NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM:
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE

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INSS Occasional Paper 3
March 1995

USAF Institute for National Security Studies
US Air Force Academy, Colorado
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This paper is the result of research sponsored by the USAF Institute for National Security Studies during the summer and fall of 1994.

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this third volume in the Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). This monograph represents the results of research conducted during the summer and fall of 1994 under the sponsorship of a grant from INSS.

INSS is co-sponsored by the National Security Negotiations Division, Plans and Operations Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (USAF/XOXI) and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air Force Academy. The primary purpose of the Institute is to promote research done within the DOD community in the fields of arms control, national security, regional studies, the revolution in military affairs, and information warfare. INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines and across services to develop new ideas for USAF policy making. The Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. We also host conferences and workshops which facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. INSS is in its third year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of the Air Staff and our other sponsors.

This paper highlights a potential source of unrest and instability in Northeast Asia. It addresses the suspected North Korean nuclear weapons program and the policies that the Bush and Clinton administrations employed to meet this perceived threat. In particular, the paper focuses on the counterproliferation
policy efforts of the Clinton administration over the past two years, leading to the arguable success of the October 1994 US-North Korean agreements. Col Berry then analyzes the counterproliferation policy and draws conclusions as to whether it can serve as a model for similar efforts to stem proliferators in other regions of the world.

The problem, of course, is similar to the Cold War axiom that no one knew whether deterrence really worked. In the case of a potential nuclear proliferant, no one can be certain of that state’s motivations for either pursuing weapons of mass destruction, or for giving them up. In North Korea’s case, as Col Berry points out, if North Korea has tied its regime survival to a nuclear weapons program, it is much less likely to follow through with agreements to stop regardless of the incentives or disincentives provided by the US or the United Nations. On the other hand, if the Clinton policies work in the North Korean case, they are likely to work elsewhere, given the nature of the North Korean regime and its reputation as a hard test case for the new counterproliferation policy.

We appreciate your interest in INSS and its research products. We hope we are meeting a need for this type of analysis and reflection, and we look forward to publishing these papers on a regular basis.

JEFFREY A. LARSEN, Lt Colonel, USAF
Director, Institute for National Security Studies
The very real possibility of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula threatens American national security interests in Northeast Asia and poses a challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. The suspected North Korean nuclear weapons program is the primary cause of concern. Although a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Safeguards Agreement, North Korea's overt and covert behavior over the past several years has raised serious questions about its true intentions.

The Clinton administration has responded to this challenge through a series of incentives and threats, the classic carrot and stick approach, in an effort to influence North Korean behavior. In particular, the United States has attempted to persuade North Korea's political leaders to abandon any nuclear weapons program. This research project addresses the most important developments from late 1991 to the present, with particular emphasis on President Clinton's counterproliferation policy and the October 1994 bilateral agreement between the U.S. and North Korea. The perspectives of both Koreas, Japan, China, and Russia are also presented.

The final section provides some constructive criticisms of the Clinton policy and its implementation, and evaluates whether the President's non-proliferation efforts directed at the Korean peninsula can serve as an effective model for possible proliferation elsewhere. According to the author, if the difficult Korean case can be solved, so can most other regional proliferation problems.
NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: 
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE

The very real probability that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is developing a nuclear weapons program has been and remains a major foreign policy and national security issue for both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in a visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in late 1991, stated that a North Korea with nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems was “the most serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and indeed in East Asia.” William Perry, Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration, echoed similar sentiments in a speech before the Asia Society in May 1994. In this speech, Secretary Perry indicated that the United States and its South Korean ally must take North Korea’s large conventional forces, its nuclear weapons program, and its harsh rhetoric seriously and plan accordingly.

The primary purpose of this paper is to address the suspected DPRK nuclear weapons program and the policies the Bush and Clinton administrations have employed to confront this perceived threat. The Clinton administration's counterproliferation policy efforts are a particular focus up to the time of the death of North Korean President Kim Il Sung in July 1994. In the final section, I draw some conclusions as to whether the Clinton policy should serve as a model for efforts to address other potential nuclear proliferators in the international political system.
North Korea is one of the most closed and isolated countries in the world. The secretiveness of this nation-state makes an analysis of any of its policies difficult, but some specifics concerning its nuclear weapons program are well established. North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974 and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, allegedly under pressure from the Soviet Union and in exchange for the continuation of Soviet assistance to its nuclear power program. However, after becoming an NPT signatory, the DPRK refused to sign the IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement which it was obligated to do within 18 months under the provisions of the NPT. South Korea is also an IAEA member and a signatory of the NPT. Since 1975, all South Korean nuclear reactors and other related facilities have been subject to IAEA inspections.

Although there were some administrative problems which contributed to the North Korean delay in signing the IAEA safeguards agreement (the IAEA sent the wrong forms), the more substantive reasons involved North Korea's concerns that these safeguards would adversely affect DPRK national security. North Korean officials established three preconditions which needed to be satisfied before their country would sign. First, the U.S. must remove its nuclear weapons which North Korea believed were located in South Korea. Second, the U.S.-ROK annual military exercise named Team Spirit and conducted in South Korea must be terminated. The North Koreans have consistently referred to this exercise as well as other U.S.-ROK combined training as “nuclear
war games.” Third, North Korea wanted to reserve the right to abrogate the safeguards agreement if it perceived that the nuclear powers were acting in a hostile or suspicious manner toward the DPRK.  

Concern over the North Korean refusal to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities increased in 1989 when U.S. intelligence reports indicated the DPRK was building what appeared to be additional reactors and possibly a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at its Yongbyon site, approximately 60 miles north of Pyongyang. These facilities supplemented the 5 megawatt (MW) reactor which the DPRK began constructing in 1980. This reactor uses natural uranium for fuel—which is readily available in North Korea—and is believed to have become operational in 1986. Work on the two additional reactors began in the mid 1980s. One of these is thought to be a 50 MW model which is also uranium fueled and capable of producing plutonium, as is the 5 MW reactor. Another 200 MW reactor is under construction at Taech'on, and both of these larger reactors are projected for completion in the mid to late 1990s. U.S. estimates are that by the end of the 1980s, North Korea had developed the capability to produce enough plutonium from its 5 MW reactor to construct one Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon each year.  

At the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991, U.S. and other countries' concerns over the DPRK's nuclear weapons capabilities increased because Iraq's program turned out to be far more advanced than U.S. intelligence had detected before the war. One expert argued that the North Korean program was more dangerous
than Iraq's because North Korea was more autarkic and not as dependent on outside assistance.\textsuperscript{8} A North Korean diplomat who defected to the ROK in 1991 informed officials in Seoul that the DPRK had no intention of signing the IAEA safeguards agreement, and was only using the offer to sign as a ploy to gain more time to develop its nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{9} As a result of Iraq's success in fooling U.S. intelligence and the defector's allegations, a series of initiatives began in 1991 which addressed North Korea as well as U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK.

The United States has consistently refused to confirm or deny the presence of its nuclear weapons in foreign countries. However, in September 1991, President Bush announced that the U.S. would withdraw all of its short-range nuclear weapons from abroad and return them to the United States either for destruction or storage. He subsequently extended this policy to include nuclear bombs.\textsuperscript{10} Bush was influenced by other negotiations ongoing with the Soviet Union and additional initiatives underway in Asia, but his announcement had a definite effect on the Korean peninsula. As indicated previously, the North Koreans had justified their refusal to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement in part on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the ROK. That justification was no longer applicable.\textsuperscript{11}

South Korea's President Roh Tae Woo decided to press ahead with his own diplomatic efforts directly with North Korean authorities on nuclear issues in conjunction with talks which were also underway on a non-aggression pact and peace treaty. In late November 1991, South Korean officials announced that the U.S. had begun withdrawing its nuclear weapons, and Roh followed this
in mid-December with a statement that all U.S. nuclear weapons
were out of his country. Roh's announcement allowed the U.S. to
maintain its neither confirm nor deny policy. In a televised speech
in November 1991, Roh also announced that South Korea would
not manufacture, possess, deploy, or use nuclear weapons nor
would it build nuclear fuel reprocessing plants to extract
plutonium.

