politic, only when convinced that no outside people will advance funds to a government which sells national rights and interests for its private ends.

While the Chinese must awake to their national and international importance in the world of economics, the Japanese are revising their views on government, diplomacy and patriotism through the necessity of fraternizing with the democratic, republican or richer members of the family of nations. The idea of the Far East for the Japanese and Chinese, of the political and economic independence of the two Asian Neighbors from the aggressive and peaceful West alike, is no more than part and parcel of Germanism to which Japan has been trained for the last three decades or more, since the popular agitation for a liberal government after the French, English and American models had been drastically suppressed. The late Emperor proclaimed on his resumption of political power in 1868, "Knowledge shall be sought in the wide world and all State affairs shall be decided by public opinion;" and since the Russo-Japanese War, by which the international position of Japan was made secure, certainly there has been no excuse whatsoever for maintaining bureaucracy and militarism as a means to patriotism or national defense. Unless the Germanism side of Japan is demolished by a league of free nations, the Germanism within Japan will go on eating up the blood and soul of the entire nation. If the Central Allies are not sufficiently chastized, the Japanese or Teutonic education or inclination will say triumphantly: There, you see! no country has been fighting for human rights; Japan after all must be prepared with China against the territorial aggression and economic invasion of Europe and America. The salvation of the millions and millions of the Far Eastern people turns upon the pivot of cooperation and interdependence of the East and the West for a speedy and complete removal of the only obstacle in the way of universal concord and mutual uplift of mankind.

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THE MID-VICTORIAN ATTITUDE OF FOREIGNERS IN CHINA

By Frederick Wells Williams, Assistant Professor of Modern Oriental History, Yale University

Long ago, when Europeans traded at one port in China, a hand-to-mouth arrangement combining bluff and submission was found to serve the ordinary purposes of intercourse with a people who denied any right of strangers to travel or reside in their country. The foreigners there were for the most part intelligent and reasonable men, but intercourse with Asiatics was still in the mediaeval stage; traders as a class had no intellectual curiosity; they enjoyed life as they could under exotic conditions but they did not add to its anxieties by prying into the forbidden domains beyond their preserve; traditions of India in the eighteenth century survived and were actually maintained until the opium war began in 1840. In Europe the little company of Factory merchants at Canton were accounted experts in dealing with the Chinese, though they actually remained ignorant of the language, the culture and the genius of the nation. In China they were treated as a gild and given their instructions through the agency of a native trading corporation, with no interest shown in their affairs so long as they refrained from contumacy. Certain restrictions had been sufficiently galling before the crisis arrived, but when Great Britain withdrew her gild and demanded direct intercourse with Chinese officials, the court at Peking determined to force them out of the country and have an end of European trade at once. The merchants were too imperfectly informed to estimate the purpose of the Chinese or their actual feeling as to the iniquitous opium traffic, but they saw trouble ahead and appealed to their statesmen at home to defy the Chinese government and support their business. At a time when Great Britain made it her affair to settle
the successions in Spain and Portugal, to help create the kingdom of Belgium, interfere in Naples and defend the sultan of Turkey, it seemed natural and easy to hear the cry of a company of merchants in the Far East and teach the Chinese how to respect the European. This was the period of Lord Palmerston who, as a leader of the upper classes of a country, recalls the Emperor Trajan. He was preeminently a chief of aristocrats and of fighting men. There were admirers in England who compared him with Pitt, with this reservation—that Palmerston's policies appeared always to be successful while Pitt's were not. The schoolboys of every English-speaking district in the world today can tell of Pitt, but not many of them would know of Palmerston who has been dead only fifty years. Yet his was a name to conjure with in the generation that watched the progress of our Civil War from the other side of the Atlantic. It might be interesting to note in passing that the arrogance of this splendid bully of the nineteenth century—and he was rather splendid—was checked at last by the sense and justice of the English democracy slowly pushing aside the young aristocrats and insisting upon moderation.

It was the voice of the sons and retainers of the gentry class in England that gave expression to the mid-Victorian age. And as the citizens of every country are always, when they go abroad, more loyal than the king, so it happened that the British trader in China, quickened by hopes of a policy of aggression, were enthusiastic supporters of Palmerston. His energy and directing hand had much to do with England's two China wars of 1840 and 1857, while his imperious temper and the extreme bitterness of his speech became models for the admiring youth of England wherever her interests could be promoted. We need not now condemn the extravagance of his imitators; they had been taught to advertise the fact that all other cultures were inferior to theirs; it became a habit of talking rather loud to Asiatics and to hustle them for their own good; it was the mid-Victorian façon de parler which has now come to an end in English-speaking countries, but the influence of this fashion of regarding Asiatics has been one of the causes of their undoing.

