WHAT'S WITH THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN AMERICA'S ARMY AND CHINA'S PLA?

An Examination of the Terms of the
U.S. Army's Strategic Peacetime Engagement
with the People's Liberation Army of the
People's Republic of China

Colonel Jer Donald Get

September 15, 1996
FOREWORD

In May 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the Army to examine various ways to re-establish the army-to-army ties which existed between the U.S. Army and Beijing's People's Liberation Army (PLA) prior to the 1980s. U.S. President George Bush ordered a curb in military-to-military ties following the Tiananmen incident in 1989, and, since then, efforts at rapprochement between the two armies have been faltering and uneven.

There are some who question the value of renewing military ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) based on the limited gains accrued to the U.S. Army from the earlier relationship. In this essay, U.S. Army Colonel Jer Donald Get argues that this is a short-sighted attitude. The reasons for renewing army-to-army ties are substantial given that China's relevance as a power will grow. The United States needs to marshal all the resources at its disposal to influence China positively. One of those resources, Colonel Get argues, is America's Army.

The ideas expressed in this monograph constitute a host of positive recommendations which could influence the course of trans-Pacific relations over the next decade. Our Army and the PLA must take a measured approach, setting pragmatic objectives and extending the reciprocity that characterizes relations between great powers. For both armies, and both nations, the stakes are high---to engage as strategic partners rather than clash again in conflict.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL JER DONALD GET is a Military Intelligence Officer and former Army War College Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. His military service includes both tactical and strategic assignments in a variety of locations to include overseas duty in Germany, Hong Kong, and Korea. Colonel Get has also been trained as a Foreign Area Officer for the People's Republic of China, and he has served as the China politico-military affairs desk officer on the Army Staff. Colonel Get is assigned to Camp Zama, Japan, where he commands the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade.
SUMMARY

In the late spring of 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry asked the Secretary of the Army to look into the restoration of functional exchanges between the American Army and China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). This request was a major step toward the re-establishment of U.S. Army-PLA ties suspended by U.S. President George Bush in response to the 1989 Tiananmen incident. Reviving functional exchanges by Chinese and American military personnel is particularly significant because these exchanges had been one of the "three pillars" of Sino-American military cooperation during the 1980s. Furthermore, even though the U.S. Army has a long-standing tradition of maintaining military-to-military contacts with foreign armies, these contacts and other forms of "peacetime engagement" have grown in significance in the post-Cold War era. This is due to a number of factors including the recent reduction of the U.S. Army's force structure, personnel, and overseas presence, as well as the nation's increasing reliance on coalition partners for deterring or prosecuting the potential conflicts of the future.

There are, however, some who question the value of renewing American military ties with the Chinese based on the rather limited U.S. gains from the earlier relationship. Furthermore, significant changes in the political environment make the U.S. Army's re-engagement with the PLA somewhat problematic. The original "China Card" rationale for military ties, that of using China as a strategic counterweight against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), became inoperative with the USSR's demise. Thus, criticism regarding military cooperation with what many Americans view as a repressive Chinese regime, once muted for the greater good of Soviet containment, has found both a stronger voice and more receptive listeners. Additionally, reductions in manpower, money, and materiel, when taken together with growing worldwide demands for the attention and/or intervention of the U.S. military, make the cost effectiveness of investing in a relationship with a country that still harbors significant distrust of U.S. strategic intentions rather questionable.

Before re-establishing functional military ties with the PLA, the U.S. Army owes itself a detailed look at the relationship. This study, undertaken to support that process, examines the terms of the American Army's engagement with the PLA.

The examination begins by exploring the history of the broader U.S.-PRC security relationship from which army-to-army ties were derived. The brief historical expedition reveals the security foundations of the original breakthrough in friendly bilateral relations. The historical trace also reveals how this
foundation first cracked under the pressures of Tiananmen and finally crumbled with the fall of the old Cold-War bipolarity.

With the original engagement rationale overcome by world events, the examination then focuses on answering the question of why the U.S. Army should renew its ties to the PLA. The answer is in three parts: first, China is relevant to U.S. interests; second, the United States can positively influence the PRC as China develops into a world power; and, third, one of America's most effective engagement tools is the U.S. Army.

After validating the role of the U.S. Army in the U.S.-PRC relationship, the study moves to an evaluation of the terms on which the U.S. Army should renew its engagement with the PLA. This begins with a determination of what went right and wrong for the U.S. Army during its initial peaceful interaction with the Chinese. From these lessons, five actions are recommended. To secure better terms in its renewed engagement with the PLA, the U.S. Army must:

(1) Establish a comprehensive long-range strategy with clearly identified mission objectives.

(2) Prioritize and coordinate (internally and externally) the identified objectives.

(3) Develop tactics, techniques, and procedures to attain these objectives.

(4) Establish measures of effectiveness to track the progress made toward the attainment of particular goals and objectives.

(5) Conduct periodic assessments to refine the engagement strategy.

Finally, in conducting this study, it was determined that a contributing factor to the ad hoc nature of Sino-American military ties is the lack of peacetime engagement doctrine. A final recommendation, therefore, is for the U.S. Army to use its ongoing work on the China engagement strategy as the baseline for the development of a broader peacetime engagement doctrine.
WHAT'S WITH THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN AMERICA'S ARMY AND CHINA'S PLA?

An Examination of the Terms of the
U.S. Army's Strategic Peacetime Engagement
with the People's Liberation Army of the
People's Republic of China

We believe that engagement is the best strategy to ensure that as China increases its power it does so as a responsible member of the international community. And we believe that [emphasis added] is critical if peace, prosperity and stability are to endure in Asia and around the world.²

U.S. Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry.