On New Year's Eve 1991 the two Koreas signed an
agreement entitled the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. This agreement, which required the
ratification of the legislatures of both countries, committed the
signatories not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess,
store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.” Also included was the
pledge that neither country would “possess nuclear reprocessing
and uranium enrichment facilities,” and they agreed that in order to
verify compliance each country would “conduct inspections of the
objects selected by the other side and agreed upon by two sides.”
In order to implement this agreement, both Koreas established a
South-North Nuclear Control Commission. In another major
announcement at the same time, the ROK and U.S. stated that the
Team Spirit exercise was canceled for 1992 because of the
progress made on resolving the nuclear issue.

In January 1992 North Korea signed an agreement with
the IAEA that provided for international inspections of its nuclear
facilities after ratification of this agreement by its legislature.
Although there were several delays in this ratification process, the
DPRK did ratify this agreement in April 1992. In accordance
with IAEA regulations, North Korea was required to submit to
outside inspections within 90 days of ratification. During May
1992, North Korea provided the IAEA with detailed information about its seven nuclear power facilities, including those at Yongbyon. Although continuing to deny any nuclear weapons capabilities or intent, this cleared the way for international inspections. Between May 1992 and July 1993, the IAEA conducted seven *ad hoc* inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Each of these inspections lasted between one and two weeks.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite progress on IAEA inspections, the two Koreas were unsuccessful in their efforts to implement the bilateral denuclearization agreement. The DPRK continually rejected the ROK’s calls for mutual inspections which would include “challenge inspections.” Under this proposal, each side would determine which sites in the other country were to be inspected and would give only a short notice before conducting each inspection. North Korea objected to this inspection plan, and, once agreement was reached with the IAEA on inspections, North Korea informed the ROK that this IAEA agreement resolved all inspection issues.\textsuperscript{18}

After the first IAEA *ad hoc* inspection in May 1992, Hans Blix, the IAEA Director General, held a press conference. He related that North Korean officials had allowed him and the other inspectors to visit all of the sites they had requested, including the operational 5 MW reactor and the 50 MW and 200 MW reactors under construction. Of perhaps even more significance, they had access to a facility which the U.S. believed was a nuclear reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, but which the North Koreans referred to as a “radiochemical laboratory.” The North Koreans admitted to Blix that they had built this laboratory to experiment
with plutonium extraction in the event they ever desired to build a breeder reactor, which uses plutonium as fuel. Additionally, these North Korean officials confirmed they had in fact extracted some plutonium, but claimed this extraction only amounted to a few grams.\textsuperscript{19}

During some of the subsequent IAEA inspections between May-November 1992, IAEA suspicions increased because of some apparent discrepancies discovered concerning the amount of plutonium the North Koreans admitted to extracting. These discrepancies involved North Korean claims that the plutonium extraction only occurred on one occasion, and the IAEA's opinion that fuel had been reprocessed up to three separate times. If true, this observation could mean that North Korea had stored more weapons-grade plutonium than the few grams they admitted.\textsuperscript{20} In late 1992, IAEA inspectors requested they be given access to two additional sites which the agency suspected of being storage sites for nuclear waste. DPRK officials denied these two facilities were waste sites and claimed instead that they were military warehouses and, therefore, not subject to IAEA inspection. By the end of 1992, North Korea had also broken off discussions with South Korea concerning bilateral inspections under the terms of the denuclearization agreement.\textsuperscript{21}

As the transition from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration took place in January 1993, progress had been made in clarifying some of the issues concerning nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. However, problems had developed between the IAEA and the DPRK on nuclear inspections, and the talks between the two Koreas on the
The Clinton Administration and the Counterproliferation Policy

Relations between the IAEA and North Korea continued to deteriorate during the first few months of the Clinton administration. In early February 1993 the IAEA requested permission to conduct “special inspections” of two sites at Yongbyon which inspectors believed were nuclear waste storage sites. North Korea refused this request based on its assertion that these two buildings were military warehouses and were not associated with its nuclear energy program in any way. An impasse developed between the IAEA and the DPRK in February with the North Koreans repeating more frequently that the IAEA was simply a U.S. tool, and, as such, was attempting to place increased pressure on their country.23
In mid March, the UN Security Council voted 13-0 to adopt a resolution calling on the DPRK to allow IAEA inspectors access to the two suspected nuclear waste sites. China and Pakistan abstained. North Korea responded that such inspections of military facilities would be “an interference in the internal affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereignty.” When the IAEA, now backed by the Security Council, continued to press for these special inspections, North Korea announced on 14 March 1993 that it intended to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the conclusion of the 90-day notification period as required by the NPT. This was the first instance in the history of the NPT when a signatory country officially announced its decision to withdraw.

Several nuclear weapons experts at the time speculated that the DPRK decision was mainly predicated on its shock at the sophistication of IAEA inspections and the belief that access to the additional sites would reveal more conclusively that North Korea was developing a nuclear weapons program. Others thought that this decision may have been more related to domestic politics in North Korea, and that Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il Sung, was using the withdrawal threat to demonstrate his toughness to his own military and to indicate that he would be a worthy successor to his father.

Whatever the motivations for deciding to withdraw from the NPT, the Clinton administration took this threat very seriously—both because of the increased threat to U.S. national security interests in Northeast Asia, and because of the long-term implications a North Korean withdrawal from the NPT would have on the international non-proliferation regime. Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin stated in an interview at the time that the U.S. would “go on a full court press to see if we can't get the North Koreans to change their policy.” Compounding the difficulties for the administration was the fact that there was no consensus on whether the DPRK already had enough plutonium to build a bomb. For example, former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger testified before a congressional committee that he believed North Korea already had at least one nuclear weapon. However, R. James Woolsey, the new CIA Director, expressed the opinion that the DPRK had enough plutonium to build a bomb, but had not yet done so.

International diplomacy continued in May 1993 when the UN Security Council considered a resolution once again calling on North Korea to allow IAEA inspections and not to withdraw from the NPT. This resolution passed once again by a 13-0 vote with China and Pakistan again abstaining. North Korea responded in late May by listing five conditions which must be met if it were to remain in the NPT. First, the U.S. and ROK must agree to cancel future Team Spirit military exercises. This demand had taken on increased salience from the DPRK's perspective because the two allies had resumed this exercise earlier in 1993 after canceling it in 1992. They reached this decision based on the belief that resumption of Team Spirit would pressure the North Koreans to reopen negotiations with the ROK on denuclearization issues. Second, the ROK must allow inspections of its military facilities and those of the U.S. in South Korea. Third, the United States must guarantee not to launch a nuclear attack on North Korea. Fourth,
the U.S. must remove its nuclear umbrella from the ROK. Fifth, the U.S. must recognize the socialist system in North Korea.

**U.S.-North Korean Talks Begin**

In late May 1993, the U.S. and DPRK agreed to hold high-level talks in an effort to resolve some of the outstanding issues. The 90-day notification period was due to expire on 12 June, so this deadline provided a sense of urgency for this series of meetings. Kang Sok Chu, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, led the North Korean delegation, and Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, represented the U.S. Newspaper accounts at the time indicated that the U.S. would press North Korea to remain in the NPT and adhere to IAEA inspection requests and to resume its discussions with the South Koreans concerning denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In return, the United States was willing to discuss a variety of political and economic incentives, to include the possible termination of Team Spirit.³²

Negotiators from the two sides met in New York at the United Nations between 2-11 June and in Geneva between 14-19 July 1993. In the joint statement at the conclusion of the first of these negotiations, the U.S. and North Korea agreed to some rather broad and potentially ambiguous principles.³³ Both expressed support for the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and other non-proliferation goals and agreed to give “assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.” Further, both agreed to support “peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial
application of full scope safeguards, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.” Finally, both agreed to “support the peaceful reunification of Korea.” In the final section of this statement, North Korea “decided unilaterally to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

After the discussions concluded in Geneva during July, the negotiators released another statement. They reaffirmed the principles agreed to during the June meetings in New York, and the U.S. “specifically reaffirmed its commitment to the principles of assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons.” In another significant agreement, North Korea and the U.S. recognized the importance of the DPRK’s intention to replace its aging graphite moderated reactors with light water moderated reactors (LWRs). The U.S. stated it was ready to support the DPRK’s efforts to obtain LWRs. The DPRK agreed to begin consultations with the IAEA on safeguard inspection issues as soon as possible and to meet with ROK representatives “on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue.”