The history of English commerce has been a source of pride to the nation as a whole, and some of its best chapters concern the romantic and really noble achievements of her adventurous spirits lured by prospects of profits to the eastern seas. Her sons have been eager traders but they have often if not always tried to be more—to educate, to lessen human suffering, to enlarge the routes of commerce for others as well as for themselves. In China under the Old Company their lot was comparatively easy; they traded under a monopoly with Chinese monopolists at Canton, and the profits were considerable on either side. After the company privileges were abolished and energetic English communities were established at other ports in China the tradition of solidarity was forgotten as the merchants pressed their consuls to extract advantages for each new port from the unwilling mandarins. The result of an enlarged competition was a decided diminution in the ease with which money was made as contrasted with the old days, a decrease in profits, and a tendency to overtrade. Men saw their gains disappearing and became feverish. They ignored a plain economic law and fixed their hopes on obtaining access to a wider territory. But after the Arrow War had opened more ports for trade and this expansion had been secured it dawned upon them that a dispersion of their forces over a reluctant country which feared and hated them not only failed to increase their business but reduced their corporate strength. The heads of the great houses lost their commanding positions to untrained and cheaper new-comers unacquainted with the technique of the China trade, while native dealers took advantage of competing foreigners and brought on a period of commercial distress and ruin. There was, indeed, no such demand for European commodities in China as Europeans imagined, and what the Chinese bought they prudently resolved to pay for out of the sales of their own products. Solicitude over losing transactions with a people confidently regarded as occupying a lower plane of civilization found expression in a certain acerbity in speech and writing on the part of foreigners.
In reviewing the disdain expressed by Europeans fifty years ago toward the mind, body and estate of the Chinese empire we are impressed by two things, first, their indifference to obvious commercial conditions, and, second, their ignorance of China and the Chinese character.

As to the first: they honestly believed that by forcing their way into the chief commercial centers of the country they could appropriate the harvest of its trade and exploit its resources as easily as they could enter its capital and burn down its palace. Without giving consideration to a study of the material features of a populous region the size of Europe, or to the almost infinite complexities involved in its economic penetration, they entered cavalierly upon its exploitation by untrained youngsters, known in the East as "griffins," fresh from England, who soon became victims of their ignorance and of their illusions. Through the necessity of confiding their affairs to compradors, those indispensable agents presently became acquainted with every detail of foreign business without imparting anything worth knowing about China in return. The perils of a fluctuating exchange, the temptations to immorality, the exotic influences both climatic and social—none of them understood then as they are today—combined to harass and demoralize the anxious youths whose careers were proving failures. But it is the magnificent indifference of the British capitalists at home that is more wonderful than the bewilderment of the griffins in China. The latter were financed by firms who had no precise acquaintance with the East and no intelligence departments to collect data and train agents before embarking upon commercial expansion. They were sent abroad merely to carry out a program, it was their masters, the "practical" men of England, upon whom the blame must rest of entering the field of commercial enterprise and competition without plans, without data, without even patience as they faced the unknown.

As to the second: the Chinese people remained for the most part inscrutable to Englishmen of affairs. Racial psychology was not then a subject of scientific scrutiny, as it has since become. An ancient idea, that supremacy is based on force, was more generally current then than it is today. A nation that could be conquered was an inferior nation in every essential respect. The ease with which European arms had conquered the coastal part of China was in fact the undoing of those who imagined that conversion necessarily must follow upon defeat. Supremacy may indeed be established upon such a foundation, as history shows in abundant instances. The Chinese might have been put under the rule of Queen Victoria had the English been disposed to undertake a long war and incur the expense of an army of occupation as well as the enmity of a jealous Europe. Few of us realize today the self-control of the great nation that hardly bestowed a thought upon a profitable hazard which would have been seized by any other first-class European power in possession of her advantages two generations ago. But in withdrawing their forces from China and trusting to the lesson of arms, to moral suasion and to the promise of a lucrative over-sea trade, the English failed utterly in their understanding of Chinese character. Because they had been beaten on the field of battle it was thought that they were an inferior people in the endowment of civilization; because the experience and traditions of two or three thousand years had evolved different standards and ideals their intellectual processes were called fantastic or immoral. China, as it happened, was taken at a great disadvantage. It is probable that she had not fallen to so low a level in culture and in the control of her subjects during the previous five hundred years as in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the empire was aflame with rebellion against the corrupt and decrepit Manchu dynasty. Yet despite her miserable state, China was properly resentful of the foreigners who had preyed upon her weakness, insulted her ancient culture, introduced strange faiths and practices and lured her people into new vices. To beg such a people to listen to "reason" and acquaint themselves with the material delights to be gained from the application of steam and gunpowder to the science of living, while the military instrument of foreign power was deliberately dis-
carded, was simply to invite failure. China was purblind; she was mediaeval, incompetent and superstitious; but, being all these, one could not expect her to understand the complex nature of an attack which challenged claims to superiority that had been willingly acknowledged by the world about her since the period of Alexander. England was fresh from her experience with India and provided with all the means for studying the problem before her. Yet she did not understand.

