the central problem of the anti-imperialist struggle in Asia. The development of the Laotian situation is in our favor and not in favor of imperialism. The struggle there will be a long, drawn-out affair. Our relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America will be further developed in 1961.

21. Though the anti-Chinese movements of the reactionary cliques in India and Indonesia have already been brought to a stop, we must still guard against them, especially in India.

22. Since the Moscow Conference, a trend in the international Communist movement has arisen based on the Moscow Declaration. Relations between the various countries inside the socialist camp, generally speaking, are good. This is the main current. There is, however, another aspect; we should be aware that the Moscow Conference did not solve all the problems in dispute.

23. China must be particularly on guard when the Soviet Union has a detente with Western countries or when an incident breaks out within the socialist camp. China should be also on guard in her relations with those socialist countries and parties which have either already shown their hands against China or criticized China before the Moscow Conference.

The Main Experiences and the Lessons Learned in Diplomacy during 1960

24. As far as our external struggle is concerned, 1960 was a most exciting and violent year. This was also the year during which our diplomacy saw the greatest expansion. Since 1959, there has been an increase in anti-Chinese activities, particularly in India and Indonesia. In the international Communist movement, another adverse current emerged against our country within the socialist camp. The imperialist countries headed by the United States, rode this wave, and with two-faced tricks tried to destroy Sino-Soviet unity. The United States stirred up ill-feeling between us and socialist countries.

25. Never before on an international scale was there such an anti-Chinese wave. We were forced to counterattack. With attacks from three sides, (USSR, India-Indonesia and the United States) the struggle assumed a tremendous magnitude. Even under such circumstances, the correct thinking of the Central Committee of the GCP enabled us to carry on a series of struggles and achieve an important victory.
26. During the year, we hosted high a banner opposing American imperialism, exposing and striking at the two-faced policy of American imperialism. We waged a head-on struggle with the United States. We supported resolutely and efficiently the revolutionary storm against American imperialism and its running dogs wherever such storms appeared in the world.

27. In our country there were mass demonstrations. In Peiping, there were 21 such demonstrations during 1960 and more than 4,700,000 people participated in them. A total of 80 million people throughout the country participated in demonstrations in support of the people in the Soviet Union, South Korea, Japan and Turkey. Chairman MAO's private talks with visitors from Asia, Africa and Latin America especially favorably encouraged and pushed the just struggle of the people in the world against imperialism. Chairman MAO's thinking for uniting 90 percent of the world's population into a united front against American imperialism and its running dogs and for depending upon the masses for the struggle greatly encouraged the people under oppression.

28. The three articles published by the CCP in commemoration of the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth attacked the aggressive nature of imperialism, criticized Yugoslavia's modern revisionism and other erroneous thinking inside the international Communist movement and clarified the ways to protect world peace.

29. During the year, we hosted high a banner of peace and friendship and support for national independence movements. On all fronts, our diplomatic activities unfolded. Once again, we proposed a non-nuclear zone in Asia and the Pacific area. We supported completely the national democratic movements of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Diplomatic relations were established with four countries: Cuba, Ghana, the Somal Republic and Mali. Trade and other friendly relations were developed with African and Latin American countries. With Burma, Nepal, Guinea, Afghanistan, and Cambodle, friendship and mutual non-aggression treaties and peace and friendship treaties were signed. With Burma, a border treaty was signed, and a border agreement was reached with Nepal. With Indonesia a plan for the enforcement of the dual nationality treaty governing overseas Chinese was signed, thus meaningfully easing the conflict between overseas Chinese and the interests of Indonesian nationals.

30. Our premier took the initiative in going to New Delhi to negotiate with Nehru and exposed the refusal of the Indian ruling group to settle the border dispute. In the diplomatic struggle between China and India, the initiative is in our hands. Thus, we prevented the anti-Chinese intrigue of India, consolidated and expanded our international position and elevated our international prestige. We forced the imperialists and the various reactionary cliques in every country into an isolated position.

31. During the year, an efficient struggle in line with our policy was waged against those erroneous concepts which were harmful to the important problems of the international Communist movement and of the international situation confronting the international Communist movement.

32. In general and basically, our relations with the Soviet Union and with other brotherly countries and parties were tackled correctly. We safeguarded the purity of Marxism-Leninism, protected the international Communist movement, and strengthened the unity of the socialist camp. The talks and interviews that Chairman LIIU Shao-ch' i had after the Moscow Conference enabled us to understand the direction in which Sino-Soviet unity should go.
33. In the diplomatic struggle of 1960, much valuable experience was gained in employing gloriously the tactics and strategy of Chairman MAO and Marxism-Leninism in the scope of international struggle. The following were learned:

a. The correct treatment in coordinating the whole and its parts.