As an instrument of American policy, the Army must be ready to provide the nation a variety of tools to influence the international environment ... The U.S. Army is engaged with the armies of friends around the world through military assistance programs, joint training exercises, and military to military exchanges.³

From DECISIVE VICTORY:
America's Power Projection Army,

The preceding statements reflect the rationale for the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Secretary Perry's remarks represent not only the current administration's official policy, but also the "conventional wisdom" regarding how the United States should deal with a rapidly modernizing Chinese Army, intent on gaining both strength and stature in the "New World Order." The second statement reaffirms the American Army's long-standing role as a strategic force in U.S. foreign policy. However, in today's complex international environment, where demands on American soldiers are growing while their numbers and other key resources are increasingly constrained, one might question the wisdom of having the U.S. Army engage an army, resistant to American values of liberty and democracy, which is still used as an instrument of state repression. The current national security strategy of the United States prescribes that: "Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our
resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools... The questions that naturally follow then are: Is China a nation both relevant to U.S. interests and responsive to U.S. resources?, and Is the U.S. Army the right tool for engagement? To answer these questions, this study explores the history of the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with China's PLA and explains why U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties should continue. The paper further evaluates what is both right and wrong with the current relationship and suggests how America's Army can create a more effective China engagement strategy for the future.

EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA

The China Card.

On October 11, 1995, the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began 2 days of hearings on the Security and Military Considerations of U.S. Policy toward China. The congressional concerns regarding U.S. national security policy toward the PRC voiced during these hearings were not new. They echoed those raised in similar hearings held over a decade earlier when America was still in the initial stages of normalizing its relations with China. At that time, there was particular apprehension about the administration entering into a military relationship with the Chinese. However, since China was seen by many foreign policy specialists in those Cold War days as a significant counterweight to the Soviet Union, bilateral military ties were established. In fact, military/strategic ties provided the primary raison d'être for Sino-American normalization.

The origin of the modern, official, public Sino-American military relationship can be traced to the January 1980 visit of Defense Secretary Harold Brown to Beijing. The Brown visit was followed by numerous exchanges, by a wide variety of high-ranking defense officials from both countries, which were to become the first of the "three pillars" of Sino-American security cooperation. In addition to high level visits, the "three pillars" announced by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1983 also included bilateral functional exchanges by military/security subject matter experts and the sale by the United States of defensive military weapons, equipment, and technology to China.

The U.S. Army had significant involvement in each of the "three pillars." Between 1981 and 1988, there were five high level army-to-army exchanges (see Appendix A). Second pillar functional exchanges focused primarily on training. The
Department of the Army delegated responsibility for the conduct of the training exchanges to its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) located at Fort Monroe, Virginia. From 1984 to 1989, TRADOC participated in four exchange visits (training seminar list at Appendix B). Other U.S. Army functional level interaction with the Chinese included Corps of Engineer cooperative studies with PRC research institutes from 1986 to 1989; a U.S. military history delegation visit to China in 1987; and Army participation in U.S. Defense Department-hosted logistics, medical, and educational exchanges. Under the third pillar of technology transfer and weapons sales, the Chinese expressed interest in a number of Army weapons systems including TOW anti-tank missiles, Redeye and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, artillery munitions, artillery counter-battery radar systems, and scout, transport, and attack helicopters. From these, the U.S. Army initiated two projects under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program—the transfer of technology related to the modernization of Chinese artillery ammunition known as the Large Caliber Ammunition Modernization Program (LCAMP), and the sale of U.S.-manufactured AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" counter-battery radar systems. Both of these were suspended prior to completion due to the Tiananmen incident.

Clearly, through the 1980s America's Army was an active supporter of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and China. In fact, the Army's LCAMP was the only FMS program close to completion prior to Tiananmen. Furthermore, the sale to the PRC of the AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" radar systems included a training package whereby a number of Chinese soldiers actually were trained on the system at the U.S. Army Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. These PLA soldiers were later able to demonstrate their capability with the radar to the American TRADOC Commander, General Maxwell Thurman, when he visited China in the summer of 1988. Finally, the U.S. Army's top two leaders, Secretary of the Army John Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army General Carl Vuono were scheduled to visit the PRC as the decade was coming to a close. Secretary Marsh's trip, originally scheduled for the spring of 1988, was postponed by the United States because of American human rights concerns regarding China's handling of its Tibetan minority. General Vuono, who was scheduled to visit China in June of 1989, was asked by the Chinese to postpone his trip because of their concerns about a growing democracy demonstration at Tiananmen Square.

Crisis At The Heavenly Gate And A Change In The Correlation Of Forces.

The year 1989 was a watershed for Sino-American ties as two momentous events were to change the fundamental nature of the relationship. First, the decision of the Chinese government to
use massive military force to deal with the democracy movement at Tiananmen Square horrified the American people and led to a June 5th order from President George Bush for the U.S. Defense Department to suspend all military cooperation with the PRC. The immediate effect of this presidential order on U.S. Army relations with the PLA essentially was to cancel the previously postponed China visits of both the Secretary of the Army and the Army's Chief of Staff, end the annual bilateral training seminars, withhold the delivery of hardware and software which would have closed out the LCAMP FMS project, and withhold the delivery of two AN/TPQ-37 "Firefinder" radar systems.

The second major event affecting U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the U.S. accommodation with the PRC was no longer deemed essential to containing Soviet expansionism. Thus, the Chinese lost the strategic cover that had, in the past, helped American Cold Warriors overlook the ills and transgressions of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes.

After Tiananmen, A Gradual Renewal.

In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, U.S. Army contact with the PLA was severely restricted. By late summer of 1990, however, the United States moderated its restrictions against contact with the Chinese military, as the American government was looking for PRC cooperation in responding to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. As part of its campaign to persuade the Chinese not to veto the U.S.-authored United Nations (UN) resolution for the use of all means available (i.e., force) to deal with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration reinitiated limited official Sino-American military contact. At the inception of Operation DESERT SHIELD, PRC military attaché visits to Department of Defense (DoD) personnel were approved on a case-by-case basis and restricted to U.S. military personnel of the ranks of two-star general/admiral and below. However, by the end of DESERT STORM, PLA attaches in Washington were starting to gain access to higher-ranking military officials and were routinely receiving briefings on U.S. operations in the Gulf. Furthermore, in the euphoria of the war's successful completion, the United States even included the PRC as a coalition partner in the June 8, 1991, victory parade down Constitution Avenue in Washington, DC. Once again, security cooperation protected the PRC from its American critics. However, for some opponents to the U.S. engagement with China, this Gulf War cover was to be as short lived as the conflict itself.