It would be unfair, perhaps, to expect that writers for the public press should understand. The English papers of this period are full of animosity against China, but it is plainly a manifestation of ignorance. The beliefs of a people are not perfectly recorded in their newspapers, though these may always be accepted as reflecting conventional opinion. The authors who moulded public thought at this time were for the most part those who having visited China could boast of their knowledge, mainly on the same principle that in the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed man is king. These were the men who preached the doctrine that activity would make the future secure, whose serene confidence in the inventions which render life luxurious brought the Asiatic for the moment into contempt.

A number of excerpts from this literature of disparagement may serve to illustrate a significant attitude, the attitude of an arrogant western world toward Orientals who had lost none of their ancient culture but had been outstripped for the time being in their mechanical development and military machinery. They show the same boastfulness of knowledge, the same conviction of automatic progress that marked the Teutonic press at the outbreak of the present war, and in both we may observe the same failure to profit by human experience. The fact that the quotations are chiefly from English writers does not imply that the spirit of Great Britain differed greatly from that of other countries upon the Atlantic. With the exception of her responsibility for the opium trade England cannot be accused of anything in the Far East which other Christian countries were not doing or ready to do. The change in attitude came very slowly, and traces of the old hauteur still appear in print, but a turning-point may be said to have been reached after the efforts of two American envoys, Harris in Japan and Burlingame in China, offered evidence to those who would listen that justice and sympathy were better instruments in dealing with Asiatics than scorn.

Lord Palmerston found a defender for his aggressive policy in Thomas De Quincey, who does not deserve quotation as an authority on China but as a publicist whose reputation gave his presentation some weight. In his passionate little essay on China reprinted from the Titan in 1857, he creates an idealized Chinaman who survived for a generation in the minds of Englishmen. He declares:

It is well known, to all who have taken any pains in studying the Chinese temper and character, that obstinacy—obstinacy like that of mules—is one of its foremost features. Once having conceded a point, you need not hope to recover your lost ground. The Chinese are, as may easily be read in their official papers and acts, intellectually a very imbecile people.

It was a sore point that the Chinese had refused upon a quibble to admit the British after the Treaty of Nanking into the walled city of Canton. It was an infraction of the treaty, but the English had sent their army home and the Manchu Court gained credit among its subjects because Downing Street did not deem it worth while to force the issue. There were abundant trading facilities along the river without the walls, and foreigners could afford to wait. De Quincey puts the matter in this wise:

Amongst a people that cannot be thought to have reached a higher state of development than that which corresponds to childhood, it is not prudent to suffer any one article of a treaty to be habitually broken. Such infractions are contagious: the knavish counsellor of the emperor, finding that we submit coolly to one infraction, that aims at nothing confessedly beyond a bitter insult to us, this only, and no dream of any further advantage being proposed, are tempted into trying another infraction, and so onwards. For fourteen years we have allowed ourselves to tolerate this burning scandal, and all the while the successive governors of Canton have been amusing us with moonshine visions that the time may come when they can think of fulfilling their engagements.
China is taken by this author rather more seriously than by most of his contemporaries as "the oyster which must and will only open to our good swords and strong wills." His plan was to secure the interruption of the grain tribute from the southern provinces to Peking, starve a population of two millions living in Chihli, provide a means of indemnification which would not press upon the innocent people of China, and "thus suspend a rod over the heads of the authorities in China, while our forces will be free to act upon those points most likely to have an effect upon emperor and court." But, while others held the Chinese rather lightly as opponents, De Quincey found them to be antagonists worthy of the international game of Strafen:

In the case of China this apostrophe—the Nations hate thee—would pass by acclamation without the formality of a vote. Such has been the inhuman insolence of this vilest and silliest amongst nations toward the whole household of man, that we are pledged to a moral detestation of all who can be supposed to have participated in the constant explosions of unprovoked contumely to ourselves.