Chairman MAO instructed us in the importance of taking cognizance of the whole. He said again that only when we understand the whole will we be able to maneuver the parts, because the parts belong to the whole. Only when we understand the whole will we be able to use the parts and to use the parts in a better way. In our international struggle, our strategic policy is to unite all the forces which can be united and to point the tip of our sword at American imperialism. This is the whole and also the core of our strategy. All our work should evolve around this general strategy. During the first half of 1960, we pursued an all-out counterattack against the anti-Chinese struggle of India. In the international context, however, our struggle against India should be subservient to the struggle against imperialism. Our struggle against India should not go beyond this limit. For instance, we have actively controlled our struggle against Indonesia, relegating it to a position next to our struggle against India. We have even restrained ourselves in attacking the reactionary clique of Indonesia. When an armed conflict broke out at the Sino-India border, we took further measures. Our struggle against India could not exceed our struggle against the United States. And in Southeast Asia, India is our main target. Therefore, our struggle against Indonesia could not exceed our struggle against India. When the Sino-Soviet dispute arose, we again controlled appropriately our struggle against India. At the same time, our relations with the Soviet Union were handled with extreme caution. Sino-Soviet unity is regarded by us as an important matter. All along, the differences between us were considered to be minor differences. We have always insisted on the unity of the socialist camp. We have always supported whatever struggles of the socialist camp benefited the cause of anti-imperialism and the protection of peace. Inasmuch as the whole and the parts have been treated by us correctly, we were able to arrange each complicated struggle of ours in perfect order.

b. The correct application of principles and flexibility.

The Central Committee pointed out that in our diplomatic work, principles and the tactic of flexibility must be handled adroitly so that we can employ our strategy freely and cleverly. For instance, within the international Communist movement and in the socialist camp, an ideological dispute arose. We had to struggle and could not back down. However, in launching our struggle, we had to choose an opportune moment and limit its scope; the methods of waging the struggle had to be studied very carefully. From beginning to end, the point of departure was unity. Our policy is "do not start it", "stick to the struggle", "leave some leeway", "insist on unity" and "oppose a split". With India and other nationalist countries, we have had both struggle and unity. For instance, India started on anti-Chinese movement and this we opposed with determination. Then, after our opposition, the Premier went to New Delhi to negotiate with Nehru. The two chiefs of states met. At the border, a clash was avoided. The relations between the two countries again calmed down temporarily. The struggle against India shows how
we applied our principles and used the tactic of flexibility.
Again, in the case of "two Chinas", we oppose firmly the
conspiratorial activities of the United States and
CHIANG Kai-shek for the creation of "two Chinas". We do
not carry on any official activities with countries which
recognize CHIANG. Nevertheless, in consideration of the
actual conditions in Africa and Latin America and the
special relations CHIANG and the United States have in
these countries and for the purpose of seeking a right
opportunity for establishing our beachhead in Africa and
Latin America and of preventing the United States and
CHIANG from carrying out their conspiracy, our strategy
adopted in Africa and Latin America is different from that
adopted in Europe and Asia. While Cuba still had diplomatic
relations with CHIANG, we established official contacts
with Cuba. When Guinea was receiving CHIANG's envoy from
Libya, our ambassador reported for duty. We understand
the predicament of those countries in Africa which express
their wish to have friendly relations with us but previously
established diplomatic relations with CHIANG only because
of the pressure from imperialism.

c. The correct treatment of the first step and the following steps.
Chairman MAO pointed out during the Korean negotiations that
when taking the first step, consideration must be given for
the following steps. The first step should not be restricted
by the situation prevailing. In 1960, Chairman MAO again
instructed us repeatedly that in our struggles, some leeway
must be provided. This represents a high degree of strategic
and tactical thinking. The struggles of the past year proved
that directives from the Central Committee and Chairman MAO
led us to a glorious victory. For instance, in the Sino-American
talks, we have insisted on a settlement of the Taiwan issue
before other discussions can proceed, a reversal of our previous
strategy of tackling the details before touching on the
principle. Thus, the United States is prevented from launching
a series of attacks on our country. As another example, our
struggle against Nehru was, in fact, not beneficial to our
relations with Indonesia. In our struggle against Indonesia,
we never attacked Sukarno personally. In our struggle against
some erroneous concepts of our brotherly countries, our
criticisms were targeted at problems instead of at individuals.
We do not label people. This is beneficial to our common
cause. In a complicated struggle, to give consideration only to
the movement of one chess piece is not enough. Can we replace
policy with emotion to give vent to our feelings? We must be
able to see things clearly and be prepared to think about the
next steps.