After the liberation of Kuwait, the American domestic debate
over U.S. policy toward the PRC tended once again to focus on the Chinese government's human rights record, which had been linked by congressional pressure to the administration's annual renewal of the PRC's Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. Opponents of MFN renewal also cited their concern with China's proliferation of nuclear and missile technology, rapidly rising trade surplus with the United States, and its failure to protect American intellectual property rights. In order to renew MFN and blunt criticism that they were "soft" on China, both the late Bush and the early Clinton administrations tended to limit Sino-American dialogue to human rights and trade discussions, which precluded the advancement of security initiatives. However, by the end of President Clinton's first year in office, the U.S. Government signaled its desire to reopen the suspended high-level Sino-American military dialogue by dispatching Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman to Beijing to meet with PLA leaders. Secretary Freeman concluded his 2 days of talks with "an agreement to a 'modest' agenda of future dialogue and professional exchanges."10

The "modest" military dialogue was initiated in the military-academic arena with a January 1994 China visit by a U.S. National Defense University (NDU) delegation led by American Army Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, the NDU President. This was followed by an August visit to the United States by a PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Xu Huizi, whose itinerary included a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry. Perry, in turn, made his first visit to China as the Secretary of Defense in October of that year. Sino-American military exchanges (to include additional reciprocal high-level visits and the first U.S. Navy ship visit to China since Tiananmen) continued through the first half of 1995, when they were essentially frozen by the Chinese in protest of the U.S. Government allowing President of Taiwan Lee Teng Hui to visit the United States. Lee's visit, which led the Chinese leadership to question America's commitment to a "one China policy," together with increasingly vocal disagreements over human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation issues, plunged Sino-American diplomatic relations to their lowest point since Tiananmen. Despite this rift, the U.S. defense establishment steadfastly maintained its policy objective of peaceful engagement as an element of the Clinton administration's comprehensive engagement strategy with the PRC. This position was reiterated by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph Nye, during his October 11, 1995, testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. (See Appendix C for the new "five pillars" of the Sino-American security engagement.)

Thus, even though the Chinese had postponed the June 1995 U.S. visit of their Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian (rescheduled to begin April 6, 1996, but again postponed due to
tensions over Taiwan's presidential elections), the PLA was allowed to participate in lower level functional visits on logistics and air traffic control. However, even though U.S. Army personnel participated in the post-Tiananmen round of Sino-American military exchanges, the American Army, as an institution, was not a major player until Secretary Perry dispatched a May 1995 memorandum to Secretary of the Army Togo West asking the U.S. Army "to explore the feasibility of conducting functional exchanges with the PLA in the areas of training and military jurisprudence." In preparing its response to the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army had an ideal opportunity to examine fully the goals and objectives of U.S. peacetime engagement with the Chinese Army; then, reassess its own prior army-to-army engagement results; and, finally, apply the lessons of the past to develop a comprehensive and coordinated plan for the future.

EXPLAINING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA

The "Why's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: Why China?

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools . . .

The easiest explanation of why the U.S. Army should participate in peacetime engagement operations with China's PLA is to execute a mission specifically requested by the Secretary of Defense. This simplistic rationale, however, ill serves both the Army itself and the nation it defends. For the U.S. Army to play an effective role in comprehensive engagement with China, its leadership must have a sound understanding of their Commander-in-Chief's intent. Thus, it is first necessary to understand the rationale for the broader Sino-American security relationship.

A most obvious initial question that must be answered is, Why is China relevant to U.S. interests? In his recent testimony before the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord offered these facts on the PRC's relevance:

China is not only the most populous country in the world, with 1.2 billion people, but it has the largest standing army. Even after a 25% reduction in its armed forces in the late 1980's, it still has 3 million men and women in arms. China is a nuclear power, and along with France, the only country in the world still testing nuclear weapons, to our regret. China possesses
ballistic missiles, including ones capable of reaching the United States. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with the rights and responsibilities that go with membership in that exclusive club.\textsuperscript{13}

China's relevance to the United States is directly related to its power. While its military might is currently nowhere near that of the United States, the PRC, with its nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), can inflict grievous harm to America's territory and citizens. In the world political arena, China's UN veto authority gives it the power to thwart American international interests. This was evidenced by U.S. concerns over the previously mentioned PRC vote during the buildup to the Gulf war and America's recent frustration with China's reluctance to support a UN resolution condemning the February 1996 Cuban shoot-down of two U.S. civilian aircraft. Yet, what is even more important for Americans to understand is the relevance of China's future power potential to U.S. national interests. Though it is not yet a dominant economic force in the world, the PRC, which enjoyed a 1995 trade surplus with the United States of almost $33 billion, is projected to have the world's largest economy in the first part of the 21st century. Furthermore, it is apparent from the PLA's ongoing defense modernization that the PRC is developing force projection capabilities which will soon make it a major regional military power. Additionally, assuming China's defense modernization is able to parallel its economic development, there is a strong possibility that sometime in the 21st century the PRC will be a major military power capable of challenging the United States.\textsuperscript{14}

In summary, then, as Secretary Perry recently remarked, "A new geopolitical order is being created in the Asia Pacific region as one of the world's most ancient nations (China) emerges as one of the world's most powerful nations."\textsuperscript{15}

The "Whys" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: Why Engagement?

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference. We must also use the right tools . . . \textsuperscript{16}

During his October 1995 confirmation hearings, U.S. Ambassador-designee to the People's Republic of China James J. Sasser reflected not only the importance the U.S. government places on the Sino-American relationship, but also its belief that America can make a difference in China's development. He testified that,

Secretary (of State) Christopher has said our relationship with China is one of the most important
bilateral relationships we have. Even without a cooperative relationship with the United States, China will continue, no doubt, in growth and influence, albeit at a lower rate. But a constructive American relationship with China can play an important role in the development of Chinese policies and attitudes in the pivotal post-Deng (Xiao Ping) era. Our interests dictate that we move boldly to establish a productive bilateral relationship with China.17

The basic premise behind America's comprehensive engagement with the PRC is that such a strategy will facilitate the orderly entry of China, an acknowledged regional and potential world power, into international and regional affairs and allow the world to avoid the conflict that accompanied the rise of earlier powers such as Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan in the 1930s. This premise is reflected in America's most recently published national security strategy which states,

Our (U.S.) leadership must stress preventive diplomacy—through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military to military contacts, and involvement in multilateral negotiations...in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they become crises.18

The more specific reasons the U.S. Government is currently attempting to engage the Chinese in the security arena were articulated by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nye during his October 1995 congressional testimony. (See Appendix D for the seven reasons cited by Secretary Nye.)