The expedition of 1860 to Peking was accompanied by the Rev. R. J. L. M'Ghee, Chaplain to H. B. M. Forces, whose account of How We Got to Peking (1862) contains a series of incidents in the campaign related with some lightness of touch, but chiefly interesting because they reveal the attitude of a professing Christian toward the barbarians whom it was his duty to help conquer and save. He shows no hostility against the Chinese. He is humane enough to approve the missionary efforts of his countrymen and of the Americans, and to rejoice at the medical relief extended to a few sufferers by army surgeons. He marks the dealings of British officers and men as characterized "not only by strict justice and propriety but by moderation, kindness and charity." He adds:

Yet, at the same time that we respected both their rights and feelings, the army very properly refused to submit to anything like undue self-assertion, or what is vulgarly called "cheek," upon the part of the vain Celestials, and I have upon various occasions seen with satisfaction a Mandarin and his chair overturned in the street when he dared to call upon a British officer to make way for him. You must expect to be well jostled if you don't take means to prevent it, as the Chinese here have no idea of making way for anybody. Their own great people never walk and their chairs are preceded by runners to clear the way, so that the street population have not yet thoroughly imbibed the idea that a "swell" can walk at all, although we tried all winter to drive it into their heads, and that with pointed arguments. It is necessary to carry a stick, and so to carry it that if a Chinaman chooses deliberately to walk against you, he also walks his own face against your cane, and however much his self-sufficiency might be gratified by the former, he would hardly like the latter. A very pleasant thing, no doubt, for the Celestial to feel that he has asserted his supremacy over the Barbarian in a quiet manner by not making way for him, but not an unmingle pleasure when he acquires along with it a poke in the head; he will not jostle you again; and thus you have the satisfaction of feeling that you have taught one disciple of Confucius a lesson which he never learned before, and have contributed your mite to impress upon the Asiatic mind the fact that, when the European requires it, he must, as the Negro melodist so poetically remarks "get out of the way."

The disciple of Confucius has had a good many lessons to learn from the disciples of Christ who have called upon him to accept their customs and be saved.

Captain Sherard Osborn, a British naval officer, is sufficiently frank in supporting the methods of his countrymen in China. In his volume entitled Past and Future of British Relations in China (1860) he defends the mailed fist in these words:

What can you do with such a people? Either one of two things: leave them alone to exult in their obstinate ignorance, or make them by force yield to your view of the case. Necessity compels us to adopt the latter course. We cannot exist without tea and silk; we want that huge market of 400,000,000 for our manufactures; the exchequers of Britain and India need the revenue already derived from the trade between us. But instead of taking one or other of these two courses we try to combine them. We want the Chinaman to act as we think best, without using force or without, apparently, consulting our own interests. The result is constant bickerings and ultimate use of large force; whereas if you simply started upon the ground of "You must do so and so," the Chinese intellect would appreciate the consequences and yield. We are barbarians and unreasonable under all circumstances; nothing we can say or do will alter that opinion of us; do, therefore, what is right, and merely consult our own convenience and the interests of our own country. We always come to this in the long run in China.
The Englishmen, whom Captain Osborn elsewhere described as "often called by Providence to pave the way for a better condition of things amongst the benighted millions of the wonderful East," are accused by the Scotch merchant James MacDonald of Shanghai of having their own interests in executing the behests of Providence. This representative of English liberalism was a marked man in China as an opponent of Palmerston's policy, and his little volume entitled The China Question (1870) contains some revealing statements from a member of the merchant body. There were those, it seems, who had their own reasons for inciting war with China because of the direct profits brought by such disturbances to foreign exporters. The Lorcha Arrow War, he declares,

caused an immediate rise of sixpence a pound—two guineas a chest—in tea, the first war much more, I believe. Hence the cheerful submission on our part to occasional interruptions of the trade. The largest fortunes have been made in such times.