In a separate statement released concurrently, Robert Gallucci made some interesting observations concerning the negotiations to that point. He indicated that some progress had been made convincing the North Koreans to continue discussions with both the IAEA and ROK on nuclear issues. Gallucci also noted that the U.S. motivation for offering some support to North Korea on LWRs was based on the fact that LWRs “are less suitable for nuclear weapons material production” than the graphite
reactors. However, he cautioned that the United States would not support the acquisition of the more modern reactors until North Korea fully complied with IAEA safeguards and entered into discussions with the ROK.

Although the bilateral negotiations in June and July 1993 were important in that North Korea agreed to “suspend” its withdrawal from the NPT, the references to mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs provided the DPRK with a degree of ambiguity which its negotiators would use effectively in subsequent discussions with the U.S. and others. During the first few months of the Clinton administration, the U.S. had primarily been reacting to events initiated by the IAEA and North Korea. However, in July 1993 President Clinton visited South Korea and made a number of statements and speeches designed to clarify the new administration's policy involving the Korean peninsula.

Even prior to his arrival in Korea, both President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were quoted as taking a harder line on the possibility that North Korea either already had or was developing nuclear weapons. The President described the DPRK as the “scariest” place on earth, and when asked specifically about possible nuclear weapons capability in the DPRK, he replied “that is not something we can afford to let happen.” In explaining further why he described North Korea as the “scariest” place on earth, he stated that the Korean peninsula was one of the few places where Cold War confrontations remained, and that the DPRK had a long track record of unpredictable behavior.
Speaking before the South Korean National Assembly on 10 July 1993, President Clinton outlined his “new Pacific community” concept. The second priority for the development of this community involved “stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” In providing more details in reference to the Korean peninsula, President Clinton warned that North Korea appeared committed to developing Scud missiles and related technology. He also expressed concern that the North Koreans would sell these missiles to countries in the Middle East. Concerning nuclear weapons, he urged the DPRK to reaffirm its commitment to the NPT and “to fulfill its full-scope safeguards obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency, including IAEA inspections of undeclared nuclear sites, and to implement bilateral inspections under the South-North Nuclear Accord.”

The President then traveled to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the 38th parallel where he made even more specific comments regarding North Korea. Speaking before U.S. military forces forward deployed, President Clinton stated that if North Korea developed and used nuclear weapons, “we would quickly and overwhelmingly retaliate. It would mean the end of their country as they know it.” The DPRK immediately responded by referring to the President's statement at the DMZ as a “rash act” and warned him against taking any provocative measures.

The administration developed its official counterproliferation strategy in 1993 and published it in the “Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress” in January 1994. This report indicated that deterrence in the post Cold War era may be more difficult and dangerous
because during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the primary threat, and the superpower relationship was well established and understood. However, at present, countries possessing or hoping to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have different strategies and motives. To insure continued deterrence, this report called for both preventive and protective measures to guard against WMD proliferation. The preventive tools include dissuasion, denial, arms control, and international pressure. Protective tools include defusing, deterrence, offense, and defense.

Each of these tools requires more explanation in order to evaluate which of them the Clinton administration has employed in the case of North Korea and the effectiveness of these efforts. Dissuasion attempts to convince a potential proliferator that the economic and political costs of developing nuclear weapons and other WMD are too high. Positive and negative security assurances can be used in the effort to make this argument. Denial includes export controls, interdiction, and similar efforts to restrict access to nuclear weapons and related technologies. Arms control certainly includes support for the NPT and other international regimes as well as inspections and monitoring of nuclear programs. International pressure includes sanctions as well as attempts to isolate proliferators. On the protective side, defusing refers to cooperative disarmament efforts plus confidence building measures. Deterrence involves bringing military, political, and economic pressures to bear to convince the proliferator that the costs of using WMD are too high. Offense provides the means of protecting U.S. forces and those of allies by seizing, disabling, or
destroying nuclear weapons and other WMD. Defense includes both active and passive measures to mitigate the effects of nuclear weapons.

The Implementation of the Counterproliferation Strategy in Korea

After the Clinton visit to South Korea in July 1993 and the two high-level talks that summer, direct negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK were limited to relatively low-level discussions at the UN. These talks attempted to find common ground to improve relations, but perhaps more important, the American negotiators attempted to break the impasse between North Korea and the IAEA. This task was becoming more urgent because the film, batteries, and other equipment the IAEA had installed at DPRK nuclear facilities would expire before the end of the year. If not replaced, the IAEA would not be able to guarantee the continuity of its safeguard inspection procedures.

In early November 1993, Hans Blix, the IAEA Director-General, delivered a report to the UN which explicitly stated that if the IAEA inspectors were not permitted to revisit the North Korean nuclear facilities, the agency could no longer verify the implementation of the nuclear safeguards accord. The General Assembly then agreed to discuss the IAEA-DPRK dispute. At the conclusion of these discussions, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on North Korea “to cooperate immediately with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.” The vote was 140 in support of the
resolution with only the DPRK voting against. China and eight other countries abstained.42

Despite this General Assembly resolution, there was no progress in the IAEA-DPRK impasse over inspections even though North Korea had agreed to hold consultations with the IAEA and ROK in the June and July joint statements. In addition, the negotiations between the two Koreas concerning the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula had been unsuccessful and were not even being held by the end of 1993.

Based at least in part on the failure of these negotiations, the U.S. decided to modify its diplomatic approach to the DPRK late in the year. The senior U.S. negotiator, Bob Gallucci, described this new tactic as “the broad and thorough approach” in an interview during May 1994 and indicated it was conceived in the September-October time period in 1993.43 According to Gallucci, the U.S. wanted to tie North Korean behavior to specific U.S. incentives which could include beginning the diplomatic recognition process, more normal economic relations, and assistance with the LWRs. In return, the DPRK not only would have to comply with all NPT and IAEA requirements to resolve the nuclear weapons issue, but also would have to redeploy its forces away from the 38th parallel and to cease its weapons sales, particularly those to the Middle East, among other demands. If these “carrots” did not work, then Gallucci indicated the U.S. would move ahead with efforts to have the UN adopt economic sanctions, although he cautioned there were dangers involved with this particular “stick.” The U.S. also hoped that if it did offer a comprehensive deal to North Korea, the Chinese would see this
offer as a reasonable effort to resolve this dispute and not veto a 
subsequent sanction resolution in the Security Council if it ever 
came to sanctions.44

In December 1993, the DPRK offered to allow IAEA 
inspectors access to five of its seven declared nuclear facilities to 
change the film and batteries in the cameras monitoring North 
Korean activities at these locations. However, the Korean 
authorities would not allow the inspectors to visit the nuclear 
reactor at Yongbyon or the suspected nuclear reprocessing plant 
there. This proposal was unacceptable to the IAEA which was still 
embarrassed by its failure to detect the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program prior to the Gulf War. In addition, the IAEA refused to 
accept the premise that an NPT signatory country could determine 
the scope of IAEA inspections at any of that country's officially 
declared nuclear facilities.45

According to The New York Times, the need for further 
meetings received an additional impetus in late December when 
American intelligence sources notified President Clinton that 
North Korea probably had developed one or two nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, there reportedly was a “better than even” chance that 
the DPRK could have extracted as much as 26 pounds of 
plutonium from the spent fuel rods it collected from its Yongbyon 
reactor when it was shut down in 1989. Under optimum conditions, 
this amount of plutonium would be enough for two bombs.46 These 
reported findings put additional pressure on the administration to 
resolve the issue of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program 
expeditiously.
Early in January 1994, diplomatic contacts did increase, and the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced IAEA inspectors would be allowed to visit all seven declared nuclear facilities, but only on a one-time basis. This announcement also indicated that the two suspected waste storage sites would remain off limits to the IAEA. North Korea justified its decision to allow only a one-time inspection based on the fact that it had only suspended its withdrawal from the NPT in June 1993.47 Therefore, it was not bound by the specific inspection requirements of a normal NPT member.