Yet, even if one accepts the validity of the need for America's strategic engagement with the PRC, the operative question then becomes whether or not China is responsive to American influences. For a variety of reasons, the answer is a "qualified" yes. First, there is significant anecdotal evidence of engagement leading to the Chinese government's acquiescence to U.S. initiatives. This has been true not only in the security arena, which saw Beijing helping the United States reach an agreement with North Korea to stop the North Korean nuclear weapon's program,19 but also in a number of other areas as well. One area was economics, where China agreed to open its markets to U.S. farm products and to hold talks on allowing more U.S. telecommunications and insurance services.20 Another was human rights, with China's 1995 adoption of a law that allows its citizens to recover damages from the government for infringement of their rights.21 Second, there is also ample evidence that, when the U.S. Government has chosen to focus its resources, there are few countries in the world that have been able to
resist. Yet, one must always keep in mind that, for most matters, the "yes" answer is "qualified" because there are limits both to the degree of PRC accommodation and to what the United States can focus on at any particular time.

Even with these limitations, America's strategic engagement with China's military is sound policy because, with or without direct influence, strategic engagement with the PRC brings America other benefits. The most important of these is access to and a channel for communicating with the PLA, an important segment of Chinese leadership. Increased bilateral communication normally leads to increased understanding, which can prevent military miscalculations that have so often in the past led to armed conflict.

The "Whys" of the Army-to Army Relationship: Why the Army?

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference. **We must also use the right tools . . .**

The rationale for America's Army to be involved in the comprehensive engagement strategy with the PRC is two-fold. The first is related to the dominant role the PLA plays in Chinese politics. The roots of the PLA's political power were succinctly described in the recent congressional testimony of Richard D. Fisher, who stated,

> In China, to an even higher degree than most other communist systems, the military is an integral part of the political power equation: it brought the Chinese Communist Party to power, remains its ultimate guarantor, and is a key tool for fulfilling the Party's international goals.

Thus, in order to engage China's leadership, the U.S. must engage the leadership of China's Army.

The second reason for Army involvement in engagement is related to the special part the U.S. Army plays in American defense and foreign policy. As reported to the U.S. Congress in its Fiscal Year 1996 posture statement,

> America's Army plays a unique role in the defense of the nation. As the strategic core of U.S. forces for joint or multilateral operations, the Army can be used by national leaders to . . . demonstrate U.S. capabilities, promote stability, and contribute to the nation's ability to influence world events.
The U.S. Army sees its role as being particularly important in the peaceful engagement of foreign nations because,

In most nations, armies are the foundation of military forces . . . . This means that America's Army, as the counterpart of the armies of other nations, is an indispensable tool to influence the policies and practices of other nations, through nation assistance, army-to-army contacts, security assistance and shared training.25

Finally, while the validity of this statement may be debatable for some nations, there is little doubt that in China the People's Liberation Army is the dominant military service. In the words of Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, a former Politico-Military Affairs Officer with service in both the Pacific Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "The Army is generally the dominant service in Asian countries and it most certainly is in the PRC. It is important for the U.S. Army as an institution to engage the PLA."26

The underlying justification for the American Army's strategic mission of peacetime engagement with China's PLA is essentially sound. Sound mission justification does not, however, necessarily lead to successful mission accomplishment. In fact, it is the perception that the U.S. military gained precious little of substance from its prior strategic cooperation with China in the 1980s that causes some to oppose renewing the Sino-American military engagement. Yet, America's Army should not be precluded from building ties to the PLA by the perceived or real failures of their earlier interaction. Rather, the U.S. Army should take advantage of that experience to develop a strategy for the peacetime engagement of the Chinese Army, which both eliminates what was wrong as well as reinforces what was right with their previous engagement.

EVALUATING THE U.S. ARMY'S PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PLA

The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's Wrong?

. . . the confusion and controversy surrounding U.S. policy toward China reflects the fact that American foreign policy more generally is also in a state of serious disarray . . . Without a consensus on a new national strategy in the post-Cold War era, the context for a new American policy toward China will remain uncertain.27

Much of what has been wrong with the development of a constructive U.S. Army relationship with the PLA stems from
friction in the overall Sino-American relationship. Many of these larger problems can be attributed to the failure of the American government to articulate an overarching strategy with clear priorities and measurable objectives for dealing with China. This has been particularly true since Tiananmen and apparently still plagues the current administration. According to Leon T. Hader of the Cato Institute, significant intergency disagreements characterize management of U.S. policy toward China,

For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his human rights aides threatened Beijing with trade sanctions if it refused to release dissidents just days after top Commerce Department officials had bombarded the Chinese with new U.S. trade and investment proposals. Similarly, after John H. F. Shattuck, the State Department's top human rights officer, attacked the Chinese for their human rights abuses, Secretary of Defense William Perry and other Pentagon officials announced their plans to pursue contacts with the Chinese military, described as prime villains in the 1989 Tiananmen Square killings.28

The lack of a well-defined strategy adversely affects Sino-U.S. relations in a number of ways. First, with priorities for engaging China described by one operator currently involved in policy execution as a "food fight," executive branch departmental interactions with China can appear from China's perspective to be ad hoc, competitive, personality driven, uncoordinated, and at cross-purposes. This puts American policy officials at a decided disadvantage when negotiating with their Chinese counterparts. It also leaves the administration's comprehensive engagement policy vulnerable to inquiry, influence, and interference from opponents both at home and abroad.

The absence of an administration plan has also been cited as a key reason no political consensus on the broader subject of overall Sino-American ties exists in either Washington or Beijing. On the American side, the lack of consensus has been most visible in the legislative branch where there are a multitude of views on how to deal with the PRC. Factors contributing to the varied views among congressional representatives include a belief that the executive branch has often failed either to consult with or inform Congress of administration initiatives regarding China;29 a perception that the Chinese government has been reluctant to cooperate with the United States in the areas of human rights, trade, and weapons proliferation;30 and strong residual ties among some members of Congress to America's former Chinese Nationalist allies on Taiwan.33

A particular problem that politicization has brought to the
army-to-army ties is the disruption of the high-level exchanges which serve as one of the basic foundations of the developing relationship. These have included the politically motivated cancellation of U.S. Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh's 1988 Beijing visit and the postponement of PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian's 1995/1996 U.S. visit (now rescheduled for late 1996). Politicization has also hurt Sino-American defense conversion cooperation, another pillar of the current relationship. In a move many observers attribute to partisan politics, the U.S. Congress eliminated funding for U.S. participation in Sino-American defense cooperation by inserting special restrictive language in the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Bill.