MacDonald is one of the very few British merchants who is willing to speak frankly of the scandal of the opium trade. This rôle was so generally left to the missionaries—who, unhappily, were often hysterical on the subject—that the layman's observations are worth quoting. Future historians will perhaps fix upon the slavery and opium-trade controversies as the two significant moral struggles of the nineteenth century, both of them fortunately adjusted in principle before the present century began. We need not enter into the contention over opium here; it is only necessary to recall that in the mid-Victorian period the great majority of fighting and trading Englishmen recognized no moral obligation on the part of Great Britain to sacrifice her Indian finances in order to lessen or remove a menace to the welfare of China. Captain Osborn represents honestly enough the sentiments of his class: "As to the Opium Saint—what would he? What will he give to the government of India as a substitute for the ten millions revenue from our opium farms? And suppose we could say Perish India; principles before empire! how will he prevent our American brethren importing opium from countries where its production will be immediately developed? I, for one, say we cannot, we dare not act in so suicidal a manner." The matter is mentioned here partly because an uneasy sense of the scandal of the traffic had something to do with the attitude of the period under discussion and partly because MacDonald is a specimen of the type of upright critic in a time of easy morality that Britain has always been able to produce. He reminds his countrymen, while protesting against their heartless policy, that "Young Britain" will live to see that disciplined Chinese soldiers can fight, and that time will bring its accounting. He was right about the profound feeling of distrust which a comparison of British professions with British acts bred in the minds of Chinese statesmen. "Can we be surprised," he asks, "that the Chinese, while giving foreigners the credit for being truthful, still do believe that in the pursuit of wealth they neither fear God nor regard man?" When the British army withdrew from China the sensible policy, of course, would have been to disarm the Chinese of suspicion and fear of another invasion; the alacrity shown by Young Britain in looking for trouble and pouring contempt on Chinese pride made it extremely difficult for such a policy to prevail.

Mr. Horatio Nelson Lay, a British ex-consul in charge of the famous Chinese Maritime Customs Service, was sent to England to negotiate the purchase of a small fleet of gunboats to police the coast for the Chinese. He returned in 1863 with eight powerful steamers with English officers and crews engaged to serve only under their English commanders subject to Lay's orders. The arrangement involved an actual abdication of sovereignty in their own waters, and the Chinese government naturally refused to ratify the contract, subsequently dismissing Lay from their service as inspector general. He was properly a very angry man at the conclusion of the episode, most of his wrath being poured upon the head of the British minister at Peking who sensibly and honorably advised the Chinese how to repudiate the preposterous agreement as to the flotilla. His diatribes against Sir Frederick Bruce in his book called
Our Interests in China (1865) need not occupy us here; our paramount concern lies in his arrogant assumption that an Englishman employed by China might and ought to control the coast trade and foreign commerce of the empire in the interests of himself and his countrymen. Lay’s pretentious program, which was never for a moment endorsed by British authorities, represents the extreme point to which English ideas as to their duty toward the heathen were pushed in this period.

He writes:

When I left China, the Emperor’s government, under the pressure of necessity and with the beneficial terror established by the Allied foray to Peking in 1860 fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be guided, thankful for counsel, grateful for help and in return for that help prepared to do what was right by the foreigner. What did I find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed. There was the old, insolent demeanor, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties, the declared determination to yield nothing that could be evaded. In short all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered away and we were thrust back into the position we occupied before the war—one of helpless remonstrance and impotent menace. . . . My attitude toward the Chinese was this: if I help you to collect revenue, you must do what is right by foreign questions; if you do not, I shall cease to help you. I used my influence to coerce them—for the Chinese will do nothing except under coercion—to do right. I was ambitious of obtaining the position of middleman between China and foreign powers because I thought I saw a way of solving the problem of placing pacific relations with China upon a sure footing. The Chinese government was too rotten a reed to lean upon, and the foundations of the structure I was endeavoring to build had to be artificially created. My position was that of a foreigner engaged by the Chinese government to perform certain work for them, not under them. I need scarcely observe in passing that the notion of a gentleman acting under an Asiatic barbarian is preposterous.

There were not many who allowed themselves the luxury of publishing their thoughts with the irate Lay’s abandon, but his presentation of the case for what we have learned lately to call Prussianizing China offers us the stock arguments set forth at all the treaty ports for coercing Chinese officials whenever and wherever they were encountered. The theory was that oriental governments existed only to preserve despotism and nurse corruption. According to the school represented by Lay they were discredited because they were effete and inferior because they were antiquated; moreover, there could be no such thing as effective moral suasion with an oriental—he had to be kicked into a higher morality.