Based on these North Korean assertions concerning only a one-time inspection agreement, the Clinton administration found itself on the defensive both in the U.S. and in South Korea. Lynn Davis, the Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs, stated that North Korea had agreed to carry out full inspections and denied any concessions which would have permitted anything less. President Clinton also got into the act. In response to the one-time inspection report, he responded that to “the best of our knowledge,” those reports were “not accurate.” Davis also indicated that no final decision had been made on whether or not to conduct Team Spirit 94, and the U.S. and ROK would hold this decision in abeyance until the results of the IAEA were known.48

The South Korean response, at least as reported by the media, was highly critical of any agreement which would limit the IAEA inspections in North Korea. These criticisms focused on the differing interpretation of exactly what was agreed to as well as the perception in the ROK that the U.S. was making unsatisfactory efforts to convince the North Koreans to renew the negotiations
between the two Koreas.\textsuperscript{49} Partially to assuage South Korean
concerns, but also to meet U.S. forces' defense requirements, the
United States announced in late January that the U.S. would deploy
additional Patriot missile batteries to the ROK as well as Apache
helicopters and advanced counter-artillery radar. The U.S. also
agreed to increase the intelligence assets it devoted to the Korean
peninsula as an additional indication of American resolve.\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{Inspections Begin, Differences Continue}

In mid February, the DPRK surprised many officials in
the U.S. and ROK by announcing it would permit IAEA
inspections of all seven of its declared nuclear facilities, and did
not limit these to one-time inspections. However, it still refused to
grant access to the two suspected waste sites. If these inspections
of the declared sites did occur, this would allow the IAEA to
maintain the continuity of safeguards which was essential from the
agency's perspective.\textsuperscript{51} The South Korean Prime Minister also
welcomed the DPRK's inspection decision, but once again called
on the North Koreans to return to the North-South talks on the
denuclearization process.\textsuperscript{52} Just a few weeks later in early March,
the ROK Defense Minister announced that Team Spirit 94 was
being suspended provided that North Korea did in fact allow IAEA
inspectors access to all seven nuclear facilities.\textsuperscript{53} However, North
Korea still remained opposed to the resumption of North-South
negotiations. The First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs justified
this reluctance based on what he referred to as the need for
“simultaneous action” in the U.S.-DPRK talks. He criticized the
U.S. position that North-South talks should be a precondition for
direct, high-level U.S.-DPRK negotiations as violating the
principle of simultaneous action.54

IAEA inspections began in the second week of March, but
immediately ran into difficulties when DPRK officials prohibited
the inspectors from collecting samples at specific locations. What
set off this particular confrontation was the discovery that the seals
placed on the suspected reprocessing plant by the IAEA during the
previous inspection in August 1993 appeared to have been broken.
This suggested that North Korean technicians had entered the
reprocessing plant in the intervening months. The IAEA requested
access to the hot cell--a lead-lined room where plutonium is
handled by remote control in the final stages of processing into
weapons-grade material--but this request was refused.55

The North Koreans also refused the request to take swab
samples from what is referred to as the glove box. This is a
specially designed area in front of the hot cell in which remotely
controlled devices are used to handle the radioactive material.
These samples would have indicated if any quantity of spent
reactor fuel had been handled by the remotely controlled gloves
since the IAEA sealed the facility the previous August. The IAEA
inspectors also were unsuccessful in their efforts to convince the
DPRK to allow them to conduct gamma-ray scans of the
reprocessing plant. This “gamma mapping” would have
determined whether nuclear materials had passed through or been
present in the plant since the last inspection. Once again it
appeared that North Korea miscalculated the technological
sophistication of the IAEA inspections to determine whether or not the DPRK was developing a nuclear weapons capability.

The Clinton administration responded to this inspection impasse by canceling the high-level talks which were scheduled to begin on 21 March and began consultations with the ROK concerning setting a date for the Team Spirit exercise. The two sides had agreed previously to suspend this exercise pending the completion of the IAEA inspection. In addition, and, perhaps more significantly, the administration began to lay the groundwork for introducing an economic sanctions resolution in the Security Council. President Clinton also sent a letter to the ROK's President Kim Young Sam in which he stated that the U.S. would consider any North Korean attack on South Korea to be an attack on the United States. At the same time, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution which referred the nuclear dispute to the UN Security Council. The vote was 25 in favor of the resolution with Libya being the only country to vote against it. China and four others abstained. This resolution once again urged North Korea to allow the completion of IAEA inspections.

North Korean officials wasted no time in responding to what they perceived as aggressive acts on the part of the U.S., ROK, and IAEA. Concerning South Korea, the DPRK blamed the South for allowing the U.S. to deploy Patriot missiles and other advanced weapons there, supporting the rescheduling of Team Spirit, and discussing the possibility of economic sanctions. The charges against the U.S. included the alleged violation of the 25 February 1994 agreement between the two countries on the resumption of the IAEA inspections and diplomatic discussions.
These officials argued that the talks and inspections were to occur simultaneously, but now the U.S. insisted that the inspections be completed before the negotiations began. Concerning the recently released IAEA resolution, North Korea condemned this act as provocative and once again argued that since the DPRK had only suspended its withdrawal from the NPT, it was under no obligation to permit IAEA routine inspections but only those inspections which provided for the continuity of safeguards. Specifically referring to the glove box area, the spokesman stated that inspections of this location had “nothing to do with the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.”

The North Korean decision to cancel further discussions was important, not because these talks had been fruitful, but more so because this decision tended to isolate the ROK even further on the resolution of this critical issue. The North Koreans sent a clear signal that the nuclear issue was strictly between themselves and representatives of the United States. Seoul had no role to play according to this scenario.

After a series of behind-the-scenes negotiations at the UN, the Security Council decided in early April that the Council President would issue a statement requesting that North Korea allow the completion of the IAEA inspections. This represented a compromise between the U.S. and China in that the U.S. had desired a Security Council resolution making the same request, but China opposed the resolution as being too strong. In addition, the U.S. and South Korea decided to defer their decision on Team Spirit in the hope that this would persuade the North Koreans to allow the inspections and to resume negotiations. Later in April,
Secretary of Defense Perry announced that Team Spirit would not be held until at least November.62

South Korea also expressed a more conciliatory policy on the North-South talks when the Deputy Prime Minister stated that his country no longer insisted on the exchange of special envoys between the two Koreas as a condition for the resumption of high-level negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK. However, he did insist that North Korea abide by the provisions established in the denuclearization accord concluded in late 1991.63 By so doing, the South Koreans seemed willing to allow themselves to be even further isolated if this action contributed to IAEA inspections and the resumption of negotiations between the DPRK and the United States.

North Korean Actions Increase Tensions

Despite these conciliatory gestures, the DPRK shocked the international community in mid May 1994 when it announced that it had begun to remove an estimated 8,000 spent fuel rods from its 5 MW reactor in Yongbyon. Prior to this time, the IAEA had demanded its inspectors be present before the North removed any fuel rods. If North Korea did remove fuel rods without an IAEA presence, this would violate the NPT according to an IAEA spokesman.64 North Korea justified its decision to remove the fuel rods based on safety factors, and its representative repeated the argument that because of its “unique status” following its temporary suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT, there was no requirement for an IAEA presence other than the cameras which were operating.65
The IAEA did not accept this argument, however. Its spokesperson labeled the North Korean removal of spent fuel rods as a “serious violation” of the IAEA safeguards agreement. If the removal continued, the IAEA warned, “it would result in irreparable loss of the agency's ability to verify that plutonium-laden fuel was not being diverted for use in nuclear weapons.”

Another IAEA concern was that if its inspectors did not have access to these 8,000 fuel rods, it would be impossible to determine how much plutonium the North could have extracted when the same reactor was shut down for approximately 100 days in 1989. An analysis of the fuel rods could determine age. If the vast majority of these fuel rods were not from the original core, this would suggest that the DPRK had probably extracted much more plutonium than it was admitting.