The Chinese Army's participation in the bilateral relationship is, of course, also affected by its country's domestic politics, as the leadership in China is also split regarding Sino-American cooperation. The most divisive issue is an argument over American intentions toward the PRC. One major group in Beijing distrusts the West in general and sees the U.S. policy of comprehensive engagement in particular as being a code name for the containment of China. Another Chinese leadership element takes a more positive view toward the West and believes the American engagement policy is benign. PRC internal politics, however, do not fully explain the PLA's record of uneven cooperation, a third major problem encountered by the U.S. Army in its engagement with the Chinese. One of the more constant complaints by Americans who have dealt with the Chinese military is the PLA's unwillingness to reciprocate in terms of frankness in discussions, access to people and information, and other activities normally associated with bilateral military exchanges. While Chinese uniformed leaders are constantly soliciting data and opinions from their American counterparts, their typical offerings and responses to U.S. presentations are mostly a rote reiteration of "party line" positions. Furthermore, in their meetings with Americans, PLA leaders often open their remarks with general assertions in an attempt to control and limit discussion.

One of the most frustrating problems for U.S. military representatives visiting China is having to deal with their counterparts through the PRC Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Bureau (FAB). One senior U.S. Army official described the FAB as the PLA's modern "barbarian handlers," whose mission is to construct bureaucratic barriers both to control their own PLA personnel and keep the Americans at arms length. Another technique the PLA uses to perpetuate the uneven relationship is to "kill their guests with kindness." Under this rubric, the mandatory escorts assigned to U.S. visitors are not there to watch the Americans or restrict access (which they do quite effectively) but to ensure that the "foreign guests" are
comfortable and safe from "bad elements." An additional PLA ploy is to include the spouses when inviting U.S. leaders, which has often had the effect of transforming substantive military exchanges into tourist visits. The Chinese have also been known to make last minute changes to discussion topics or venues to catch their counterparts off guard.

Another problem in the general U.S. military engagement with China which also adversely affects the army-to-army relationship is in the area of doctrine. Although military-to-military contacts are identified as a key program in the peacetime engagement component of the U.S. national military strategy, there is currently no doctrine on how to execute those contacts. Doctrine is important because it "provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort." As one of its six institutional imperatives, doctrine is even more critical to the U.S. Army because it

touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates communications between Army personnel no matter where they serve, establishes a shared professional culture and approach to operations, and serves as the basis for curriculum in the Army school system. Doctrine permeates the entire organizational structure of the Army and sets the standard for leadership development and soldier training.

With no doctrine to guide the development of military-to-military contacts, a key part of America's military engagement with the Chinese (like the overall U.S. China policy) has been a succession of ad hoc experiments subjected to unnecessary, counterproductive, and personality-driven internecine rivalry.

Another major failing in the past Sino-American army-to-army relationship was the absence of the Army Reserve and National Guard in the China engagement activities. Although the National Guard Bureau had expressed a strong interest in participating in the early development of the relationship, this interest was largely overlooked by the Department of the Army staff officers who worked the issue at that time. This omission cannot be allowed to continue, as it is completely contrary to the "Total Army" spirit. Moreover, in today's constrained fiscal environment, the National Guard and the Reserves are resources that the active Army leadership cannot afford to overlook when considering current and future peacetime engagement operations.

One final negative aspect of past U.S.-PRC army ties was that almost everything that happened was driven from the top down. With the focus on strategic ties, particularly when the Soviets were still a threat, little or no engagement input was
solicited from America's operational and tactical soldiers who were the ones tasked to provide the briefings, demonstrations, and escorts for the visiting Chinese military delegations. The failure to get this segment of the U.S. Army involved in the army-to-army relationship with the Chinese (other than as training aids) was a missed opportunity, for, as the current Army Chief of Staff has repeatedly pointed out, these soldiers are not just in the Army, they are the Army.

The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's Right?

This (American) policy of comprehensive engagement with China is not new. Indeed, U.S. engagement with China has been pursued for over 20 years by six American presidents, both democrat and republican, and it has a solid track record.40

It is quite a challenge identifying what is right with the Sino-American army-to-army relationship. This is because, at first glance, there appears to be little evidence of the U.S. Army receiving any substantive benefit from peacetime engagement with the PLA. A closer investigation, however, reveals that there have been some positive aspects to U.S.-PRC security ties.

First, they are part of a larger peaceful contemporary Sino-American relationship that has survived many ups, downs, and near crises since normalization in 1979. It is also heartening to note that, despite a myriad of disputes, a succession of leaders in both the United States and China have recognized the importance of this relationship and have remained committed to its continued development.41 Furthermore, even though changes in the international environment altered the original foundation of the security ties, the military leadership of both countries understands the need to continue it.42

While they are hard to measure objectively, there have been a number of intangible benefits of Sino-American security relations in general and the army-to-army ties in particular. Foremost is access to and a direct means of communicating with the PLA, a key segment of China's leadership. This direct line of communication has been proven repeatedly to be important to U.S. interests. For example, army-to-army contacts played an important role in gaining Chinese cooperation in two key areas during the Gulf War, that is, securing the PRC's commitment not to veto the UN Security Council resolution allowing the use of force to liberate Kuwait and getting technical information on Chinese weapons systems used by the Iraqi forces to develop countermeasures. Direct communications between Chinese and American military leaders also proved valuable in moderating the tensions that had built up on the Korean peninsula in the summer of 1994 due to North Korea's nuclear weapons development and
aggressive force posture. U.S.–PRC military-to-military contacts are believed to be one of the factors that persuaded China to play a positive role in the successful multilateral effort to contain North Korea's nuclear ambition. These communications links were also used to reassure the Chinese regarding U.S. strategic intentions toward North Korea when the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Charles Larson, was able to use a visit to Beijing to reassure the PLA personally that the U.S. actions taken in response to North Korea were defensive in nature and not the precursor to a preemptive attack.43