What possible motive can an oriental despotism, whose very existence depends upon crushing all thought in the minds of the people, have for introducing changes the certain effect of which will be to set that faculty at liberty and produce rebellion? Why does the law of China punish with death anyone guilty of innovation? Improvement and reform under an eastern administration must not be looked for from within; they can only be brought about by pressure from without. . . . We urged reforms because they would be beneficial to China. In the first place a Chinese would answer to this in his heart that this was no concern of the foreigner, and he would suspect our motive. In the second place an oriental government does not comprehend the meaning of benefiting the people, it thinks only of taking care of itself and it says let the people take care of themselves. The notion of promoting the welfare of the nation is scouted as a matter of course.

Mr. Lay seems to have been untruthful as well as truculent. Being familiar with Chinese from his boyhood he must have known that in official China it has never been safe to scout the notion of promoting the welfare of the people.

The acts and attitude of these foreign bullies in China were challenged by the American minister to Peking, Anson Burlingame. To him more than to any single individual is due the gradual awakening on the part of Europe and America to the futility of treating China with contempt and the danger of coercing her officials. He perished in the prime of life, before his plan was even fairly presented, but not before the tiger-baiters at the open ports had assembled all their forces to destroy his plans and the influence of the mission from China to the western powers which he headed. The editor of the North China Herald was for many years in the habit of summarizing the events of a past twelve-month in his New-Year editorial. These Retrospects are for the most part sound and fair accounts of the
happenings in China and are valuable as expressing the contemporary opinion of the English-speaking community in Shanghai. In reviewing the year 1868 the author, as spokesman of his class, presents his compliments to Mr. Burlingame for having disappointed the hopes of the predatory merchant group on China. He is willing to concede that the dispatch of the mission did imply progressive instincts at Peking; but the conduct of Mr. Burlingame, the head of this mission, has destroyed our pleasing anticipations. He has made a mistake into which other theoretical legislators have fallen, of disregarding the evidence of practise. He has insisted on China being treated on a perfect footing of equality with western nations, forgetting that she is not on that footing as regards enlightenment, civilization or honesty of purpose. Negotiations must be conducted on a give-and-take principle. It is impossible to treat equally when you know your interlocutor will take advantage of all your concessions but will do his best to escape his own obligations.

The author's sense of fairness in treating China on terms of equality transpires in his next paragraph. It must be remembered that at this time China was even more defenceless than she is now, for no European government protested against acts of aggression by other powers in the east, and there was no Japan in the political world to call us to account. It was the heyday of the "gun-boat policy," when retribution for disturbances was demanded at the cannon's mouth wherever a gun-boat could be floated, and Christian men and women rejoiced in the way in which China was being brought 'round.

It is a curious anomaly in our relations with China that we may quarrel with one province and yet be uninterruptedly friendly even with the central government; indeed that we even may be at war with a Viceroy and yet on friendly terms with his people. The difficulties we have just settled with Yangchow and Formosa are cases in point. Our minister's intercourse with the Peking government was never disturbed although our ships of war were riding threateningly off Nanking and bombarding the chief port of Formosa. Fortunately this overt act of war was averted by the concession of our just demands, and foreign relations throughout the empire have been strengthened by the timely firmness displayed by our authorities. The term "refractory" seems strange as applied to the officials of a great empire; it expresses more generally the misbehavior of a school boy. Yet it is applicable to Chinese mandarins who try, much as a schoolboy does, to shirk fulfilment of obligations wisely and justly laid upon them. This spirit of refractoriness in regard to treaty obligations has been gradually increasing, and a lesson such as that given at Nanking and Taiwan was needed to break it.

An illustration of the method of applying the gun-boat cure to Chinese communities that seemed to be in need of tonic treatment is taken from E. B. de Fonblanque's Nippon and Pe-cho-li, (1863):

Mr. Davenport, consular interpreter at Newchwang, unmindful of the fate proverbially befalling those who in others' quarrels interpose, and more particularly when the quarrel is of a domestic nature, on seeing a Chinaman furiously beating his wife, interfered on the lady's behalf, and was immediately set upon by the combatants and their neighbors, who with their billhooks and scythes and other agricultural implements, attacked the unfortunate interpreter, the injured wife taking a prominent part in the assault upon her champion. He was left for dead by the roadside. On redress being demanded the mandarin of the district defended the outrage and declined to accede to the consul's request for punishment of the offender. Mr. Meadows thereupon, feeling that a lesson was necessary to inculcate respect for the persons of Europeans in this remote part of the country, ordered up a gun-boat, the crew of which was landed, and after repeated refusals to punish the guilty, burned the principal houses of the village. This brought the mandarin to reason, and ever since the people of Newchwang have entertained the greatest respect and regard for us.