In early June, the Clinton administration announced that it intended to pursue global economic sanctions against North Korea if it did not permit IAEA inspectors to be present to examine the spent fuel rods at Yongbyon. The DPRK Foreign Minister responded that the implementation of economic sanctions would be treated as an act of war by his country. At this same time period, the IAEA's Board of Governors adopted a resolution condemning North Korea's actions regarding the spent fuel rods. The vote was 28 in support of the resolution with only Libya voting against it. China and three other countries abstained. Shortly thereafter, an administration spokesman stated that the President intended to implement the sanctions in a phased approach. Initially, the U.S. would press for non-economic sanctions which could include the elimination of UN technical assistance and the cessation of
scientific and cultural exchanges. If these measures failed to change North Korea's behavior, the U.S. was prepared to introduce an economic sanction resolution. The primary reason the administration proposed this phased sanction approach most likely was to garner international support, particularly that of China since it would be critical that the Chinese did not use their veto in any Security Council resolution.

As the crisis deepened, North Korea sent mixed signals. An American specialist on the DPRK reported that during an interview with Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader offered to freeze the extraction of plutonium from the nuclear fuel rods if the U.S. would give a firm commitment pledging assistance in providing North Korea with other types of nuclear power plants. However, a Foreign Ministry official rejected any special IAEA inspections of DPRK nuclear facilities and referred to such inspections as a “gross infringement upon our sovereignty and a graphic expression of the policy for stifling the DPRK.”

Shortly thereafter, North Korea announced that it was withdrawing from the IAEA. Foreign Minister Kim Young Nam cited the IAEA's recent resolution condemning the DPRK for beginning to extract the spent fuel rods. But he also made reference to his country's “unique status” involving the NPT as well as North Korea's charges that the IAEA was little more than a tool of the U.S. Furthermore, he alleged that the IAEA's actions threatened the DPRK's nuclear energy program. In response, the U.S. moved ahead with its plans to introduce a sanctions resolution in the Security Council. The proposed draft called for a one-month grace period before the sanctions would go into effect. During this
month, the DPRK must re-establish its relationship with the IAEA. If the North failed to do so, the U.S. would move to ban the exports of all weapons to North Korea plus halt economic, technical, and cultural assistance programs. Just when it appeared an impasse had been reached, former President Jimmy Carter appeared on the scene and attempted to negotiate a way out of this crisis.

**The Carter Trip**

The Carter visit to meet with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang during mid June 1994 was controversial both in the ROK and in the U.S. Because Carter planned to reduce the U.S. ground presence in South Korea when he was President and also because of his criticisms of Korean human rights violations in the late 1970s, the former President was not the mediator ROK officials would have chosen. Many South Koreans feared that Carter's visit would provide additional legitimacy to North Korea in the international community and also give the North additional time to complete its nuclear weapons program. South Korean domestic political issues also were involved. There was some suspicion among President Kim Young Sam's supporters that Kim Dae Jung, a long-time rival of President Kim, had suggested to Carter that he visit North Korea. Although Carter stated that his trip to Pyongyang had been in the planning stages since the Bush administration and had nothing to do with Kim Dae Jung, these suspicions continued. Finally, ROK officials were concerned that there had been very little coordination with them before this visit. This fostered the fear that South Korea was being further isolated.
In the U.S., the Clinton administration suffered some embarrassment when Carter held a news conference in Pyongyang and stated that the administration's effort to impose economic sanctions against the DPRK through the United Nations was “a serious mistake,” one that he hoped the U.S. would reconsider.\textsuperscript{77} Obviously, these comments, coming as they did at the same time President Clinton was trying to marshal international support for economic sanctions, did not enhance the administration's efforts or reputation. After Carter left North Korea, the administration announced that it would be willing to grant a 30-day grace period before introducing any sanction resolution against North Korea.\textsuperscript{78} This policy change was not popular with many critics of President Clinton who argued that the U.S. had made a significant concession without gaining anything of substance in return from Korea.\textsuperscript{79} It also reflected another policy shift which hurt the President's overall foreign policy agenda.

Soon after the Carter mission, there was a spate of announcements outlining future negotiations. Kim Il Sung accepted Carter's suggestion that the leaders of the two Koreas hold a summit meeting. When Carter broached this offer to Kim Young Sam, the ROK President accepted it too, thus setting the stage for the first meeting between the leaders of the two countries.\textsuperscript{80} The U.S. and North Korea also agreed to resume the high-level bilateral talks which had been scheduled for March, but were canceled because of the impasse over IAEA inspections. In return for rescheduling these talks, North Korea agreed to three conditions which would continue as long as the negotiations made progress. First, the DPRK would not extract any plutonium from
the 8,000 spent fuel rods now in cooling ponds at Yongbyon. Second, it would not refuel its 5 MW reactor there, and third, it would allow the IAEA inspectors to remain at Yongbyon.\textsuperscript{81} Although these conditions may have seemed like concessions, they really weren't since North Korea was committed to each either through the NPT or the IAEA safeguards agreement.

Talks between the U.S. and North Korea began on 9 July with Robert Gallucci once again calling for a “broad and thorough” approach to the resolution of the nuclear issue. Both sides expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of the first day and found that “there is much in common” in their respective positions.\textsuperscript{82} Despite these encouraging statements, the talks were postponed the next day when North Korea announced that Kim Il Sung, the only leader the country had ever known, died of a heart attack at the age of 82. DPRK officials also canceled the planned summit with Kim Young Sam.\textsuperscript{83}

\textit{The 1994 Agreements}

In August 1994, the U.S. and DPRK resumed the high-level discussions disrupted in July by the death of Kim Il Sung. The two sides released a statement at the end of these discussions, in which the DPRK decided to replace its graphite-moderated reactors with LWRs. In return, the U.S. pledged to help arrange for the acquisition of the LWRs and to help find alternate energy sources for the DPRK. North Korea agreed to freeze the construction of the two nuclear reactors at Yongbyon while the LWRs are being built, to forego reprocessing any more plutonium, and to seal what the North referred to as its “radiochemical
“laboratory” but what the IAEA suspected was a reprocessing plant. The U.S. also acquiesced to provide the DPRK with “assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” This is the negative security guarantee which North Korea had wanted for several months. Finally, the DPRK stated it would remain in the NPT and allow the implementation of IAEA safeguards.84

After the release of this statement, the ROK proposed that it provide the LWRs to North Korea, in consultation with the U.S., and suggested that Japan assist with the financing.85 South Korea's motivations were interesting. First, this offer represents the South's confidence that eventually reunification will occur under the South's political and economic systems, so this proposal is nothing more than an investment in the future energy needs of a united Korea. Second, the ROK sees this initiative as a means to involve itself directly in the negotiations between the U.S. and the DPRK, thereby reducing its isolation. However, North Korea once again took a somewhat intransigent position when it rejected South Korea's offer of LWRs.86

North Korea and the United States held two separate technical discussions in September: one in Berlin on acquiring the LWRs, and one in Pyongyang on the process of establishing diplomatic relations. Significant differences remained on both issues, but the two countries did agree that the high-level negotiations would resume in Geneva beginning on 23 September.87 After a series of discussions the two sides reached an agreement on 21 October 1994.88 This agreement basically called for a three-phased resolution of the North Korean nuclear program. In the first phase, which could take as long as five years, the
DPRK pledges not to refuel its 5MW reactor at Yongbyon and to stop building the two larger reactors. The North Koreans also agree to keep the 8,000 spent fuel rods in the cooling ponds and allow the IAEA to inspect them. In return, the U.S. and its allies indicated they would begin constructing two LWRs at a cost of approximately $4 billion, most of which the ROK and Japan would finance. During the time the LWRs are under construction, the U.S. will provide 50,000 metric tons of heavy oil for heating and electricity during the first year; this amount will increase to 500,000 metric tons thereafter until the LWRs come on line. During the second phase, likely to begin in about five years, North Korea will allow IAEA inspections of the two suspected nuclear waste sites which should clarify how much plutonium the DPRK reprocessed previously. The United States and its allies will complete work on the first LWR and bring it on-line. In the final phase, which will take several more years, the DPRK will dismantle the 5MW, 50MW, and 200MW reactors as well as the radiochemical laboratory and the fuel fabrication plant. In return the second LWR will be completed and brought on-line.

