SPECIAL ESTIMATE

PROBABLE EFFECTS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF ARMING THE JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE AS FOUR FULLY EQUIPPED DIVISIONS

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Number 2

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper is based on information available on 19 February 1951.
PROBABLE EFFECTS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF ARMING THE JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE AS FOUR FULLY EQUIPPED DIVISIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Sino-Soviet Reactions

1. Responsible officials of the USSR have declared in public statements and in speeches to the UN and to the Allied Council for Japan, that they consider the rearmament of Japan as intolerable. The Chinese Communists have taken the same line. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda has asserted that the "revival of militarism" in Japan "would present a serious threat to the cause of peace in the Far East." (Soviet-Communist pronouncements on Japanese rearmament, together with Soviet-Chinese allegations on the status of Japanese rearmament, are summarized in Enclosure A.)

2. Moscow has charged and Peiping has echoed the charge that the rearmament of Japan is already taking place, but thus far the reaction of Moscow and Peiping has been limited to propaganda and verbal protests. We believe that they would not resort to direct military action merely to prevent the conversion of the Japanese National Police Reserve into fully-equipped divisions.

3. Whether or not a limited rearmament of Japan takes place, it must be anticipated that the USSR and Communist China will certainly continue their campaign of propaganda and intimidation...
against Japanese rearmament. The equipping of even a few Japanese divisions would be seized upon to intensify such a campaign. Even though Moscow will probably not expect that such efforts would prevent Japanese rearmament, it might hope thereby to strengthen its position with respect to China, exploit Far Eastern fears of renewed Japanese militarism, and, in general, undermine the position of the US by increasing the fear of war among non-Communist countries. While it would be difficult to conceal the conversion of the National Police Reserve, there would be an advantage to the US in not publicizing the operation and in continuing to characterize the force as the National Police Reserve.

4. Should the USSR decide to invade Japan, even a partial rearmament of Japan would of course provide a convenient pretext to justify such aggression. The Soviet decision to attack Japan, however, would not be made on the basis of the creation of four Japanese divisions.

Effect on Soviet Capabilities

5. The Soviet capability to mount an invasion of Japan has been examined in "Estimate of Soviet Probable Intentions Toward Japan," dated 10 February 1951 (see Enclosure B). The creation of four fully-equipped, combat-efficient, and tactically-disposed Japanese divisions would limit but could not in itself effectively reduce Soviet capabilities to invade Japan. However, the existence of such a Japanese force, supplemented by available US forces, would make a Soviet invasion of Japan a major military operation.
ENCLOSURE A

19 February 1951

I. SOVIET-COMMUNIST PRONOUNCEMENTS ON JAPANESE REARMAMENT.

Responsible officials of the USSR have declared in public statements and in speeches to the UN and to the Allied Council for Japan, that they consider the rearmament of Japan as intolerable. The Chinese Communists have taken the same line. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda has asserted that the "revival of militarism" in Japan "would present a serious threat to the cause of peace in the Far East."

The Sino-Soviet Mutual Aid Pact of 14 February 1950, as published by USSR, contains the following provisions regarding Japan:

The preamble notes that the signatories were "filled with determination jointly to prevent, by the consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Peoples Republic of China, the rebirth of Japanese imperialism and a repetition of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite in any form with Japan in acts of aggression."

Article 1 stipulates: "Both High Contracting Parties undertake jointly to take all necessary measures at their disposal for the purpose of preventing a repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which should unite with Japan, directly or indirectly in acts of aggression.

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In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all means at its disposal."

Article 2 stipulates that both will strive for a peace treaty jointly with other powers allied in World War II.

A Pravda editorial on the occasion of the signing of the treaty asserted that it was hardly necessary to prove how "topical" the agreement was "at a time when American imperialism was doing all in its power to turn Japan into its strategic place d'armes directed against the USSR and against the Peoples Democratic China."

Since this article, Moscow avoided linking developments in Japan with the treaty until 3 September 1950. At that time a Pravda editorial once more juxtaposed the two when it castigated US plans to rearm Japan and alleged intentions to use Japanese in Korea and followed this castigation with direct quotations of the articles of the treaty as cited above.