It was not by such methods that Europeans could expect to constrain the Chinese to alter their ways. The British minister, Sir R. Alcock, had warned his countrymen that "if foreign powers would guide they must begin by convincing and persuading them." But the first serious effort to replace the Palmerston practice by this novel principle, Burlingame's plan, was met with contumely by the mercantile element along the coast.

Horace Greeley wrote in a Tribune editorial,

If there is any class of evil counsellors, whom an American or an English minister in China ought especially to avoid, it is that cluster and colony of British traders who have squatted in the open ports of China. If there is any policy which a representative of the United States ought to reject alike from instinct and conviction, it is the policy which these men invariably recommend.
It would be impossible to exaggerate the evils which have sprung from the influence of this class of persons over the Chinese policy of England. They are essentially narrow-minded, selfish and grasping; for them the whole raison d'être of China and its vast population is limited to the advancement of the trade they desire to push. Too often and too long did English statesmen give way to the audacious importunity of men of whom, as Burke said of a class not dissimilar, that their ledger is their bible, their desk their altar, their counting-house their temple and their money their God.

While Burlingame's presentation of China's peril as translated by foreign merchants compelled the attention of the American and British foreign offices and induced a change of policy, his successor at Peking, Mr. J. Ross Browne, suffered contamination only a few months after his arrival in China and fell a victim to their doctrine. Their prejudices were not a matter of nationality; American and English merchants thought alike upon a subject that involved their trade. The group of American merchants of Shanghai presented Mr. Browne with an address in which they declare their conviction that the true policy of the United States involves the raising of China in the scale of civilization. We claim that China as she stands is low in civilization as she is in wealth and power; that her history teaches us little worth knowing except maxims of morality long reduced by western nations to actual practice, but by China neglected and forgotten; that her present state so far from being an example is a warning of the results of a false system and a vicious policy. We claim that the presence of foreigners is a protection and a blessing to the people, that this presence is their only chance of improvement, save through desolating wars. We believe that while western governments are bound to act a friendly, just and generous part toward China, they cannot forego the advantage of the moral influence of their greater material power. As China has not arrived at that stage where she will spontaneously accept and firmly discharge her part in the reciprocal obligations of states and advance in a career of discreet progress, the withdrawal of pressure would be disastrous to foreign and native interests, and even threatening to the safety of the state.

The British merchants in their turn tell Mr Browne that "It is almost impossible for us to convey to our fellow countrymen at home a just idea of the utter inability of the Chinese to comprehend any motives for forbearance other than our own powerlessness, or a fear of their growing strength." In reply to which Mr. Browne proposed the extraordinary doctrine that Christian states are not supposed to respect the independence of pagan states, and that equality in intercourse between China and the United States was impossible. He assured his friends that in his opinion Western nations "should do the best that can be done under such anomalous circumstances; treat China with forbearance, consideration and respect due to a power sovereign in its political aspect, but possessing an organization incompatible with absolute equality. Believing our civilization to be superior to theirs, we should endeavor to elevate the Chinese to our standard." He did not remain long at his post, for the United States took the Burlingame plan rather seriously and Seward would not be stultified by acknowledging such sentiments, but his defection is a startling indication of the insidious strength of the virus of detraction which we are now considering. Credit is due to Lord Clarendon for his firmness in rejecting the Palmerston tradition and preparing the way for a more correct attitude toward Eastern countries, though confronted by the opposition of British industrial corporations that might have alarmed a statesman of less fortitude. From this time on, so far as Great Britain was officially concerned she gave no cause of offence in returning to the bullying role of Palmerston's cabinet, though forty years were to elapse before she could be convinced that stopping the opium trade with China might prove to be as wise a measure as it was humane.

The pretentions of the commercial colonies in China did not escape the comment of their contemporaries—especially of the Liberals—in England. Sir Charles Dilke in a letter to the Times, January 4, 1870, quotes two or three sample "murmurs" of Shanghai and Hongkong which had come to his notice:

At a dinner lately given to Sir H. Keppel at Hongkong, and at which the whole of the leading merchants and officials seem to have been present, Colonel Knox Gore responded for the Army. One of the China papers thus reports his speech: "As regarded
China, he contended that the Chinese were an inferior nation. (Loud cheers.) He objected strongly to the tampering policy followed by the present economical Government, and styled it a most pernicious policy, and a policy which would not have been tolerated for a moment two hundred years ago.