On the diplomatic front, the U.S. and DPRK agreed to reduce trade barriers and to open liaison offices in the two capitals after resolving consular and other technical issues. North Korea also will take steps to implement the North-South joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and talk with ROK officials. Finally, North Korea will remain in the NPT and allow IAEA inspections.
An Evaluation of the Clinton Counterproliferation Policy

The Policy Positions of the Key Allies

Before this evaluation can be made, it is necessary to briefly review the policies of Russia, Japan, China, and the two Koreas on the nuclear issue because the Clinton administration has had to take these policy positions into account. Russia's basic position has been that North Korea does not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons at the present time and is using the suspicions that it does have this capability as a bargaining chip. For example, Mikhail Ryzhov, the Chairman of the Committee for International Relations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, stated in September 1993 that “our view is that North Korea does not have the capability of developing nuclear warheads within a few years.” Russian views have a certain credibility in this regard because the Soviet Union was very much involved with North Korea's nuclear power program over the years.

After a meeting of the Russian and Japanese Foreign Ministers in October 1993, they issued a joint statement which included a reference to the North Korean nuclear program. Both called for the DPRK to remain in the NPT and to comply fully with IAEA safeguard inspections in order to contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The Russian Ambassador in Seoul, Georgy Kunadze, made similar statements in February and April 1994. In the latter instance, he indicated that Russia would not block a Security Council resolution designed to punish North Korea for its intransigence on the IAEA inspection issue. In June 1994, as the Clinton administration was attempting to marshal
international support for economic sanctions, Foreign Minister Kozyrev told Secretary of State Christopher that Russia would support these sanctions. In return, the *International Herald Tribune* reported that the U.S. endorsed a Russian proposal for an international conference to address the North Korean problem.93

Japan's role has been more important because of the foreign currency which ethnic Koreans living in Japan send to the DPRK. Although impossible to determine precisely how much money is involved, estimates range between $600 million to $1.8 billion per year.94 Whatever the correct figure, it is the largest single source of foreign exchange that the DPRK receives. The Japanese government has been reluctant to take steps to reduce or eliminate this critical flow of hard currency to North Korea primarily because of fears that the ethnic Korean population in Japan might revert to violence. Also, there is concern that a cutoff would result in massive suffering on the part of the North Korean people. For whatever reasons, the *New York Times* reported that the Japanese government informed the U.S. in June 1994 that it could not support American efforts then underway to introduce an economic sanctions resolution in the Security Council.95

China's support was even more important than Japan's. Although China does not want nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, it also has opposed the introduction of harsh measures against the DPRK. This policy is partly explainable in that China has historically opposed actions which could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of other states. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made this point in a statement issued in March 1993.96 President Jiang Zemin expanded on this position in
November 1993 during a conference in Seattle. In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Mirohiro Hosokawa, he indicated that China really had very little influence to exert over North Korea and shouldn't be relied upon to moderate the North's behavior. During a similar meeting with Kim Young Sam, Jiang stated that he supported a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but this should be accomplished through inter-Korean talks, negotiations with the IAEA, and efforts by the U.S. and North Korea rather than through economic sanctions. Prime Minister Li Peng met with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in late December 1993 and stated that “China favors a proper settlement of the issue (the nuclear problem) through dialogues and consultations instead of imposing pressure and sanctions.”

This Chinese opposition to sanctions forced the Clinton administration to be very deliberate as it has tried to bring pressure to bear on North Korea. Perhaps the best example of this was in March 1994 when the U.S. wanted to introduce a resolution calling on North Korea to allow the IAEA inspectors back into the country. Because of trepidation that China would use its veto to block this initiative, the administration agreed to a compromise whereby the Security Council President issued a statement urging DPRK cooperation with the IAEA. This statement was less serious than a Security Council resolution, and is indicative of China's influence. Obviously, the other major factor involving China and sanctions against North Korea was and is that China is a major supplier to the DPRK of critical products such as petroleum and food. Even if China would abstain on any Security Council action,
the implementation would be in jeopardy if China would not or could not stop the flow of these products to the DPRK.

North Korea's policy positions on a variety of issues have been referenced throughout this paper, particularly its “unique status” in reference to the NPT and IAEA safeguard inspections. However, it is important to note that DPRK officials have consistently denied having a nuclear weapons program. Kim Il Sung made such an assertion in a press conference covered by CNN shortly before his death. He stated unequivocally that his country did not have nuclear weapons, did not have delivery systems for nuclear weapons, and was too small to test these weapons.\textsuperscript{100} Despite these assurances, other comments made in 1990 suggested otherwise. During discussions with Soviet officials in September of that year, the DPRK Foreign Minister cautioned that if the USSR established diplomatic relations with the ROK, which did in fact occur later that month, his country “would consider itself not bound by the pledges not to create its own nuclear weapons.” In a written memorandum, the Foreign Minister warned that if normal relations were established, “we will have no option but to take measures to produce ourselves those weapons that we have heretofore relied on from our alliance.”\textsuperscript{101} These comments plus the discrepancies noted by IAEA inspectors certainly cast doubt on Kim's assertions.

Two additional points need to be made to help explain North Korean policies on the IAEA and special inspections. Ever since the Korean war when the United Nations Command fought against North Korea forces, the DPRK has been suspicious of the UN and its various agencies. Vice Premier and Foreign Minister
Kin Young Nam reflected these suspicions and mistrust when Boutros-Boutros Ghali visited Pyongyang in December 1993. In short, North Korea has suspected that the UN and its agency, the IAEA, are nothing more than puppets of the U.S. and are not to be trusted. Concerning the special inspections, Kim Il Sung told his old friend King Sihanouk in December 1993 that he viewed these inspections as nothing more than an attempt by the U.S. to use the IAEA as a spy on North Korean conventional military capabilities. For a country which is one of the most secretive in the world, particularly concerning its national security, this is not a surprising position for its leader to express.

The Republic of Korea has been caught on the horns of a dilemma for several years concerning the DPRK. It does not want a war on the Korean peninsula nor does it want the economic collapse of the DPRK. By the same token, the ROK does not want to be isolated and a non-participant in the negotiations addressing the nuclear weapons issue. In South Korea's view, there can be no settlement to his problem unless the South is intimately involved with determining what this solution is to be. This has caused some strains in the U.S.-South Korean relationship from time to time, although U.S. negotiators are adamant about the extensive coordination which exists in order to keep South Korean officials fully informed. This tension was reflected at the time of the Carter visit when the government in Seoul was not pleased with the consultations which occurred prior to the visit or after its completion.

South Korean fears about another Korean war and its likely devastating effects are well founded, based on what occurred
between 1950-1953. The economic issue also causes much concern, particularly since the German example of reunification is well known in Seoul. The National Unification Board has estimated that the cost of Korean reunification could well be between $200-500 billion over 10 years. Of this amount, this organization predicts that the ROK would have to pay between 70-85%. Based on these factors, the ROK has been very cautious about supporting any proposals which its leaders believe would lead to either war on the peninsula or the collapse of the North Korean economy and the resulting drain on the ROK's treasury.

The shifts in South Korean policy toward North Korea have been frustrating to American negotiators and officials. There are many instances of these policy swings, but in general, when the Clinton administration has taken a tougher position, the South Koreans have urged caution and vice versa. For example, according to The New York Times in February and March 1994 when the Clinton administration urged tougher measures as North Korea balked at IAEA inspections, the South Korean Foreign Minister warned against sanctions and building up U.S. military strength in the ROK. President Kim reportedly urged similar restraints involving sanctions and the military buildup just two weeks later.

By the same token, in June 1994 during and immediately after the Carter visit when the Clinton administration indicated it was willing to move ahead with high-level negotiations, the South Koreans took a tougher tack. President Kim held his first National Security Council meeting in the 16 months he had been in office at that time and stated that North Korea “should not be allowed to
possess even half a nuclear bomb.”

When the DPRK announced it planned to withdraw from the IAEA there was a strong reaction from Seoul, which pledged to follow “firm and consistent” policies in response. Even more ominous was the action taken by the Democratic Liberal Party, the plurality party in the National Assembly. At a meeting in mid-June, the party and local chapter chairmen passed a resolution calling on the government to re-evaluate its non-nuclear weapons policies to include the denuclearization declaration.