34. In the process of executing our directives from the Central Committee,
many mistakes have been committed. Such mistakes shall be analysed and
conclusions drawn. Our most important mistakes were the following:

a. We do not know how to combine correctly the relations
of struggle and unity. Our relations with brotherly countries
constituted our chief external work during 1960. Despite the
fact that there was a clear-cut directive from the Central
Committee on each struggle concept, in execution big
deviations still occurred. After three articles were published,
some of our comrades still lacked the courage to express our
views confidently, whereas some comrades openly discussed
with comrades from other brotherly parties our internal dispute
with the big brother. When the dispute became intensified
and the struggle started unfolding, some comrades did not
dare to struggle and were not good in struggle. In explaining
our viewpoint some of our comrades tended to simplify and to become dogmatic, failing to see the whole and to argue the points. Some comrades failed to understand the seriousness of the struggle. They refused to believe that differences between brotherly parties could sharpen. Therefore, they lacked ample preparation. They were busy in meeting blows and fell into a passive position. In general, we cannot look at new problems from an old angle. After the Moscow conference, we could detect immediately the new factor which caused the development of events. Here the concept lies. There is a new factor behind the development of each event. One is unable to make a change if he keeps on looking at new problems from an old angle.

b. In our work, at times, we only see the mound without seeing the mountain. We only pay attention to the obvious and the petty. We lack a high degree of strategic thinking. For instance, during one period of our struggle against Indonesia, we failed to take into consideration our struggle against India. In enforcing the Central Committee’s policy for overseas Chinese and the Indonesian government, we failed to differentiate between the struggle of the masses and the diplomatic struggle. During the Sino-Burmese border negotiations, many such mistakes were also made. In speedily settling the China-Burma border problem, we failed to take into consideration every situation. In some African countries, we, in opposing “two Chinas”, failed to have a specific target, and our presentation was general.

c. There were reasons for the mistakes we made in our external work during 1960. It was due to the fact that we did not study properly and carry out thoroughly the directives from the Central Committee.

35. Our diplomatic work will see a great development and our diplomatic army will be greatly enlarged. Just as our construction policy does, the policy for our diplomatic work during 1961 will stress readjustment and consolidation, while at the same time continuing development.

36. On the basis of the Moscow Declaration, we will continue to strengthen and consolidate the internal relations within the socialist camp. We will support actively the liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the revolutionary struggle of the people of every country in the world and strive for unity with nationalist and peace-loving countries. We will take a further step to expand the international united front by utilizing the contradiction existing among Western countries. We will exert maximum efforts to isolate and strike at American imperialism. Since the dispute was already brought to the end of a chapter after the Moscow Conference, with a view to consolidating and strengthening the unity among socialist countries, we will utilize a right moment to strengthen the unity in the international Communist movement and the friendly cooperation among socialist countries. We will not violate the spirit of the Moscow Conference, nor will we kick up a dispute, nor will we do anything which is harmful to the unity. At the same time, however, we should be also always prepared for a dispute. Without a directive from the Central Committee, we must not discuss political problems on our own with brotherly parties.

37. There will be an enlarged celebration of the anniversary of the Sino-Soviet alliance and preparations will be made to settle between the two countries economic, trade, scientific collection and other problems. Visits of Chairman LIN and the Premier to East Europe are being considered. There will be all-out political and economic support for Albania. Various friendship and mutual-aid treaties will be signed. The anti-imperialist
struggle of the socialist countries will be actively supported and in international activities initiative will be taken with the brotherly countries. In propaganda, friendly unity and cooperation among brotherly countries and the peaceful foreign policy of our country will be stressed. In our political propaganda, the Moscow Conference shall be viewed from all sides and not only from the direction of the dispute.

38. Support for the liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the revolutionary struggle of the people of every country in the world and the struggle for world peace will be continued. We will hold high a banner of opposing imperialist colonialism and supporting the liberation movement and the revolutionary struggle of the people of the world. Under the conditions we already have in this area, effective support and aid will be rendered to the countries and people in Asia. The just struggles of the people in Cuba, Algeria, the Congo and Laos will continue to be supported. An all-out support of the revolutionary struggle of the Japanese people will be continued. Aid to African countries which have already gained independence will be pushed actively and dealings and contacts with the anti-imperialist patriotic forces in Latin America will be further strengthened and developed. The economic and political struggles of the people of the United States, West Europe and other capitalist countries in the world will be supported. The struggle of the people in every country against imperialism and for world peace will continue to be given active support.