One of the chief doctrines enunciated by Lord Clarendon was that British officials should not make war on their own account, except in cases where English lives or property were immediately exposed; and one of the hardships of which the Hongkong and Shanghai communities complain is that gentlemen holding the opinions of Colonel Knox Gore should not be permitted to attack the Chinese whenever they think fit. The Overland Mail of China speaks thus: "Let us say to China, this must be done because we choose. There is no other way of appealing to the nation. What can avail but threats." . . . The Supreme Court and Consular Gazette of October 16, in an annexation leader says:

It cannot be doubted that if two or three foreign commissioners were sent into each province, with power first to collect revenue and prevent its present misappropriation, and secondly to apply the revenue to the development of the mineral and agricultural resources, to the improvement of means of communication and the enhancement of the value of the staple productions, no opposition would be expected from the people at large. For some time there would be a conservative class, some members of which should be summarily dealt with, while others would learn that under the new régime the fairest field would be open to the most marked intelligence.

Forty-eight years after these words were written England is fighting certain efficiency experts who desire to do something like this very thing, for England's own good, after the removal of "some members of a conservative class which should be summarily dealt with."

If we review our knowledge of the prevalent posture of all people toward strangers in the middle ages—the customary antagonism of each in-group to every out-group—we may realize that Europeans in the Victorian age remained mediæval in their point of view. To seize upon differences in social customs and deplore every lapse from a foreign standard of manners as indicating depravity was essential to the dignity of the white man and the maintenance of his superior estate. What is called a "correct and spirited judgment" upon the Chinese is this: "The Chinese are essentially Asiatics; fraud, duplicity and cunning are never spared to gain the most trifling point, particularly in matters of etiquette or negotiation." This was the opinion of a man writing at the end of the mid-Victorian period (1876), who felt the reproach brought upon his nation by the arrogancy of the Palmerston terms and tried to maintain the reputation of Englishmen for loving justice and fair play. When the power to dictate terms is wholly on one side it is impossible to be just and fair. Every agreement between China and the European powers had been prescribed by force, all of Europe's duties toward China were self-imposed and sanctioned by no higher authority than self-interest and fear of rivals. It is possible to detect through the selfishness and complacency of these foreigners a real desire to act mercifully according to their lights. They blundered in their charities but they often meant well. Yet the facile success of wars with the helpless Chinese and the readiness with which ends could be gained by browbeating local officials made it almost impossible for anyone with a money stake in the empire to remain intellectually and spiritually honest in his standpoint regarding the natives with whom he dealt. The foreigner at the open port lived like the burgher in the mediaeval town behind high walls, hearing rumors from distant places but receiving his impressions from his fellows about him and learning nothing at first hand of the lands beyond. Of the real thoughts of the men of those lands he knew next to nothing. Every reform, every improvement advocated by the foreigner touched upon some vested interest or prejudice of which he was unaware. There were cases when an innovation was approved by the country people and disapproved by their local magnates; others when it might be rejected not through ignorance but distrust. The fate of India was a nightmare to the Manchu rulers in Peking, and their objection for many years to railways and telegraphs was merely their fear of a similar absorption of China by England if the devilish mys-
teries of their unknown apparatus of science should be fastened upon the land. When, as at Shanghai in 1876, a dozen miles of railway were surreptitiously laid down by a syndicate of foreigners the trick aroused the resentment of even the most progressive Chinese officials, and the plant was bought up and removed. The action on the part of the foreigners was but another instance of how little the Chinese were understood by those living among them. Thinking that the mandarins had objected to railways through ignorance of their usefulness they tried to do good by stealth. Purchasing a strip of land between Shanghai and Wusung ostensibly for a macadam road they laid rails upon it and presently produced a locomotive and some cars which were run back and forth in great style before the authorities knew what had happened. Whatever the intention of the promoters of this experiment, they adopted a plan that was of all others most calculated to arouse the suspicion of the government. And the Englishmen who put up this little job upon a blameless if backward community were the same who accused the Chinese of fraud, duplicity and cunning.

Such instances as these gathered as typical specimens from a considerable literature on the subject afford us opportunity for sober reflection. The misjudgments of a generation from which we have just emerged are for the most part too obvious to need further comment; there is no such surplus of righteousness in our own day that we can afford to rebuke our fathers for their sins. We may, however, recognize in their fatuity the source of some of our misinterpretations of the East, and endeavor by a more rigorous application of certain fundamental concepts of the creed of Christendom to improve the future prospects of our relations with the other half of civilized mankind.