Another benefit of increased U.S. military contacts with the PLA is that these contacts have also led to an increased American understanding of China's ongoing military modernization goals and objectives. During recent NDU leader exchanges, senior PLA leaders were more forthcoming about issues of multilateralism and budget transparency than they had ever been. According to one report, the PLA visitors shared information "unprecedented in its candor and specificity."44

Another area that has seen significant improvement is the inclusion of regional forces in the planning and execution of the U.S. military's peacetime engagement with the Chinese. While the Defense and Service Attaches in Beijing have always been key players in the U.S.–PRC military relationship, the participation of the PACOM's Unified and Component Commands has been rather uneven. Recently, however, the PACOM and its supporting component commands have been proactive participants in the development and execution of Sino-U.S. military engagement plans. The U.S. Army Pacific has played an especially active role in hosting the Chinese Army in recent multilateral gatherings such as the annual Pacific Armies Management Seminars.

One final element that is right with the current state of the Sino-American army ties is the U.S. Army's recognition of its need to develop a strategy for engaging the PLA in order to optimize the relationship. Taking a long term strategic approach to the contacts with China's PLA should help the American Army avoid the failings of the past and allow it to build a relationship with the Chinese Army that will stand the test of time.

The "What's" of the Army-to-Army Relationship: What's the Army To Do?

Initiating and sustaining cooperation is never easy, because it not only requires that both sides have common interests but also requires that their conflicts of interests be either insignificant or manageable. More often than not, there are significant preexisting
and ongoing bilateral conflicts, so that establishing and sustaining cooperation requires mutual adjustment and extensive negotiations. Cooperation is neither spontaneous nor self-perpetuating. Maintaining cooperative relations requires considerable effort by both parties.\textsuperscript{45}

The establishment of a cooperative relationship with China's PLA will require a significant effort on the part of America's Army. The first order of business is to establish a clear strategy. Clarity requires the Department of the Army (DA) Staff to identify the goals and objectives it desires from the peacetime engagement of the PLA, as well as the means to attain them. In developing these means, goals, and objectives, former U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy recommended that the Army take a step back and evaluate the situation with a long-term perspective. He also offered the opinion that the Army should determine not only what it wants, but also how easy or difficult its objectives will be to attain. Ambassador Roy further cautioned the Army not to push harder than the traffic can bear. One possible U.S. Army objective offered by the Ambassador was to demonstrate to the PLA that the United States does, in fact, have the best military forces in the world. This would be done to prevent the Chinese from underestimating America's ability to respond to a crisis in the Far East. Another objective should be to persuade the PLA that the United States has neither a desire nor a design to "contain" China. Finally, contacts with the PLA could also help the U.S. Army's leadership gain insight into the thought processes of their Chinese counterparts.\textsuperscript{46}

Clearly understanding what the traffic can bear is particularly important in the currently highly politicized Sino-American relationship. One regional operator pointed out that there have been a couple of conflict areas that have tended to dominate the relationship.\textsuperscript{47} A prime example of a "hot button" issue was the proposed April 6, 1996, U.S. visit by PRC Defense Minister General Chi Haotian, who was in a key PLA leadership position in 1989 when the Army was used to suppress dissidents at Tiananmen Square. This visit, originally scheduled for June 1995, was again postponed due to significant bipartisan opposition in the U.S. Congress.\textsuperscript{48} Another controversial issue involves possible U.S. military discussions with the PLA on advanced command and control communications technology. Understanding and, if necessary, avoiding those issues that are not politically supported by the administration or the Congress are key to setting one boundary of the U.S. Army's peacetime engagement with the PLA.

It is equally important for the U.S. Army to recognize that there are "traffic cops" on the PRC's side of the relationship who will limit what the bilateral traffic will bear. In order to
define the engagement strategy's Chinese boundary, the DA Staff must determine what the PLA is willing to bring to the relationship. Awareness of these boundaries is significant for two important reasons. First, this knowledge will allow the Army to conserve resources by not investing operator or staff time preparing for unexecutable bilateral activities. Second, this boundary will also set the bottom-line for U.S. Army-PLA engagement negotiations.

Once the general external boundaries have been determined, the next step in developing the Army's engagement strategy is to gain an understanding of the relative priority of internal (Army only) and external (other agencies) objectives. Then the Army should determine how focusing on any one issue will affect the ability to achieve progress on the others. These processes require measures of effectiveness to track the progress toward the attainment of particular goals and objectives. Yet, one must be careful in choosing measures of effectiveness. Ambassador Roy warns that the Army should not let its China policy be defined in terms of what is not under American control. Rear Admiral McDevitt also cautions that "rigid 'bench marks' will put engagement under the control of the PRC. The Chinese will then dictate the pace by what they decide they are willing to do." There are, however, other ways to measure the effectiveness of progress in Sino-American army-to-army ties than the rigid reciprocity and bench marks currently being employed. For example, one measure of progress could be the topical content of what the Chinese military is willing to discuss with their American counterparts during high level and functional exchanges. Another measure is the level and type of PLA academic institutions accessible to U.S. soldiers. The task for the DA staff, then, is to create a menu of prioritized options with multiple measures of effectiveness. This menu will enhance operational flexibility while providing a way to measure progress.

To gain an understanding of both the contentious issues and the relative priority of objectives mentioned above, the American Army faces another imperative in the development of its China engagement strategy. That imperative is comprehensive coordination, which is essential if Army actions involving the PRC are to be complementary to rather than at cross purposes with those of other U.S. agencies.

Internal staff coordination has to cover the full spectrum of Army activities. Horizontally, coordination must encompass the "Total Army" structure, including the Army Reserves, the Army National Guard, and the Department of the Army civilian work force. The Reserve component adds value to the engagement process by bringing skills of interest to the PLA not always found in the active force. More importantly, however, is the
visible testimony America's citizen soldiers give regarding the strength and power of the Army of a democracy. Thus, "Total Army" coordination can only enrich the possibilities in the menu of engagement options.