39. Relations with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America will be further developed. With countries which have already established diplomatic relations with us, friendly relations will be further consolidated and efforts will be made to settle long-standing issues. We will strive for the signing of friendship and non-aggression pacts. With newly independent countries in Africa, we will try to establish diplomatic relations. In Southeast Asia, we will continue to counter-attack the anti-Chinese activities of India's reactionary clique. In our economic aid to friendly countries in this area, quality instead of quantity will be stressed. Friendly relations with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Cambodia and other countries will continue to be strengthened. An early signing of the border treaty with Nepal will be striven for. We will also strive for the signing of a treaty of dual-nationality for overseas Chinese in Cambodia. We will perform a good job of economic aid in Burma, Nepal and Cambodia. The king of Nepal and the king of Afghanistan will be invited to visit China. We will work for a reasonable settlement of the problems regarding the choice of nationality and residence of overseas Chinese in Indonesia. We will try to develop friendly relations with Ceylon. We will strive to have better relations with India and influence India into assuming a passive position on the border problem. This is important. Inviting Nehru to visit China once again will be considered at an opportune moment. A border conference will be called again and at the same time we will be prepared for another anti-Chinese wave to be started by the Indian government. The Sino-Indian Tibet agreement which is due to expire will be revised. We will strive for an appropriate improvement of relations with Pakistan and consider a settlement of the border problem when conditions are ripe. We will maintain normal relations with North African countries. We will try to improve friendly contacts with Iraq, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, and Yemen. An invitation will be extended to the King of Morocco to visit China. We will try to further friendly relations with Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. The presidents of Ghana and Mali will be invited to visit China. We will strive for diplomatic relations with Nigeria and the Congo. We will support Cuba's determined struggle against American intervention and further Sino-Cuban friendly relations. The chiefs of state of Mexico, Bolivia and Brazil will be invited to visit China.

40. We will exert maximum effort to isolate and strike at the United States by utilizing the contradictions existing among Western countries. Basically, we will maintain the status quo in our relations with the West. However,
we will take advantage of the conflict between American economic interests with other imperialist countries and develop appropriate trade and cultural activities with Western imperialist countries and semi-official contacts with the people so that the contradictions among Western countries will be further enlarged. We must be especially aware of the new two-faced policy which began after the inauguration of the Kennedy administration. We will continue to hoist an anti-American imperialist flag, to hammer at the aggressive and military nature of American imperialism, to expose the American disarmament plan as controlled by the American ruling classes and the paralyzing influence of the United Nations. We will oppose with determination the American occupation of Taiwan.

41. Towards Western and Northern Europe, we will continue the struggle against the conspiracy for the creation of "two Chinas".

42. What are these problems which are in different degrees in our diplomatic work during the past year? In our daily routine work, political ideology failed to take a lead. We are weak in investigation and research. With such a situation in mind, we must try to take a further step to improve our work in all its aspects by:

a. Exerting more effort to study and hold firmly to the foreign policy of the party and the writings of MAO Tse-tung, especially the Selected Works of MAO Tse-tung and MAO Tse-tung's knowledge of diplomatic work, diplomatic strategy and diplomatic policy.

b. Elevating the guided thinking for diplomacy in concert with politics, and coordinating such thinking with practice, experience and lessons.

c. Following seriously and undertaking timely examination of the three disciplinary rules laid down recently by the Central Committee.

d. Strengthening educational work. "Evaluate; one spirit and the system of verifying; in the facts to get at the truth."

43. Within our diplomatic ranks, the following problems will be tackled according to an over-all plan of the Central Committee.

a. Ridding ourselves of our subjective and fragmentary inclination in our thinking process and eliminating bureaucratism and administrativeism from our working attitude;

b. Elevating our ideological and political level;

c. Improving our working methods and style;

d. Strengthening our relations with the masses;

e. Promoting a democratic attitude;

f. Overcoming all bourgeois thoughts and inclinations;

g. Consolidating unity within diplomatic ranks;

h. Strengthening organization and discipline in our diplomatic work;

i. Defending strictly the system in working, no referring back for instructions; and

j. Sticking to the policy of thrift, economy, anti-waste and anti-luxury in our diplomatic work.
1. Headquarters Comment. Source stated that he had overheard some Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials discussing the need for training diplomats to handle all kinds of situations. The official referred to an incident in which an officer of a brotherly legation had tried to hand a Chinese Communist diplomat a memorandum of protest, something the Chinese Communists had never done to a brotherly country. The Chinese diplomat refused to accept it, but he made no protest. The diplomat of the brotherly country refused to take it back. In the end, the memorandum was just left lying on the table.