A more recent example occurred in October 1994. At this time, the U.S. and North Korea were again negotiating, with South Korea watching carefully from the sidelines. In an interview with the American press, President Kim supported the overall objective of finding a diplomatic solution and praised the coordination between the ROK and the U.S. But he questioned American negotiating tactics by characterizing them as “naive and overly flexible.” He also expressed irritation with the administration’s failure to raise human rights violations in the talks with North Korea. Foreign Minister Lee Hong Koo joined in this criticism by arguing that Robert Gallucci and other U.S. negotiators relied more in their preparations for negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation experts than on experts on Korea. The most salient point here is that the ROK still believes in the old dictum that “the road from Washington to Pyongyang must pass through Seoul.” However, President Kim and other officials frequently feel frustrated in their efforts to shape policies which they view as absolutely vital to their national security.
One final issue involving South Korean policy needs to be mentioned concerning its policy on whether or not North Korea had developed nuclear weapons. The official government policy as stated by President Kim in June is that North Korea must not be allowed to have any nuclear weapons and that it does not now have such weapons. If South Korea was forced to admit that North Korea did possess nuclear weapons, this would cause Seoul serious problems in that it would be placed in an inferior position regardless of the impressive economic and political gains the South has made in recent years. Such a recognition would also force the ROK to re-evaluate its military strategy and doctrine, which it would rather not do.115

However, on an unofficial level, there is a lively debate ongoing concerning how the ROK should respond to the possibility of the North having nuclear weapons. One argument expressed is that South Korea should support a policy which attempts to limit the DPRK's nuclear program and its delivery systems first, and then work toward final elimination of these weapons through subsequent negotiations.116 The other side of that argument is that the ROK should continue the policy that no nuclear weapons are acceptable in North Korea even in the short term. This argument rejects the India-Pakistan example of attempting to cap nuclear weapons at a certain level. One South Korean defense expert stated that if North Korea were allowed even a small number of nuclear weapons, this would lead to increased proliferation in Northeast Asia. In his view, North Korea would attempt to sell nuclear weapons and technology if it could, which also would lead to proliferation. Finally, this expert argued
that the India-Pakistan example is unacceptable when applied to 
the Korean peninsula in that Pakistan developed its program 
because of India's nuclear weapons. Since South Korea has no 
nuclear weapons, there is no reason for the DPRK to build such 
weapons.117

The Clinton Policies

The primary reason for reviewing the pertinent policy 
positions of Russia, Japan, China, and the two Koreas is that the 
Clinton administration must take all of these countries and their 
policies into account in the formation and implementation of its 
counterproliferation policy as applied to the Korean peninsula.

There has been no shortage of criticism directed at the 
Clinton administration's counter-proliferation policy involving 
North Korea. These criticisms range from those who support the 
use of military force to remove the nuclear weapons and facilities, 
to those who criticize Clinton for not being perceptive enough to 
understand there are moderates in the DPRK's government willing 
to find a mutual agreement. In between are those who argue that 
the administration's vacillation on North Korea is just another 
example of broader foreign policy failures in Somalia, Bosnia, 
Haiti, etc.118 The military option is not feasible, this group argues, 
for political, economic, and military reasons. While there may be 
moderates in the North Korean regime, with the death of Kim Il 
Sung and the ongoing succession process, it is unlikely these 
individuals will be able to play a significant role--at least in the 
foreseeable future.

The “lack of consistency “ argument deserves more 
attention. An objective observer can identify at least three issues
where the administration has not been consistent: whether any nuclear weapons are acceptable in the DPRK; whether Team Spirit should be held; and whether or not the IAEA should be allowed to conduct special inspections. In July 1993, President Clinton indicated that no nuclear weapons in North Korea were tolerable. Secretary of Defense Perry was even more explicit during his Asian Society speech in May 1994. In this speech, Perry stated that what the U.S. wants to achieve is a “nuclear-free Korean peninsula.” However, more recently, some administration officials have indicated that it is more important to eliminate the present and future nuclear weapons potential in North Korea with less concern for what the DPRK may have constructed in the past. The ROK has not reacted well to this policy change.119

Concerning the Team Spirit exercise, in 1992 the Bush administration and the ROK canceled this exercise, but reinstated it in 1993. During 1994, President Clinton announced it, then postponed it, and finally canceled it.

The special inspections question is closely associated with whether any nuclear weapons are acceptable. One of the primary means to determine whether North Korea may have built nuclear weapons in the past is to inspect the two nuclear waste sites. This would require a special IAEA inspection because North Korea has consistently maintained that these two sites are military installations. The administration has argued that this issue must be resolved before any deal with the DPRK can be finalized. However, in the most recent negotiations, it appears that this policy has changed, and the administration possibly is willing to defer special inspections until a later time.120 Since this is such a major
issue, even the perception of inconsistency can be harmful, and it is almost a certainty that the ROK will not be pleased if this change in policy has occurred.

Another criticism of the administration's policy is that the “broad and thorough approach” which Bob Gallucci and others have identified lacks a certain amount of specificity as implemented. Basically, this approach attempts to define the proper ratio of carrots and sticks to meet the general criteria of the counterproliferation strategy. For example, the U.S. has attempted to dissuade North Korea from building nuclear weapons by arguing that the political and economic costs would be too high and by providing certain security guarantees. The June and July 1993 joint statements provide good examples of these assurances. But a legitimate question is how these negative security guarantees, which seem to suggest that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons or attack the DPRK, square with extended deterrence, which is so important to the ROK's security? If there is not consistency in this approach, is it really credible? Finally, should North Korea be rewarded for simply complying with the obligations it has assumed, particularly under the terms of the NPT and IAEA?

The last criticism concerns the administration's evaluations of the motives behind the North Korean nuclear program. The carrot and stick approach assumes that the other side is willing and able to make a deal. In the case of North Korea then, nuclear weapons are a bargaining chip that the DPRK will trade for certain political, economic, and military rewards—whether these rewards are diplomatic recognition or light-water reactors. This is basically the argument that the Russians have made, and it may be
true. However, it may not be true. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il may have decided to build nuclear weapons as the best means to insure regime survival and the succession process from father to son. Or they may have viewed nuclear weapons as the best deterrent against possible South Korean and/or U.S. attack as the conventional balance swings to the South's favor. Perhaps they chose this course because they believed that nuclear weapons would eventually drive a wedge between the U.S. and ROK, thereby contributing to the weakening of the South and possibly leading to reunification under North Korean control.

The problem is that no one can know for sure what the correct motivation or combinations of motivations are. But if the DPRK leadership has tied the very survival of the regime to the presence of nuclear weapons, it is less likely to be willing to bargain them away regardless of the incentives the U.S. and others provide. One U.S. official argues that the importance of nuclear weapons to the North Koreans has led them to negotiate using the “3-D's strategy”—deny, delay, and deceive. Another American observer refers to this same strategy as the DPRK’s “renunciation doctrine.” That is, they make an agreement and then immediately begin finding ways to avoid the obligations agreed to. The denuclearization agreement with South Korea is a good example. Only the final results will definitively answer this basic question concerning North Korean motives. Hopefully, the administration has it right.

The final question is: does the Clinton administration's counterproliferation policy as applied to the North serve as a model for use against other potential proliferators? The qualified answer
is that if this policy results in a satisfactory outcome on the Korean peninsula, it would probably be successful elsewhere. The reason for this conclusion is that North Korea is a very hard target for this policy. Its autarkic economy and self-reliance policies reduce its vulnerabilities to external pressure. Similarly, it has developed its nuclear program with limited amounts of outside assistance, and it has plentiful supplies of uranium and other resources required to support its program. The use of international arms control regimes such as the NPT, UN threats of sanctions, confidence building measures, deterrence, and other forms of military preparedness can be successful if implemented correctly. The experience the administration has gained through its efforts to stop the North Korean program will be helpful in other proliferation cases.