Vertical coordination must be from the Army Secretariat down to the operating forces. The tactical forces, in particular, have much to offer the DA Staff as it develops the implementing objectives of the Army's China strategy. For example, America's Army has a tremendous asset available in its 25th Infantry Division (Light) (ID(L)) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The 25th ID(L), also known as the Tropic Lightning Division, currently represents the U.S. Army and the U.S. Pacific Command in a number of activities with several foreign armies in the Pacific theater through U.S. Army Forces, PACOM's Expanded Relations Program (ERP). The Division has already provided tactical demonstrations for high ranking Chinese military visitors to include PLA Generals Xu Huizi and Zhu Dunfa. According to one division staff officer, interaction with the PLA would be a tremendous teaching and learning opportunity for Tropic Lightning soldiers. The 25th ID(L) could share its knowledge through a number of individual and small unit infantry courses conducted by its outstanding Light Infantry Training Command (LITC) and Non-Commissioned Officers Academy (NCOA). Conversely, the LITC and NCOA cadre have a continuing interest in the field craft (e.g., tracking, infiltration, marksmanship) of all armies in the Pacific, including China's PLA.

The U.S. Army's formal external staff coordination should begin with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), which has been designated the lead agency for Defense Department elements dealing with the PLA. In the development and execution of its China strategy, the DA Staff should be in constant and close contact with the OSD/ISA country director for China, who will normally set the azimuth and boundaries for U.S.-PRC security engagement actions. The Army staff should also maintain close liaison with staff counterparts from the other services (Marines, Navy, and Air Force) and the Joint Staff (J-2 and J-5). Meetings with this core group should take place on a routine basis (probably monthly) to identify and deconflict potential problem areas, exchange good ideas, and synchronize future actions. Direct Army coordination should also be effected on an as-required basis with the various other agencies concerned with China that belong to or are in support of the Department of Defense. Additionally, because of the highly politicized nature of Sino-American relations, the Army must maintain an awareness of the concerns of the U.S. Congress when developing and implementing its peacetime engagement strategy for the PRC. Congressional concerns or legislation potentially affecting U.S.-PRC army ties should be routinely addressed by the Army.
leadership through its Office of Congressional and Legislative Liaison.

Informal coordination on China issues by the Army should, of course, be limited only by the time and energy the DA staff has to devote to the particular issue or action. Fortunately for the Army there are a plethora of China experts in the close vicinity of the Pentagon. Among the resources available are the agencies in the U.S. intelligence community, offices in the Department of State and other executive departments, think tanks, academic institutions, as well as congressional researchers and staffers. Because of the high level of interest in Sino-American relations and the number of players involved, the full coordination of the Army's engagement strategy will be a laborious and time consuming effort. This effort must be undertaken, however, if the Army's peacetime engagement of the PLA is to have politically realistic goals and objectives.

Although the completion of a clear and coordinated engagement strategy would certainly be a step in the right direction, this cannot be the terminal objective of the Army staff. In addition to building its China strategy, the DA Staff must also develop sound procedures for its successful implementation, for history has demonstrated that even great strategies have been doomed to failure by poor execution.

The first recommended procedure is to ensure that every U.S. Army leader who is likely to be involved in direct interaction with the PLA is thoroughly briefed on how the Chinese will approach the relationship. Knowledge of the PLA approach is particularly important in these early stages of the renewal of army ties as American representatives are preparing to negotiate the terms for moving the relationship forward. This is because Americans in the past have learned,

The contrasting approach to the bilateral relationship also affected the course of (U.S.-PRC) negotiations. China was often content to defer compromise and agreement until it extracted maximum U.S. concessions; it never compromised until it had to, often at the last minute. It adopted an "optimizing" bargaining strategy . . . . But whereas China rejected compromise until necessary, the United States adopted its problem solving approach and presented China with a succession of conciliatory proposals, hoping to elicit Chinese compromise and renewed cooperation. The United States adopted an "accommodative" approach to resolving conflict. In such circumstances, Chinese leaders acqiesced only when the United States refused to make additional concessions, leaving them with the choice of either compromise or escalated conflict. Beijing always
chose compromise. Another key reason for U.S. Army leaders to receive extensive briefing on PLA negotiating tactics is to forewarn them that, Chinese negotiators tend to exploit the psychological dimension of interpersonal relations. Such highly personalized diplomacy is intended to create obligations and attitudes receptive to psychological demands. The full implication of such techniques as old friends, shame and sympathy, criticism, and nonverbal communications are often not recognized by Americans. Generally these techniques are very effective stimulating the friendly or hostile responses that help the Chinese negotiator maintain the initiative.

These and other tactics such as late changes of agendas or venues have historically been used by the PLA to protect Chinese interests in dealing with Americans. Briefing U.S. representatives on Chinese negotiating tactics should help them recognize these tactics and expect their employment by the PLA.

Briefings should also include positive procedures for dealing with the Chinese military. One such procedure was provided by a senior U.S. naval officer who has had extensive dealings with the PLA. He noted, "The way to get the attention of China's leadership is for U.S. objectives to be clear and constantly reinforced by including them as talking points for all U.S. visitors to China, e.g., Commerce, State, Defense, etc."

In its preliminary stages of engagement, the U.S. side should also offer to set up a bilateral Executive Steering Committee (ESC). The Chinese and American members of this committee would work together to set up the initial engagement parameters and then mutually guide the relationship through its early development. This approach is strongly recommended as the Army has had positive experiences in employing the ESC technique in developing contacts with other foreign armies. The U.S.-PRC Executive Steering Committee should be a functional exchange at the high-intermediate level of leadership (major general and below) to minimize its politicization.

In preparing to deal with their Chinese counterparts, another technique that the U.S. Army should adopt is the use of relative rather than rigid reciprocity. A policy of rigid reciprocity, whereby each exchange must be matched in substance and style by the two parties, will tend to limit Sino-American army interaction because of the disparity in the relative wealth and technology between the Chinese and Americans. Rather than reciprocating event for event, U.S. and PRC Army objectives should be matched in terms of relatively equal levels of
priority, accessibility, and transparency.

Another tactic beneficial to the engagement process would be for the Army leadership to ensure that Department of the Army civilians are routinely included. These key members of the "Total Army" team bring a continuity that is highly valued by the Chinese. Military leaders in China tend to remain in a given position much longer than most of their uniformed American counterparts.

