Special Analysis

CHINA-INDIA: Beijing's Border Brinkmanship

China may be preparing for limited military action against India and is privately warning third parties that fighting is likely to erupt late next month along the border near Bhutan. China's saber-rattling will probably fail to intimidate New Delhi, and the Indians give no indication that they will be pressed into returning to negotiations on China's terms. The Chinese may engage Indian forces in a limited action and call for a new round of border talks in hopes that the specter of a wider conflict will induce New Delhi into accepting China's longstanding proposal to swap territorial concessions along the border. New Delhi is likely to respond militarily to any provocation.

Beijing probably expects the Indians to take note of its combat preparations as an indication of China's determination to back up its border claims with military force. China may also be seeking to warn New Delhi through third parties; last month, China would be unlikely to attack the locally superior Indian forces before moving at least 20,000 additional troops to Tibet, and there is no firm evidence that such a move is under way. China's ability to reinforce and resupply its troops in Tibet depends almost entirely on the 750-mile (1,200-kilometer) highway connecting Lhasa with the railhead at Golmud.
Prospects for Clashes Before Summer

If New Delhi shows no sign of modifying its position on the border dispute over the next month, Beijing may move to escalate tensions by provoking a minor military confrontation vis-a-vis Indian border posts. The Chinese would probably allege Indian provocations against their frontier guards and local inhabitants. Beijing would exploit such incidents to press for renewed border talks on more favorable terms.

New Delhi has always balked at Beijing's proposal that India renounce its claim to the strategic Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin area in the west in return for a renunciation by China of its territorial claims in the east. Beijing's current concentration on the east is probably intended to counter apparent Indian military and political efforts to deny this bargaining chip to the Chinese.

Gandhi has little room to maneuver should the Chinese attack. Remembering its loss to China in 1962, New Delhi is certain to retaliate if provoked by Beijing in a new incident—staged or inadvertent. Gandhi has been frustrated with his inability to resolve foreign policy issues; during the recent war scare with Pakistan, he turned to the military before seeking to reduce tensions through diplomacy.