Epilogue

The October 1994 agreement became controversial as soon as it was signed, with several critics arguing that the U.S. and its allies granted too many concessions without obtaining immediate inspections of the two suspected waste sites. Perhaps more significantly, after the November congressional elections, several prominent Republicans joined in the criticisms. Senator Robert Dole, the new Senate Majority Leader, stated shortly after the agreement was signed that “it was always possible to get an agreement when you give enough away.” More recently, Senator Frank Murkowski, who became the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, criticized the agreement because it did not provide for initial inspections of the suspected storage sites.
Senator Larry Pressler has also been critical, charging that this agreement establishes a bad precedent for countries such as Iran which may prohibit IAEA inspections unless the U.S. and others provide new power plants.\textsuperscript{124}

Robert Gallucci, who negotiated this agreement, has been the primary administration respondent. He continues to argue that the DPRK pledged to give up far more under this agreement than it was required to do under the NPT. For example, he points to the decision not to refuel the 5MW reactor, to stop construction on the 50MW and 200MW versions, and eventually to dismantle these graphite reactors. He also references initial IAEA reports that North Korea is cooperating after signing the agreement and emphasizes that the U.S. will not provide the critical core components for the two LWRs until North Korea satisfies the IAEA on all of its past, suspected nuclear weapons initiatives.\textsuperscript{125}

Concerning South Korea's involvement with supplying the LWRs to North Korea, the ROK and U.S. have agreed to form the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which will be responsible for the reactor project. South Korean officials have estimated this project will cost between $3.5-$4.0 billion with the ROK providing approximately $1.8-2.5 billion of this estimate.\textsuperscript{126} There are obvious political, economic, and security advantages which South Korea would achieve as a result. Politically, Seoul would gain status \textit{vis a vis} Pyongyang if it provided the reactors, in that the North would be forced to acknowledge the South's technological superiority. Also, South Korea is intent on linking its participation in supplying the LWRs with the re-establishment of the North-South dialogue. This would counter the suspected DPRK
ploy of isolating the ROK on the nuclear issue. Economically, South Korea is looking to the future of a unified Korea and how the LWRs could contribute to the improved economy in the northern half of the peninsula, thereby possibly reducing reunification costs. The security implications are apparent in that South Korean technicians would have access to some of the most critical sites in North Korea.

The DPRK is well aware of these advantages and has attempted to derail South Korean participation to the extent that it can. It has threatened to break off discussions with the U.S. on the implementation of the framework agreement if the American side continues to insist on South Korea providing the LWRs. The major argument made by North Korean representatives is that the ROK LWRs have certain safety and technological problems, and that North Korea should be allowed to choose the country of origin for its new reactors. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, and Robert Gallucci have stated publicly that North Korea's position on the reactors is untenable and that only South Korean LWRs are viable. Since South Korea has agreed to provide more than half of the costs, they assert the reactors must be from the ROK and that this position is not negotiable. Gallucci also suggested that the DPRK agreed in Geneva to accept South Korean LWRs and, therefore, must comply. South Korea has remained adamant that it will not participate in KEDO if its reactors are not provided to the DPRK. Foreign Minister Kong No Myong recently stated that the LWR project could not proceed without ROK financial assistance. Therefore, no alternative to his country's reactors are acceptable.
Although the 1994 framework agreement appeared to be a major step forward, the implementation process has presented additional problems as evidenced by the dispute over which country should supply the LWRs. Nonetheless, the Clinton administration may be in a stronger diplomatic position in the international community if North Korea reneges on some or all of its pledges than it was before this agreement. Only time will determine this outcome, and the administration will have to pursue whatever objectives it deems most appropriate.
ENDNOTES

Secretary Perry's speech is located on pp. 26-29.
6 Washington Post, 29 July 1989, p. 9 and NYT, 25 October 1989, p. 9. For a good chart on North Korea's nuclear chronology from 1962 to 1994, see the data provided by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control as reported in the NYT, 20 March 1994, Sect 4, p. 4.
11 For a good argument that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea were of little military or political value, see William J. Taylor, IHT, 27 June 1991, p. 6.
13 President Roh's three non-nuclear policies can be found in FEER, 21 November 1991, p. 13.
16 IHT, 10 April 1992, p. 4.
20. Ibid., p. 238.
22. Gates's concerns were reported in the IHT, 14 January 1993, p. 6.
23. IHT, 2 February 1993, p. 2 and Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons program,” p. 2. For an argument that the IAEA had become closely associated with U.S. policy goals, see Selig S. Harrison, “Breaking the Nuclear Impasse: How North Korea Views the Nuclear Problem,” pp. 6-7. Paper presented at a symposium conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C. 16 November 1993. Harrison argues that Hans Blix, the IAEA Director General, testified before a U.S. congressional committee in July 1992 which was the first time the IAEA head had done this. He also points out that this was the first time the IAEA had requested to conduct “special inspections” in any country.
25. IHT, 13-14 Mar 93, p. 1. Article X.1 of the NPT requires 90 days notice before a signatory country withdraws from the NPT.
31. See the statement by General Robert W. RisCassi, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, as reported in the IHT, 15 January 1993, p. 7.
32. IHT, 26 May 1993, p. 4.
50

41 NYT, 27 October 1993, p. 4.
43 Author’s interview with Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Washington DC, 17 May 1994.
44 FEER, 2 December 1993, pp. 16-17.
45 NYT, 7 December 1993, p. 4.
47 NYT, 2 January 1994, p. 3.
48 NYT, 6 January 1994, p. 6. For a particularly critical appraisal of these negotiations from the American perspective, see NYT, 9 January 1994, p. 1.
53 NYT, 3 March 1994, p. 3.
55 For two excellent accounts of this inspection and its failure, see NYT, 16 March 1994, p. 1 and FEER, 31 March 1994, pp. 14-15. The following chain of events is taken from these two articles.
59 FBIS-EAS, 23 March 1994, pp. 8-10.
61 NYT, 1 April 1994, p. 4.
This decision probably was made more in consideration for South Korean farmers than as an incentive for North Korea to comply with the IAEA. Team Spirit can't be held when rice and other crops are under cultivation because to do so would ruin much of these crops.

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Author's interview with Colonel William R. McKinney, U.S. Defense Attaché, Seoul, Korea, 13 June 1994. Colonel McKinney was present when Carter addressed the Country Team at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul before traveling to North Korea. At this meeting the former President indicated he had been considering making this trip for some time.

Negative security guarantees are controversial in South Korea because of the possible effects these guarantees could have on America's extended deterrence which is so important to the ROK's national defense. For more on this issue, see Taiwoo Kim, “The United States and North Korea: A South Korean Perspective,” a paper prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 16 November 1993.
87 NYT, 15 September 1994, p. 7.
88 “Agreed Framework Between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America,” 21 October 1994, is found in FBIS-EAS, 24 October 1994, pp. 34-35. The following specifics are taken from this document.
89 NYT, 21 October 1994, p. 4.
94 NYT, 1 November 1993, p. 1.
97 NYT, 28 November 1993, Section 4, p. 5.
99 NYT, 27 December 1993, p. 3. See also FBIS-EAS, 10 January 1994, p. 15.
100 FBIS-EAS, 18 April 1994, p. 34.
101 These quotes can be found in Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 7.
105 Author's interviews with Robert L. Gallucci and Thomas Hubbard at the State Department on 17 May 1994. Hubbard led the U.S. delegation which negotiated with the DPRK at the UN during late 1993 and early 1994.
106 Author's interview with Colonel William R. McKinney, U.S. Defense Attaché, in Seoul on 13 June 1994. McKinney stated that originally Carter planned to spend only a few hours in Seoul on his return from Pyongyang. However, Embassy officials convinced him to spend at least one night and brief Kim Young Sam concerning his negotiations with Kim Il Sung.
108 Author's interviews with Gallucci and Hubbard in Washington D.C. on 17 May 1994 and with James Keith, First Secretary of the Political Section, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, Korea, 14 June 1994.
109 NYT, 12 February 1994, p. 3.
113 NYT, 8 October 1994, p. 3.
114 Author's interview with Colonel McKinney on 13 June 1994 in Seoul.
116 Author's interview with Young Koo Cha, Director, Arms Control Research Center, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, Korea, 8 June 1994.
119 NYT, 15 October 1994, p. 5.
120 Author's interview with Colonel McKinney in Seoul, Korea, 13 June 1994.
121 Author's interview with Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., 19 May 1994. Niksch also argues that the administration has made a mistake by offering negotiations or sanctions. In his view, the better course is to pursue sanctions at the same time as negotiating if North Korean behavior dictates this approach.


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