A final key procedure that should be developed is a periodic internal Army reassessment of its engagement with the PLA. Objectives of the reassessment would be to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of executing the China strategy as well as the cost and benefits of engaging the PLA. Regular reassessments will allow the Army not only to re-evaluate its engagement goals and objectives, but also refine its tactics, techniques, and procedures for working with the PLA. Scheduled evaluations can also be used by the Army to capture the actual monetary costs associated with U.S.-PRC army-to-army ties. As the program matures, this fiscal data could be used to make China engagement part of the Army's Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) input for programmatic funding. Programmed funds would eliminate the requirement for the Army either to use its limited "initiative" funds or find other bill payers for each China initiative. Including China engagement in the Army's FYDP would have the additional benefit of ensuring everyone would be working from the same game plan.

**ENDORsing the U.S. ARmy's PEAcetime engAgemenT wITH THE PLA**

**Conclusions.**

A historic opportunity is still present to secure a more orderly, less disruptive Chinese entry into international and regional affairs than occurred with the rise of other powers in the past century. But that opportunity will be lost if the leaders of China and the United States do not seize upon it during the coming decade.55

Part of the current U.S. China policy of comprehensive engagement, designed to take advantage of the historic opportunity mentioned above, is for the U.S. Army to renew its peacetime engagement with China's PLA. The reasons for renewed army-to-army ties are clear. First, China's relevance to U.S. interest, which is already significant, will increase with China's rapidly growing power. Second, the United States has resources at its disposal that can positively influence China's development. Finally, one of the most effective resources for
engaging the PRC is America's Army.

To maximize its effectiveness as an instrument of U.S. China policy, the American Army must learn from its past interaction with the PLA. The recommendations offered here are by no means exhaustive. A significant limiting factor is the lack of peacetime engagement doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures. Thus, a final recommendation is for the U.S. Army to use its ongoing work on the China engagement strategy as the baseline for the development of peacetime engagement doctrine. This doctrine should then yield the full range of tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for building a clear, consistent, coordinated, and comprehensive campaign plan for engaging China's PLA. Such a carefully planned approach to peacefully engaging the PRC would, to paraphrase Rear Admiral McDevitt, be the modern day functional equivalent of America's Army "keeping its powder dry."
Among the senior U.S. and Chinese Army officials who conducted high level visits in the 1980s were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General William R. Richardson</td>
<td>Commander, U.S. Army</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General William R. Richardson</td>
<td>Commanding General, Combined Arms Center</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General John A. Wickham</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U.S. Army</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Maxwell Thurman</td>
<td>Commanding General, U.S. Army Training &amp; Doctrine Command</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Xu Huizi</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

SINO-U.S. ARMY-TO-ARMY TRAINING EXCHANGES

August 17–29, 1985
Chinese observed U.S. individual, specialized, collective, and combined arms training at Fort Benning, GA; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Irvin, CA.

October 14–26, 1986
Americans visited PLA Armor and Artillery Academies, observed Chinese combined arms training, and received presentations on PLA militia training.

October 3–16, 1987
Chinese observed curriculum, composition and selection process at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; computer simulation and academic program at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; discussed computer simulation, the Joint Readiness Training Center, force structure, and training management at Fort Monroe, VA; and observed a combined arms live-fire exercise at U.S. Army Western Command (now U.S. Army Pacific).

September 14–25, 1988
Americans visited China's National Defense University, the Nanjing Command College, an airborne training brigade at Yingshan, and a live-fire exercise at Luo Tu Shan.
APPENDIX C

FIVE PILLARS OF SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

In his October 11, 1995, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Asian Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye listed the following five pillars through which the United States is implementing its policy of security engagement with the People's Republic of China.

(1) High-level visits. This includes visits such as Defense Secretary William Perry's to China in October 1994.

(2) Functional exchanges. These are working level professional exchanges such as those between our National Defense Universities and our military medical communities.

(3) Routine military activities and confidence building measures. Included in this category are ship visits (such as the visit of USS Bunker Hill to Qingdao in March 1995) and defense transparency talks.

(4) Participation in multinational security fora. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command hosted a series of conferences and symposia in which PLA participation has been fairly good.

(5) Defense conversion activities. Through the activities of the Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission, we seek to maintain a channel of communications with an important element of the PRC's defense establishment.56
APPENDIX D

REASONS FOR SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY ENGAGEMENT

In his October 11, 1995, Congressional testimony, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye listed the following seven reasons why the United States is implementing its policy of security engagement with China.

(1) Security dialogues and military exchanges are important during periods of international transition. These dialogues get at the heart of issues of greatest importance to the countries involved. . . . China's Pacific power and presence is still in a formative stage and outcomes can be influenced. This is why we choose to engage China, not contain it.

(2) U.S. allies and friends in the region support a policy of engagement. Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand have all pressed the United States to engage China on a broad range of issues, including security concerns.

(3) We are trying to promote transparency and mutual understanding. . . . In this post-Cold War environment, we want to promote transparency and build confidence in the Pacific—not arsenals.

(4) China holds the key to progress in a variety of regional trouble spots and, increasingly, in global security issues. . . . the PRC's support and cooperation is vital to our ability to establish effective international arms control and nonproliferation regimes.

(5) The military and security elite in China will play a critical role during a period of internal political transition. The military retains power and access in modern China and has a voice on issues of concern to us. Dialogue allows us to gain valuable insights into the evolving political system, and allows us a line of communication with this powerful entity.

(6) We must avoid and prevent military accidents and dangerous misperceptions. Our interests in the Asia-Pacific region mean that we will likely in the future operate in the same areas as Chinese forces.

(7) China must be encouraged to join and participate in regional and global security regimes and institutions . . . that support U.S. national security objectives. . . . As a global and Pacific power, we can facilitate the process of drawing China into those collective regimes and frameworks that enhance mutual understanding and confidence, and ultimately stability.
ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., p. 3.


20. Dumbaugh, p. 11.


24. Togo D. West and Gordon R. Sullivan, A Statement on the


27. Harding, p. 327.


29. The New Era in East Asia, passim.


34. Sutter, p.10.


38. General George H. Decker, Preface to Chapter II, Office


42. Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC, interview with author, November 28, 1995.


51. A group of these agencies known collectively as the U.S. Military China Working Group currently meets on an as-needed basis.

52. Ross, p. 257.


57. Ibid., pp. 2-3.