On 28 January 1951, the linking of Japanese events and the Sino-Soviet pact became explicit and direct as the Peiping Peoples Daily wrote:

"The Chinese people certainly cannot tolerate the rearming of that country Japan by the Americans. One of the primary objectives of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance is the prevention of Japanese armed aggression. If America arbitrarily carries out its plot to rearm Japan, the powerful peoples of China, the Soviet Union,
and other Asian countries certainly cannot ignore it and a tense situation would ensue in the East. In such a case, the Japanese people would be the first victim.”

Moscow rebroadcast this editorial on the following day.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the Sino-Soviet pact (14 February 1951), commentaries from Moscow and Peiping gave particular emphasis to the charge that the US was planning to rebuild Japan for aggressive purposes, a development over which both were concerned under terms of their pact. After noting that the treaty was directed against the threat of aggression in the Far East, Pravda declared:

“‘There is no necessity to try to prove that the revival of militarism in Japan and the creation of a center of imperialist aggression in Japan would present a serious threat to the cause of peace in the Far East. Meanwhile it is well known that the American imperialists are trying to achieve just this. They are reviving the Japanese Army and Japanese war industry, supporting Japanese revanchists, and are preparing a separate plot with Japanese reaction in an effort to sabotage the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty on a multilateral basis. The Soviet-Chinese Treaty is a counterweight to these unlawful activities of the US ruling circles.’”

Radio Peiping on 16 February cited a Chinese Communist article which declared that “the peoples of China, the Soviet Union, and other peoples in the East will never allow the United States to rearm Japan and undermine the peace of the Far East.”
Another Peiping broadcast reminded the "imperialists," that the Sino-Soviet treaty "unites the might of 700 million people to fight against any attempt to do just what the US imperialists are plotting to do in Japan. And this great force is supported by the ever-increasing strength of the peace camp of the world, determined to prevent the resurgence of Japanese aggressive forces and the plunging of their lands into a new holocaust of war."

In addition to their propaganda, Moscow and Peiping have made several other moves in an attempt to show the allegedly rising danger of the rebirth under US aegis of a militaristic Japan.

a. Opposition to Japanese remilitarization has been made one of the main responsibilities of the whole world Communist movement. The World Peace Council scheduled to meet in Berlin from 21 to 24 February has made Japanese (together with German) rearmament one of the two main subjects of the agenda. Izvestiya declared in an editorial on 11 February that the "World Peace Council is intensifying the mobilization of the peoples against remilitarization of Western Germany and Japan, a struggle which is at the present time the main task of all Peace Partisans."

b. An obviously officially-inspired protest movement in Communist China against Japanese rearmament and a separate treaty is growing throughout the country. This movement is steadily being woven into the "oppose America, aid Korea" campaign and is assuming considerable proportions. In Japan the Communists are trying to generate a similar movement.
II. SOVIET-CHINESE ALLEGATIONS ON THE STATUS OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT:

Moscow and Peiping have repeatedly contended that Japanese rearmament is actually already under way:

a. Since as early as 1946, Soviet representatives in the Allied Council for Japan and in the Far Eastern Commission have charged that far from carrying out a demilitarization program, American occupation authorities were taking steps to rearm Japan.

b. In November 1950, Chinese Communist representative Wu Hsiu-chuan told the UN that the US "has not only turned Japan into its main Far Eastern base in preparation for aggressive war but it has already begun to use this base as a means of launching aggressive war against a series of Asiatic countries. The headquarters of the US aggression against Korea and Taiwan is in Japan." Furthermore, Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda has for several months asserted that Japanese troops are engaged in fighting in Korea.

c. The Soviet delegate to the Allied Council for Japan on 14 February issued a long statement denouncing US rearming of Japan, charging that a "regular army" is already being established and that US authorities "are not limiting themselves to rebuilding the industrial war potential of Japan but are beginning to use it." He cited numerous specific details in support of his contention. On 17 February, a Tass dispatch from Shanghai devoted over half a column to listing Japanese firms working on US orders for the Korean war. On 16 February, with the obvious intent of adding to the weight of his charge of US alliance with Japanese "aggressive" elements, Moscow made public a new note to the US again protesting the release of former Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.
d. Soviet propaganda has vehemently attacked John Foster Dulles' mission to Japan as proof that the US is proceeding further with its "plot" to sign a separate treaty with Japan as well as a military pact designed to prolong US occupation, make available Japanese "cannon fodder," and bases "for expanding the American aggression in Asia."
ENVELOPE B

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET PROBABLE INTENTIONS TOWARD JAPAN

10 February 1951

PROBLEM

To estimate whether the USSR will attack Japan before mid-April 1951.

CONCLUSION

1. There are no positive indications that the USSR intends to attack Japan by mid-April 1951, but it has the capability of doing so and could launch such an attack without any appreciable warning.

DISCUSSION

2. The Soviet Union, directly or indirectly, now controls the mainland of Asia from Siberia to Indochina, with the exception of southern Korea. The USSR also controls the northern portion of the island chain off the eastern shore of Asia, comprised of Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

3. The USSR has the capability of conducting a major amphibious airborne offensive against Japan; simultaneously assaulting Hokkaido and northern Honshu; or of invading Hokkaido first, to be followed by an invasion of Honshu. This operation can receive adequate air support and relatively strong naval support, primarily by submarines.

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TOP SECRET
4. Soviet troop concentrations in the Far East have been maintained as follows:

9 line divisions, including the equivalent of 1 airborne division in the Vladivostok area.

4 line divisions in the Port Arthur-Dairen area.

3 line divisions in Sakhalin.

2 line divisions in the Kurile Islands.

1 line division in the Kamchatka and Chukotak peninsulas.

There are 16 additional Soviet divisions in other areas of the Far East.

5. Soviet air forces in the Far East total an estimated 5,300 aircraft of all types, including sufficient airlift for 9,500 men for a distance of about 400 miles.

6. Soviet Far Eastern Naval forces are divided into two fleets—the 7th Fleet based at Sovetskaya Gavan and the 5th Fleet based at Vladivostok. The total fleets consist of 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 34 destroyer types, 81 submarines, and a number of minor craft.

7. The Soviet Far East merchant fleet aggregates a total of over a million gross registered tons, including 235 fighter-type, 21 combination fighter-passenger type, and 79 amphibious craft, all of which are considered suitable for amphibious operations and capable of lifting 10 combat divisions.
8. Both the USSR and Communist China have clearly expressed their concern over the possible remilitarization of Japan.

   a. They have steadily intensified their propaganda campaign against alleged US plans to remilitarize Japan and to secure bases there by means of a separate peace treaty. At the end of January, Radio Moscow, repeating a Chinese Communist press editorial, made the first specific statement that the Chinese people "cannot tolerate" the remilitarization of Japan, asserted that the peoples of China and the Soviet Union "cannot ignore" it, and warned that if the US armed Japan "a tense situation would ensue in the Far East." The broadcast, in an unusual mention of the Sino-Soviet alliance, explicitly stated that "one of the primary objectives" of the treaty "is the prevention of Japanese armed aggression."

   b. The Soviet Union has officially served notice that it wants the Allied Council for Japan at its 14 February meeting to discuss the subject of "demilitarization of Japan."

   c. The Communist-controlled World Peace Council has announced that it will discuss the remilitarization of Japan and Germany at a meeting in Berlin during 21-24 February.

9. Recent indications of possible Soviet intentions are:

   a. Increased traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

   b. Increased stockpiling in the Far East.

   c. Indications of some build-up of Soviet air strength in the Kuriles area and the presence of sizable air forces on Sakhalin.
d. Reports of the arrival of 12 additional Soviet divisions and 500 unspecified aircraft in Sakhalin have been received, but these reports are of questionable validity.

e. Reports that 6 divisions composed of former Japanese POW's have been moved to Sakhalin. However, little credence is given to these reports.